Dismissed¶103

P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy

Supreme Court5 Dec 19561956 INSC 78 · [1957] 1 S.C.R. 1951956 INSC 78

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy; Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1955; Supreme Court of India; Jagannadhadas J.; adverse possession; co-heirs; ouster; open assertion of hostile title; exclusive possession and enjoyment; secret hostile animus; Receiver pendente lite; tacking of possession; limitation — commencement against a person unable to sue; s. 14 Limitation Act; Hindu law — agnatic succession to deceased infant; Anantapur; Madras High Court Second Appeal No. 766 of 1947; 1956.

What did the court decide?

None to the appellant; the plaintiff-respondent's decree for his one-third share stands and the appeal is dismissed with costs. ¶103

P. Lakshmi Reddy versus L. Lakshmi Reddy — Supreme Court (1957) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None to the appellant; the plaintiff-respondent's decree for his one-third share stands and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

¶103

Issue for consideration

Whether the plaintiff lost his right to a one-third share in the suit properties by adverse possession of Hanimi Reddy and his successor, the first defendant-appellant. +3 more

¶24

Court's answer

Assuming that Hanimi Reddy's possession from January 20, 1930 was in fact adverse and amounted to ouster of the co-heirs, such adverse possession was not adequate in time by October 23, 1941, the date of suit, to displace the title of the plaintiff.

¶100

Ratio / Principle

The possession of one co-heir is, in law, the possession of all the co-heirs and, when one co-heir is in possession, it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title; a co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to a non-possessing co-heir merely by a secret hostile animus of his own.

¶62

Key takeaways

To establish adverse possession of one co-heir as against another it is not enough that one of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties; ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession claiming adversely must be made out.ratio¶62
As between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster; an express demand by one and denial by the other is not necessarily required.ratio¶62
The burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1955 (Supreme Court of India, Jagannadhadas J., December 5, 1956) — Adverse possession between co-heirs; tacking of Receiver's possession. Venkata Reddy died an infant in 1927; Hanimi Reddy, an agnatic relation, recovered the properties from third-party maternal uncles (decree March 15, 1929) and took possession through Court on January 20, 1930, a Receiver appointed in February 1928 having meanwhile held the properties; on Hanimi Reddy's death (August 16, 1936) his nephew, the first defendant-appellant, succeeded. The plaintiff-respondent, an agnate of the same degree, sued on October 23, 1941 for a one-third share as co-heir. Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (i) the possession of one co-heir is in law the possession of all and is presumed on joint title; adverse possession against a non-possessing co-heir requires ouster — open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the other's knowledge; mere sole enjoyment of profits or secret hostile animus is not enough, and the burden of proving ouster lies on the co-heir in possession; (ii) a Receiver pendente lite is an officer of the Court and no party's agent; the doctrine that his possession is that of the successful party cannot be extended to permit a person initially out of possession to tack the Receiver's possession onto his subsequent adverse possession; (iii) limitation cannot run against one who cannot sue — during the Receiver's possession the plaintiff could not have sued Hanimi Reddy, so that period is excluded, and Hanimi Reddy's assumed adverse possession from January 20, 1930 was inadequate in time by October 23, 1941 to displace the plaintiff's title; the plaintiff was entitled to his decree, the High Court being correct though on different grounds. Whether a Receiver's interim possession interrupts or abandons a defendant's own pre-existing adverse possession was expressly left open.

¶1

195

¶2

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶3

was· fired from the pistol Ex. III produced by the appellant from his house. There can, therefore, be no room for thinking, in the circumstances established ·in this case, that any one else other than the appellant might have shot Daya Ram. He was, therefore, rightly convicted for the offence of murder. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

¶4

Kalua The Stat1 "· ef U1tar Pradesh Imam].

P. LAKSHMI REDDY

ti.

De&1mbtr, 5.

La LAKSHMI REDDY

(JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SrNHA and JAFER IMAM, JJ.)

¶10

Adverse Possession-Possession of co-heir, when adverse,Ottster-Possession of Receiver pendente lite, if can be tacked. V died an infant in 1927 and H, an agnatic relation, filed a suit for the recovery of the properties belonging · to V which were in the possession of third parties, on the ground that he was the sole nearest male agnate entitled to all the properties. During the pendency of the suit a Receiver was appointed for the pro- · pcrties in February, 1928. The suit having been decreed H obtained possession of the properties from the Receiver on January 20, 1930, and after his death in 1936, his nephew, the appellant, got into possession as H's heir. On October 23, 1941, -the respondent brought the present suit for the recovery of a onethird share of the properties from the appellant on the footing that he and his brother were agnatic relations of V of the same degree as H, that all the three were equal co-heirs of V and that I-I obtained the decree and got into possession on behalf of all the co-heirs. The appellant resisted the suit and contended that the respondent lost his right by the adverse possession of H and his successor and that for this purpose not only the period from January 20, 1930, to October 23, 1941, was to be counted but also the prior period when the Receiver was in possession of the properties during the pendency of H's suit. It was found that the respondent's case that H o'btained the decree and got possession from the Receiver on behalf of the other co-heirs was not true :

¶11

Held, that the respondent did not lose his right by adverse posses~ion. Even assuming that H's possession from January 20, 1930, was adverse and amounted to ouster of the other co-heirs, such adverse possession was not adequate in time to displace the title of the respondent and the period during which the Receiver was in possession could not be added, because (I) the Receiver's

¶12

196

¶13

[1957]

¶14

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶15

1956 possession could not be tacked on to H's possession, as a Receiver P. /4Jhmi R1dd7 is an ofliCer of the Court and is not the agent of any party to the v. suit and notwithstanding that in law his possession is ultin1ately {4,hmi R1d<f:I treated as possession of the successful party on the termination of the suit, he could not be considered as the agent of such party with the animus of claiming sole and exclusive title with the view to initiate adverse possession ; and (2) during the ti1nc of the Receiver's possession the respondent could not sue H, and limitation could not therefore run against him.

¶16

The possession of one co-heir is considertd, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs and _in order to establish adverse possec;sion ouster of the non-possessing co-heir should be made out and as between the.rn there must be evidence of open assertion .of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of thetn to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster.

¶17

CIVIL APPELLATE j URISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1955.

¶18

Appeal by, special leave from the Judgment and decree dated December 3, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal No. 766 of 1947 against the · decree dated November 19, 1946, of the District Court of Anantapur in Appeal No. 130 of 1945 arising out of the decree dated january 31, l94~,, of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Anantapur, in Original Suit No. 10 of 1944.

¶19

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, P. Ram Reddy, K. Sundararajan and M. S. K. Aiyangar, for the appellant.

¶20

C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India, an<l g, R. Chaudhury, for the respondent.

¶21

December 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JACANNADHADAS J.-The plaintiff in the action out of which this appeal arises brought a suit for declaration of his title to a one-third share in the suit properties and for partition and recovery of that share. The suit was dismissed as having been barred by limitation and adverse possession. On appeal the District Judge reversed the decision and decreed the suit. The High Court maintained the decree of the District Judge on second · appeal. Hence this appeal before us on special

¶22

197

¶23

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶24

leave by the first defendant in the action, who 1s the appellant before us. The main question that arises in the appeal is whether the plaintiff has lost his right to a one-third share in the suit property by adverse pmsession.

¶25

1956

¶26

P. LW'-i Rdtl7 Y. L. IAU,. R.ld7_

¶27

The property in suit belonged to one Venkata Reddy. He died an infant on August 25, 1927. At that time, the properties were in the possession of the maternal uncles of the father of the deceased Venkata Reddy. One Hanimi Reddy, an agnatic relation of Venkata Reddy, filed a suit O.S. No. 26 of 1927 for recovery of the properties from the said maternal uncles and obtained a Jecree therein on March 15, 1929. A Receiver was appointed for the properties in February, 1928, during the pendency of the suit and presumably the properties were in . his possession. This appears from the decree which shows that it directed the Receiver to deliver possession to the successful plaintiff in that suit. Hanimi Reddy obtained actual possession of these properties on January 20, 1930, and continued in possession till he died on. August 16, 1936. The first defendant in the present action who is the appellap.t before us is a son of the brother of Hanirni Reddy and came into possession of all the properties as Hanimi Reddy's heir. The respondent before us is the plaintiff. The present suit was brought on the allegation that the plaintiff and the second defendant in the suit, his brother, were agnat'c relations of Venkata Reddy, of the· same degree as Hanimi Reddy and that all the three were equal co-heirs of Venkata Reddy and succeeded to his properties as such on his death. It was alleged that though Hanimi Reddy filed the prior suit and obtained ·possession of the properties thereunder, he did so as one of the co-heirs, with the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant and that he was enjoying the properties jointly with the plaintiff and his brother as tenants-in-common but that the first defendant, who came into possession on the death of Hanimi Reddy denied the title of the plaintiff and his brother in or about the year i940. The plaint in the present action was filed originally in the District Munsif's Court on October 23, 1941, and was ordered

¶28

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957]

¶29

1!J56 to be returned for presentation to the. District Judge's P. Laksllmi &tidy Court on November 30, 1942. It was actu~lly re-prev. sented in that Court on December 2, 1942. One of the L. Laks/tnli Reddy questions raised in the suit was that the suit was J.,.,,.,.lllf1uM1a, J. barred by limitation on the ground that it must be taken to have been instituted not on October 23, 1941, but on December 2, 1942. This plea was upheld by the trial Court. On. first appeal the District Judge held that the plaintiif is entitled to the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act and that the suit must be taken as having bl:en instituted on October 23, 1941, and is, therefore, in time. He accordingly decreed the suit. 1n the High Court the question as to whether. the plaintiif was entitled to the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act, though raised, was not finally decided. It was held that the possession of Hanimi Reddy was not adverse to the plaintiff and that accordingly he was entitled to the decree as prayed for. The· questi!'>n as to the non-availability of the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act to the plaintiff in the present suit has not been urged before us and the finding of the District Judge that the plaint must be taken to have been validly presented on October 23, 1941, stands. That date must, therefore, be taken to be the commencement of the action for the purposes of this appeal. It will be noticed that this date is more than fourteen years from the date when the succession opened to the properties of Venkata Reddy on August 25, 1927, but is less than twelve years after Hanimi Reddy obtained actual possession in execution of his decree on January 20, 1930. The contention of the learned Attorney-General for the appellant first defendant is .that the possession of Hanimi Reddy was adverse, that the plaintiff as well as the second defendant lost their right by the adverse possession of Hanimi Reddy and his successor, the first defendant, and that for this purpose not only tl1e period from January 20, 1930, up to Octoher 23, 1941, is to be counted but also the prior period during the pendency of Hanimi Reddy's suit when the Receiver was in possession of the suit properties. It is the validity of

¶30

S.C.R.

¶31

199

¶32

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶33

these two parts of the argument which has to be considered.

¶34

It will be convenient to consider in the first instance whether or not the possession of Hanimi Reddy from January 20, 1930, up to the date of his death in 1936 was adverse to his co-heirs. The facts relevant for this purpose are the following. At the date when Venkata Reddy died his properties were in the custody of the ·two maternal uncles of his father. Hanimi Reddy filed his suit on the allegation, as already stated above, that he was the nearest agnatic relation alive of the deceased minor Venkata Reddv and as his next rightful heir to succeed to all the. etate, movable and immovable, of the said minor, set forth in the schedules thereto. He appended a genealogical tree to his plaint which showed his relationship to Venkata Reddy through .a common ancestor and showed only the two lines of himself and Venkata Reddv. Plaintiff and the second defendant belong to anoth line emanating from the same common ancestor but that line was not shown and the plaintiff and second defendant were ignored. The first defendant in the present suit did not admit the relationship of plaintiff and second defendant in his written statement. He disputed that the father of the plaintiff and second defendant was descended from the common ancestor either by birth or by adoption, as shown in the genealogical table attached to the present plaint. It is possible that this may have been the reason for Hanimi Reddy ignoring the plaintiff arid the second defendant in his suit. However this may be, at the trial in this suit it was admitted that the plaintiff and the second defendant are the agnatic relations of Venkata Reddy of the same degree· as Hanitni Reddy. The defendants in the earlier suit who were in possession on that date claimed to retain possession on behalf of an alleged illatom sonin-Iaw (of Venkata Reddy's father) a son of the second defendant therein. It may be mentioned that in that part of the country (Andhra) an illatom son-in-law is a boy incorporated into the family with a view to give a. daughter in marriage and is customarily recognised as an heir in the absence of a natural-born son. This 6-76 S. C. lndia/59

¶35

P. Lakr/,,ni Reddy v;

¶36

L. Laksh1lii Reddy Jaganntulliada.s ].

¶37

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶38

(1957]

¶39

1956

¶40

'°· l..alcJhmi Reddy •• -f,, La!r.Jhmi R.tdd.J Ja~annadht1r/rir J.

¶41

claim appears to have been negatived and the suit was decreed. During the pendency of the suit -a Receiver was appointed in February, 1928. He presumably took possession though the date of his taking possession is not on the record. The decree in that suit dated March 15, 1929, is as follows :

¶42

"This Court doth order and decree that plaintiff do ·recover possession of immovable property and movables in the possession of the Receiver."

¶43

It is in the evidence of the first defendant himself as D.W. 1 that the properties were taken possession of by Hanimi Reddy on January 20, 1930. The plaint" ilf examined himself as P.W. 1 to substantiate the case as set out in his plaint that he and the second defendant and Hanimi Reddy were enjoying the pr<>perties: jointly as tenants in common. The relevant portion of his evidence is as follows :

¶44

"Annu Reddy (Hanimi Reddy) uncle of defendant l, and myself filed 0. S. No. 26 of 1927, District Court, Anantapur-same as O.S. No. 24 of 1928, Sub-Court, Anantapur-for the properties of the deceased Venkata - Reddy. As Hanimi Reddy was the eldest member, he was attending to the conduct of that suit. I was also coming to Court along with him. The suit ended in our favour. Hanimi -Reddy took possession through Court after the decree in the year 1930. Since then both Hanimi Reddy and myself have been in 1oint possession and enjoyment of the same."

¶45

In cross-examination he said as follows :

¶46

"I told Hanimi Reddy that I would also j0111 him as a party in 0.S. 24 of 1928. He said there was no need for me to join and that he would give my share to me .......... I did not file any application to be impleaded as a defendant. . . . . . . . . . . I have nothing in writing to show that Hanimi Reddy was giving me any produce from the suit lands."

¶47

The first defendant filed the plaint, judgment and decree in' Hanimi Reddy's suit as also pattas, cist receipts and lease deeds tak"11 by Hanimi Reddy in his -time. With reference to this evidence the trial Court found as follows :

¶48

201

¶49

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶50

"The documents filed on behalf of the first defendant completely establish that Hanimi Reddy filed the 1uit in his individual capacity and obtained possession thereof. There is nothing to indicate that either the plaintiff or the second defendant took any in~erest in those proceedings ...... ,., ....... There is no evidence of Hanimi Reddy having given any produce to the plaintiff or to the second defendant.. . . . . . . .. The plaintiff and the second defendant have been excluded from participation of profits to their knowledege since 1930." The learned District Judge found on appeal (whep the same was remanded to him for a finding by the High Court) as follows :

¶51

1956

¶52

P. Lakshmi Reddy v.

¶53

L. Lakshmi Reddy

¶54

Ja:1J11Mdhadas J.

¶55

"I have no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff had nothing to do with the institution or conduct of the suit O.S. No. 24 of 1928 on the file of the SubCourt of Anamapur, and that he never had any actual joint enjoyment of suit properties with the late D. Hanimi Reddy or the first defendant."

¶56

He has not given a finding as to whether the nonparticipation of the profits by the plaintiff and the aecond defendant was in the nature of exclusion to their knowledge. But there are some· admitted and relevant facts brought out in evidence which are significant. The present evidence as well as the plaint in the earlier suit of 1927 show clearly that all the parties including Hanimi Reddy were residents of village Mamuduru. All the suit properties arc situated in that village itself, as appears from the schedules to the plaint in the earlier suit. Hanimi Reddy and the plaintiff were fairly closely related as appears from the plaintiff's admission as follows :

¶57

"My brother-in-law who is also the nephew of Hanimi Reddy was staying with Hanimi Reddy. My father-in-law and defendant No. l's father-in-law is the same."

¶58

On these facts the question that arises is whether, in law, the possession of Hanimi Reddy from January 20, 1930, onwards was adverse to' the plaintiff and the second defendant.

¶59

202

¶60

SUPREME COURT REPORTS f19571

¶61

1956

¶62

1956 Now, the ordinary clascal requirement of adverse P. Lakshmi &1dy possession is that it should be ner t'i nee clam nee v. precario. (See Secretary of State for India v. · Debe,zdra L. Lakshmi &ddy Lal ·Khan (¹ ) ). The possession required must be ade- JagannadhiJdas J. quate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. (See .Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna (') ). But it is well-settled that in order to establish a<lvc:rsc possession_ of one co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession, who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, a possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession ·of the properties it is presumed to be on the basi; of joint title. The cohdr in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title. (See Corea v. Appuhamy(³ ) ). It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence .of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession a11d enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial bv the other. There arc cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title. Whether that line of cases is right or wrong we need not pause to consider. It is. sufficient to notice that the Privy Council in N. Varada Pillai v. /eevarathnammal( ) quotes, apparently with approval , a passa~ from Culley v. Deod Taylerson() which indicates that such a situation may well lead to an inference of (1) [1933] L.R. 61 l.A.78,82. (4) A.l.R.1919 P.C. +H7· (2) [1900) L.R. 27 l.A.136,r40. (5) 3 P.&D. 539;52 R.R.566. (3) [1912) A.C. 230.

¶63

S.C.R.

¶64

203

¶65

SlIPREME COURT REPORTS

¶66

ouster "if other circumstances concur". (See also Govindrao v. Rajabai( 1 ). It may be further menti~t:ied that it is well-settled that the burden of making out ouster is on the person claiming to displace the lawful title of a co-heir by his adverse possession.

¶67

1956 .

¶68

P. Likshmi Reddy v.

¶69

L. Lakshmi Reddy Ja1annadhadas ].

¶70

In the present case there can be no doubt that Hanimi Reddy obtained sole possession of the suit properties after the death of Venkata Reddy on the basis of an action against third parties in which he claimed to be the sole nearest male agnate having title to all the properties. After obtaining possession he was in continuous and undisputed possession of the properties till his death enjoying all the profits thereof. No doubt in an ordinary case such possession and enjoyment has to be attributed to his lawful title, he being one of the co-heirs. But the plaint in the suit of 1927 and the decree therein render it reasonably clear that he filed the suit and obtained possession on the basis of his having exclusive title ignoring his coheirs. It is urged that knowledge of thr assertion of such exclusive title averred in a plaint cannot be imputed to other co-heirs who are not parties to the suit. But in thi~ case it is not difficult on the evidence to i>ay that the plaintiff and the second defendant must have been fully aware, at the time, of the nature of the claim made by_ Hanimi Reddy in the prior litigation and on the basis of which he obtained possession. That knowledge is implicit in the very case that they have put forward in the present plant. Their case is that the prior suit was brought by Hanimi Reddy with the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant and on their behalf. No doubt that specific case has been found against them and that . finding is res judicata between the parties. But there is no reason why the admission as to the knowledge of the nature of the litigation and the contents of the plaint which such a case necessarily implies should not be attributed at least to the present plaintiff. It appears reasonable to think that the plaintiff being unable to explain his inaction for over fourteen years after the <leath of Venkata Reddy has been constrained to put (1) A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 48.

¶71

204 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶72

[1957]

¶73

1956

¶74

P. 1.Airshmi Reddy v.

¶75

L. Lakshmi R.dd,y

¶76

Jagannadhmlas ].

¶77

forward a false case that the prior suit by Hanimi Reddy was with his consent and on his behalf. It is significant that the plaintiff has remained silent without asserting his right during Hanimi Reddy's lifetime, and comes forward with this suit after his death, rendering it difficult to ascertain whether the fact of Hanimi Reddy completely ignoring the existence of the plaintiff and the second defendant as co-heirs was not in denial of their relationship and consequently of their title as co-heirs to their .knowledge. The fact that even so late as in the written statement of the first defendant relationship is denied may be indicative as to why Hanimi Reddy ignored the plaintiff and the second defendant and why they remained silent. The learned Judges of the High Co_urt thought that there was nothing to show that Hanimi Reddy was aware that plaintiff and second defendant had any . rights in the properties as co-heirs. This assumpti<>I). is contrary to the admission of mutual knowledge of each other's rights implicit in the plaintiff's case that Hanimi Reddy brought his suit with the consent of the plaintiff. In such circumstances and especially having regard to the fact that both the plaintiff and Hanimi Reddy were living in the same village and the plaintiff has put forward a false explanation to account for his inaction, a Court of fact might well have inferred ouster. Sitting on an appeal in special leave, however, we do not feel it desirable to decide the case on this ground. We, therefore, proceed to consider the further question that arises in the case, t1iz., whether the Receiver's possession can be tacked on to Hanimi Reddy's possession on the assumption that Hanimi . Reddy's possession on and from January 20, 1940, was adverse to the plaintiff. The learned Attorney-General urges that prior possession of the Receiver pending the suit must be treated as possession on behalf of Hanimi Reddy with the animus of claiming sole and exclusive title dis. closed in his plaint. In support of this contention . he relies on the well-known . legal principle that when a Court takes possession of properties through its Receiver, such Receiver's possession is that of all the

¶78

205

¶79

S.C.R.

¶80

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶81

parties to the action according to their titles. (See Kerr on Receivers, 12th Ed., p. 153). In Woodrotfe on the Law relating to Receivers (4th Ed.) at p. 63 the legal position is stated as follows : "The Receiver being the officer of the Court frorri which he derives his appointment, his possession is exclusively the possession of the Court, the property being regarded as in the custody of the law, in gremio legisi for the benefit of whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled thereto." But does this doctrine enable a person who was not previously in possession of the suit properties, to claim that the Receiver must be deemed to have taken possession adversely to the true owner, on his behalf, merely because he ultimately succeeds in getting a decree for possession against the defendant therein who wa•; previously in possession without title. A Receiver is an officer of the Court and is not a particular agen~ of any party to the suit, notwithstanding that in law his possession is ultimately treated as possession of the successful party' on the termination of the suit. To trea( such Receiver as plaintiff's agent for the purpose of initiating adverse possession by the plaintiff would be to impute wrong-doing to the Court ana its officers. The doctrine of Receiver's possession being that of the successful party cannot, in our opinion, be pushed to the extent of enabling a person who was initially out of possession to claim the tacking on of Receiver's possession to his subsequent adverse possession. The position may conceivably be different where the defendant in the suit was 'previously in adverse possession against the real owner and the Receiver has taken possession from him and restores it back to him on the. successful termination of the suit in his favour. In such a case the question that would arise would be different, viz., whether the interim possession of the Receiver would be a discontinuance or abandonment of possession or interruption of the adverse possession. We are not concerned with it in this case and express no opinion on it.

¶82

195G

¶83

P. Lakshmi Reddy .v. L. Lakshmi Rrddy J agannadhadas J.

¶84

The matter may be looked at from another point of view. It is well-settled that limitation cannot begin

¶85

¶86

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶87

[1957]

¶88

1956

¶89

P. l.ak.thmi &ddy v.

¶90

! .. Lak~ii;ni Redi(Y

¶91

,Jaganna.Jhadas ].

¶92

to run against a person unless at the time that person is legally in a position to vindicate his title by action. In Mitra's Tago;·e L2W Lectures on Limitation and Prescription (6th Ed.) Vol. I, Lecture VI, at p .. 159, quoting from Angell on Limitation, this principle is stated in the following terms : . ·

¶93

"An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued ttnder a claim of right, either under an openlv avowed claim, or under a constmctive claim (arising from the act' and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him who was in possession. (Angell, sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cattse of action which ~onstitutes adverse possession."

¶94

Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person, implies that that person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of CJ[clusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wantini: to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus. In the leading case of Agency Company v. Short(¹ ) the Privy Council points out that there is discontinuance of adverse possession when possession has been abandoned and gives as the reason therefor, at p. 798, as follows :

¶95

"There is no one against whom he (the rightful owner) can bring his action:'

¶96

It is clearly implied therein that adverse possession cannot commence • without actual possession which can furnish. cause of action. This principle has been also explai1>ed in . Dwiiendra Narain ~oy v. Joges Chandrtt De(') at p. 609 by Mookerjee J. as follows: "The substance of the matter is that time runs ·when the cause of action accrues, and a cause of action accrues, when there is in existence a person who can (1) (1888) 13 App. Cas. 793· (•) A. I. R. •9•4 Cal. o

¶97

¶98

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 207

¶99

S.C.R.

¶100

sue and another who can be sued ...... The cause of action arises when and only when the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper tribunals for relief. The statute (of limitation) does not attach to a claim for which there is as yet no right of action and does not run against a right for which there is no corresponding remedy or for which judgment cannot be obtained. Conseouentlv the true test to determine when a cause of 'actio~ has accrued is to ascertain the time when plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result." In the present case, the co-heirs out of possession such as the plaintiff and the second defendant were not obliged to bring a suit for possession against Hanimi Reddy until such time as Hanimi Reddy obtained actual possession. Indeed during the time when the Receiver was in possession, obviously, they could not sue him for possession to vindicate their title. Nor were they <>pliged during that time to file a futile suit for posses$ion either against Hanimi Reddy or against the defendants in Hanimi Reddy's suit when neither of them was in possession. It appears to us, therefore, that the adverse PQssession of Hanimi Reddy, if any, as against his co-heirs could not commence when the Receiver was in .possession. It follows that assuming that the possession of Hanimi Reddy from January 20, 1930, was in fact adverse and amounted to ouster of the co-heirs such adverse possession was not adequate in time by October 23, 1941, the date of suit, to displace the title of the plaintiff. It follows that the plaintiifrespondent before us is entitled to the decree which he has obtained and that the decision of the High Court is, in our view, correct, though on different grounds. It may be mentioned that objection has been. raised on behalf of the respondents before us that the question ·of tacking on Receivr:r's possession was not in issue in the lower Courts and should not be allowed to be raised here. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to -Oeal with this objection.

¶101

1956

¶102

P. Lakshmi &ddy "· L. Lakshmi Reddy ] agannadhadas J.

¶103

In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

¶104

Appeal dismissed.

P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy

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P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy

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