Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs Rajendra Chaturvedi S/O Shri Suraj Mal (Conductor)

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[2026:RJ-JP:10178-DB]

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

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D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1277/2025

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Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through Chairman Cum Managing Director, Head Office, Parivahan Marg, Chomu House, C-Scheme, Jaipur.

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General Manager (Purchase/store) And Authorized Disciplinary Authority, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur.

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Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jalore Depot, District Jalore.

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----Appellants

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Versus

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Rajendra Chaturvedi S/o Shri Suraj Mal (Conductor), Aged About 69 Years, R/o Gudha Katla, Via Bandikui, Tehsil Baswa, District Dausa (Raj.)

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----Respondent

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For Appellant(s)	: Mr. Mr.	R.N. Mathur, Sr. Adv. assisted by Prateek Mathur
	Mr.	Utkarsh Dubey
For Respondent(s)	: Mr.	Rahul Ghiya

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HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINIT KUMAR MATHUR

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Judgment

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10/03/2026

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The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant – RSRTC against the order dated 15.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent has been allowed and the appellants were directed to pay the respondent all the service benefits from the date of passing the dismissal order dated 28.11.2002 till he attains the age of superannuation. Further, a direction was also issued to pay interest @ 6% per annum over the arrears of service benefits. It

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[2026:RJ-JP:10178-DB]

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[SAW-1277/2025]

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(2 of 5)

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was also directed that the needful be done within a period of twelve weeks from the date of passing of the order, failing which, interest was ordered to be levied @9% per annum and the same was ordered to be beared by the responsible officer.

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Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted that the respondent-petitioner was dismissed from service for carrying passengers without ticket on 28.11.2002 and thus, he did not performed any duty till his time of superannuation on 30.09.2015. Learned counsel, however, submits that the dismissal order could not fall within the parameters of Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’) and thus, was not approved by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur. Learned counsel for the appellants seeks invocation of the simple jurisprudence of ‘No Work No Pay’. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that once the respondent- petitioner has not served for such a prolonged period, at best, the Hon’ble Single Judge could have awarded him notional benefits and/or award 50% of the total wages.

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Learned counsel for the appellants has also relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Manager of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Haneef Khan (Special Leave Petition (C) No.24258-24259/2019), decided on 13.2.2025.

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Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is a Constitutional Bench judgment, which is holding the field regarding non-approval of termination under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma And Ors. reported in

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[2026:RJ-JP:10178-DB]

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[SAW-1277/2025]

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(3 of 5)

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(2002) 2 SCC 244 . Para 14 of the said judgment is reproduced

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hereunder:-

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“Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said 9 provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and

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(4 of 5)

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[2026:RJ-JP:10178-DB]

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[SAW-1277/2025]

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thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions b contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33-A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal c becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2) (b), Section 33-A would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted.”

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Learned counsel for the respondent thus submits that once the respondent was not responsible for any kind of concealment or any kind of reasons from his side, which could have prevented him from working, which includes abandoning the service or any other services, then it was a duty of the appellants to either have allow him to work or to pay him full retiral benefits, particularly when the application filed by the appellants under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the termination order has been rejected by the learned tribunal.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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In light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the Hon’ble Single Bench has rightly allowed the writ petition, as the Constitutional Bench judgment in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (supra) is holding the field. Further, when the respondent was

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(5 of 5)

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[SAW-1277/2025]

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not at fault and no act on his part resulted in his failure to join, it was the duty of the appellants to allow him to join. Not only this, if the appellants were so certain about the validity of the termination order, they ought to have successfully contested the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, however, they contested the matter before the Industrial Tribunal, but the appellants failed to obtain approval of the termination order.

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Since no fault can be attributed to the respondent, the consequence of his non-working cannot be held against him. Moreover, Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a protective provision envisaged under the Act, which must operate strictly and is supported by the Constitutional Bench judgment.

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Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the present appeal, hence, the same is hereby dismissed.

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(VINIT KUMAR MATHUR),J

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(PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

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18-Nitin/Shahenshah-

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Rajendra Chaturvedi S/O Shri Suraj Mal (Conductor)

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Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Rajendra Chaturvedi S/O Shri Suraj Mal (Conductor)

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