Surendra Sharma S/O Shri Shyam Lal Sharma, Vs State of Rajasthan

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 7395/2021

Surendra Sharma S/o Shri Shyam Lal Sharma, Aged About 56 Years, Resident Of 8/359, Vidhyadhar Nagar, Jaipur; Presently Posted As Additional Superintendent Of Police, A.C.B. Chowki, Sawai Madhopur (Rajasthan).

¶5

----Petitioner

¶6

Versus

¶7

State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor.

¶8

----Respondent

¶9

For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Kapil Gupta, Adv. with
	Mr. Abhay Singh Rathore,
	Mr. Susil Yadav, Adv. &
	Mr. Chitransh Saxena, Adv.
For Respondent(s)	: Mr. Vivek Choudhary, PP

¶10

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

¶11

Judgment

¶12

Reportable

¶13

RESERVED ON :: 29.10.2025 PRONOUNCED ON :: 01.11.2025

¶14

Aggrieved by the adverse remarks recorded by the Special Judge, Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, No.4, Kota (Rajasthan) in its judgment dated 07.09.2021 against the petitioner, he has preferred the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Petition.

¶15

It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that on FIR No.134/2019 was registered at Police Station Khatoli, District Kota (Rural) alleging therein that daughter of complainant aged in 17 years was missing since 25.05.2019 and one accused

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(2 of 15)

Hukam Singh had kidnapped her. Investigation after registration of the aforesaid FIR was handed over earlier to one Shri Puranmal and thereafter to the petitioner. During the investigation process, he recorded statement of witnesses, prepared the site plan, and also got the prosecutrix medically examined. In her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the victim stated that the accused was known to her and on 24.05.2019, he took away the petitioner to Jodhpur and tried to forcibly solemnize the marriage but since she was minor, this should not be done, however, the accused established physical relations with her. On the basis of such investigation, charge-sheet was prepared by the petitioner under Section 173 Cr.P.C. against accused Hukam Singh for committing offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of IPC, Section 5(L)/6 of POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) & 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. After filing of the charge-sheet, cognizance was taken against the accused and charges were also framed against him for committing the aforesaid offences. During trial, the prosecutrix turned hostile and retracted from her earlier statement.

¶20

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after such proceedings while passing the judgment of acquittal dated 07.09.2021, learned trial Court recorded following remarks against the petitioner:-

¶21

"bl ekeys esa vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh ih-MCy;w- 9 lqjsUnz 'kEkkZ }kjk ftl izdkj ls dkuwu ds f[kykQ tkdj vuqla/kku djrs gq, vuqla/kku dh 'kfDr;ksa dk nq:i;ksx fd;k gS] mldk foLrr foospu iwoZ esa fd;k tk pqdk gSA blds vykok iqfyl v/kh{kd] dksVk xzkeh.k }kjk fcuk ekbUM ,IykbZ fd;s gh pktZ'khV is'k djus dk tks vkns'k fn;k x;k gS] og vkns'k i=koyh ij vkbZ lkexzh dks nf"Vxr j[krs gq, fcYdqy Hkh fo/kh vuq:i gksuk izekf.kr ugha gSA pkykuh vkns'k tkjh djuk ek= vkSipkfjdrk ugha gS] cfYd dkuwuh izko/kku ds vuqlkj gh iqfyl v/kh{kd dks pkykuh vkns'k tkjh djuk pkfg;s rFkk bl lEcU/k esa vius efLr"d dk leqfpr iz;ksx Hkh djuk pkfg;s] dsoy ek= vius v/khuLFk vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh } kjk fd;s x;s vuqla/kku ij vka[k fepdj fo'okl ugha djuk pkfg;sA bl ekeys

(3 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

esa vfHk;qä ds fo:) iqfyl }kjk tks pktZ'khV is'k dh xbZ gS] og pktZ'khV fcuk ekbUM ,IykbZ fd;s tcjnLrh is'k fd;k tkuk i=koyh ij vkbZ lkexzh dks ns[krs gq, c[kwch lkfcr gS] blfy;s ekeys dh xaHkhjrk dks ns[krs gq, ;g vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd bl vkns'k dh izfr iqfyl egkfuns'kd] jktLFkku] t;iqj dks Hksth tkos rFkk mUgsa ;g funsZ'k Hkh fn;k tkrk gS fd bl fu.kZ; dk /;kuiwoZd v/;;u dj bl izdj.k ds rRdkyhu vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh&Jh lqjsUnz 'kekZ rRdkyhu oÙkkf/kdkjh] ,l-lh-@,l-Vh- lsy] oÙk bVkok] dksVk xzkeh.k ,oa rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd] dksVk xzkeh.k ds fo:) foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh vey esa ykos rFkk dh xbZ dk;Zokgh ls bl U;k;ky; dks Hkh ,d ekg esa voxr djkosA"

¶26

It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in the instant matter, the petitioner conducted investigation fairly and with due honesty and charge-sheet was filed on the basis of available evidence, however, only on account of conduct of the prosecutrix, charges could not be proved. It is submitted that there is no complaint against the petitioner with regard to adopting any unfair or illegal practice in the instant matter or of causing any undue gain and loss to any other party. Under these circumstances, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to explain his conduct as well as to put forward his defence, only on the basis of assumptions the aforesaid remarks prejudicing the right in the interest of the petitioner as well as directing his higher authority to conduct the proper enquiry are causing serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice to the petitioner.

¶27

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that charge-sheet is prepared by the Investigating Officer on the basis of statements and evidence collected during investigation, which is placed before the higher authority of the police department and only on approval of the higher authority followed by the remarks of department of prosecution as well as learned Public Prosecutor, charge-sheet is filed before the Court. During the entire process, subsequent to proposal of charge-sheet on the basis of investigation, no authority pointed out any defect in the

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(4 of 15)

investigation and result proposed by the petitioner. There are no allegations of any oblique motive and extraneous consideration against the petitioner, under these circumstances, even if the trial Court was of the view that any of the conducts of the petitioner was not in accordance with law, before recording any adverse remarks in the judgment and before directing the higher authorities of the petitioner to conduct departmental proceedings against him, proper opportunity of hearing ought to have been given by the trial Court, but in the instant case, petitioner has been deprived of any opportunity of hearing by the court below before recording adverse remarks in the judgment dated 07.09.2021.

¶32

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.09.2021 to the extent to which adverse remarks and directions against the petitioner were included in the judgment, the petitioner filed the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while recording the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner with regard to non-compliance of the provisions of audi alteram partem, issued notice on 20.01.2022 and by way of interim measure, effect and operation of portion of the impugned judgment to the extent of containing adverse comments and directions against the petitioner was stayed.

¶33

Learned counsel further submits that despite such stay order dated 20.01.2022, learned trial Court again took up the matter for monitoring compliance of directions against the petitioner contained in the judgment dated 07.09.2021 and vide order dated 03.02.2022 further directed for ensuring conduct of

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(5 of 15)

departmental enquiry against the petitioner under the provisions of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and not to assign any investigation to the petitioner for a period of one year as well as to deduct Rs.3 lacs from the salary of the petitioner for the purpose of granting compensation to the accused.

¶38

Under these circumstances, the petitioner by way of moving an interim application No.1/2022 brought the aforesaid order dated 03.02.2022 on record of this Court and prayed for passing appropriate order.

¶39

Thereafter, I.A. No.1/2022 filed by the petitioner against the order dated 03.02.2022 was heard by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 29.06.2022 and while staying the effect and operation of order dated 03.02.2022, following observations were made:-

¶40

"After culmination of trial and passing of final judgment/order, the trial Judge has become functus officio. Despite passing of order and judgment dated 07.09.2021 which has been assailed before this Court and this Court has passed the aforementioned order vide order dated 20.01.2022, there was no occasion for Trial Court to pass an order on 03.02.2022."

¶41

Thus, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the part of the judgment dated 07.09.2021, whereby adverse remarks and directions have been given against the petitioner as well as subsequent order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the trial Court.

¶42

Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Lal Krishna Advani & Ors. reported in (2003) 8 SCC 361 and judgment delivered by Kerala High Court in Criminal Appeal

(6 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

No.1235 of 2007 in the case of G. Gopan @ Gopakumar Vs. State of Kerala .

¶47

Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and submitted that the Investigating Officer was required to conduct impartial and truthful investigation to ensure fairness in the proceedings. However, in the instant case, on account of faulty investigation of the petitioner by the police, the accused had to face vexatious and frivolous trial, therefore, finding the fact that the investigation has framed the accused in the aforesaid case falsely, and in order to enforce discipline and to ensure fair investigation in future, reasonable and justified remarks have been recorded by the trial Court in its judgment dated 07.09.2021 and further in subsequent order dated 03.02.2022. It was also submitted by learned Public Prosecutor that as the faulty investigation of the petitioner has not only harassed and victimized the accused but also put the entire modus operandi of the police department in question, therefore, quite rightly directions were given by the trial Court to conduct disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner as well as to deduct compensation amount from the salary of the petitioner.

¶48

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

¶49

This Court is conscious of the fact that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised in routine manner and such petition can be entertained only in the cases where, from perusal of the record, manifest and apparent miscarriage of justice is reflected, as well as to ensure proper administration of justice.

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(7 of 15)

In the instant case, the facts are not much in dispute that after alleged kidnapping of the prosecutrix an FIR was registered by father of the victim girl, which was investigated by the petitioner and during investigation, he took statement of the prosecutrix and also got medical examination done. Thereafter, after following the process, charge-sheet under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. was filed through learned Public Prosecutor by the petitioner of which cognizance was taken by the trial Court and subsequently after hearing the accused as well as prosecution even charges were framed against the accused.

¶54

The facts of the case would also reveal that on account of fact that prosecutrix turned hostile during trial, the accused could not be convicted and was ultimately acquitted by the trial Court vide judgment dated 07.09.2021. Thus, under these circumstances, even if some fault in the investigation was detected by the trial Court then before entering any adverse remarks against the petitioner or giving any directions prejudicial to his right, the minimum requirement was to afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which is fundamental requirement of law, however in the instant case, no such opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner prior to recording adverse remarks and directions in judgment dated 07.09.2021. It is elementary principle of law and no one can be condemned or punished without affording him opportunity of hearing and such principle have also been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of State of Bihar Vs. Lal Krishna Advani & Ors. (supra) .

(8 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

In the similar circumstances, this Court in the case of Sumit Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.254 of 2014 decided on 08.07.2016) after considering so many judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, exercised inherent powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. and observed as under:-

¶59

"10. Before switching to examine the legality and propriety of the strictures passed against the petitioner by the learned Sessions Judge in its judgment dated 06.01.2014, the twin questions of great significance have cropped up for judicial scrutiny, i.e., (i) Whether inherent powers can be exercised by this Court for expunging the adverse remarks made against an individual including a police officer?, and (ii) Under what circumstances such power of judicial review can be exercised? For eliciting answer to both the questions, I feel inclined to examine them in the light of facts of the case and the legal precedents on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for petitioner.

¶60

The extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is in the nature of inherent powers and such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The issue concerning scope and object of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (1898), which is pari-materia to Section 482 Cr.P.C. (1973), came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in case of State of Utter Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Naim (AIR 1964 SC 703), more particularly with reference to exercise of inherent powers for obliterating adverse remarks against an individual in the judgment. Speaking for the Court, Justice S.K. Das, while answering the question in affirmative, held:

¶61

“The second point for consideration is this, has the High Court inherent power to expunge remarks made by itself or by a lower court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? There was at one time some conflict of judicial opinion on this question. The position as to case-law now seems to be that except for a somewhat restricted view taken by the Bombay High Court, the other High Courts have taken the view that though the jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and is to be exercised in most exceptional cases only, it is undoubtedly open to the High Court to expunge remarks

(9 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

from a judgment in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court (see Emperor v. Ch. Mohd. Hassan, A.I.R. (1943) Lah. 298; State v. Chhotay Lal, 1955 A.L.J. 240; Lalit Kumar v. S. S. Bose, A.I.R. (1957) All. 398; S.Lal Singh v. State, AIR 1959 Punj. 211; Ram Sagar Singh v. Chandrika Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 364 and In re Ramaswami, AIR 1958 Mad 305). The view taken in the Bombay High Court is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgment of an inferior court which has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision; but an application under s. 561-A Cr. P.C. is maintainable and in a proper case the High Court has inherent jurisdiction, even though no appeal or revision is preferred to it, to correct judicially the observations made by pointing out that they were not justified, or were without foundation, or were wholly wrong or improper [see State v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave, AIR 1954 Bom 65. In State of U.P. v. J. N. Bagga (Judgment in Cr. A. 122/1959 of this court decided on January 16, 1961.), this court made an order expunging certain remarks made against the State Government by a learned Judge of the High Court of Allahabad. The order was made in an appeal brought to this court from the appellate judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. In State of U.P. v. Ibrar Hussain (Judgment of this court in Cr. As. 148/1957 and 4 of 1958 decided on April 28, 1959.), this court observed that it was not necessary to make certain remarks which the High Court made in its judgment. Here again the observation was made in an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court. We think that the view taken in the High Courts other than the High Court of Bombay is correct and the High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only.

¶66

(emphasis supplied)

¶67

In Naranjan Patnaik Vs. Sashibhusan Kar and Anr. [(1986) 2 SCC 569], Supreme Court, while following the verdict of Constitution Bench in Mohd. Naim’s case (supra), further elaborated that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct.

(10 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

In S.K. Viswambaran Vs. E. Koyakunju [(1987) 2 SCC 109], Supreme Court had occasion to examine adverse remarks against an individual in violation of rule of natural justice. The Court, while recognizing principles of natural justice as great humanizing principles, clarified that in making adverse remarks against an authority or a person, rule of natural justice shall be strictly followed. The Court held:

¶72

“We have also to point out a grievous procedural error committed by the High Court. Even assuming for argument's sake that for expunging the remarks against respondents 2 and 3 the conduct of the appellant required scrutiny and merited adverse comment, the principles of natural justice required the High Court to have issued notice to the appellant and heard him before passing adverse remarks against him if it was considered necessary. By its failure the High Court has failed to render elementary justice to the appellant.”

¶73

In State of Karnataka Vs. The Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka [(2000) 7 SCC 333], Supreme Court has disapproved the practice of Judges for giving vent to their general apathy towards the present system of administration of justice. Further, the Court underplayed the practice of the Court for exercising any redundancy in the judgment. The Court held:

¶74

“Judicial disposition is definitely different from a paper presented for seminar discussion. Nor can it be equated with a dissertation. Judicial decorum requires that judgments and orders should confine to the facts and legal points involved in the particular cases which Judges deal with. May be, sometimes Judges would, perhaps wittingly or even unwittingly, jut outside the contours of the litigation, but even such overlapping should be within bounds of propriety and sobriety. But there is no justification for traversing so far beyond the canvass as was done by the High Court in this case or to cover areas which are grossly extraneous to the subject matter of the case. If the subordinate courts are also to be tempted and encouraged to follow suit by travelling far outside the scope of the lis the consequences would be far too many. Demoralisation of departments would badly erode the already impaired efficiency of our forces. It is time to remind ourselves once again that judgment should confine to the scope of the case.”

¶75

In Manish Dixit & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan [(2001) 1 SCC 596], Supreme Court further clarified that castigating remarks to ensue serious consequences on future career may not be made without giving opportunity of being heard to the incumbent. The Court held:

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(11 of 15)

“Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for, otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice.”

¶80

In case of A Judicial Officer Vs. Registrar General High Court of Andhra Pradesh [(2010) 11 SCC 722] Supreme Court has held that while examining the judicial order of subordinate Court, the High Court is not expected to make disparaging remarks against judicial officer which may adversely affect the image of the officer in the eyes of public.

¶81

Thus, answer to the first question is in affirmative but subject to certain restrictions. As regards second question suffice it to say that power of judicial review under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in such cases can be exercised in the event of violation of principles of natural justice; non-essentiality of such disparaging remarks for disposal of the case or otherwise in the wake of such conduct of an individual having no ramification on the final outcome of the case."

¶82

Recently also, when the adverse remarks were entered by the Trial Court against a Police Officer, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Manoj Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.7443/2019 decided on

¶83

03.01.2025) has observed as under:-

¶84

"8. It is indeed a settled proposition of law and part of the principles of natural justice that a man cannot be condemned unheard. Therefore, before passing the adverse remarks against the petitioner, the Presiding Officer was duty bound to issue notice to the petitioner and afford him due opportunity of hearing, but in the instant case, without following the above aforesaid procedure, straightaway the order impugned has been passed which has casted stigma on the service career of the petitioner. In the considered opinion of this Court, before passing the impugned order, a fair opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioner."

(12 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

Similarly, Allahabad High Court in a recent judgment dated 29.05.2025 delivered in the case of Balaram Chari Dubey Vs. State of U.P. (Application under Section 482 No.-16 of 2016) 2025 SCC Online All 3268 has held as under:-

¶89

"25. Now, summarising the issue, it is apparent that the statements of the victim as well as the Investigating Officer/applicant have been recorded by the learned trial court for deciding the criminal case, but, the question aries that whether prior to making the adverse remarks, as per the settled proposition of law, the basic principle of natural justice has been followed or not. From perusal of the remarks, it transpires that the same must cast prejudice to the applicant and the settled proposition is that if the court is making some adverse remarks, which is necessary for pronouncement of the Judgment and Order, without affording opportunity of hearing, the same would not stand, in the eyes of law.

¶90

As discussed hereinabove, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neeraj Garg (Supra) and Mohammad Naim (Supra), has said in so many words that unbriddled, sweeping and frequent remarks, would defeat the purpose unless the same is not guided by following the settled laws. In fact before such adversarial remarks is made, the opportunity of explaining or defending must be accorded.

¶91

So long as the present case is concerned, from perusal of the impugned Judgment and Order dated 2710-2015, the opportunity of hearing is not afforded to the applicant and the learned trial court in a sweeping manner, has made the adverse remarks in the form of a direction so as to lodge the criminal case against the applicant and to prosecute him, under section 4 of the Act, 1989, which apparently, shall cause prejudice to the applicant. In fact, the statements of the applicant and the victim, are recorded by the learned trial court in normal course of trial proceeding, but, as soon the court reaches to the conclusion that some wilful negligence is committed by the Investigating Officer with respect to the duty casted upon him under the Act, 1989, he should have been given an opportunity of hearing, calling the explanation of the applicant, but, it reveals from the impugned Judgment and Order dated 27-102015 that no such opportunity of hearing was given to the applicant.

¶92

In the case of G. Gopan @ Gopakumar Vs. State of

¶93

Kerala (supra) , the Kerala High Court was also considering the

(13 of 15)

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

question of passing the adverse remarks against the Investigating Officer and it is observed in the following manner:-

¶98

"34. Now, the last issue to be considered is the passing of adverse remarks against the Investigating Officer. The learned Sessions Judge found that the Investigating Officer (PW7) committed dereliction of duty, holding that he had consciously omitted the appellant from the array of the accused while submitting the final report. Passing of adverse remarks against the Investigating Officer is challenged on two grounds:

¶99

(a) The remarks were passed behind his back.

¶100

(b) The conclusion of the Investigating Officer that the appellant had no link with the alleged offence is sound.

¶101

The learned Sessions Judge had not given any opportunity of being heard to the Investigating Officer before passing the adverse remarks.

¶102

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned, he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for otherwise, the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. In this case, such an opportunity was not given to the Investigating Officer {Vide: The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim (AIR 1964 SC 703) : [1964 (1) CriLJ 549]; Ch. Jage Ram, Inspector of Police v. Hans Raj Midha [1972 (1) SCC 181]: [1972 CriLj 768]; R. K. Lakshmanan v. A. K. Srinivasan [1975 (2) SCC 466] : [1975 CriLj 1545]; Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar [AIR 1986 SC 819] : [1986 CriLj 911] and State of Karnataka v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka (AIR 2000 SC 2626)} .

¶103

In State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani [2003 (8) SCC 361] the Supreme Court observed that strictures cannot be passed against an individual without making him a party and without giving an opportunity of being heard since the right to reputation is an individual's fundamental right.

¶104

Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned Sessions Judge ought not to have passed the remarks contained in paragraph 31 of the judgment.

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(14 of 15)

The remarks passed against the Investigating Officer (PW7) shall stand quashed."

¶109

Principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment would make it clear that the trial Court before entering any remarks against any person/officer bearing such serious consequence as well as adverse effect on future career of the officer, must grant an opportunity of hearing is must.

¶110

In the instant case, admittedly the trial Court did not grant any opportunity whatsoever to the petitioner before entering adverse remarks in judgment dated 07.09.2021 and further when the impugned portion of the judgment dated 07.09.2021 containing adverse remarks and direction was specifically stayed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.01.2022, there was no occasion whatsoever to again take up the matter and to pass more rigorous remarks and directions given to the effect of deducting amount of compensation from the petitioner's salary and to conduct departmental enquiry against him. It is settled proposition of law that after conclusion of trial and passing of the judgment, the trial Court becomes functus officio and therefore, after passing of the final judgment, under no provisions of law the trial Court could have given remarks against the petitioner by again taking up the file.

¶111

It is also settled that a court of law must exercise restraint while making observation that may prejudice the reputation or service record of an Investigating Officer. The law mandates that no adverse remarks or finding reflecting upon the conduct, competence or integrity of an officer shall be recorded without affording him an opportunity of hearing. Any deviation from this procedural safeguard amounts to denial of principles of

[2025:RJ-JP:43431]

[CRLMP-7395/2021]

(15 of 15)

natural justice. The trial court, therefore, was not justified in recording adverse observations against the Investigating Officer in the impugned part of the judgment dated 07.09.2021 and subsequent order dated 03.02.2022 without granting him fair opportunity to explain such conduct. Such remarks, having been made in violation of settled legal principles, deserve to be expunged.

¶116

Hence, in view of foregoing discussions, this Court deems it just and proper to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and to quash and set aside the adverse remarks against the petitioner entered in judgment dated 07.09.2021 passed by the Court of Special Judge, Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, No.4, Kota (Rajasthan) in Special (POCSO) Case No.221/2019. Subsequent order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the trial Court pursuant to earlier remarks entered in aforesaid judgment dated 07.09.2021 is also quashed and set aside.

¶117

Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition stands allowed. 26. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

¶118

(ANAND SHARMA),J

¶119

Jatin /53

Surendra Sharma S/O Shri Shyam Lal Sharma, v. State of Rajasthan

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Surendra Sharma S/O Shri Shyam Lal Sharma, v. State of Rajasthan

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Dharmpal Singh Puniya Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr.

Gambhir S/O Gajanand Vs State of Rajasthan

Suraj Narayan S/O Nanag Ram B/C Jangid Brahmin Vs State of Rajasthan

Balveer and Ors. Vs State of Raj and Anr.

Ranvir Singh Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr.

Ranvir Singh Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr.