Murari Lal Choudhary S/O Shri Maida Ram Jat Vs State of Rajasthan

State of Rajasthan through the Learned Public Prosecutor. 2. Mukesh Kumar Raiger Son of Late Dhanna Ram Raiger, R/o Nindadh Mode, Govidam Tower Ke Peeche, Sikar Road, Harmada, Jaipur West, Rajasthan.

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----Respondents

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Tarun Jain For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vivek Choudhary, PP

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

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Order

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09/10/2025

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In S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4459/2020:

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This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a prayer to quash FIR No.234/2020

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registered at Police Station-Harmada, District-Jaipur (West) for offences under Sections 323, 341, 336, 427, 456, 143, 509 & 380 IPC and Sections 3(1)(d), 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'the Act of 1989').

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It is stated that complainant-Mukesh Kumar Raiger lodged an FIR alleging therein that his neighbour (Murari Lal Choudhary) came to his house at around 3:00 a.m. on 24.05.2020 along with 10-15 other persons and started stone pelting and forcibly entered in his house and abused the complainant by referring to his caste. He also assaulted mother of the complainant and misbehaved with his wife. Despite information given to the police station, no effective action was taken against the accusedpetitioner.

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By challenging the aforesaid FIR, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that allegations levelled in the FIR are totally vague, ambiguous and evasive. Bare reading of the contents of the FIR would not make out any cognizable offence against the petitioner. Although general reference of involvement 10-15 persons has been given in the FIR, yet name of not a single person apart from the petitioner has been mentioned in the FIR. It is also submitted that the reason for falsely implicating the petitioner appears to be the fact that the petitioner is a government servant, serving as a constable in the Police Department, and in case of inclusion of provision of SC/ST Act, the statutory bar on granting anticipatory bail under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 comes into operation, thus the FIR has been lodged

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with ulterior motive as a planned device to ensure the petitioner's arrest and consequential suspension from service.

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It was further mentioned that nebulous allegations with regard to hurling abuses by referring the caste of the complainant, have been levelled only in order to create sensation and to unnecessarily implicate the petitioner in harsher provisions of the Act of 1989. It is submitted that a bare perusal of FIR itself would make it clear that as per complainant himself the alleged incident had taken place at 3:00 a.m. at night and there was no reference whatsoever that any other person, except the family of the complainant was present there to witness and observe the incident.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to Section 3(1) (r) of the Act of 1989, which makes it clear that, whoever not being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view shall be punishable with the sentence as mentioned in Section 3(1) of the Act of 1989.

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Learned counsel further submits that the necessary ingredients for invoking the provisions of the Act of 1989 is that the humiliation alleged against a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe should be at a place within public view. In the instant case, admittedly, as per the contents of the FIR, the alleged incident has not taken place within public view.

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It is also submitted that time and again, Hon'ble Supreme Court has given caution to the police authorities that while registering cases under the Act of 1989, due care and

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diligence should be adopted and Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 should not be ignored.

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It is further submitted that even otherwise, the allegations of stone pelting and unauthorizedly entering into house are totally false, fictitious, baseless and unfounded, whereas the fact is that the complainant himself has committed serious mischief, trespass and offence against the petitioner on 23.05.2020 itself, where after breaking the boundary wall of house of the petitioner and he took away the valuable goods from his house. It was also submitted that father of the complainant had borrowed Rs.60,000/- from the petitioner, which has not been returned so far. Complainant has also encroached upon petitioner's house and on raising protest, he used to threaten the petitioner to lodge FIR under the Act of 1989. Thus, the impugned FIR has been lodged by the complainant in order to wreak vengeance in a malicious manner against the petitioner. Thus, in case, the petitioner is prosecuted pursuant to such fictitious FIR, it would cause grave prejudice and miscarriage of justice to the petitioner. Hence, in order to prevent abuse of process of law, the FIR in question be quashed and set aside.

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In S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.9456/2022:

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Petitioner No.1 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.9456/2022 is the son of the petitioner in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4459/2020 and the petitioner No.2 has also stated that he has also not named in FIR No.234/2020. 10. Arguments which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition

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No.4459/2020 have been repeated with regard to wrong implication of the petitioners in view of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 and malicious involvement of the petitioners during investigation, whereas their names do not find place in the FIR has also been questioned.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgments of Hitesh Verma Vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr. reported in 2020 (10) SCC 710, Ramesh Chandra Vaishya Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2023 (17) SCC 615 and Gulam Mustafa Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2023 (18) SCC 265 .

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Despite service, nobody is present on behalf of the complainant even in the second round.

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Learned Public Prosecutor opposes the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition by submitting that the allegations levelled in FIR are still at investigation stage and are yet to be investigated by the Investigating Officer.

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It has been objected that the scope of Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and cannot be exercised to appreciate and appraise the defence material, which can be better examined either by the Investigating Officer during investigation or by the trial Court during trial. It was also submitted that only on account of the fact that the complainant belongs to Scheduled Tribe category, by virtue of provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, the stringent provisions of the Act of 1989 shall automatically be applicable. Hence, no mistake whatsoever has been caused by the police authorities in registering the case against the petitioner.

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Discussion, Analysis and Conclusion:-

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Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record.

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The material available on record would reveal that there are cross-cases between the petitioner in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4459/2020 and the complainant, it also reveals that they are the next door neighbours having old enmity. Bare perusal of the FIR does not reflect anything to show that the incident of hurling abuses, if any, has taken place in public view. There is no reference whatsoever that the petitioner was heard by any member of the colony/society while hurling abuses to the complainant.

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Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 is relevant and is

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being reproduced here under:

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"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities - [(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,- (a)..... (b).....

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(r) Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine.]"

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Object of the Act of 1989 is to protect members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from atrocities and to address caste based hate crimes. However, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act makes it clear that only if a member of SC/ST has been intentionally insulted or intimidated in public view by using their

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caste name as a slur, only then it would constitute as an offence under the Act of 1989.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitesh Verma (supra) , after examining the provisions of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 as well as earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the term 'public view' and 'public place' as well as the provisions of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989. After examining such provisions as well as earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been observed that merely an allegation does not make out an offence under the Act of 1989, because the complainant belongs to Scheduled category. Moreso, when property disputes were already existing between the petitioner and the complainant. It has further been observed that property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act of 1989 unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a member of Scheduled category. Merely, the fact that the accused person was having knowledge with regard to the caste of the complainant is also not sufficient to attract the provisions of the Act of 1989, when the provisions of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 are not attracted.

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Similarly, in the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: " (17). The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21^st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to

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drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under Sections 323 and 504, Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1) (x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first FIR nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present.

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(18). That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first FIR as well as the chargesheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that casterelated abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract Section 3(1) (x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since Section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court's jurisdiction

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under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under Section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the FIR (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge-sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21^st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under Section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.

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In the case of Gulam Mustafa (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued caution to the police officers, who institute an FIR based on any complaint and it has been observed that they are duty bound to be vigilant before invoking any provisions of very stringent nature like the SC/ST Act which imposes serious penal consequences on the accused concerned. The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. It has been cautioned that such provisions should not be applied mechanically. 22. In the light of foregoing discussions, it is clear that without properly examining the essential ingredients of the provisions of the Act of 1989, in quite mechanical manner stringent provisions of SC/ST Act have been made applicable to register a case against the accused-petitioners.

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Even otherwise, the very factum that there are crosscases between the accused and the complainant with regard to trespass and encroachment over the property, it becomes clear that the FIR-in-question has been lodged by the complainant against the accused/petitioners for oblique reasons and with an intention to wreak vengeance.

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The existence of cross-cases between the parties demonstrates mutual animosity and a pattern of retaliatory action. 25. In such circumstances, the FIR in question appears to be motivated by personal vendetta rather than arising from any genuine incident. As observed above, the SC/ST Act was enacted to protect members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from social discrimination and harassment on account of their caste identity, but the same cannot be used as an instrument of vengeance to lodge frivolous prosecution.

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The submission of the petitioner that he is a government servant, therefore, the FIR was lodged against him by invoking such provisions denying him anticipatory bail and ensuring his arrest, cannot be said to be without any basis, as it is supported with allegations of prior animosity. Hence, it is evident that the FIR has been lodged by the petitioner for extraneous purposes rather than being based on any real incident of castebased atrocity.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down the scope and extant of exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and in Para 102 it has been observed as under:

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"(102). In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

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Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

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Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that where this Court finds in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the criminal proceedings have been manifestly attended with mala fide all the proceedings are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudges, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice, jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court to interfere with such malicious FIR.

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Accordingly, both the S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.9456/2022 & S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4459/2020 filed by the petitioners, are hereby, allowed. F.I.R. No.234/2020 registered at Police Station-Harmada, District-Jaipur (West) is hereby quashed and set aside.

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Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

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(ANAND SHARMA),J

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DAKSH/16 & 18

Murari Lal Choudhary S/O Shri Maida Ram Jat v. State of Rajasthan

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Murari Lal Choudhary S/O Shri Maida Ram Jat v. State of Rajasthan

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