Allowed

Union of India v. Jai Singh Meena S/O Shri Durga Prasad Meena

Rajasthan HC3 Jan 2024SAW/1651/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A CISF Constable's services were terminated for suppressing his prior prosecution under Sections 498A/406 IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act in his attestation form, though acquitted before appointment. The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the Single Judge's reinstatement order, holding suppression by a candidate to a disciplined force disentitles employment and no hearing was needed on

What did the court decide?

Single Judge's reinstatement order dated 22.07.2019 set aside; writ petition dismissed; termination upheld.

Union of India Vs Jai Singh Meena S/O Shri Durga… — Service and Employment | Rajasthan HC (2024)

¶1

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶2

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

¶3

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1651/2019

¶4

Union of India, Through its Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi-110011

¶5

Director General, Central Industrial Security Force, Headquarter, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi110003

¶6

The Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Office Premises, East Division Headquarter, Boring Road, Patna (Bihar)-800013 (Now at Ranchi, Jharkhand)

¶7

----Appellants

¶8

Versus

¶9

Jai Singh Meena S/o Shri Durga Prasad Meena, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Village Shishram Kali Dhani, Post Hardiya, Tehsil Khetri, District Jhunjhunu (Raj.)

¶10

----Respondent

¶11

For Appellant(s)	: Mr. Mr.	R.D. Rastogi, ASG with Ashish Kumar.
	Mr.	C.S. Sinha.
	Mr.	Devesh Kumar Bansal.
	Mr.	Devesh Yadav.
For Respondent(s)	: Mr.	Mahendra Singh Gurjar.

¶12

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

¶13

Judgment

¶14

(Per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Bhansali) 03/01/2024

¶15

This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.07.2019 passed in SBCWP No.15565/2012 passed by learned Single Judge, wherein, the writ petition filed by the respondent/petitioner has been allowed and the petitioner has been ordered to be reinstated in service. However, it has been ordered that he shall not be

¶16

(2 of 16)

¶17

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶18

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶19

entitled for actual salary during interregnum period and the same shall be fixed notionally.

¶20

The petitioner was offered appointment on the post of Constable/Driver in CISF on 25.02.2011; on 05.03.2011, he submitted his attestation form and on 27.03.2011, the petitioner was appointed as Constable/Driver on temporary basis.

¶21

The attestation form submitted by the petitioner, at the time of appointment, was sent to District Magistrate, Jhunjhunu for character and antecedents verification. 4. The verification report was submitted by the District Magistrate in which it was indicated that as per the records of Khetri Police Station, a police case No.162/2003 was registered against the petitioner under Section 498A, 406 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and charge-sheet was submitted to the Court of ACJM, Khetri on 02.10.2003. Later on, the petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khetri vide order dated 13.08.2009.

¶22

Based on the said antecedent report, by order dated 27.02.2012 pursuant to the provisions Rule 26 (4) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 (‘Rules of 2001’), services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. receipt of the order. It was also indicated that he would be entitled for one month’s pay plus allowances in lieu of one month’s notice.

¶23

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed departmental appeal. The appellate authority by its order dated 11.06.2012 dismissed the appeal.

¶24

(3 of 16)

¶25

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶26

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶27

Feeling aggrieved of the orders terminating the services and rejecting the appeal, the writ petition was filed by the petitioner.

¶28

Learned Single Judge by its order impugned came to the conclusion that termination order was passed simply on the ground of concealment, however, as the petitioner had already been acquitted prior to his selection referring to judgment in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2016 (8) SCC 471 and another Single Bench judgment of this Court came to the conclusion that it cannot be said that concealment was material for the purpose of discontinuing the petitioner and consequently, passed the order impugned and the writ petition was allowed.

¶29

Learned ASG made vehement submissions that from the facts of the case, it is apparent that in the attestation form, the petitioner inter-alia was required to disclose whether he has ever been prosecuted and other criminal antecedent related questions to which he clearly indicated ‘No’. The attestation form inter-alia clearly want the candidates that furnishing of the false information or suppression of any factual information would be a disqualification and would render the candidate unfit for employment.

¶30

Further, it was also indicated that if there is any suppression of any factual information, which comes to the notice at any time during the service of person, his services would be liable to be terminated.

¶31

The petitioner despite having been prosecuted for offence under Section 498A, 406 IPC & Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act gave wrong information/suppressed the said aspect and

¶32

(4 of 16)

¶33

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶34

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶35

verified in the attestation form that the information was correct and complete to best of his knowledge.

¶36

Admittedly, the petitioner was prosecuted for criminal offence and he suppressed the said information. It was submitted that mere acquittal before filling up the application form by itself cannot wash away the fact that the petitioner had suppressed material facts pertaining to his criminal antecedents. 13. It was emphasized that irrespective of acquittal, for coming to a conclusion whether the petitioner was fit to be appointed on the post of a Constable, the said aspect could be taken into consideration and, therefore, the suppression of the material facts pertaining to his criminal antecedents were sufficient for the appellants to have terminated his employment.

¶37

Further submissions were made that under Rule 26 (4) of the Rules of 2001, the appointing authority during the period of probation without assigning any reason could terminate the services of a member of a force on the ground of furnishing false and incorrect information at the time of appointment and as such, in terms of the policy guidelines framed by the appellants dated 01.02.2012, which indicates serious offences/offences involving moral turpitude which inter-alia includes the offence under Section 498A/406 IPC & Dowry Prohibition Act, the order was passed and, therefore, the dismissal was justified.

¶38

It was submitted that learned Single Judge did not properly appreciate the judgment in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), wherein, under Clause 38.5, even if the declaration pertaining to the acquittal was made truthfully by the petitioner, the appellants

¶39

(5 of 16)

¶40

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶41

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶42

had the right to consider the antecedents and could not be compelled to appoint him and as such, the suppression being material, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside.

¶43

Reliance was also placed on Devendra Kumar Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.: (2013) 9 SCC 363 to emphasize that suppression of facts itself amounts to moral turpitude; State of Odisha & Ors. Vs. Gobinda Behera: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 199 , which emphasized the requirement of a person seeking to be employed in Police Force to be truthful in the disclosure of information sought about the antecedents and Ex-Const/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 27 , wherein, a case pertaining to CISF after analyzing the judgment in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) and Satish Chandra Yadav Vs. Union of India: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1300 inter-alia on account of not revealing the pendency of a case upheld the judgment of the Division Bench reversing the relief granted by the learned Single Judge.

¶44

Learned counsel for the respondent made vehement submissions that the action of the respondents in terminating the services of the petitioner is ex-facie illegal and, therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition filed by him.

¶45

It was submitted that the petitioner was acquitted way back in the year 2009 and the attestation form was filled up by the petitioner on 05.03.2011 and as the fact of acquittal was not

¶46

(6 of 16)

¶47

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶48

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶49

relevant, the same was not disclosed, as no case was pending against him.

¶50

It was submitted that petitioner was accorded appointment and without providing opportunity of hearing, his services have been terminated, which is in violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to appellants’ own Policy Guidelines.

¶51

It was submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments has laid down that non-disclosure of acquittal cannot be made a basis for termination.

¶52

Reliance was placed on judgment in Avtar Singh (supra), Umesh Chandra Yadav Vs. The Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, R.P.F., Northern Railway, New Delhi & Others: Civil Appeal No.1964/2022 , decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 02.03.2022; Ram Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.: (2011) 14 SCC 709 . It was prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

¶53

Learned counsel for the appellants with reference to the submissions pertaining to violation of principles of natural justice made submissions that in view of the admitted and undisputed facts when only one conclusion is possible, the order passed cannot be vitiated on account of purported non-grant of hearing. Reliance was placed on M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India: 1999 (6) SCC 237 and Rule 26 (4) of Rules of 2001.

¶54

We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.

¶55

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶56

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶57

(7 of 16)

¶58

The facts are undisputed, wherein, the petitioner was prosecuted for offence under Section 498 A, 406 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and came to be acquitted on 13.08.2009.

¶59

In the attestation form filled up by him for appointment on the post of Constable, in the columns relating to criminal antecedent, wherein, the specific question asked was ‘Have you ever been prosecuted ?’, the petitioner indicated ‘No’.

¶60

In the attestation form, in the beginning itself following warnings indicated:-

¶61

“The furnishing of false information or suppression of any factual information in the Attestation Form would be a disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for employment under the Government. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx If the fact that false information has been furnished or that there has been suppression of any factual information in the Attestation Form comes to notice at any time during the service of a person, his services would be liable to be terminated.”

¶62

Further, the verification of the attestation form given by the petitioner indicated as under:-

¶63

“I certify that the foregoing information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am not aware of any circumstances which might impair my fitness for employment under the Government.”

¶64

From the above facts, it is absolutely undisputed that the petitioner for reasons best known to him had suppressed the fact that he was prosecuted for offence under Section 498A, 406 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

¶65

The issue, which requires consideration is whether on account of his acquittal in the year 2009 can the petitioner claim

¶66

(8 of 16)

¶67

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶68

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶69

immunity from the allegation of suppression of material facts, though not disclosing the said aspect in his attestation form.

¶70

The issue of conviction, acquittal, arrest, pendency of criminal case and its disclosure by the candidates at the time of seeking employment, has been considered in detail by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), wherein, it was inter-alia laid down as under:-

¶71

“38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.

¶72

38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.

¶73

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government Orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

¶74

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:

¶75

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.

¶76

38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.

¶77

38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

¶78

38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

¶79

(9 of 16)

¶80

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶81

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶82

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.

¶83

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of Termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.

¶84

38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/ verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

¶85

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi , knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him."

¶86

Several judgments came to be delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court, after judgment was delivered in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), based on facts resulting in divergent views.

¶87

Whereafter, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) after taking into consideration the various views inter-alia observed and laid down as under:

¶88

“89. The only reason to refer to and look into the various decisions rendered by this Court as above over a period of time is that the principles of law laid therein governing the subject are bit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) different courts have enunciated different principles.

¶89

(10 of 16)

¶90

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶91

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶92

In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to shortlist the broad principles of law which should be made applicable to the litigations of the present nature. The principles are as follows:

¶93

a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public employer concerned, through its designated officials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society's security.

¶94

b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

¶95

c) The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service.

¶96

d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders' conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.

¶97

e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority concerned whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.

¶98

f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the Authority?

¶99

g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the Authority concerned was fair and reasonable?”

¶100

(emphasis supplied)

¶101

In State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Chetan Jeff: AIR 2022 SC 2274, in a case, where, the information about facing criminal prosecution was suppressed, after referring to several judgments on the issue of suppression, the Division Bench judgment of this Court was set aside.

¶102

The Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Singh Rathore: D.B. Spl. Appeal (Writ)

¶103

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶104

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶105

(11 of 16)

¶106

No.1377/2019 decided on 02.09.2022, laid down that in a case, where the candidate is desirous of seeking employment in a disciplined force he is expected to carry high moral standards and any deliberate mis-statement or omission in furnishing vital information is to be viewed seriously and consequently, set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge.

¶107

In the case of Devendra Kumar (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically laid down that suppression of information itself

¶108

amounts to moral turpitude by observing as under:-

¶109

“12. So far as the issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is concerned, it is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude . In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged.”

¶110

Similarly in the case of Gobinda Behera (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court inter-alia observed as under:-

¶111

“The respondent was seeking public employment in the State police service. His duties, on appointment to the service, would be of a responsible character, bearing intrinsically on the maintenance of law and order and with consequences for personal liberty of citizens. To expect that an applicant for such a position would be truthful in the disclosure of information sought about the antecedents is a justifiable basis for assessment of personality and character. The employer can legitimately conclude that a person who has suppressed material facts does not deserve to be in its employment.”

¶112

In a very recent judgment dated 20.10.2023, which applies on all force to the present case, Hon’ble Supreme Court in almost similar circumstances in Director General of Police Tamilnadu,

¶113

(12 of 16)

¶114

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶115

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶116

Mylapore Vs. J. Raghunees: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1379 laid down

¶117

as under:-

¶118

“9……………………. Additionally, the respondent was required to disclose certain information about himself by filling the verification roll. The said verification roll is very relevant and important for the purposes of the present case, especially its column 15 and in particular the language of the said column which reads as under:

¶119

"15 - Have you ever been concerned in any criminal case as defendant?"

¶120

The aforesaid column in unequivocal terms inquires from the candidate about his involvement in any criminal case whether in past or present and unaffected by its status or result.

¶121

The respondent in filling up the said verification roll in reply to the query made in the aforesaid column stated 'NO' meaning thereby he clearly stated that he had not been involved in any criminal case.

¶122

Apparently in the admitted facts, the respondent was involved in a criminal case but had been acquitted therefrom. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent was not concerned with any criminal case. Therefore, he ought to have disclosed the correct position that he was involved in a criminal case but had been acquitted. The respondent instead of giving the full and complete information as above simply stated 'NO' as if he was never involved in any criminal case. The answer of the respondent to the question posed in column 15 of the verification roll undoubtedly conveys the wrong information and amounts to the suppression of the correct information.

¶123

The issue in the matter is not of eligibility of the respondent to the post in the light of Rule 14(b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 rather that of suppression of material information which was required to be disclosed in column 15 of the verification roll. The respondent has certainly not disclosed the correct information. His honorable acquittal or acquittal by giving benefit of doubt is not material and relevant but what is relevant is the full and complete disclosure of the information regarding his involvement in a criminal case which has been suppressed by him.

¶124

In Avtar Singh case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar kind of situation summarised the legal position by stating that (i) Information given by the candidate to the employer as to his conviction, acquittal, arrest or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required

¶125

(13 of 16)

¶126

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶127

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶128

information. (ii) In cases where conviction or acquittal had already taken place before filling the application/verification form, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. (iii) and even if the employee had made truthful declaration of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents of the candidate/employee and cannot be compelled to appoint him/her.

¶129

In other words, the candidate in the first instance is obliged to give correct information as to his conviction, acquittal or arrest or pendency of the criminal case and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. Secondly, even if truthful declaration is made by him, he would not be entitled to appointment as a matter of right and that the employer still has the right to consider his antecedents.

¶130

In the case at hand, though the respondent may be eligible for appointment but since he has not disclosed the complete information with regard to his involvement in a criminal case, wherein he might have been acquitted earlier even before verification, he cannot escape the guilt of suppressing the material information as required by column 15 of the verification roll. Keeping in mind that the respondent was a candidate for recruitment to a disciplined force, the non-disclosure of the information of his involvement in the criminal case and subsequent acquittal therefrom cast a serious doubt upon his character and the antecedents which is sufficient enough to disentitle him from employment.

¶131

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the judgment and order of the Division Bench passed in writ appeal cannot be sustained in law and is hereby set aside restoring that of the writ court.

¶132

The appeal is allowed and the writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs”

¶133

Therefore, it can be concluded that on the ground of admitted suppression by the respondent/petitioner in seeking appointment to a disciplined force, which conduct casts a serious doubt upon his character and the same is sufficient enough to disentitle him from employment.

¶134

Coming to the aspect of violation of principles of natural justice, as observed hereinbefore, the facts are absolutely undisputed rather the counsel for the petitioner himself indicated

¶135

(14 of 16)

¶136

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶137

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶138

that the fact that in the attestation form, the petitioner did not disclose his acquittal, is admitted. However, the implication needs to be examined.

¶139

Provisions of Rule 26 (4) of the Rules of 2001, which interalia deals with termination, reads as under:-

¶140

“26. Termination-

¶141

(1) xxxxxxxxx

¶142

(2) xxxxxxxxx

¶143

(3) xxxxxxxxx

¶144

(4) During the period of probation or its extension thereof, as the case may be, the appointing authority may without assigning any reason terminate the services of a member of the Force on the grounds of furnishing false or incorrect information at the time of appointment of that member of the Force or for his failure to pass the basic training or repeat course, by tendering a notice of one month to that effect or one month’s pay in lieu thereof.”

¶145

The provisions clearly authorize the appointing authority to terminate the services of a member of the force on the ground of furnishing false and incorrect information at the time of appointment without assigning any reason.

¶146

The order impugned passed by the appellants inter-alia reads as under:-

¶147

“DATED: 27/02/2012

¶148

ORDER

¶149

In pursuance of the provision of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 26 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules-2001 (Amended Rules 2007), the undersigned hereby terminates the services of CISF No.114400240 Const./Dvr. Jai Singh Meena of CISF Unit BSL Bokaro. The order of termination will be effective from the date of receipt of this order by the said No.114400240 Const/Dvr. Jai Singh Meena.

¶150

No.114400240 Const/Dvr. Jai Singh Meena is entitled for one month’s pay (Pay Band + Grade Pay) plus allowances at the rate which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his service, which is in lieu of one month’s notice.”

¶151

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶152

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶153

(15 of 16)

¶154

As such it is apparent that the power of termination on account of admitted suppression/total declaration, as provided in the Rule, has been exercised by the Authority.

¶155

In the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court inter-alia laid down as under:-

¶156

“21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice.”

¶157

As noticed hereinbefore, as the factual aspect has not at all been in dispute, pertaining to suppression by the petitioner of information, which was specifically asked and which had bearing on his employment, as a constable, the mere fact that the appellants exercising power under Rule 26 (4) of the Rules, passed the order terminating the employment of the petitioner cannot be vitiated only on account of the fact that the petitioner was allegedly not afforded prior opportunity of hearing.

¶158

So far as the judgments relied on by counsel for the petitioner are concerned, as already discussed hereinbefore, in Avtar Singh (supra), besides the observations made in para 38.4.3, Hon’ble Court had left it open for the employer to consider on the relevant facts available as to antecedent and take appropriate decision and in view of para 38.5, once it has been laid down that even if a truthful declaration of a concluded criminal case has been made, the employer has the right to consider the antecedents, as such it cannot be said that suppression was irrelevant.

¶159

(16 of 16)

¶160

[2023:RJ-JP:38713-DB]

¶161

[SAW-1651/2019]

¶162

In the case of Umesh Chandra Yadav (supra), the same was a case of discharge passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, as the petitioner therein was neither prosecuted nor arrested and based on which, it was laid down that the same was not a case of misrepresentation or concealment, whereas, in the present case, the petitioner was prosecuted and the said information was clearly suppressed by him as such, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.

¶163

In the case of Ram Kumar (supra), the Court had come to the conclusion that no finding was recorded pertaining to the unsuitability of the candidate on account of the suppression and allowed the petition, whereas, in the present case, under Rule 26 (4) of the Rules, specific power has been conferred and as such, the said judgment also has no application.

¶164

In view of the above discussion and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the judgment of learned Single Judge, which did not deal with any of the aspects and simply after quoting the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) has arrived at the conclusion that order was required to be set aside, cannot be sustained.

¶165

Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 22.07.2019 of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent/petitioner is dismissed. 51. No order as to cost.

¶166

(ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J

¶167

(ARUN BHANSALI),J

¶168

PRADEEP KUMAR LIMBA/-

Union of India v. Jai Singh Meena S/O Shri Durga Prasad Meena

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Union of India v. Jai Singh Meena S/O Shri Durga Prasad Meena

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

M/S Khaitan Electricals Ltd. Vs State Finance Departmentors

M/S Khaitan Electricals Ltd. Vs State Finance Departmentors

Ramavtar Alias Pappu S/O Soji Vs Smt Girija W/O Shri Ramavtar Alias Pappu Wife of Shri Jagdish

M/S Harish Forex Services Pvt. Limited Vs Assistant Director of Enforcement

Sanjay Mittal S/O Mr. Udai Chand Mittal Vs Central Board of Direct Taxes

M/S. Hcl Infosystems Limited Vs Assistant Commissioner, Anti-Evasion