promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka Gandhi's case at page 681. If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiorari so can a provision or the Constitution, for a Constitutional provision has a far greater and allpervading sanctity than a statutory provision. In the present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly excluded by the opening words of the second proviso and particularly its key-words this clause shall not apply. As pointed out above, clause (2) of Article 311 embodies in express words the audi alteram partem rule. This principle of natural justice having been expressly excluded by a Constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side-door to provide once again the same inquiry which the Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited. Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In such a case the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. This is, however, the only scope which Article 14 can have in relation to the second proviso. but to hold that once the second proviso is properly applied and clause (2) of Article 311 excluded, Article 14 will step in to take the place of clause (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the intention of the makers of the Constitution. The second proviso is
