Dismissed

Bijendra Singh Tanwar S/O Shri Prahalad Singh v. State of Rajasthan

Rajasthan HC5 Nov 2024CRLMP/5284/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petition to quash an FIR for assault, snatching and trespass was dismissed despite a compromise between the parties, as the allegations were grave, the offence was recorded on CCTV, investigation remained incomplete, and the petitioner had extensive criminal antecedents including a Section 307 IPC case.

What the court decided

AI extract

Bijendra Singh Tanwar S/O Shri Prahalad Singh Vs State of… — Quashing and FIR | Rajasthan HC (2024)

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[2024:RJ-JP:43991]

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

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S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 5284/2024

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Bijendra Singh Tanwar S/o Shri Prahalad Singh, Resident Of Plot No. 5, Laxmi Nagar, Bajrang Dwar, Harnathpura Jhotwara, Jaipur, Raj.

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----Petitioner

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Versus

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State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

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Pankaj Sharma S/o Shri Ramesh Chand Sharma, Resident Of House No. 32-58, Rajiv Colony, R.p.a. Road, Panipech, Sastri Nagar, Jaipur Raj.

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----Respondents

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For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Neeraj Kumar Sharma
For State	: Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP
For Complainant	: Mr. Govind Gupta

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN

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Judgment

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Reserved on :: 19/10/2024 Pronounced on :: 05/11/2024

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The instant petition is filed under the provisions of section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 seeking directions for quashing of F.I.R. bearing no. 425/2021 dated 09.11.2021 registered at Police Station Shastri Nagar, District Jaipur City, North for offences under sections 143, 323, 341, 379, 427, 452 of I.P.C. (Annexure-1) and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

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The germane facts for consideration of the instant matter are that the complainant-respondent no.2 lodged an F.I.R. on 09.11.2021 at the jurisdictional Police Station wherein, it was stated that the complainant and his staff were working in the

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complainant’s office and in early evening some people entered the premises of the said office carrying deadly weapons along them. Moreover, the said group of people assaulted the complainant and his staff and with strenuous force took away the money and mobile phone of the complainant. Resultant to the said incident the complainant suffered various grievous injuries. Moreover, the said incident was clearly recorded in the CCTV camera recording.

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Upon being informed about the said incident the police authorities commenced their investigation however, have subsequently submitted a negative final report. Nevertheless, on the directions of the higher authorities the police officers were/are re-investigating/ thoroughly investigating the alleged offence, however, during the course of said investigation (continuing from past three years) the parties have entered into a compromise.

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In this backdrop, learned counsel for the parties submitted that the parties as on date have amicably entered into a compromise (dated 02.08.2024 – Annexure-2) to put quietus to the dispute inter-se between them. Hence, considering the consensus drawn in-between the parties and the ratio encapsulated in Mohammad Wajid & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and ors. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 , the impugned F.I.R. along with all its consequential proceedings is ought to be quashed and set aside.

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Per contra , learned Public Prosecutor during the course of hearing on various dates had vehemently opposed the instant compromise, and had submitted that the allegations leveled against the accused-petitioner are of serious nature. It was further

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submitted that two of the offences alleged against the accusedpetitioner are non-compoundable in nature.

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Considering the submissions of the learned counsel and to fathom a better view of the instant matter this Court vide order dated 05.09.2024 directed the Investigating Officer to mark presence before the Court along with the relevant records qua the petitioner and the co-accused (as named in the F.I.R.). 7. In compliance of the directions of this Court, Investigating Officer had marked appearance and had furnished the factual report, record of antecedents registered against the petitioner and the other co-accused. Investigating Officer had apprised the Court with the fact that as many as eleven criminal antecedents are reflected against the accused-petitioner herein. Further, it was asserted that the matter in hand is not the first instance wherein allegations of such nature are leveled against the accusedpetitioner; at two prior occurrences also, allegations of akin nature are registered against the accused-petitioner, along with one antecedent being registered for offence under section 307 of I.P.C. 8. This Court to ascertain certain issues and submissions had even interacted with the parties, who have marked presence in the Court (identified by their respective counsel). Nevertheless, it prima facie appeared that the complainant is under threat or coercion, to enter and affirm the said compromise. 9. Considering the aforementioned discussions and findings; juxtaposing the averments raised by the learned counsel for all the parties and taking note of the provisions under which this Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 528 of

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B.N.S.S. and the allied provisions for affirming the instant compromise, this Court deems it apposite to dismiss the instant petition for the reasons noted herein below:

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9.1 That the contents of the F.I.R. categorically mentioned that the accused-petitioner whilst committing the alleged offence has used ferocious actions against the complainant and have inflicted injuries upon him. Moreover, a life-threatening warning was also given to the complainant, in front of his staff workers.

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9.2 That the alleged offence is even recorded in the CCTV Camera.

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9.3 That the date of incidence as mentioned in the F.I.R. and affirmed by the parties is 09.11.2021 and the complainant without any delay, on the same date had reported the same to the concerned Police Station i.e. on 09.11.2021. It goes without saying, that from the aforementioned, the fear created by the accused-petitioner on the complainant is apparent.

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9.4 That the record of criminal antecedents (furnished by the Investigating Officer) and the averments made by the police authorities makes it unambiguous, that the accused-petitioner is habitual to committing such offences. Moreover, the accusedpetitioner is a threat to the society. For the sake of brevity, the criminal antecedents registered against the accused-petitioner are tabulated herein below:

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Ø0la0	eqdnek uEcj e; fnukad	/kkjk	pkVZ”khV uEcj	Ukke Fkkuk
1.	300/2011 12-04-2011	447 IPC	59/2011 29-09-2011	tsMh, t;iqj
2.	55/2010	323 341	40/2010	“kkL=h uxj
	14-04-2010	325 342	30-03-2010

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		IPC
3.	160/2009 5-6-2009	324 341 327 504, 34 IPC		“kkL=h uxj
4.	259/2008	341, 323, 324, 504, 34 IPC	58/2009 24-3-2009	“kkL=h uxj
5.	179/2009 14-04-2009	143 323 341 427 IPC	240/2009 29-06-2009	>ksVokMk
6.	556/2016 28-07-2016	307 504 427 341 323 IPC	157/2017 20-06-2017	dj/kuh
7.	193/2012 07-07-2012	323 325 326 147 148 143 IPC	212/12 09-10-2021	dksrokyh
8.	336/2014	323 341 452 356 34 IPC	309/2014 31-07-2014	fo/kk/kj uxj
9.	355/2021	323, 341 IPC	iSf.Mx vuqla/kku	“kkL=huxj
10.	239/2010			HkV~Vk cLrh
11.	351/2013			fo/kk/kjuxj

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9.5 That not only the accused-petitioner herein, but the other co-accused (Ajay Singh, Praveen Kumar, Vikram Singh Tanwar and Bhupendra Singh) also have a number of antecedents registered against them, which are of serious and heinous offences (primarily for offences under sections 307, 341, 120B of IPC and even under the provisions of Arms Act).

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9.6 Moreover, reliance can be placed upon the ratio encapsulated in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and ors. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 wherein it was stated that:

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“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the

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power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed . However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal

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proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

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9.7 Withal, in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kalyan Singh and Ors . reported in (2019) 4 SCC 268 wherein it was held that:

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“It is required to be noted that the original Accused was facing the criminal proceedings Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not in dispute that as per Section 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code are non-compoundable. It is also required to be noted that the allegations in the complaint for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code are, as such, very serious. It is alleged that the Accused fired twice on the complainant by a country-made pistol . From the material on record, it appears that one of the Accused persons was reported to be a hardcore criminal having criminal antecedents. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Accused was facing the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and that the offences under these Sections are not non-compoundable offences and, looking to the serious allegations against the Accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code solely on the ground that the original Complainant and the Accused have settled the dispute. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Gulab Das and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2011) 12 SCALE 625 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, this Court has specifically observed and held that, despite any

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settlement between the Complainant on the one hand and the Accused on the other, the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be quashed, as the offence Under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence. Under the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the original Accused for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.”

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9.8 Additionally, from the dictum spelled out by Hon’ble Apex Court in Monica Kumar (Dr.) Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 781 , it can be inferred that the Courts have to be extremely cautious while invoking its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (Now section 528 of B.N.S.S.). The relevant extract from the afore-cited ratio is reproduced herein below:

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“28. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab reported in 1960 CriLJ 1239 , this Court summarises some categories of cases in which inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:

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(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. wants of sanction;

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(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged.

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(iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

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29. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court which has been dealt with by the High Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in :

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1992CriLJ527 . In the said case, a note of caution to the effect was, however, added that the power should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are earlier extracted in the order of the High Court.

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30. We may reiterate and emphasize that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury reported in 1993CriLJ600; Raghubir Saran Dr. v. State of Bihar reported in : 1964 CriL J1; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana reported in 1977 CriLJ 1900; and Zhandu Pharmaceuticals Works Limited and Ors. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. reported in 2005 CriLJ 92].”

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In summation of the aforementioned and taking specific note that the investigation in the instant matter is yet to be culminated; that allegations of serious nature are leveled against the accused-petitioner; that the accused-petitioner has a history of criminal nature (two-three of akin nature); that the instant matter falls out of the permissible ambit as enshrined in the ratio of Gian Singh (Supra) this Court observes no extraordinary reason to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 528 of B.N.S.S.

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