Dismissed

Devendra Singh v. Shri Vinod Kumar

Rajasthan HC5 Oct 2023CMA/287/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

High Court dismissed an appeal that was time-barred by 690 days. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay, rejecting arguments of poor legal knowledge or lack of certified copy availability as valid excuses.

What did the court decide?

Application for condonation of delay and the appeal were dismissed; stay application dismissed; no order as to costs.

Devendra Singh Vs Shri Vinod Kumar — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Rajasthan HC (2023)

¶1

[2023:RJ-JD:32711]

¶2

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

¶3

S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 287/2020

¶4

Devendra Singh S/o Shri Bharat Singh, Aged About 30 Years, B/c Rajput ,r/o Aduda Thana Sapotara District Karoli, Current R/o 10 Solankiyon Ki Ghati, Bhatiyani Chohata, Thana Ghantaghar, Tehsil Girva And District Udaipur.

¶5

----Appellant

¶6

Versus

¶7

Shri Vinod Kumar S/o Hansraj Mirasi, R/o Bashir, P.s. Tibbi, District Hanumangarh

¶8

Smt. Silochana Devi W/o Ramswaroop Saharan, B/c Jatt, R/o Dhani 2 Dpm Bashir Tehsil Tibbi, District Hanumangarh.

¶9

----Respondents

¶10

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ravi Panwar For Respondent(s) : Mr. KR Saharan

¶11

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN GOPAL VYAS

¶12

Judgment

¶13

DATE OF JUDGMENT 05/10/2023

¶14

The present civil miscellaneous appeal is listed in Defects category. 2. As per office report, the appeal is time barred by 690 days and the appellant has preferred an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

¶15

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional. It is further submitted that the the delay in filing the appeal has ocurred due to lack of information about the outcome of the decision of the claim petition filed before the learned Tribunal. Further, learned counsel for the

[2023:RJ-JD:32711]

[CMA-287/2020]

(2 of 5)

appellant submits that the appellant recieved injuries in the accident and sustained 20-25% of permanent disablement. He is poor and illustrate person and does not have much knowledge about the legal proceedings. Therefore, the delay in filing the present appeal occurred.

¶20

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while opposing the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is a gross delay of 690 days and there is no sufficient reason which explains the said delay and thus, the same may not be condoned.

¶21

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the learned Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award on 24.11.2017 in the presence of learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and award on 4.1.2020 and it was delivered to appellant on 11.1.2020. The present appeal was thereafter filed on 13.1.2020. However, no cogent reasons have been put forth by the appellant as to why he could not get certified copy of the judgment and award for such a long period and file the instant appeal within the period of limitation.

¶22

In Basawraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

¶23

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be

(3 of 5)

[2023:RJ-JD:32711]

[CMA-287/2020]

negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

¶28

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Majji Sannemma @

¶29

Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors reported in 2021 SCC OnLine

¶30

SC 1260 has discussed as under :

¶31

17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is observed and held as under:—

¶32

In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan , (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.”

¶33

18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of

(4 of 5)

[2023:RJ-JD:32711]

[CMA-287/2020]

delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

¶38

19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as under:—

¶39

“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

¶40

It is a settled principle of law that generally justice should not be denied merely on technical grounds but if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, such delay ought not to be condoned unless the applicant is able to satisfy the court that he was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting the case. Since no sufficient reasons have been put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant to explain such a long delay of 690 days in filing the present appeal, the present application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed.

¶41