Dismissed

Birma Devi v. Subhash

Rajasthan HC21 Sept 2023CFA/532/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this civil first appeal concerning specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land, the High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the appeal. The court affirmed the trial court's decree, holding that the plaintiff successfully proved his readiness and willingness despite a witness declared hostile, and the defendant failed to substantiate her claim of fraud or lack of consideration.

What did the court decide?

The appeal was dismissed with costs; the decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 09.10.2014 dated 21.10.2022 was affirmed.

Birma Devi Vs Subhash — Specific Performance | Rajasthan HC (2023)

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

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S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 532/2022

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Birma Devi W/o Late Shri Ashwani Kumar, Aged About 52 Years, By Caste Jat, Resident of Suranwali, Tehsil Pilibanga, District Hanumangarh.

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----Appellant

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Versus

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Subhash S/o Shri Brijlal, Aged About 45 Years, By Caste Jat, Resident of Suranwali, Tehsil Pilibanga, District Hanumangarh.

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----Respondent

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For Appellant(s)	: Mr. S.L. Jain
For Respondent(s)	: Mr. Sushil Bishnoi

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HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA Judgment

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21/09/2023

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The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 21.10.2022 passed by the Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Cases), Hanumangarh in Civil Original Suit No.49/2018 (28/2016) whereby the suit for specific performance of the agreement and perpetual injunction has been decreed.

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Brief facts of the case are as under:

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i. The plaintiff-respondent Subhash filed a suit for specific performance of agreement dated 09.10.2014 executed in his favour by the defendant-appellant Birma Devi. It was averred in the plaint that the defendant had agreed to sell a portion of her agricultural land measuring 0.759 Hectares entered/situated as/at Khata no.70/68, Stone no.12/241, Murraba no.34, Kila no.16, 24 and 25 at Chak no.40 LLW (B) Tehsil Pilibanga to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.5,50,000/-. An advance payment of Rs.5,00,000/- was received by the defendant and an agreement to the effect

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was executed on 09.10.2014. Vide the agreement, it was agreed that the sale deed would be executed and got registered in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant on 15.05.2015 and remaining consideration amount of Rs.50,000/- would be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the said date. It was also a condition of the agreement that if the defendant fails to execute the sale deed on the said date, plaintiff would be free to get it executed by the Court and if the plaintiff fails to pay the remaining consideration amount, the advance amount would be forfeited by the defendant.

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ii. It was further averred in the plaint that on 01.05.2015 i.e., ten days before the date fixed for execution of the sale deed i.e., 15.05.2015, defendant sought extension of time till 13.04.2016 to execute the same. An agreement to the effect was entered into and handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant whilst the other terms of original agreement to sell remained same. On 13.04.2016, plaintiff went to the office of Sub-Registrar, Goluwala with complete documents and the remaining consideration amount with an intention to pay the same to defendant and to get the sale deed registered in his favour but defendant Birma Devi did not turn up. Thereafter, despite continuous requests, she kept on evading the execution of the sale deed. Hence, on 24.08.2016, a registered notice, calling upon the defendant to receive the due/remaining sale consideration of Rs.50,000/- and get the sale deed registered in the favour of plaintiff within 15 days of its receipt, was served upon the

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defendant which was received by her on 27.08.2016. When the same was not responded to, the present suit was instituted with a prayer for specific performance of the agreement dated 09.10.2014 and also for an injunction to restrain the defendant from alienating the suit property.

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iii. A written statement was filed by defendant-Birma Devi and she categorically denied the execution of agreement to sell as well as the receipt of the advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/- on 09.10.2014 qua sale consideration. It was stated that the value of her agricultural land is about Rs.15,00,000 and there was no need for her to sell the land. It was the case of the defendant that plaintiff got her thumb impressions on the agreement to sell dated 09.10.2014 before Sub-Registrar under the garb of getting her a bank loan against the subject land. The document dated 09.10.2014 and any sale in pursuance of the said document was never intended to be executed by the defendant as it was entered upon due to fraudulent act of the plaintiff without any sale consideration been received by the defendant. Therefore, the same cannot be directed to be acted upon. She admitted the receipt of notice dated 24.08.2016 but pleaded that after receipt of the notice, she contacted the plaintiff who assured that the said agreement would be annulled. A prayer for dismissal of the suit with the aforesaid submissions was made.

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On basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following six issues:

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“7. उभय प्ቌ के अभिभवचनों के आधार पर ायालय ारा भिन्ቖभिलखि�त भिववा्ቕक भिवरभिचत भिकए गए:

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(1) आया ्ቚभितवाभि"या ने वा"ी के हक में भि"नांक 09.10.2014 को्ቚ्቞ गत स्ቘ "ा का भिवकय इकरारनामा स्ቚभितफल भिन्ቡ ाभि"त भिकया? (2) आया वा"ी भिवकय इकरारनामा भि"नांक 09.10.2014 में वभि-.त अपने भि/्ቜे की शत2 की पालना हेतु स"ैव त्቎ र व तैयार रहा है? (3) आया वा"ी ्ቛारा वा" अ्ቜ ाय शु्ቇ पर त भिकया गया है?

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(4) आया वा"ी गत भिवकय इकरारनामा भि"नांक 09.10.2014 की भिवभिनभि".्ቖ अनुपालना करवाने का अभिधकारी है? (5) आया वा"ी ्ቚभितवाभि"या के भिवरू्ቍ वा" में वभि-.तानुसार शा्ቫत्ቤ ा"ेश ्ቚा्቎ करने का अभिधकारी है?

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(6) अनुतोष?”

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The plaintiff got examined four witnesses, himself (PW-1), Ramchandra Mittal (PW-2) – Waseeqa Nawis, Anil Kumar (PW-3) – defendant’s son and Ved Prakash (PW-4) – defendant’s brother-inlaw and got exhibited 7 documents (Exhibit 1 to 7). The defendant got examined herself only (DW-1).

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After hearing the parties, the learned Court below, vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.10.2022, proceeded on to decree the suit of the plaintiff and directed the defendant to execute the sale deed in her favour after receiving the balance consideration amount within a period of two months and further restrained the defendant from alienating the suit property.

¶35

Before adverting into the other grounds as raised by learned counsel for the appellant, consideration of the preliminary objection raised by him qua the impugned judgment and decree is relevant. Learned counsel submitted that while deciding issue No.2, the Court below did not give any specific decision on the said issue as para No.39, wherein finding on issue No.2 has been

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concluded, is not complete in any sense and therefore, it would be deemed that issue No.2 remained undecided.

¶40

In response to the said submission, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that after judgment dated 21.10.2022 been passed, an application for correction of the said discrepancy in para No.39 was preferred on behalf of the plaintiff and the said application was allowed vide order dated 15.12.2022. Vide order dated 15.12.2022, it was observed by the Court below that the concluding part pertaining to the finding/decision on Issue No.2 could not be typed because of an inadvertent error of the typist and hence, direction to add two sentences to the said para so as to conclude the finding on the said issue was given. Vide the said order, the following two sentences were directed to be added in red ink to para No.39 (page 19)

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“ ;g nkok izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA vr% ;g rudh oknh us c[kwch izekf.kr dh gSA vr% ;g rudh oknh ds i{k esa ,oa izfrokfn;k ds fo:) fuf.kZr dh tkrh gS ”

¶42

Consequently, the above two lines were added to the para and an amendment copy of the judgment dated 21.10.2022 was also issued. The application as preferred before the Court below, order dated 15.12.2022 and the amended judgment and decree dated 21.10.2022 have been placed before this Court by learned counsel for the respondent which are permitted to be taken on record.

¶43

In view of the order dated 15.12.2022, the ground as raised by learned counsel for the appellant been taken care of, no more survives.

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Learned counsel for the appellant raised the following other grounds:

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i. The impugned judgment and decree deserves to be set aside only on the count that the same was in contravention to the basic provision of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act of 1872’). Section 138 of the Act of 1872 provides for the process/order for examination of witnesses. The said process was not at all followed by the Court below in so far as PW-3 and PW-4, who were the plaintiff witnesses, were permitted to be cross-examined by the plaintiff himself after they being declared hostile. There is no provision under the civil law for declaration of a witness to be hostile and for permitting the plaintiff to cross-examine his own witness. Even then, if the plaintiff was permitted to cross-examine his own witnesses, defendant ought to have been permitted to re-examine or cross-examine the said witnesses. A perusal of the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 makes it clear that the defendant did not cross-examine the said witnesses and hence it is proved that he was denied the right of cross-examination. The Court below proceeded on to decree the suit of the plaintiff totally relying upon the evidence of the said witnesses, i.e., PW-3 and PW-4 only. The reliance on their evidence was evidently in contravention to law and hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside.

¶49

ii. It was the specific case wherein it was proved on record that the plaintiff did not have the complete consideration amount available with him on the stipulated date of execution of sale

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deed. The plaintiff (PW-1) specifically admitted in his crossexamination that he was not in possession of complete balance consideration amount and hence, the Court could not have concluded the issue of readiness and willingness in his favour. Learned counsel submitted that it is the settled proposition of law that the person calling for performance of contract must prove in unequivocal terms that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Proof of readiness and willingness is a sine qua non for a suit for specific performance and the plaintiff having miserably failed to prove the same, Issue No.2 could not have been decided in his favour. Further, the plaintiff having failed to prove as to from where he managed the amount of Rs.5,00,000/alleged to be paid qua the consideration and as to why he did not take the possession of the property despite the substantial part of the consideration amount having been paid, the issue was wrongly decided against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff.

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iii. Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides for proof of not only readiness but also willingness of the party praying for the relief of specific performance of contract.

¶55

To prove readiness, the plaintiff was required to prove that he was in possession of the complete consideration amount not only on the stipulated date of execution of saledeed but also on all the subsequent dates till the institution of the suit.

¶56

In the present case, it was an admitted case of the plaintiff that he was not in possession of the balance

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consideration amount and hence, the Court could not have concluded that the plaintiff was ready to perform his part of the contract.

¶61

iv. The plaintiff has not proved on record as to why the stipulated date for execution of the sale-deed i.e. 15.05.2015 was extended to 13.04.2016. The same having not been proved, the factum of denial of execution of sale could not have been held to be proved.

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v. Issue No.1 was also wrongly decided in favour of the plaintiff despite the specific admission of PW-2, the alleged deedwriter that no transaction took place before him.

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In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon

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the following judgments:

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1. U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. LRs. vs. A.M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 2022 SC 3361

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2. Man Kaur (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512

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3. Bal Krishna and Ors. vs. Bhagwan Das (Dead) and Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 145

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4. Hansraj vs. Govind Narain, 2005 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1465

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5. Mirahul Enterprises and Ors. vs. Vijaya Sirivastava and Ors., AIR 2003 Delhi 15

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Per contra learned counsel for the respondent submitted as under:

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i. Agreement to sell dated 09.10.2014 was a registered document and there is a presumption in law that a document which is registered is a valid document.

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ii. The factum of the execution of agreement to sell was very well proved on record and was rather admitted by the

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defendant as well as the attesting witnesses. The said document bears signatures of the attesting witnesses i.e. PW-3 and PW-4 who are the son and brother-in-law of the defendant herself. The said signatures having been admitted by both the witnesses and even by the defendant herself, it is not open for the defendant to aver anything contrary to the same. The fact was also proved vide the register of Waseeqa Nawis produced in evidence and exhibited as Exh.7A.

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iii. The agreement (Exh.3) for extension of the stipulated date of execution also bears signatures of Sunil Kumar, second son of the defendant and the said fact has not been denied either by the defendant or any of the witnesses. The same was clearly proved on record.

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iv. The factum of the agreement to sell having been entered into and the consideration amount of Rs.5,00,000/- having been paid on that date is even substantiated by the fact that the defendant purchased 25 bighas of land at some other place and the dates of said purchase specifically tally with the dates of present transaction which further fortifies the case of the plaintiff that the defendant sold the plot in question for purchasing some other property. The fact of some other property having been purchased during the same period was even proved by the statements of the defendant recorded in another suit wherein she admitted the fact of having purchased 25 bighas of land.

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v. It is totally wrong to aver that the defendant was denied any right of cross-examination. A perusal of the statements of

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PW-3 and PW-4 would make it evident that there was no such request even been made by learned counsel for the defendant and hence, no question of the same having been rejected arise.

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vi. So far as service of the notice calling upon the defendant to execute the sale-deed is concerned, the same was very well served on her after she having refused to execute the sale deed in his favour. The said notice was not responded to and hence, the suit in question was filed. The defendant had earlier assured him to execute the sale-deed and hence, no cause to serve any notice upon her ever arose prior to 15.05.2015.

¶85

In rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the statements of the defendant (Exh.8) recorded in some other matter could not have been considered and relied upon by the Court in the present suit in contravention to the provisions of law.

¶86

In alternate, learned counsel submitted that the defendant is ready to repay the alleged paid consideration amount with interest to the plaintiff and the impugned decree be modified to a decree for repayment of the consideration amount while setting aside the same for specific performance.

¶87

In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgments:

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i. R. Lakshmikantham vs. Devaraji, (2019) 8 SCC 62 ii. Harvinder Kaur vs. Mandeep Singh, (2020) 1 CivCC 102

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iii. Mattam Ravi and Ors. vs. Mattam Raja Yellaiah and Ors., AIR 2017 AP 155

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

¶94

Coming to the first ground as raised by learned counsel for the appellant regarding the permission granted to the plaintiff to cross-examine his own witnesses and further denying defendant to cross-examine them. The averment of the counsel that crossexamination of PW-3 and PW-4 by plaintiff was in contravention to the procedure for examination as prescribed under the Act of 1872, finds an apt reply in Section 154 of the Act of 1872 which reads as under:

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“ S. 154. Question by party to his own witness :The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.”

¶96

The above provision is an apt answer to the averment as raised by learned counsel for the appellant. The said provision clearly vests a discretion with the Court to permit the person who calls a witness to put any question to him which can be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 154 does not make any distinction between the civil or the criminal law. Meaning thereby, the provision is applicable to the proceedings of civil as well as criminal nature.

¶97

Dealing with a similar question and Section 154 of the Act of 1872, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mattam Ravi (supra) held as under:

¶98

“7.2. A plain reading of the section makes it clear that it does not make any distinction between civil and criminal cases. It only vests discretion in the Court to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put any question which can be put in crossexamination by the adverse party. Such a request can be made in civil as well as in criminal cases. What is required to be considered is when such a

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request should be made and how such wide discretion vested in the Court ought to be exercised by the Court.”

¶103

Therefore, in view of the clear provision of law, it cannot be concluded that the grant of permission by the Court below to the plaintiff to cross-examine his own witnesses was in contravention of law.

¶104

So far as the declaration of the witnesses to be hostile and reading of their evidence is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gura Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (2001) 2 SCC 205, cleared the misconception on the efficacy of the testimony of a witness declared hostile. After extensively referring to precedent decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

¶105

“11. There appears to be a misconception regarding the effect on the testimony of a witness declared hostile. It is a misconceived notion that merely because a witness is declared hostile his entire evidence should be excluded or rendered unworthy of consideration……”

¶106

In view of the above ratio and in view of the settled position of law, this Court is of the clear opinion that the permission granted to the plaintiff to cross-examine his witnesses was perfectly valid in terms of law and further, the deposition of the said witnesses was rightly relied upon by the Court below to arrive at a finding while deciding Issue No.1 pertaining to factum of the execution of agreement in question.

¶107

So far as the ground taken by learned counsel for the appellant that PW-2, the alleged deed writer himself admitted that the transaction did not take place before him is concerned, the same is clearly, reading of a part of the evidence. The complete statement as made by PW-2 in this regard was as under:

¶108

“;g lgh gS fd izn”kZ&2 dh fy[kk i<h ds oDr esjs lkeus ysu nsu ugha gqvk Fkk ysfdu izfrQy jkf”k izkIr djuk Lohdkj fd;k

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FkkA esjs le{k ;fn ysu nsu ugha gksrk gS rFkk foØsrk us jkf”k izkIr djuk Lohdkj fd;k gS rks eSa nLrkost esa ,slh jkf”k izkIr djuk fy[krk gw¡ tks eSaus izn”kZ&2 esa fy[kh gSA”

¶113

A composite reading of the above statement clarifies that the said witness has admitted that although the giving and taking of the consideration amount did not take place before him but the factum of the receipt of the consideration amount was very well admitted before him. The overall reading of the statements of PW-2 does fortify the story/case of the plaintiff.

¶114

The Court below, while relying upon the statements of D.W.1, defendant witness and PW-3 and PW-4, the attesting witnesses wherein they specifically admitted their signatures on the agreement in question, decided Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff. The Court observed that had the document been entered into fraudulently, the attesting witnesses, who were admittedly educated, would not have put their signatures on the same. Even if it is assumed that the defendant was an illiterate lady and signed the agreement in question in some misbelief, the attesting witnesses who were the son and brother-in-law, could not have signed the same under the same misbelief, they being not illiterate. This Court is of the clear opinion that the finding as reached by the Court below on Issue No.1 being totally in consonance with law as well as the material available on record, does not deserve any interference and is hereby affirmed. 17. The finding on Issue No.2 regarding readiness and willingness has also been assailed. It is clear on record that the date initially fixed for performance of the contract was 15.05.2015 and the same was extended at the request of defendant till 13.04.2016. The factum of an agreement for extension of the

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date has also not been denied by the defendant and the signatures on the same of other son of the defendant has rather been admitted by the defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff was clearly not required to take any action till 13.04.2016. So far as his readiness and willingness post 13.04.2016 is concerned, the plaintiff specifically pleaded that he appeared before the office of the Registrar on 13.04.2016 to get the sale deed executed but the defendant did not turn up. Further, the defendant was continuously requested to get the sale deed executed which she assured to execute and never denied till the month of August 2016. It is only in the month of August 2016 that she tried to avoid the request of the plaintiff and the plaintiff, soon after that, served a registered notice dated 24.08.2016 calling upon her to receive balance consideration amount and get the sale deed executed. When the notice remained unresponded to, the present suit was filed on 24.09.2016.

¶119

In the opinion of this Court, the above facts are sufficient to prove the willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and the Court below rightly held the same in favour of the plaintiff.

¶120

So far as the readiness on part of the plaintiff is concerned, he clearly deposed as under:

¶121

“fedj fnukad 13-04-2016 dks “ks’k izfrQy jkf”k ,oa [kpkZ cS;ukek dk izcU/k dj dk;kZy; miiath;d xksywokyk esa foØ; vuqcaf/kr Hkwfe dk cS;ukek vius i{k esa djokus ds fy, mifLFkr jgk ysfdu izfrokfn;k mifLFkr ugha vkbZA”

¶122

The averment of learned counsel for the appellant regarding admission of the plaintiff that he did not possess the consideration amount is also baseless as the plaintiff deposed as under:

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“izn”kZ&2 ds fnol esjs ikl jftLVªh djokus ds fy;s dqy izfrQy jkf”k ugha FkhA”

¶127

A perusal of the above statement makes it clear that the said admission is qua the date of execution of agreement to sell and not qua the stipulated date for execution of the sale deed. The said statement cannot be read in isolation and it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff was not possessed of sufficient means to pay the remaining sale consideration.

¶128

As held in Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap vs Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar, (2020) 15 SCC 731 , the question as to whether the plaintiff seeking specific performance has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract is required to be examined with reference to all the facts and surrounding factors in a given case. The requirement is not that the plaintiff should continuously approach the defendant with payment or make incessant requests for performance. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held as under:-

¶129

“For the relief of specific performance, which is essentially a species of equity but has got statutory recognition in terms of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff must be found standing with the contract and the plaintiff’s conduct should not be carrying any such blameworthiness so as to be considered inequitable. The requirement of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is not theoretical in nature but is essentially a question of fact, which needs to be determined with reference to the pleadings and evidence of parties as also to all the material circumstances having bearing on the conduct of parties, the plaintiff in particular.”

¶130

Coming to the facts of the present case, as observed above, in terms of the agreement to sell dated 09.10.2014, the stipulated date for execution of sale was 15.05.2015 and the said date was extended at the request of the defendant only to 13.04.2016. In the said circumstances, what can be concluded would be that the

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defendant was not ready to perform her part of the contract on the original stipulated date of execution. An analysis of the overall circumstances and the conduct of the parties in the present matter is sufficient to show that the plaintiff, who admitted the execution of the original agreement as well as the agreement for extension of the date for execution of sale, subsequently declined to execute the same. Further, an important aspect in the present matter is that out of the total sale consideration of Rs.5,50,000/-, the substantial amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid in advance and due consideration amount was just Rs.50,000/-. 20. As is the settled position of law, the factum of readiness and willingness is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the parties and the attending circumstances. Testing on the touchstone of the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the clear opinion that the plaintiff successfully proved by cogent evidence that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the finding of the Court below on Issue No.2 is totally in consonance with the evidence as led by the parties and the same is hereby affirmed.

¶135

So far as the findings on other issues are concerned, no challenge to the same has been made by the counsel before this Court during the course of arguments and hence, the Court is not required to delve into the same. Even otherwise, the findings on Issue Nos.4 & 5 are totally dependent on the findings on Issue Nos.1 & 2 and the findings of Issue Nos.1 & 2 having been affirmed by this Court, findings on Issue Nos.4 & 5 are also hereby affirmed.

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So far as Issue No.3 pertaining to the court fee is concerned, the Court below observed that the defendant who examined herself did not depose a single statement regarding the said issue in her cross-examination. Though she stated that market price of the land in question is Rs.15,00,000/- per bigha, she did not produce any sale deed or DLC rates to substantiate the said fact. On the contrary, the plaintiff specifically deposed that the prevalent market price at that point of time was Rs.1.5-2 Lacs per bigha and DLC rates of the chak in question in the year 2014 was Rs.1,80,000/- per bigha. The reason why the rates of land in question were comparatively lesser than the market price was also given by the plaintiff and no evidence to controvert the same was led by the defendant.

¶140

In view of the evidence as led by the parties, the Court below decided the issue against the defendant and rightly so. This Court does not find any ground to interfere with the same and the finding on Issue No.3 is also hereby affirmed.

¶141

Regarding the alternate plea raised by learned counsel for the appellant for a modified decree for re-payment of the consideration amount in lieu of the decree for specific performance, it is suffice to state that the said plea was never taken by the defendant before both the Courts below and not even in the present memo of appeal. It is the settled proposition of law that a decree to the extent of repayment of the consideration amount in lieu of the decree of specific performance can only be granted by a Court if a plea qua the same has been made and evidence has been led to the effect that the same would suffice the purpose or that the same is justifiable keeping into

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consideration the enhanced market price or so. In the present matter, no such plea had ever been taken by the defendant and hence, the said plea cannot be permitted and entertained by this Court at this stage.

¶145

The findings on all the issues having been affirmed by this Court, no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.10.2022 is made out and the present appeal is hence, dismissed being devoid of merits.

¶146

Stay petition and all the pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

¶147

(REKHA BORANA),J

¶148

T.Singh/-

Birma Devi v. Subhash

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Birma Devi v. Subhash

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