Writ petition for alternate of rejection from employment due to criminal cases disposed of. Court dismissed petition noting employer's right to scrutinize antecedents.
Writ petition stands dismissed; appointment rejected.
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5607/2020
Rajesh Kumar Son Of Shri Nawal Singh, Aged About 37 Years, Resident Of Opposite New Collectorate, Patpara Mohalla, Bharatpur (Rajasthan)
----Petitioner
----Respondents
| For Petitioner(s) | : Mr. Nripendra Sinsinwar. |
|---|---|
| For Respondent(s) | : Ms. Sanjana Shresth for Mr. C.L. Saini,AAG |
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
Order
13/07/2021
following prayer:-
i. Issue an appropriate writ, order or directions to quash and set-aside the order dated 30-08-2019 (Ann-11) issued by the respondents by which the respondents rejected the representation of the petitioner and denied him to allow to join the duties on the post of IIIrd Grade Teacher - English(L-2),(Non-TSP).
ii. By an appropriate writ, order or directions, the respondents be directed to give posting to the petitioner on the post of IIIrd Grade TeacherEnglish (L-2), (Non TSP) as per the appointment order dated 28-03-2018 (Ann-4) at the Government Higher Primary School, Dangarwada,
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Panchayat Samiti Khanmdar or any other suitable place.
iii. Issue such appropriate writ order of directions as may be deemed just and proper by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
“Heard.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner even after having declared successful in the recruitment process for appointment to the post of ‘Teacher Grade-III Level-II’, vide order dated 28th March, 2018, is not allowed joining on the pretext of pendnecy of a criminal case.
It is further contended that the controversy raised in the instant writ application is no more res-integra in view of the law declared by the Apex Court of the land in the case of Avtar Singh Versus Union of India and others: 2016 (8) SCC 471, which has been referred to and relied upon by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in somewhat similar factual matrix in the case of Prayag Raj Gocher Versus Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and another: S.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 2718 of 2016, decided on 21st April, 2017, observing thus:
“In the light of the orders passed in the case of Shobha Ram Meena (supra), wherein reliance was placed upon the case of Kamal Singh Meena Vs. Union of India & Others, reported as 2016 (3) W.L.C. (Raj.) 687 and in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and Others, (Special Leave Petition No.20525/2011), reported as 2016 (8)
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SCC 471, the present petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner, in terms of the judgments of the Court in the case of Kamal Singh Meena Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) and of the Apex Court Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra). In the event, it is decided not to appoint the petitioner a reasoned and speaking order shall be passed by the respondents. However if the petitioner is to be appointed, an appropriate order in that regard shall also be passed. The entire exercise be completed within a period of three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that for the present; the petitioner would be satisfied, if the State-respondents are directed to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner in view backdrop of the law declared by the Apex Court of the land in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), within a time frame, which he is ready and willing to address within two weeks hereinafter.
In view of the limited prayer addressed; the instant writ proceedings are closed with a direction to the petitioner to address a comprehensive representation enclosing a copy of the order in the case of Avtar Singh (supra).
In case, a representation is so addressed within the aforesaid period, the Staterespondents are directed to consider and decide the same by a reasoned and speaking order as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. However, in no case later than four weeks from the date of receipt of the representation along with a certified copy of this order.
With the observations and directions, as indicated above, the writ application stands disposed off.
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registered against the petitioner which are as under :-
| Sr. No. |
Case No. | Party’ name | Offences | Decision date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Case No.12/2019 | State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Babli |
Under Sections 341, 376, 455, 327, 323 & 201 of IPC |
19.11.2019 |
| 2. | Case No.09/2019 | State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Babli & Anr. |
Under Sections 307, 324, 341, 323, 34 & 452 of IPC |
16.12.2019 |
| 3. | Case No.298/2018 | State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Babli & Ors. |
Under Sections 341, 323 & 34 of IPC |
02.03.2020 |
| 4. | Case No.142A/2019 | State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Babli |
Under Sections 341, 323, 452 & 458 of IPC |
06.02.2020 |
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appointment to the post. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that the acquittal or discharge by itself cannot lead to presumption that a person has been honourably acquitted/ completely exonerated. But, at the same time, if a person is acquitted of the charges for want of evidence, it would not necessarily lead to inference that the acquittal of the person by the Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction is not honourable.”
“13.It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
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acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character.
17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasized. As held in Mehar Singh case, the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the Respondents are not suitable for being appointed to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.”
“1. The moot point which arises for consideration is whether a benefit of doubt resulting in acquittal of the respondent in a case charged under Sections 302,323,341/34 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] can create an opportunity for the respondent to join as a constable in the Rajasthan Police service.
24. We may also notice this is a clear case where the endeavour was to settle the dispute, albeit not with the job in mind. This is obvious from the recital in the judgment of the Trial Court that the compoundable offences were first compounded during trial but since the offence under Section 302/34 IPC could not be compounded, the Trial Court continued and qua those offences the witnesses turned hostile. We
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are of the view that this can hardly fall under the category of a clean acquittal and the Judge was thus right in using the terminology of benefit of doubt in respect of such acquittal.
25. The judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (supra) on the relevant parameter extracted aforesaid clearly stipulates that where in respect of a heinous or serious nature of crime the acquittal is based on a benefit of reasonable doubt, that cannot make the candidate eligible.
26. We may also note the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 38.3 in Avtar Singh’s case (supra), the employer has to take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules applicable to the employee at the time of taking a decision. It is her say that the issue whether the circular dated 28.03.2017 would apply or not was res integra in view of the earlier order of the learned Judge dated 14.05.2018. She has further contended that, in any case, the circular had come into force and as per the judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (supra) para 38.4, it is the date of decision which is material and as on the date of decision dated 23.05.2017, the said circular was applicable.
27. We may note here that the circular dated 28.03.2017 is undoubtedly very wide in its application. It seeks to give the benefit to candidates including those acquitted by the Court by giving benefit of doubt. However, such circular has to be read in the context of the judicial pronouncements and when this Court has repeatedly opined that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle candidate for appointment, despite the circular, the impugned decision of the competent authority dated 23.05.2017 cannot be said to suffer from infirmity as being in violation of the circular when it is in conformity with the law laid down by this Court.
28. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and the appellants are well within their rights to have issued the order dated 23.05.2017.
29. The consequence is that the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench dated 16.07.2019 and learned Single Judge dated 14.05.2018 are set aside leaving the parties to bear their own costs.”
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(INDERJEET SINGH),J
MG/46
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the High Court should interfere with the rejection of the petitioner's appointment due to pendency of criminal cases where he was acquitted.
Whether the employer has the right to deny appointment to a person with criminal antecedents including serious offences like rape even after acquittal.
Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is exercisable in the present facts.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Avtar Singh vs. Union of IndiaReferred¶25
Avtar Singh Versus Union of India and others: 2016 (8) SCC 471 · Who else cites this
Kamal Singh Meena vs. Union of IndiaReferred¶25
Kamal Singh Meena Vs. Union of India & Others, reported as 2016 (3) W.L.C. (Raj.) 687
State of Rajasthan vs. Dinesh Singh BithuReferred¶41
State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Dinesh Singh Bithu
Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration vs. Pradeep KumarExplained¶48
Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr
The State of Rajasthan vs. Love Kush MeenaExplained¶54
The State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Love Kush Meena reported in AIR 2021 SC 1610 · Who else cites this
RAJESH KUMAR S/o SHRI NAWAL SINGH
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
INDERJEET SINGH
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
