The High Court dismissed writ petitions challenging a Board of Revenue compromise decree. The court held the challenge was not maintainable as the decree did not affect the petitioners' rights and reiterated an earlier land ownership order, citing bars under CPC provisions regarding compromise decrees.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2479/2006
LRs of Basanti Devi & Ors.
----Petitioners
Versus
State of Rajasthan & Ors.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4974/2007
Navin Bhansali & Ors.
----Petitioners Versus
Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer & Ors.
----Respondents
| For Petitioner(s) | : Mr. Ranveer Singh Mehta assisted by Ms. Pallavi Mehta, on VC & Mr. Ankit Bhaskar. Mr. Vikas Balia assisted by Mr. VD Vaishnav. Mr. CR Jakhar. Mr. Akhilesh Rajpurohit. Mr. Hukum Singh. |
|---|---|
| For Respondent(s) | : Mr. JL Purohit Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Rajeev Purohit. Mr. Rajesh Joshi Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Devesh A. Purohit. & Ms. Kamini Joshi. Mr. S.G. Ojha. Dr. Sachin Acharya with Mr. Jitendra Mohan Choudhary. Mr. Ram Dayal Mr. Shashank Ojha. |
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Order
22/11/2021
(2 of 12)
CWP No.2479/2006 :
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed, record of the case from SDO Court, Revenue Appellate Authority and Board of Revenue may kindly be called for and by an appropriate writ, order or direction
(i) The impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 31.01.2006 may kindly be quashed and set aside and all consequential steps taken thereto may also be quashed and set aside.
(ii) It may be declared that on account of judgment of the Board of Revenue, so far as the rights of the petitioners are concerned, they are not at all affected and the respondents may be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioners over their respective parcels of land.
(iii) That the District Administration may be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioners and they should not use their good offices so as to dispossess or otherwise harass the petitioners and to help the members of the ruling political party.
(iv) That the Urban Improvement Trust may be restrained from entertaining any application for the purpose of conversion of land by any of the persons who have purchased the land from Kan Singh.”
CWP No.4974/2007 :
“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the writ petition may kindly be allowed and by an appropriate writ, order of direction:-
(i) The order of Board of Revenue dated 22.3.07 (Annex.29) and the judgment and decree dated 31.1.06 (Annex.28) may kindly be quashed and set aside and all the consequential steps taken thereto may also kindly be quashed and set aside;
(ii) It may be declared that on account of the judgment of Board of Revenue so far as rights of the petitioners are
(3 of 12)
concerned they are not at all effected and the respondents may be restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the petitioners over their respective parcials (Plots) of land.”
(4 of 12)
learned Revenue Appellate Authority was rejected on merits vide its order dated 30.07.2003.
The present petitioners thereafter, filed a review to the second appeal before the learned Board of Revenue, but the same was dismissed on 22.3.2007.
(5 of 12)
Order dated 22.05.2006 :
“Admit. Issue notice.
Meanwhile, status quo shall be maintained on the spot and the implementation of the impugned order dated 31.01.2006 shall remain stayed.”
Order dated 20.08.2007 :
“Admit. Issue notice.
In the meanwhile, status quo shall be maintained on the spot and the implementation of the impugned order dated 31.01.2006 shall remain stayed.
Connect with SBCWP No.2479/2006 titled as Smt. Basanti Devi and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and others).
(6 of 12)
“14. Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A CPC may at this stage be extracted for ready reference:
“ 3.Compromise of suit.— Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or
(7 of 12)
satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise, or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.
3A. Bar to suit – No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”
15. What is emerged as a legislative intent has been considered in extenso by this Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai(Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh and Others, after taking note of the scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A added with effect from 1st February, 1977. The relevant paragraphs are as under-
“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(8 of 12)
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
(9 of 12)
17. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code(Amendment) 1976 w.e.f. 1st February, 1977, the legislature has brought into force Rule 3A to Order 23, which create bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before the Court of competent jurisdiction once and for all.
18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The Court can be instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality attached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, still open to be questioned on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC before the Court.
22. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated compromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated 6 th January, 1984, which was purchased by him from Sampatiya judgment debtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties thereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best, he could seek relief against Sampatiya, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the
(10 of 12)
party(Sampatiya) to the proceedings in the partition suit, which could be examined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity of compromise decree dated 15 th September, 1994 passed by the High Court in the partition suit.
23. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his predecessor Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies available to Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because the appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of the present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment.
24. In the instant case, the suit was instituted in the year 1995 and 25 years have rolled by now and after the finding has been recorded in reference to issue no. 7 regarding the right, title and interest of the suit property against the appellant by the learned trial Judge devolved on the basis of a stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 and not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant, in the given circumstances, remitting the matter back to the learned trial Court to examine the suit filed at the instance of the appellant-plaintiff independently for protection of his right, title or interest being devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 which as alleged to have been executed by one of the party to the compromise(Sampatiya) in the changed
(11 of 12)
circumstances may not serve any purpose more so after the concurrent finding of Courts below have been recorded against the appellant-plaintiff.”
(12 of 12)
agreement to sell, registered power of attorney and the registered sale deed, the challenge is not maintainable, as it was a compromise decree between the concerned parties, and is not affecting the rights of the present petitioners in any manner whatsoever.
The 16 bigha of land in the share of Late Shri Durga Ram/ Smt.Bhikhi Devi/ Kan Singh @ Kana Ram remains the same, and thus, there is no cause of action arising for the present petitioners, at this stage.
Thus, at this stage, the challenge to the compromise decree, which merely reiterates the earlier order of Tehsildar passed on 27.07.1982, is not maintainable at the instance of the present petitioners.
However, it is clarified that the petitioners’ rights, arising out of the agreement to sell, registered power of attorney and the subsequent registered sale deed, would not be affected by this judgment, and the petitioners shall be free to emphasize their rights. Furthermore, the declaratory decree granted shall be binding only upon the respective parties before the second appellate court and shall have no impact upon the rights of the present petitioners.
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J.
SKant/-
3 issues framed by the court
Whether a writ petition challenging a compromise decree is maintainable under Order 23 Rules 3 and 3-A and Section 96(3) of the CPC.
Whether a compromise decree affects the rights of a third party petitioners not involved in the original suit underlying the decree.
Whether the petitioners have a cause of action to challenge a decree reiterating an existing order despite the bar on challenging compromise decrees.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Triloki Nath Singh Vs. Anirudh Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors.Referred¶14
Triloki Nath Singh Vs. Anirudh Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors., reported in (2020) 6 SCC 629 · Who else cites this
Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai (Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh and OthersReferred¶15
Pushpa Devi Bhagat(Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai(Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh and Others
LRs of Basanti Devi & Ors.
Navin Bhansali & Ors.
State of Rajasthan
Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer
DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
