Man Phool and Anr. Vs Gram Panchayat Khaishergarh and Ors.

The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs against the concurrent judgments and decrees dated 30.10.1992 passed by the learned Trial Court and dated 22.03.1995 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, whereby the suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by them stood dismissed.

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For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the parties shall be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

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Pleadings of the Parties : The plaintiffs claim to be proprietors and residents of village Khaishergarh since the time of their forefathers. Plaintiffs No.2 to 4 and plaintiffs No.5 to 7 are stated to be owners of substantial agricultural holdings in the village. It was pleaded that earlier plaintiff No.1 and

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Surja Ram, father of plaintiffs No.2 to 4, owned about 40 acres of land, which later stood transferred to the succeeding generation.

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4.1 The dispute pertains to land measuring 869 kanal 17 marla, recorded in the revenue record as Mushtarka Malkan Hasab Rasad Rakba Khewat. According to the plaintiffs, this land was allotted during consolidation proceedings, whereafter part of it was cultivated by the proprietors, while the remaining portion was utilised for common purposes such as ponds, grazing land, meadows, wells and other miscellaneous purposes. Out of the total land, plaintiffs No.1 to 4 asserted cultivating possession over 9 kanal 4 marla, comprised in Khasra Nos. 76//22/1 (4-9)and 76//21/2/1 (4-15) (hereinafter referred to as the disputed parcel).

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4.2 The cause of action arose when the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, passed an order dated 11.05.1988 directing the Tehsildar to sanction mutation of the entire land in favour of defendant No.1–Gram Panchayat. Pursuant thereto, Mutation No.1171 was sanctioned on 27.05.1988.

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4.3 The plaintiffs alleged that the said order and mutation were illegal, void and without jurisdiction, having been passed without issuing notice or granting an opportunity of hearing to the proprietors. It was further alleged that on the basis of the said mutation, the Gram Panchayat was threatening to dispossess the plaintiffs from the disputed parcel. Since the proprietary body consisted of a large number of persons, the suit was filed in a representative capacity by impleading the proprietary body as defendant No.3.

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Defendant No.3 (proprietary body) was proceeded against ex parte.

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Defendant Nos.1 and 2 contested the suit, asserting that the land in question is shamlat deh, which stood vested in the Gram Panchayat by operation of law under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 as applicable to Haryana. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs were unauthorised occupants and that ejectment proceedings under Section 7 of the Act were already pending before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade. A specific

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objection regarding the bar of jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 13 of the Act was also raised.

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Findings of the Courts Below : Upon framing issues and appreciation of the evidence, the Trial Court held that the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner and the consequent mutation could not be held to be illegal or void. It was further held that the proprietors were not the owners of the suit land. On these findings, the suit was dismissed.

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In the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court and additionally held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the land was shamlat deh or whether it vested in the Gram Panchayat. It was further observed that the impugned order dated 11.05.1988 had not been produced on record and, therefore, could not be examined for legality. The claim for injunction was also declined on the ground that the plaintiffs were facing ejectment through due process of law.

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Submissions in Second Appeal : Learned counsel for the appellants contended that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and others , 2025 AIR (Supreme Court) 4597, lands contributed by proprietors during consolidation but not specifically reserved for common purposes (commonly referred to as bachat land) do not vest in the Gram Panchayat and continue to belong to the proprietors. It was argued that the courts below failed to examine this legal position and, therefore, committed a substantial error of law.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the concurrent findings and submitted that the jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly barred under Section 13 of the 1961 Act and, therefore, no interference is warranted.

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Issues for Consideration : From the rival submissions and the record, the following core issues arise:

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Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question as to whether the suit land is shamlat deh or bachat land and whether it vests in the Gram Panchayat.

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Whether the impugned order dated 11.05.1988 and Mutation No.1171 can be declared illegal by a civil court.

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Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction.

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Analysis and Discussion : The foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim rests upon the assertion that the suit land is not shamlat deh but bachat land, which continues to belong to the proprietors. Determination of this question necessarily involves examination of the consolidation scheme, the purpose for which the land was reserved, its nature of utilisation, and the proprietary status and contribution of the claimants.

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Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 explicitly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide whether any land is or is not shamlat deh and whether it vests or does not vest in the Gram Panchayat. The statutory scheme further provides a complete mechanism under the Act, empowering the Assistant Collector Ist Grade to decide questions of title incidentally while exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act.

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The First Appellate Court, on the basis of revenue record, noticed that a substantial portion of the total land was non-cultivable and was being used for common purposes, thus attracting the definition of shamlat deh. Whether such land, or any part thereof, constitutes bachat land in light of subsequent judicial pronouncements is a matter squarely falling within the domain of the revenue authorities.

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The reliance placed upon State of Haryana v. Jai Singh (supra) does not advance the appellants’ case before a civil court. The said judgment clarifies the substantive rights of proprietors vis-à-vis bachat land. However, it does not dilute or override the statutory bar of jurisdiction under Section 13 of

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the Act. The forum competent to apply the principles laid down in Jai Singh (supra) is the authority under the Act, not the civil court.

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As regards the challenge to the order dated 11.05.1988, the same was not even produced on record. In the absence of the order itself, the civil court could not have examined the allegations of violation of natural justice. Moreover, mutation entries are fiscal in nature and do not, by themselves, confer or extinguish title.

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With respect to the relief of injunction, it is not the plaintiffs’ case that they were being forcibly dispossessed. On the contrary, ejectment proceedings under Section 7 of the Act were admittedly pending. An injunction cannot be granted to restrain lawful proceedings before a competent statutory authority.

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Conclusion : The controversy raised by the plaintiffs essentially pertains to the nature of the land and the question of vesting, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the civil court. The courts below have, therefore, rightly declined to grant the reliefs sought.

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