Subhash Chander Vs Divisional Forest Officer and Others

The present application has been filed under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking review of the judgment dated 01.04.2016 whereby the award dated 29.05.2009 passed by the learned Labour Court was modified and the applicant-petitioner was held entitled to compensation of Rs 2,00,000/- instead of Rs 20,000/-. Along with the review application, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also been filed seeking condonation of an inordinate delay of 3225 days in preferring the present review petition.

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Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that vide communication dated 08.04.2019, the name of the applicant had been recommended for regularization of service with effect from 01.10.2003. According to him, the said communication came to the knowledge of the

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GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh

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CM-4121-CWP-2025 in/and -2RA-CW-130-2025 in CWP-5753-2011

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applicant only subsequently, whereafter a legal notice dated 04.10.2021 was served upon the respondent-department. Since no decision was taken thereon, the applicant approached this Court by filing CWP No.23671 of 2021, which was disposed of vide order dated 25.11.2021. Thereafter, the claim of the applicant for regularization under the policy dated 01.10.2003 came to be rejected vide order dated 31.03.2022. The said order came to be challenged by filing CWP No.28598 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.11.2024 with liberty to avail an alternative remedy. It is contended that the aforesaid circumstances constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay and also furnish a ground for review of the judgment dated 01.04.2016. Learned counsel, therefore, prays that the delay of 3225 days in filing the present review petition be condoned and the judgment dated 01.04.2016 be reviewed and recalled by allowing the present application.

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I have heard learned counsel for the applicant at length and have thoughtfully considered the submissions advanced as well as the material available on record.

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Upon a thoughtful consideration of the material on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present application deserves dismissal, both on the ground of limitation as well as on merits. Tersely put, the applicant seeks to invoke the review jurisdiction of this Court nearly nine years after the judgment sought to be reviewed, on the strength of events which admittedly came into existence only subsequent thereto. Such an endeavor is wholly misconceived in law.

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At the outset, the application seeking condonation of delay is

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GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this documentliable to be dismissed. The judgment sought to be reviewed was rendered on Chandigarh

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01.04.2016, whereas the present review petition has been instituted after an inordinate delay of 3225 days . The explanation furnished by the applicant rests entirely upon events which admittedly transpired subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment under review. Such subsequent developments neither explain nor justify the applicant's failure to invoke the review jurisdiction of this Court within the period prescribed by law.

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The communication dated 08.04.2019, the legal notice dated 04.10.2021, the proceedings in CWP No.23671 of 2021, the rejection order dated 31.03.2022 and the subsequent writ petition challenging the said order all pertain to the applicant's independent claim for regularization of service. None of these events bears any nexus whatsoever with the applicant's omission to seek review of the judgment dated 01.04.2016 within the prescribed period of limitation. Consequently, they cannot constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the inordinate delay in filing the present review petition.

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Nor can the applicant derive any benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The benefit of exclusion of time contemplated therein is available only where a litigant has prosecuted, with due diligence and in good faith, another civil proceeding concerning the same matter in issue before a Court which was unable to entertain the same owing to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. The proceedings relied upon by the applicant satisfy none of these statutory preconditions. They related to an altogether distinct cause of action concerning regularization of service and were neither proceedings before a Court lacking jurisdiction nor proceedings which failed for any reason envisaged under Section 14 of the Act. GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24I attest to the accuracy andConsequently, the period spent in pursuing such proceedings cannot be integrity of this document Chandigarh

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excluded while computing limitation for filing the present review petition.

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It is equally well settled that although the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, such liberality cannot be stretched to condone gross, inordinate and unexplained delay. The explanation offered must be bona fide and must satisfactorily account for the delay. In the present case, the explanation furnished by the applicant neither accounts for nor justifies the inordinate delay of 3225 days in seeking review of the judgment dated 01.04.2016. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, therefore, deserves dismissal.

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Even assuming that the delay were liable to be condoned, the review petition does not disclose any ground warranting exercise of review jurisdiction by this Court. The contours of the review jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC are too well settled to warrant any elaborate discussion. The power of review is an extremely limited one. It is intended to correct patent errors apparent on the face of the record and not to enable a dissatisfied litigant to secure a rehearing on merits. A review is, therefore, by no means an appeal in disguise. The jurisdiction may be invoked only where there exists (i) an error apparent on the face of the record; (ii) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced when the judgment was rendered; or (iii) any other sufficient reason analogous thereto.

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It is trite and well settled that a judgment is required to be tested

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GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24 I attest to the accuracy andon the basis of the material which existed and was available to the Court at integrity of this document Chandigarh

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the time of its rendition. Subsequent events, unless expressly recognised by law, cannot be relied upon to reopen a concluded adjudication by invoking the limited review jurisdiction of this Court.

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Tested on the aforesaid parameters, the present application is wholly misconceived. The applicant has failed to point out any patent or self-evident error apparent on the face of the judgment dated 01.04.2016. Equally, no case of discovery of any new and important matter or evidence has been made out. The communication dated 08.04.2019 itself came into existence more than three years after the judgment sought to be reviewed. A document which was not in existence on the date the judgment was rendered can, by no stretch of imagination, constitute "discovery of new and important matter or evidence" within the meaning of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. At its highest, the communication dated 08.04.2019 constitutes a subsequent development which may, if otherwise permissible in law, furnish an independent cause of action. However, such subsequent development cannot be invoked to reopen or review a judgment which had already attained finality.

¶34

In essence, the applicant seeks a rehearing of the matter on merits by inviting this Court to revisit the conclusions already recorded. Such an exercise falls squarely outside the limited ambit of review jurisdiction. Reappreciation of evidence, reconsideration of findings already recorded or substitution of one possible view by another is the province of an appellate forum and not of a Court exercising review jurisdiction.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the present application fails on two distinct and independent grounds. Firstly,

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GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this documentthe applicant has failed to establish any sufficient cause warranting Chandigarh

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condonation of the inordinate delay of 3225 days in filing the review petition. More importantly, even on merits, no ground recognized under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has been made out for exercise of the limited review jurisdiction of this Court.

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Accordingly, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay as well as the review application are dismissed.

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(KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE

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July 22^nd , 2026 Gurpreet Singh Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No

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GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.24 13:24 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh

Subhash Chander v. Divisional Forest Officer and Others

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Subhash Chander v. Divisional Forest Officer and Others

Case brief

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