Sucha Singh Vs Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda and Another

The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of Award dated 13.03.2026 (Annexure P-10), vide which the application filed by the petitioner-workman under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for seeking the computation and payment of wages to the tune of Rs.45,46,873/- of various wages payable to the petitioner by and on behalf of respondent No.2Cooperative Multipurpose Society, has been rejected.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia submits that the petitioner, who was working as Secretary in respondent No.2-Society, was wrongly suspended on 30.09.2011 and subsequently illegally dismissed from service on 28.06.2012. The appeal of the petitioner was allowed by the Deputy Registrar on 21.03.2014, who ordered his reinstatement with full back wages. The said order was upheld by the Joint Registrar on 04.09.2014. However, the Special Secretary, Cooperation in the challenge laid before RITIKA 2026.07.13 17:11I attest to the accuracy andhim, vide order dated 12.05.2015, remanded the matter to pass a fresh order integrity of this document Chandigarh

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after following due procedure. In compliance with the remand order, respondent-Society passed resolutions dated 19.06.2017 and 20.09.2017 reinstating the petitioner in service with back wages. However, despite reinstatement, respondent No.2-Society failed to pay the salary and back wages due to the petitioner from 28.06.2012 onwards, constraining the petitioner to file an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is contended that although the petitioner produced the calculation chart and supporting evidence, the Industrial Tribunal dismissed his claim on 13.03.2026 by wrongly holding that he had no pre-existing right, as his termination had not been challenged. The Tribunal failed to consider the resolutions reinstating the petitioner with back wages and ignored the material evidence on record. Learned counsel submits that since the right of the petitioner to back wages already stood recognized by the respondent No.2-Society, his claim under Section 33-C(2) was maintainable. Therefore, the impugned award, being based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence, deserves to be set aside.

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Per contra , learned State Counsel submits that the impugned order was rightly passed after due appreciation of the facts and the material on record.

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Heard learned counsel on either side and perused the judicial record with their able assistance.

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A perusal of the case record reveals that the learned Tribunal, after considering the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, recorded a finding that although the dismissal of the petitioner was initially set aside on account of non-compliance with the prescribed Service Rules, the matter had subsequently been remanded to the respondent No.2-Society for conducting

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fresh proceedings. Pursuant thereto, respondent No.2 conducted a fresh

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enquiry after following the prescribed procedure and affording the petitioner adequate opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal further observed that the resolutions dated 19.06.2017 and 20.09.2017, whereby the petitioner was allegedly reinstated with back wages, had also been subsequently been declared illegal and cancelled by the competent authority. Moreover, the petitioner had never challenged the final orders passed after the fresh enquiry. Consequently, the Tribunal held that no pre-existing or adjudicated right in favour of the petitioner for claiming back wages existed. It is settled position of law that proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are confined only to computation of an existing or admitted entitlement and cannot be invoked for adjudication of disputed rights.

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At this juncture, a gainful reference can be made to Section 33(C) (2) of the 1947 Act, bare language of which reads thus:-

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"Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government] [Substituted by Act 36 of 1964, Section 19, for Section 33-C (w.e.f. 19.12.1964). ][within a period not exceeding three months:] [ Inserted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 19 (w.e.f. 21.8.1984).][Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit."

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Regarding this, reliance can be placed upon the judgment

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passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.813 of 2022 titled as M/s Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another , wherein it was observed that:-

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"6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, demanding difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent No.2 that he was working with the appellant as a salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical stand that respondent No.2 was never engaged by the appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the appellant that

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respondent No.2 had never worked in the establishment in the post of salesman. Therefore, once there was a serious dispute that respondent No.2 had worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a very serious dispute raised by the appellant that respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for the Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and adjudicate upon the employer-employee relationship between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court's jurisdiction under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 235).

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In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not.

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7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the fact of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act."

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In the present case, the entitlement of the petitioner to back

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wages itself remained disputed, and no final adjudication or enforceable

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order recognizing such entitlement was in existence after the fresh enquiry proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to point out any perversity or patent illegality in the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal, nor has it been shown that the said findings are contrary to the pleadings or evidence available on record.

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Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case coupled with the settled principle of law as cited hereinabove, no ground for interference by this Court in the present petition is made out and the same is hereby dismissed.

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Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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(KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 07, 2026 Ritika Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No

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RITIKA 2026.07.13 17:11 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh

Sucha Singh v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda and Another

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Sucha Singh v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda and Another

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