Harmit Singh Sidhu Vs State of Punjab and Others

The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ of quowarranto for quashing/setting aside the promotion of respondent No.4 made vide order dated 03.01.2017 (Annexure P-4) to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil).

¶14

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No.4 was not fulfilling the condition of 05 years experience as a Work Munshi/Mistri, as contemplated under ‘Punjab Trust Services (Recruitment and Condition of Services) Rules, 2015,’ when he was given promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil). He further submits that he was also not in the zone of consideration for promotion as he was at Sr. No.11 against 07 vacancies. Therefore, the promotion of respondent No.4, to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), is totally illegal and arbitrary and is liable to be quashed.

¶15

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶16

2

¶17

CWP-16084-2026

¶18

He further submits that promotion of similarly situated person, namely Sh. Vijay Kumar s/o Sh. Mahesh Kumar, made to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil), vide same impugned order, has also been challenged by the petitioner in CWP No.7291 of 2024 titled as ‘Harmit Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab and others’ , which was admitted vide order dated 22.04.2024 (Annexure P-8) and now the same has been ordered to be listed for hearing on 04.11.2026.

¶19

On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State counsel and learned counsel for respondent No.3 have put in appearance and questioned the locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the promotion of respondent No.4 as nothing has been stated in the petition about the status of the petitioner and how he is aggrieved against the promotion of respondent No.4. They further submit that the petitioner is a Journalist which is clear from representation dated 07.11.2023 (Annexure P-7) submitted by the petitioner against the promotion of respondent No.4. They further submit that the promotion of respondent No.4 to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) was made vide order dated 03.07.2017 (Annexure P-4), as a stopgap arrangement due to shortage of work-force. and the instant petition has been filed after an inordinate delay of 09 years and 04 months. They further submits that respondent No.4 was appointed against Group ‘C’ post on 22.12.2014, and thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) as a stop-gap arrangement on 03.07.2017. Since respondent No.4 has already acquired the requisite experience of 05 years for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) way back in the year 2019, therefore, his promotion

¶20

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶21

3

¶22

CWP-16084-2026

¶23

made in the year 2017 cannot be questioned at this belated stage.

¶24

In response to the contention raised by learned State counsel and counsel for respondent No.3 qua locus standi of the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that any person can raise grievance against an illegal appointment by way of writ of quowarranto and, therefore, the instant petition is maintainable. He has placed reliance upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal : (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 501 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant documents with their able assistance. 6. Firstly, the petitioner, who is not a member of the service has no locus standi to question the promotion of respondent No.4 made to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) as a stopgap arrangement. As per settled law, only an employee, working in the department, who is fully eligible to hold the post, can legitimately challenge the appointment/promotion of another employee. However, in the present case, the petitioner who is an outsider and has nothing to do with the service of respondent No.4 has no locus standi to question the promotion of respondent No.4. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Satbir Singh and another Vs. State of Haryana and

¶25

others : 2026 NCPHHC 18348 and other connected cases decided on 19.01.2026, wherein it has been held as under :-

¶26

“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant as well as petitioner(s) and after perusing the records, it transpires that it is imperative to examine the threshold issue of locus standi, particularly in the context of service jurisprudence, where the contours of maintainability are

¶27

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶28

CWP-16084-2026

¶29

4

¶30

well-defined and narrowly circumscribed. The law consistently mandates that service disputes are essentially personal and individual in character, and therefore, only a person directly and substantially aggrieved by the impugned action is entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Any dilution of this settled principle would not only distort the framework of service law but also open the floodgates to meddlesome, motivated, and speculative litigation.

¶31

5. A Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. The Collector, District Raigad 2012 INSC 126 , while speaking through Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan made the following observation:-

¶32

44. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ExPresident was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead the evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eyes of law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a state propration valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons. Under the garb of being necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis, as the person wants to become a party in a

¶33

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶34

CWP-16084-2026

¶35

5

¶36

case, has to establish that he has a proprietary right which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. (Vide: Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 385.; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Ors., AIR 1976 Supreme Court 578.; Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2602.; Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33; and Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company and Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 766). The High Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry. The case of the appellant has not been considered in correct perspective at all.

¶37

6. A Three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 INSC 204 while speaking through Justice K. Ramaswamy observed as under :-

¶38

“75. Sri Harish Chander, admittedly was the Sr. Vice President at the relevant time. The contention of Sri Thakur of the need to evaluate the comparative merits of Mr. Harish Chander and Mr. Kalyansundaram a seniormost Member for appointment as President would not be gone into in a public interest litigation. Only in a proceedings initiated by an aggrieved person it may be open to be considered. This writ petition is also not a writ of quo-warranto. In service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person i.e. nonappointee to assail the legality of the offending action. Third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Only public law declaration would be made at the behest of the petitioner, a public spirited person.”

¶39

7. A Three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar 1975 INSC 333 , while speaking through Justice Sarkarai made the following observation:-

¶40

33. This Court has laid down in a number of

¶41

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶42

CWP-16084-2026

¶43

6

¶44

decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application , though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is - necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter (See State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR 28; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, 1962 Supp 1 SCR 1; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue Orissa, (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 828; State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2112; Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal and Co., AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2720. )

¶45

39. To distinguish such applicants from “strangers”, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?” Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by

¶46

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶47

CWP-16084-2026

¶48

7

¶49

the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals? ”

¶50

8. In the case of R. v. London Country Keepers of the Peace of Justice, (1890) 25 QBD 357 , the Court has held:

¶51

“A person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another may be annoyed by the said findings. He may also feel that what he thought to be a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Magistrate.

¶52

He thus may be said to be a person annoyed but not a person aggrieved, entitle to prefer an appeal against such order.”

¶53

9. A Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra 2012 INSC 512 while speaking through Dr. Justice B.S Chauhan observed :-

¶54

“7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons .

¶55

Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to . The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the

¶56

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶57

CWP-16084-2026

¶58

8

¶59

writ jurisdiction of the courts . It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same . (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 Supreme Court 728; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996(3) RCR (Civil) 565 : AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2736; and Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784 ).

¶60

8. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The Expression, "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised . (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1719 : 1974 2 SCC 387; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1361 : 1977 3 SCC 592. )

¶61

xx xx xx xx xx 22. Thus, from the above it is evident that under ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus-standi to raise any grievance whatsoever . However, in the exceptional circumstances as referred to above, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, in articulation or poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can grind his own axe,

¶62

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶63

CWP-16084-2026

¶64

9

¶65

approaches the court, then the court may examine the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if his bona fides are doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the opinion of the court, requires consideration, the court may proceed suo- motu, in such respect.”

¶66

10. The existence of a legal right is the sine qua non for invoking the writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts under Article 226. A person cannot beheard as a party unless they qualify as an "aggrieved person," which requires demonstration of a particularized legal injury or prejudice to an interest distinct from that of the general public. The mere desire that the law be properly administered, or a generalized concern regarding illegality, does not confer locus standi. The petitioner must establish that they have been deprived of or denied a legal right, and that such deprivation constitutes an injury to a legally protected interest personal to them. Without this legal peg upon which to hang a justiciable claim, the court lacks the jurisdictional foundation to entertain the grievance. Reliance in this regard may also be placed upon the judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, AIR 1999 SC 943 .

¶67

11. The foundational principle governing locus standi, particularly in service jurisprudence, is that only a person who has suffered a legal injury can maintain an action before a court of law. A "legal right" is an entitlement or benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law, and the existence of such a right is a condition precedent for invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mere harm, annoyance, or sentimental grievance, termed damnum sine injuria, does not confer the status of an "aggrieved person." To be considered aggrieved, an individual must demonstrate that they have been deprived of a legal right or that their legally protected interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized. A person having merely a remote or tenuous interest, or who initiates litigation driven by personal animosity, or even one who professes to act in public interest as a self-styled vigilant, cannot claim locus standi, as they lack the "legal peg" upon which a justiciable claim can be hung.

¶68

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶69

10

¶70

CWP-16084-2026

¶71

12. A stranger to the lis, one who has no proprietary or particular interest in the subject matter of the dispute is strictly prohibited from meddling in judicial proceedings. In service jurisprudence, it is settled law that the legality of an appointment, promotion, or disciplinary action can only be assailed by the person directly aggrieved, such as the non-appointee or the punished employee. A third party, including a complainant or whistleblower, has no locus standi to canvass the correctness of service actions. Such a person may at best lead evidence as a witness, but cannot assume the status of an adversarial litigant.

¶72

13. The whistleblower/complainant, despite having exposed irregularities, remains a stranger to the employeremployee lis and cannot be permitted to become a party to the proceedings.

¶73

14. In view of the above, the present application stands dismissed.”

¶74

Further the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner after a period of 09 years and 04 months from the date of promotion of respondent No.4 and consequently, the same cannot be entertained at this belated stage as it is a well settled proposition of law that an aggrieved person has to approach the Court within a reasonable time. Entertaining such a stale claim would unsettle rights which have long since crystallized. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai)

¶75

A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary

¶76

and others : 2009 (2) SCT 24 , while referring to the issue of delay and laches, had held as follows:-

¶77

“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other

¶78

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶79

CWP-16084-2026

¶80

11

¶81

circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769) . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

¶82

9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR 1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 329) , Sir Barnes had stated:

¶83

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

¶84

10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under

¶85

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶86

CWP-16084-2026

¶87

12

¶88

Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

¶89

11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987 Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

¶90

12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”

¶91

In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in

¶92

Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346 , while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as under:-

¶93

“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that

¶94

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶95

CWP-16084-2026

¶96

13

¶97

services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f. 01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it rather appears that institution of the petition by the appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC 278 , observed:

¶98

“15. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cutoff date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] ”

¶99

11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538 , it was held by the Supreme Court:

¶100

“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this

¶101

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶102

CWP-16084-2026

¶103

14

¶104

behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios……............... Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to redo the seniority had by them in various cadres/grades though in the same services according to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage….”

¶105

12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”

¶106

9. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.

¶107

State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687 , while rejecting the claim of additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as

¶108

under:-

¶109

“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had even improved/acquired higher qualifications before 19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference between the employees working with the Punjab Government, holding corresponding post and the employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners that their claim would be covered in terms of decision dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and others .

¶110

4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioners would not require any consideration on merits and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches.

¶111

5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand

¶112

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶113

15

¶114

CWP-16084-2026

¶115

retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012. Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated more than 10 years back.

¶116

6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court. There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that similarly situated employees had approached this Court and have been granted releif.

¶117

7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman , U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 : (2006)11 SCC 464 . In such case, certain employees raised the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of 58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon such judgment, some of the employees, who had already superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The judgment of the High Court was challenged before the Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2 SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T. 26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347 , it was opined that persons who approached the Court at a belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here under:-

¶118

“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who

¶119

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶120

CWP-16084-2026

¶121

16

¶122

were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this court in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik, 2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a serious question that arises for consideration is whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same, collected their post-retirement benefits, can such persons be given the relief in the light of the subsequent decision delivered by this court?

¶123

6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not?

¶124

xx xx xx

¶125

16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years' salary and

¶126

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶127

CWP-16084-2026

¶128

17

¶129

increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others.

¶130

(Emphasis Supplied).”

¶131

8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314 . In the case of Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on 31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as follows:-

¶132

“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of his rights and enforces the same in court within reasonable time. The judgment in another case does not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions can be dismissed on account of delay and laches. As has already been noticed above in the present case as well, the petitioner joined service in the year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service from the due date more than five years after his retirement referring to a judgment of this court and filed the petition claiming the same relief.

¶133

12. The petitioner retired from service on 31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the

¶134

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶135

CWP-16084-2026

¶136

18

¶137

petitioner during his service career, was sought to be raised more than five years after his retirement, the claim made at such a late stage deserves to be dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.

¶138

13. Considering the enunciation of law, as referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account of delay and laches.”

¶139

9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT 664 . Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in Saroj Kumar's case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit had become time barred.

¶140

10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ 502 . In M.R. Gupta's case(supra), it had been categorically held that so long as an employee “is in service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service”.

¶141

11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that

¶142

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶143

19

¶144

CWP-16084-2026

¶145

may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated employees .

¶146

12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam's case (supra), the petitioners herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches .

¶147

13. Ordered accordingly.”

¶148

So far as the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.4 does not fulfill the required condition of 05 years experience for the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) as he joined against Group ‘C’ post (Work Munshi/Mason), vide order dated 22.12.2014 is concerned, the said contention cannot be accepted as firstly, the said promotion has been made as a stop-gap arrangement and is not a regular promotion. Secondly, the said experience of 05 years has been completed by respondent No.4 in the year 2019 and his promotion made in the year 2017 cannot be questioned at this belated stage once he had already acquired the experience of 05 years way back in the year 2019. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana and others : 1979(1) SCC 168 had the occasion to consider a similar issue, wherein a confirmed Statistical Officer was appointed as Chief Inspector of Shops. After he had worked for about ten months on the said post, he was transferred to the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer because the Government had taken a decision that the posts of Statistical Officer and Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer should be made interchangeable. However, the Rules were not amended in conformity with the said decision. The employee continued in his new post for about nine years whereupon he was reverted on the ground that he was

¶149

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶150

20

¶151

CWP-16084-2026

¶152

not qualified for the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer under Rule 4(1) of the Punjab Labour Services (Class I & II) Rules, 1955, which required the experience for five years in the working of labour laws as Labour Inspector or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops or Wage Inspector. The question which came up for consideration before Hon’ble the Supreme Court was whether his appointment was wholly void and ineffective or merely irregular. Their Lordships’ have held that the appointment as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer was irregular and not void since the employee did not possess the requisite experience but as soon as he acquired the necessary experience mentioned in the relevant Rules, his appointment must be regarded as having been regularised. It was further held that the employee must be deemed to have been appointed to that post only on the expiry of a period of five years calculated from the date when he was appointed Chief Inspector of Shops. The said judgment has been been followed and applied by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Buddhi Nath Chaudhary Vs. Abahi Kumar : (2001) 3 SCC 328 and Tridip Kumar Dingal and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others : (2009) 1 SCC 768 and by this Court in Kulbir Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and others : 2024

¶153

NCPHHC 9363.

¶154

So far as the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that similar writ petition bearing No.CWP-7291-2024 filed by the petitioner, wherein the promotion of one Vijay Kumar made to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on a stopgap arrangement, vide same impugned order, has been challenged, was admitted by this Court is

¶155

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

¶156

21

¶157

CWP-16084-2026

¶158

concerned, the said contention is also liable to be rejected as admission of one case is no bar for deciding another similar matter. Every writ petition has to be decided independently on the basis of its own facts and pleadings on record. Consequently, the admission of another writ petition cannot be treated as a precedent or a ground to grant relief in the present case.

¶159

Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the settled law, the instant petition, being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed, with costs of Rs.50,000/- to be deposited with High Court Lawyers Welfare Fund within a period of one month from today failing which, the Deputy Commissioner, Bathinda, is directed to recover the same as arrears of land revenue.

¶160

20.07.2026 kothiyal		(NAMIT KUMAR) JUDGE
	Whether speaking/reasoned:	Yes/No
	Whether Reportable:	Yes/No

¶161

VINOD KOTHIYAL 2026.07.24 13:58 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document

Harmit Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Harmit Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Joginder Singh Vs Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. and Ors.

Joginder Singh Vs Punjab State Power Corporations Ltd. Patiala and Ors.

Maninder Singh and Others Vs State of Punjab and Others

Bala Vs State of Punjab and Others

Jatinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Ors.

Sakinder Singh Vs Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. and Ors.