persons could n o t produce any permit or license f or possession of the said contrab a nd. Accordingly, th e present FIR was registered and t h e accused were arrested. 3. Le a rned counsel for the petitioner c ontends that the petitioner has b een falsely implicat e d in the present case and has no c onnection with the alleged recovery. He submits that the petitioner is in custody sinc e 06.11.2024 and as per the cust o dy certificate, he h a s undergone custody of 01 year, 03 months and 23 days. It is fur t her argued that the c hallan has already been present e d before the trial Court and the t rial is likely to tak e considerable time for its concl u sion. Therefore, no useful pur p ose would be serv e d by keeping the petitioner i n further judicial custody and the petitioner deser v es the concession of regular bail. 4. Pe r contra, learned State counsel h as opposed the present petition and submitted that t h e recovery effected in the prese n t case is 1 Kg 639 grams of ch a ras, which falls wit h in the category of commercial q uantity. He further submits that the petitioner was a pprehended at the spot and the contraband was recovered from the vehicle in whic h he was present. It is argued that in view of the rigours of Sectio n 37 of the NDPS A ct, the petitioner is not entitle d to the concession of regular b ail. Learned counse l further submits that there is one more case under the NDPS pen d ing against the petit i oner. Learned State counsel su b mits that there is sufficient mat e rial on record conne c ting the petitioner with the alleg e d offence and, therefore, the pre s ent petition deserve s to be dismissed. 5. I h a ve heard learned counsel for th e parties and have gone through the record of the ca s e with their able assistance. 6. In t he present case, the recovery e ff ected is 1 Kg 639 grams of ch a ras, which is comm e rcial quantity. In cases involvin g commercial quantity, the rigour s of Section 37 of t h e NDPS Act are attracted. As per the said provision, bail ca n be granted only if t he Court is satisfied that there a re reasonable grounds for belie v ing
