Dismissed¶12

(O&M) Mahinder Singh, etc. v. Ved Pal, etc.

Punjab & Haryana HC6 Nov 2025RSA/892/2002

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Ancestral coparcenary property; four generations male line test; mutation of inheritance No.615; Hindu Succession Act 1956 Section 8 absolute separate property; self-acquired property; legal necessity; cloth business Kotkapura; due enquiry by vendee; Article 59 Limitation Act 1963 three years; suit to set aside sale deed time-barred; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Kanpur v. Chander Sen AIR 1986 SC 1753; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (1987) 1 RCR (Rent) 225; Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur 2019 (3) RCR (Civil) 529; Regular Second Appeal Punjab and Haryana High Court; no substantial question of law; appeal dismissed.

What did the court decide?

None; appeal dismissed with no order as to costs ¶12

(O&M) Mahinder Singh, etc. Vs Ved Pal… — Succession and Inheritance | Punjab & Haryana HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; appeal dismissed with no order as to costs

¶12

Issue for consideration

Whether the suit property was ancestral coparcenary property in the hands of defendants No.2 to 4, such that they, as fathers, could not have alienated it without legal necessity. +3 more

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Court's answer

The property was not ancestral in the hands of defendants No.2 to 4: the Jamabandi showed the land in the name of Harbans Singh, and mutation of inheritance No.615 dated 20.11.1976 showing devolution on his four sons and a daughter does not by itself establish ancestry; since ancestral coparcenary property must descend undivided through at least four generations of the male line and there is no evidence Harbans Singh had himself inherited it from his father, the property devolving on his sons under mutation No.615 cannot be treated as ancestral.

¶7

Ratio / Principle

The inheritance took place in 1976, after enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; as held in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen and Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, and reaffirmed in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, property devolving under Section 8 of the Act is not ancestral coparcenary property but becomes the absolute and separate property of the heir, so the shares obtained by defendants No.2 to 4 from Harbans Singh were their individual properties.

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Key takeaways

Since there is no proof that Harbans Singh derived title from his forefathers, the property in defendants No.2 to 4's hands was self-acquired, and they were competent to alienate it.ratio¶9
Even assuming arguendo the property was ancestral, the alienation was for legal necessity: the sale deed recited the vendors' need for money to establish their cloth business at Kotkapura, DW1 Surinder Singh made due enquiries on behalf of the vendee before the transaction, and evidence corroborated opening of M/s Sardar Cloth House at Kotkapura; these constitute genuine family necessity and there is no perversity in the Appellate Court's appreciation warranting interference.ratio¶10

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Regular Second Appeal (RSA-892-2002, decided 06.11.2025) — Plaintiffs, sons of the vendor brothers, challenged a registered sale deed dated 10.10.1988 (consideration ₹3,69,750/-) as an alienation by fathers of ancestral coparcenary property without legal necessity. Held, dismissing the appeal: (i) the land stood in the name of Harbans Singh and devolved by mutation No.615 dated 20.11.1976 on his four sons and a daughter; absent proof of undivided descent through at least four generations of the male line, and since the inheritance occurred after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property devolving under Section 8 is the absolute and separate property of the heir (relying on Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen, AIR 1986 SC 1753; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 RCR (Rent) 225; Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, 2019 (3) RCR (Civil) 529) — the vendors' shares were self-acquired and they were competent to alienate; (ii) even assuming ancestry, the sale was for genuine family necessity (establishing the cloth business M/s Sardar Cloth House at Kotkapura, with due enquiries by the vendee's witness DW1 Surinder Singh) and the appellate finding suffered from no perversity; (iii) the suit filed on 09.10.1992, nearly four years after the deed, was barred by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a challenge to alienation requiring setting aside the deed within three years. No substantial question of law arose; appeal dismissed with no order as to costs.

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RSA-892-2002

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

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RSA-892-2002

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Reserved on 03.11.2025 Date of decision: 6.11.2025

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Mahinder Singh and others ...Appellants

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Versus

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Ved Pal and others ...Respondents

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

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Argued by: Mr. Shailender Kashyap, Advocate and Mr. Prashant Sethi, Advocate for appellant Nos.1 to 4.

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Mr. M.K. Singla, Advocate with Mr. Puran Prakash, Advocate and Ms. Bhoomika, Advocate for appellant No.5.

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Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Sr. Advocate with

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Mr. Devansh Sharma, Advocate for respondent No.1.

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¶14

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

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The plain*ffs are in Regular Second Appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2001 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, whereby the appeal of defendant No.1-Ved Pal was allowed and the decree for possession granted by the trial Court vide judgment dated 30.11.1999, was reversed.

¶16

Facts and Pleadings : The material facts are largely undisputed. Three brothers, namely Sumer Singh, Ajmer Singh, and Harkishan, sons of Harbans Singh, sold the suit property to defendant No.1-Ved Pal by way of a registered sale deed dated 10.10.1988 for a considera*on of ₹3,69,750/-.

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Page N: 1 of total 4 Pages

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YOGESH MEHTA 2025.11.06 12:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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RSA-892-2002

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The vendors are defendants No.2 to 4 herein. Plainffs are their respecve sons — plainffs No.1 & 2 being sons of Sumer Singh, plainffs No.3 & 4 sons of Ajmer Singh, and plain*ff No.5 son of Harkishan.

¶21

The plainffs challenged the aforesaid sale, asserng that the land was ancestral coparcenary property and that defendants No.2 to 4, as fathers, could not have alienated it without any legal necessity. They further alleged absence of bona fides in the transac*on.

¶22

Defendants No.2 to 4 were proceeded against ex parte. Defendant No.1-Ved Pal, the purchaser, contested the suit, denying the ancestral nature of the property and pleading that the sale was supported by legal necessity , namely, the marriages of the sons, repayment of loans, and establishment of business. He also raised objecons as to limitaon and non-joinder of par*es.

¶23

Findings of the Courts Below : The trial Court decreed the suit, holding the property to be ancestral and the sale unsupported by legal necessity. However, the First Appellate Court , on re-appreciaon of the evidence, reversed those findings and dismissed the suit, by holding that the suit land was ancestral but pares did not cons*tute joint Hindu family and suit property was not coparcenary. It further held that the sale was for legal necessity ; and that the suit, filed a@er three years of the impugned sale deed, was barred by limita8on .

¶24

Submissions : Learned counsel for the appellants-plain*ffs contended that the Appellate Court erred in discarding the findings of ancestry recorded by the trial Court, and that the plea of legal necessity was not proved by cogent evidence. The respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment.

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Considera�on and Analysis : As per Jamabandi for 1973-74 (Ex.P-5), the land stood in the name of Harbans Singh , father of defendants

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Page N: 2 of total 4 Pages

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YOGESH MEHTA 2025.11.06 12:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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RSA-892-2002

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No.2 to 4. Mutaon of inheritance bearing No.615 dated 20.11.1976, Ex.P-1 shows that on his death, the property devolved upon his four sons — Sumer, Ajmer, Shamsher, and Harkishan along with a daughter, Smt. Sundar Kaur. This, however, by itself does not establish that the property was ancestral. To qualify as ancestral coparcenary property, it must be shown that the property has descended undivided through at least four genera8ons of the male line. There is no evidence that Harbans Singh had himself inherited the property from his father. Consequently, the property that devolved upon his sons under mutaon No.615 cannot be treated as ancestral in their hands.

¶30

Moreover, the inheritance took place in 1976, long a@er the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. As held in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen (AIR 1986 SC 1753) and Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar [(1987) 1 RCR (Rent) 225], property devolving under Secon 8 of the Act is not ancestral coparcenary property but becomes the absolute and separate property of the heir. Hence, the shares obtained by defendants No.2 to 4 from Harbans Singh were their individual properes. The principle was reaffirmed in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur [2019 (3) RCR (Civil) 529], wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only if the property is inherited by a male ancestor from his father, grandfather, or greatgrandfather prior to 1956, does it retain its coparcenary character.

¶31

Since there is no proof that Harbans Singh derived *tle from his forefathers, the property in defendants No.2 to 4’s hands was self-acquired, and they were competent to alienate it.

¶32

Even assuming arguendo that the property was ancestral, the First Appellate Court rightly found that the aliena*on was for legal necessity. The sale deed (Ex.DW-4/1) expressly recites that the vendors required money to establish their cloth business at Kotkapura, having earlier mi-

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Page N: 3 of total 4 Pages

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YOGESH MEHTA 2025.11.06 12:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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RSA-892-2002

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grated from West Pakistan and previously engaged in hawking clothes. DW1 Surinder Singh tesfied that he made due enquiries regarding such necessity on behalf of vendee Ved Pal before the transacon, and evidence corroborated that the vendors had indeed opened M/s Sardar Cloth House at Kotkapura. These facts constute genuine family necessity recognised in law. There is no perversity in the Appellate Court’s appreciaon of this evidence warran*ng interference by this court.

¶37

Sll further, the sale deed was executed on 10.10.1988, whereas the suit was instuted on 09.10.1992, nearly four years later. A suit seeking possession based on challenge to an alienaon necessarily involves a prayer for seJng aside the sale deed, which must be filed within three years under Arcle 59 of the Limitaon Act, 1963. The plainffs having failed to do so, the suit was rightly held *me-barred.

¶38

Conclusion : On a cumulave assessment, the findings of the First Appellate Court are based on correct appreciaon of evidence and seLled principles of Hindu law. No substanal queson of law arises for determina*on in this second appeal. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed being devoid of any merit, with no order as to costs.

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06.11.2025 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No

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Page N: 4 of total 4 Pages

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YOGESH MEHTA 2025.11.06 12:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Issues for consideration

4 issues framed by the court

AI extract

1.
Whether the suit property was ancestral coparcenary property in the hands of defendants No.2 to 4, such that they, as fathers, could not have alienated it without legal necessity.¶3
The court held
The property was not ancestral in the hands of defendants No.2 to 4: the Jamabandi showed the land in the name of Harbans Singh, and mutation of inheritance No.615 dated 20.11.1976 showing devolution on his four sons and a daughter does not by itself establish ancestry; since ancestral coparcenary property must descend undivided through at least four generations of the male line and there is no evidence Harbans Singh had himself inherited it from his father, the property devolving on his sons under mutation No.615 cannot be treated as ancestral.ratio¶7
2.
Whether the sale in favour of defendant No.1-Ved Pal was supported by legal necessity.¶4
The court held
Even assuming arguendo the property was ancestral, the alienation was for legal necessity: the sale deed recited the vendors' need for money to establish their cloth business at Kotkapura, DW1 Surinder Singh made due enquiries on behalf of the vendee before the transaction, and evidence corroborated opening of M/s Sardar Cloth House at Kotkapura; these constitute genuine family necessity and there is no perversity in the Appellate Court's appreciation warranting interference.ratio¶10
3.
Whether the suit challenging the alienation and seeking possession was barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.¶11
The court held
The suit, instituted on 09.10.1992 nearly four years after the sale deed of 10.10.1988, was time-barred: a suit seeking possession based on challenge to an alienation necessarily involves a prayer for setting aside the sale deed, which must be filed within three years under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the plaintiffs having failed to do so the suit was rightly held time-barred.ratio¶11
4.
Whether any substantial question of law arises for determination in the second appeal.¶12
The court held
On cumulative assessment the findings of the First Appellate Court are based on correct appreciation of evidence and settled principles of Hindu law; no substantial question of law arises for determination in the second appeal, which is accordingly dismissed as devoid of merit with no order as to costs.ratio¶12

(O&M) Mahinder Singh, etc. v. Ved Pal, etc.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

(O&M) Mahinder Singh, etc. v. Ved Pal, etc.

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

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What the court decided

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