25. Thus, even though a stric t construction of the terms of section 89, CPC and 69-A of the 19 5 5 Act may not encompass such pri v ate negotiations and settlem e nts between the parties, we emph a size that the participants in su c h settlements will be entitled to the s a me benefits as those who h a ve been referred to explore alter n ate dispute settlement metho ds under section 89, CPC. Indeed, we f ind it puzzling that the Petiti o ner should be so vehemently opposed to granting such benefit. Th o ugh the Registry/State Government will be losing a one-time cour t fee in the short term, they will be s a ved the expense and opportu n ity cost of managing an endless cyc l e of litigation in the long ter m . It is therefore in their own intere s t to allow the Respondent No. 1's claim. 26. Thus, in our view, the H igh Court was correct in holding that section 89 of the CPC and Section 69-A of the 1955 Ac t be interpreted liberally. In v i ew of this broad purposive construc t ion, we affirm the High Court ' s conclusion, and hold that section 8 9 of CPC shall cover, and th e benefit of Section 69-A of the 1955 Act shall also extend to, all m ethods of out-of-court dispute settle m ent between parties that the Court subsequently finds to have b een legally arrived at. This w o uld, thus, cover the present controv e rsy, wherein a private settle m ent was arrived at, and a mem o to withdraw the appeal wa s filed before the High Court. In su c h a case as well, the appellant, i.e., Respondent No. 1 herein woul d be entitled to refund of court f ee.”