Puran Chand Vs Sandeep Kumar and Another

Th e present Regular Second App e al has been filed by the appell a nt– plaintiff, Puran Chand, assailing the concurr e nt findings of the learned Co u rts below. The tria l Court, vide its judgment and d ecree dated 03.07.2015, dismi s sed the suit filed by the plaintiff and allowed the co u nter-claim filed by the defenda n ts. The appeal pre fe rred by the plaintiff before the l earned Lower Appellate Court a lso came to be di s missed vide judgment and de c ree dated 09.05.2019. Aggrie v ed therefrom, the p resent Regular Second Appeal h as been preferred.

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Brief Facts

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Th e case of the plaintiff, as pleade d in the plaint, is that he is in la w ful and legal posse s sion of house No. 222, Sector 4 4-A, Chandigarh, since June 1 9 97. He asserts that he purchased the said single- s torey house through indirect s ale documents, inc l uding an affidavit, and has bee n in continuous peaceful posses s ion TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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ever since. The plaintiff avers that he construct e d the first and second floors o f the said house fro m his hard-earned money and wi t h the assistance of a loan take n by his daughter, S m t. Anu Bala, who is now marr i ed and settled. It is further pleaded that the plaintif f executed a Sub-General Powe r of Attorney in favour of defen d ant No.1, Sandeep K umar, his son, only for a limi t ed purpose of dealing with official matters pertain i ng to electricity, water, the E state Office, and the Chandi g arh Housing Board . The plaintiff contends that the said Power of Attorney was n e ver intended to co n fer ownership rights upon th e defendant. It is alleged that the brother-in-law o f defendant No.1, namely An u rag Sandal, a person of crim i nal background all e gedly involved in a bank dacoit y , has been threatening the plai n tiff to vacate the p r emises and hand over its poss e ssion. The plaintiff claims to h ave made several r e quests to the defendants and A n urag Sandal not to interfere in his peaceful posse s sion, but to no avail. Accordi n g to the plaintiff, the defend a nts, acting in conni v ance with police officials, lod g ed a false and frivolous compl a int dated 21.03.20 0 9, with an intent to disposse s s the plaintiff illegally. It is a lso alleged that de f endant No.1 and his associates have been continuously haras s ing and pressuring the plaintiff to vacate the pre m ises. The said acts compelled the plaintiff to inst i tute the present suit for perma n ent injunction, seeking to rest r ain the defendants, t heir agents, and family membe r s from interfering with his peac e ful possession of t h e house. The plaintiff further pleaded that he has been in o p en, continuous, an d peaceful possession of the house since 1997 and that the defendants hav e no right, title, or interest in th e same. He maintains that the h o use in question w a s purchased from the sale p r oceeds of his previously ow n ed property, being House No. 1099, Sector 11, P anchkula, which in turn had been purchased by h i m after selling a 10-marla house allotted to him at Phase 4, S. A .S.

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Nagar, Mohali. Thus, according to the plainti f f, the entire consideration for the disputed proper t y was paid by him, and the def e ndants have not contributed ev e n a single penny to w ards its purchase or constructi o n.

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Upon notice, the defendants a ppeared and filed their wri t ten statement-cum- c ounter claim, controverting t h e averments of the plaintiff. T he defendants sub m itted that the suit is not ma i ntainable and that the plainti ff , a practising adv o cate, has deliberately suppres s ed material facts and signed and verified false p l eadings with intent to mislead t h e Court. It is the categorical st a nd of defendant N o .1, Sandeep Kumar, that he is the exclusive and lawful owne r of the property in question, having purchased t h e same for valuable considera t ion from the previ o us owner through a General P o wer of Attorney executed by S hri Om Prakash S h arma, the original owner. It i s averred that the said Powe r of Attorney dated 2 2.04.1997 was duly registered on 27.05.1997, and on the stre n gth thereof, the defendant got the property con v erted into freehold by the Es t ate Office, Chandi g arh Administration, after payin g all requisite conversion charge s . It is further plead e d that after purchasing the pro p erty, defendant No.1 renovated and furnished the h ouse with expensive furnitur e , fixtures, and household arti c les including dini n g tables, steel almirahs, double beds, gas connection, was h ing machine, and o t her household effects, all purc h ased by him. The defendants assert that the plainti f f and his wife, Smt. Rattan R a ni, being the biological parent s of defendant No.1 , were allowed to reside on the g round floor of the house merel y as licencee, witho u t payment of any licence fee, o u t of love and affection. It is alle g ed that the plaintif f later started acting contrary to the interest of the defendant, began misappropriating rent from tenants on the u p per floors, and even issued r ent receipts in his o wn name by falsely claiming o w nership. The defendants state t hat

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license was ter m inated vide notice dated 30.03.2009, granting the plaintiff t i me until 15.04.200 9 to vacate the premises. Des p ite receipt of the said notice, the plaintiff neither vacated the premises nor paid a n y damages.

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It is also averred that the plaintiff, in collusion with others, inclu d ing Ravi kant, Smt. Vijay Kumari, Anu Bala, and h e r husband Sushil Gupta, fabric a ted false document s and aided strangers in using t he disputed property’s address for preparing forged documents. Defendant No.1 f urther alleged that on 21.03.2 0 09, the plaintiff an d his associates created a situatio n of lawlessness and even assau l ted Smt. Poonam S andal, wife of defendant No.1, and their children. The defen d ant also averred t h at the plaintiff executed fals e rent documents with one S mt. Gurvinder Kau r Sodhi on 18.08.2009, receivin g substantial consideration from her by falsely representing himself as the landlord. When the said lady discovered the real ownership, disputes arose, and the matte r was reported to the police. I t is further alleged that the plaintiff has been ret a ining unlawful possession of the house by exploi t ing his position as an advocate a nd a senior citizen. 5. By way of counter-claim, the defendants sought a decree for possession by w ay of mandatory injunction, di r ecting the plaintiff and all persons claiming under him to hand over vacant posse s sion of the ground floor of H o use No. 222, Secto r 44-A, Chandigarh, and to rem o ve all unauthorized occupants. T he defendants also claimed damages at the rate of ₹ 40,000 per month from 15.04.2 0 09 till actual resto r ation of possession, asserting t h at similar properties in the vici n ity fetch rent exceeding ₹40,000 per month.

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Th e plaintiff filed a replication to t he written statement and a repl y to the counter-cla i m, reiterating his ownership a n d denying all allegations made by the defendants. He refuted the assertion that d efendant No.1 had purchased the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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house for valua b le consideration, contending in s tead that the defendant was me r ely a holder of a S ub-General Power of Attorne y issued in his favour for lim i ted administrative p urposes. The plaintiff elabora t ed that as per the records of the Estate Office, C handigarh, plot No. 222, Sect o r 44-A, Chandigarh, was initi a lly allotted to Shr i Om Prakash Sharma, who h ad executed a General Powe r of Attorney for m a nagement purposes in favour o f Shri Ashwani Sabharwal and S hri Tarsem Sabhar w al. Thereafter, Ashwani Sabha r wal executed a Sub-General Po w er of Attorney in f avour of Shri K.C. Arora, and subsequently another Sub-GP A in favour of Shri G urdial Singh Dhillon on 29.0 2 .1996. However, the Sub-GP A in favour of Gur d ial Singh Dhillon was cance l led on 27.05.1997. The plai n tiff submitted that O m Prakash Sharma had never c o nferred ownership rights upon any of his agents a n d that the Sub-GPA holders c o uld not convey ownership bey o nd what was vested in the principal. It is the case of the plaintiff that Shri Gur d ial Singh Dhillon had constructed a three-store y building over the said plot and thereafter sold t he same to the plaintiff by wa y of an affidavit and other indi r ect documents, an d handed over actual vacant p hysical possession along with all relevant papers . On the directions of the plain t iff, Shri Ashwani Sabharwal, w ho was the origina l GPA holder of Om Prakash S h arma, issued a Sub-General Po w er of Attorney in f avour of defendant No.1, Sandeep Kumar, only to facilitate rou t ine dealings with government authorities and not t o transfer ownership rights. It w as further agreed t hat neither Ashwani Sabharwa l nor Gurdial Singh Dhillon w o uld revoke the sa m e, and the said arrangement w as made only for administra t ive convenience.

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Th e plaintiff emphasized that d efendant No.1 was residing in government ac c ommodation, namely House N o . 3091, Sector 15-D, Chandig a rh,

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since 1994, an d therefore could not have b e en the purchaser of the disp u ted property in 199 7 . The plaintiff maintained that a ll sale considerations were pai d by him from his o w n resources and from the sale p roceeds of his previous prope r ties at Mohali and P anchkula. He denied all alleg a tions of misappropriation, forg e ry, and fabrication and asserted that he has been i n continuous, peaceful, and la w ful possession of t h e disputed house since 1997. I t was accordingly prayed that the counter-claim f i led by the defendants be dismi s sed, and the decree for perma n ent injunction, as s o ught in the suit, be granted in f a vour of the plaintiff. 8. Fr o m the pleadings of the partie s , the learned Trial Court initi a lly framed the foll o wing issues for determination:

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Whether the plaintiff is en t itled to the relief of injunctio n as pr a yed for? — OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plain t iff is not maintainable? — OP D 3 3. Whether the defendant is en t itled for the damages as claime d in the counter-claim? — OPD

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Whether the suit of the pla i ntiff has not been properly val u ed for the purpose of Court fee? — O P D

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Whether defendant No.1 ha s not come to the Court with clean ha n ds? — OPP 6

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Relief.

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D u ring the pendency of the case, when the matter was fixed for the plaintiff’s evid e nce and for consideration of a n application under Order VII R ule 11 CPC, the p l aintiff, through a separate sta t ement, withdrew the present s uit, which was acc o rdingly dismissed as withdrawn. However, since the defendant h ad already filed a counter-claim, an application f or recasting of issues was mo v ed, TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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which was allo w ed by the learned Trial Cour t . Consequently, the issues fra m ed earlier on 25.0 8 . 2010 were recalled, and the f ollowing issues were reframe d on 25.04.2013 and again on 03.07.2015:

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Whether the plaintiff is liabl e to handover the vacant posses s ion of t he ground floor of House No. 2 2 2, Sector 44-A, Chandigarh, al o ng wi t h other persons brought by hi m , and also damages as set up in the co u nter-claim? — OPD

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Whether the suit of the plain t iff is not maintainable? — OP D 3. Relief.

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In o rder to prove his case, the plai n tiff, Puran Chand, himself step p ed into the witnes s box as PW-1 and tendered int o evidence his duly sworn affid a vit Ex. PW-1/A, w h erein he reiterated the content s of the plaint and substantiated his ownership and p ossession over the suit propert y . For the sake of brevity, the e n tire contents of the affidavit are not reproduced h erein. In support of his case, the plaintiff proved on record the following docum e nts: i) Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-7, incl u ding the affidavit, documents of titl e /affidavit of purchase, copy o f the passbook, copy of demand dr a ft, and other related papers;

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ii) Ex. P-8 to Ex. P-214, com p rising bills and receipts relatin g to co n struction and renovation; and iii) Affidavits Ex. P-223 and E x . P-224, establishing his posses s ion an d ownership claim.

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Th e plaintiff also examined PW-2, Sanjay Gupta, who tendered i nto evidence his d uly sworn affidavit Ex. PW-2/A, corroborating the plaint i ff’s version. Therea f ter, the learned counsel for the p laintiff closed the evidence.

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O n the other hand, to prove the defence and counter-claim, defen d ant No.1 / counter- c laimant Sandeep Kumar entere d into the witness box as DW-1 a nd tendered into evidence his duly sworn af fi davit Ex. DW-1/A, wherein he reaffirmed the e ntire case set up in the writte n statement and counter-claim. For conciseness, th e detailed contents of the affida v it have not been reproduced her e in. In support of h is case, the defendant produc e d and tendered into evidence the following docu m ents: Ex. DW-x/1 to Ex. D W -x/14, which included the Gen e ral Power of Atto r ney, Sub-General Power of A ttorney, conversion and free h old documents, pa y ment receipts, and other suppo r ting papers. The defendant fur t her examined the f o llowing witnesses:

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i) DW-2 Smt. Balwinder Kaur , ii) DW-3 Satish Kumar, iii) DW-4 Sanjay Vats, iv) DW-5 Neeraj Kumar, v) DW-6 Satish Kumar, vi) DW-7 Harjinder Singh, and vii ) DW-8 Sanjeev Kumar. Th e reafter, the learned counsel for the defendant closed the eviden c e.

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Findings of the trial Court

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Af t er hearing both sides, the lea r ned trial Court observed that the counter-claima n t’s claim was two-fold—firstly a s an owner and secondly as a S ubGPA holder. It was, however, admitted that t h ere existed no registered sale d eed either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of t he counter-claimant. Upon per u sal of the record, i t was noticed that multiple litigations were pending between the parties regardin g the same property. The Court noted that the main injunction suit TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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had already be e n withdrawn, and therefore, n o finding was required to be gi v en regarding the o w nership of the defendant in th e counter-claim. It was held that the counter-claima n t had produced various docum e nts including Ex.DX-36, the S ubGeneral Power of Attorney in his favour, E x.DX-33, the GPA in favou r of Ashwani Sabh a rwal dated 21.03.1959, and Ex.DX-37, copy of order d a ted 27.08.1997 iss u ed by the Chandigarh Admini s tration. The Court found that the Sub-GPA (E x .DX-36) authorized San d eep Kumar to apply for occupation/co m pletion certificates, to let out th e property, to enter into lease de e ds, recover rent, a n d to initiate legal proceedings t o evict tenants or occupants. F r om this, it was co n cluded that the Sub-GPA con f erred upon him sufficient righ t to manage and rec o ver possession of the premises on behalf of the principal, thou g h it did not vest ow n ership rights in him. 13. Th e Court further observed that u n der Section 54 of the Transfe r of Property Act, a sale of immovable propert y can only be effected throug h a registered sale d eed, and a power of attorney do e s not by itself transfer ownersh i p. 14. Th e trial Court also noticed that t h e defendant had failed to pro d uce any valid docu m ent proving ownership, having relied merely on photocopie s of affidavits (Ex. P -178 and Ex.P-178/A) whose originals were not produced. T he alleged constr u ction claimed to have been c arried out by the defendant a lso remained unpro v ed. The cross-examination of t h e plaintiff’s witness (PW-2 Sa n jay Gupta) reveale d that no document bore his na m e, nor was there any referenc e to payments havi n g been made in the name of the defendant. Consequently, the defendant’s pl e a of ownership and constr u ction was found to be wit h out evidentiary sup p ort. The Court further observe d that there were multiple litigations and criminal pr o ceedings pending between the p arties, and the affidavit relied u p on

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by the defenda n t for asserting ownership was i tself under suspicion, with an F IR registered regar d ing its genuineness.

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In contrast, the counter-claimant successfully proved that he w as holding a valid Sub-GPA and that the plaintif f ’s occupation of the premises h ad continued even after termination of his license . The Court held that the defen d ant had served a valid notice terminating the pla i ntiff’s license and was, theref o re, entitled to reco v er possession of the ground flo o r of the house. However, the C o urt found that there was no evidence on record to s u bstantiate the claim for damag e s at ₹40,000 per m o nth, and based on the evidence regarding the prevalent rate of r ent for similar acc o mmodation, it assessed the da m ages at ₹25,000 per month f r om 15.04.2009 till t he date of delivery of possessio n . 16. O n Issue No.2, relating to the ma i ntainability of the suit, it was h eld that the counte r -claimant, being a Sub-GPA h o lder, had the right to institute the counter-claim, a s the authority conferred upo n him under clause 6 of Ex.D X -36 specifically em p owered him to let out, recove r rent, and initiate legal action for eviction. Accor d ingly, it was held that the coun t er-claim was maintainable. 17. In conclusion, the trial Court dec r eed the counter-claim filed by the defendant Sand e ep Kumar, holding that he was entitled to possession of the gro u nd floor of House N o. 222, Sector 44-A, Chandig a rh, from the plaintiff Puran Ch a nd, along with da m ages at the rate of ₹25,000 per month from 15.04.2009 till ac t ual restoration of p o ssession, with costs.

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Findings of the Lower Appellate Court

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Th e learned first Appellate Court, after re-appreciating the pleadi n gs, evidence, and f i ndings of the trial Court, obser v ed that the appellant Puran Chand had challenged the decree of the trial Court primarily on the grounds that the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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counter-claim f i led by respondent no.1 Sandee p Kumar was not maintainable a s it had been filed b y him in his individual capacit y and not as a sub-power of attor n ey holder. It was a l so contended that the trial Cour t had erred in relying upon the S ubGPA, Ex.DX-3 6 , to decree the counterclaim a n d that such reliance was mispl a ced as the said doc u ment did not confer ownershi p rights upon Sandeep Kumar. T he appellant further argued that he had purchased the house in question from Gur d ial Singh Dhillon i n 1997 for valuable considerati o n and had taken possession of the same after full payment. He relied upon affidavits executed by Gurdial Si n gh Dhillon, which , according to him, established his ownership. It was also arg u ed that the trial C ourt failed to consider the f act that the appellant had ra i sed construction o n the first and second floors o f the property and that respon d ent no.1’s claim o f license was inconsistent an d self-contradictory. The appel l ant asserted that he had been in possession since 1 9 96 and had shifted his residenc e to the suit house well before the alleged creati o n of any license in 2009. It w as, therefore, argu e d that the trial Court wrongly d ecreed the counterclaim base d on the Sub-Power o f Attorney, ignoring the appell a nt’s ownership and possession. 19. Th e learned Appellate Court note d that the appellant had filed a suit for injunction, which he later withdrew, and that the respondent had set u p a counter-claim u nder Order 8 Rule 6A CPC , which was duly contested. T he Appellate Cou r t recorded that the appellant had withdrawn his main suit but continued to co n test the counterclaim and that the counterclaim was supporte d by valid Court-fee payment. It further noted that the appellant relied on docum e nts like Ex.P-178 a nd P-178/A, which were onl y photocopies and not prove d in accordance wit h law, and that the originals wer e not produced. The Court obser v ed that these docu m ents could not confer any titl e , particularly in view of the set t led

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law that owner s hip of immovable property ca n only be transferred by way o f a registered conv e yance deed. The contention of t he appellant that he had purch a sed the property thr o ugh indirect sale was rejected a s the same was not supported b y a registered docu m ent.

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Th e Appellate Court also found t h at the Sub-GPA Ex.DX-36 w a s a valid and subsi s ting document executed in fav o ur of Sandeep Kumar, giving h im certain powers i ncluding to let out, recover re n t, and take legal steps for evict i on. However, the s a id document did not confer o w nership. Nonetheless, by virtu e of clause 6 of the Sub-GPA, Sandeep Kumar w a s authorized to take legal step s to recover possess i on and to deal with the propert y on behalf of the principal, thereby making his cou n terclaim maintainable.

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It w as further held that althoug h the respondent/counter-clai m ant could not be d e clared the owner of the prope r ty, the appellant too had faile d to prove his owne r ship or the capacity in which h e continued to occupy the premi s es. He was neither a tenant nor an owner, and his p ossession was found to be wit h out any legal righ t . The Appellate Court concl u ded that the appellant’s plea of ownership based on unproved affidavits and photocopies could not be sustai n ed. On the other h a nd, the respondent’s right to m anage and recover possession a s a Sub-GPA holder was duly established.

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Co n sequently, the learned Additio n al District Judge found no mer i t in the appeal and u pheld the findings of the trial Court that the counter-claim b a sed on Sub-GPA w as maintainable though it did n ot confer ownership rights. It w as further affirme d that the respondent had the authority to file and maintain the counterclaim a n d to seek possession of the ho u se under clause 6 of the Sub-G P A. In view of the overall appreciation of evidenc e and legal position, the Appellate

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Court held that there was no ground to interfe r e with the well-reasoned judg m ent of the trial Co u rt and accordingly dismissed t h e appeal on 09.05.2019, affir m ing the decree in fa v our of respondent Sandeep Ku m ar. 23. Aggrieved by the concurrent fin d ings of the Courts below, P u ran Chand plaintiff filed the present regular secon d appeal. It is pertinent to men t ion here that during the pendency of the present ap p eal plaintiff -Puran Chand died and his legal repres e ntatives maintained the present appeal. 24. Upon notice, respondents appeare d and contested the appeal. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant

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Th e learned counsel for the a ppellant, representing the l e gal representatives of deceased Puran Chand, ass a iled the concurrent findings of the Courts below a s being perverse and contrary to law and evidence on record. It w as argued that bot h the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court erred in decre e ing the counterclai m of the respondent on the basis of Sub-General Power of Attor n ey Ex. D/36, desp i te holding that the said docu m ent did not confer any owner s hip rights. It was s u bmitted that the respondent/co u nter claimant is admittedly not the owner of the su i t property as there exists no re g istered sale deed in his favour, and that a power of a ttorney, whether general or su b -general, does not create or tran s fer any title. The c o unsel contended that the Court s below failed to appreciate that the question of possession and ownership was wr o ngly decided against the appel l ant without properl y determining the capacity in w hich the appellant was occup y ing the premises. T h e appellant, being in long-stan d ing possession of the suit prop e rty, had claimed o w nership based on purchase fro m Gurdial Singh Dhillon, and in t hat regard had alr e ady filed a separate suit for d eclaration of ownership, whic h is pending adjudi c ation before the Civil Judge (Ju n ior Division), Chandigarh. TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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It w as further argued that the onus to prove ownership of the prop e rty rested upon t h e respondent/counter claiman t and not the appellant, as the respondent had come forward asserting the rig h t to possession and damages u n der the alleged sub - GPA. The counsel pointed out t hat even as per the issue frame d by the trial Court “ Whether the plaintiff is liable t o hand over the vacant posses s ion of the ground f l oor of House No. 222, Sector 4 4-A, Chandigarh, along with o t her persons broug h t by him, and also damages a s set up in the counterclaim ?”, the burden square l y lay upon the respondent/ c ounter-claimant to establish his ownership and entitlement. However, the resp o ndent himself had filed a sepa r ate suit for specific performance against the origin a l owner, Shri Om Parkash, see k ing execution of a registered sale deed in his favour, which was subseque n tly dismissed by t h e learned Civil Judge (Junior D ivision), Chandigarh. The certi f ied copy of the sai d judgment was produced on re c ord by way of additional evide n ce. Thus, it was s u bmitted that once the respond e nt’s suit for specific perform a nce stood dismisse d and no title had passed to him, h is counterclaim based on the s a me alleged authorit y could not have been decreed.

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Th e learned counsel further c o ntended that the Courts be l ow misconstrued t h e scope of the powers conferr e d under the Sub-General Powe r of Attorney Ex. D / 36. It was emphasized that und e r the Power of Attorney Act, 1 8 82, an agent deriv e s his authority strictly from t h e principal and cannot exceed the powers delegat e d to him. The Sub-General Po w er of Attorney, when read with the preceding chai n of documents, namely, Ex. D /33 executed by Om Parkas h in favour of Ash w ani Sabharwal and Tarsem Sab h arwal, Ex. DW/32 (Special Po w er of Attorney) ex e cuted by Om Parkash in favour of B.K. Sabharwal, Ex. DX/34 and Ex. DX/35 exe c uted and cancelled between As h wani Sabharwal and Gurdial Si n gh

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Dhillon, and finally Ex. DX/36 executed by Ashwani Sabharwal in favou r of respondent San d eep Kumar, makes it clear that the Sub-GPA did not authorize any sale or confe r title. The said authority was limited only to obtai n ing occupation/co m pletion certificates, letting out the premises, entering into ren t or lease agreemen t s, recovering rent, and issuing r eceipts or legal notices. There w as no power confe r red to induct a person into the p roperty as a licensee or to tran s fer any ownership r ights. The lower appellate Cou r t, however, extended the lang u age of the sub-GP A beyond its terms, which was i m permissible and contrary to set t led law.

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It w as submitted that the respond e nt had failed to prove how he h ad inducted the ap p ellant into the property as a li c ensee when he possessed no s u ch authority. In fa c t, the appellant’s possession w a s lawful as owner in pursuanc e of purchase from G urdial Singh Dhillon, and till d ate, the legal heirs of the appell a nt, including his a g ed and handicapped wife, cont i nue to be in possession of the suit property. It wa s argued that in law, only the owner of a property can act a s a licensor, and si n ce the respondent is not the ow n er, his claim that the appellant w as a licensee is un t enable. The counsel further refe r red to document Ex. P-1, being the application for m for conversion of the leaseh o ld site into freehold, wherein the name of Puran C hand son of Sadhu Ram, resid e nt of House No. 222, Sector 4 4 -A, Chandigarh, is r ecorded as the purchaser, estab l ishing that even in official reco r ds, ownership stoo d reflected in his favour. 29. Th e learned counsel contended tha t both Courts below overlooked the crucial docume n t Ex. DX/32, which had been duly executed by B.K. Sabhar w al, who was expre s sly authorized to sell and tran s fer the lease rights of the prop e rty and the buildin g to be constructed thereon. It was, therefore, submitted that the

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concurrent find i ngs of the Courts below were legally unsustainable as they w ere based on misre a ding and non-appreciation of t h e evidence on record, as well a s on misinterpretatio n of the powers conferred und e r the sub-GPA. It was urged t hat both substantia l questions of law, whether the respondent could claim posses s ion or maintain a c ounterclaim in absence of titl e and whether the sub-GPA c o uld confer powers beyond those delegated by th e original owner, be answere d in favour of the appellant.

¶84

In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the appel l ant relied upon Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another 2011 (4) RCR (Civil) 669 , to emphasize that a power of attorney or sub-powe r of attorney does n o t convey ownership or confer t i tle in immovable property, and t hat transfer of title can only be effected through a registered conveyance deed. On these submissi o ns, the counsel prayed that t h e judgments and decrees of b oth Courts below b e set aside and the countercla i m of the respondent be dismi s sed with costs.

¶85

Submissions of learned counsel for the respondents

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Th e learned counsel for the resp o ndent–counter claimant suppo r ted the concurrent f indings of the Courts below an d submitted that the judgments and decrees passed in favour of the respondent we r e well-reasoned and based on d ue appreciation o f evidence and documents on r ecord. It was contended that the respondent San d eep Kumar, being the Sub-General Power of Attorney holde r of the original o w ner Om Parkash, derived h i s authority through a valid and subsisting chai n of documents, particularly Ex. DX/33 (General Power of Attor n ey in favour of As h wani Sabharwal), Ex. DX/34 a nd Ex. DX/35 (subsequent tran s fer and cancellatio n ), and Ex. DX/36 (Sub-Gene r al Power of Attorney execute d in TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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favour of resp o ndent). It was urged that the Sub-GPA was executed with full authority to m a nage, let out, and recover rent from the property, and to tak e all necessary lega l steps including institution o f proceedings for eviction and possession of t h e premises. It was submitted th a t the said document had never been revoked or c a ncelled, and therefore, rema i ned operative in favour of the respondent, the r eby giving him locus standi to m aintain the counter claim. 32. It w as further argued that the ap p ellant was occupying the gro u nd floor of the pro p erty as a mere licensee under t he authority of the respondent and had no owners h ip or tenancy rights therein. H is possession being permissive , he was bound to v a cate the premises once the lice n se was terminated. The respon d ent rightly filed th e counter claim seeking possess i on and mesne profits at the rat e of Rs.25,000/- pe r month w.e.f. 15.04.2009 till a ctual delivery of possession. T he Trial Court an d the Appellate Court, after a p preciating oral and documen t ary evidence, decr e ed the counter claim, and the mesne profits were computed and partly received through Court, with the total a m ount due up to 14.10.2025 b e ing Rs.49.50 lakhs, out of which Rs.5.58 lakhs h a d already been received, leavi n g a balance of Rs.4 3 .92 lakhs as payable to the dec r ee-holder. 33. Th e counsel contended that both C ourts had rightly held that tho u gh the Sub-GPA d id not create ownership, it val i dly empowered the responden t to institute proce e dings for possession and e v iction of any person unlawf u lly occupying the premises. The respondent’s ri g ht to maintain the counter cl a im flowed directly from clause 6 of Ex. DX/36, w h ich authorized the Sub-GPA ho l der to let out the p r emises, issue rent receipts, rec o ver rent, eject tenants or occup a nts through legal p rocess, and replace them wit h others. The appellant’s clai m of ownership was without basis as he had fai l ed to produce any sale dee d or TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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registered docu m ent of title, and his alleged p u rchase from Gurdial Singh Dhi l lon was not proved. It was also highlighted that the appellant’s own suit for perma n ent injunction had b een withdrawn, and therefore, he could not challenge the cou n ter claim.

¶91

Th e counsel relied upon the judg m ents in Hari Dass v. Sagar Chand (2017(2) RCR (Civil) 80 and Sunder Lal v. Sita Bali (2003(3) RCR (Civil) 243 , to contend that th e relationship between a licensor and licensee is purely personal and non-transferabl e , and that the right of a lice n see ceases upon the death of the licensor. It wa s argued that since Puran Cha n d, the original appellant, had d ied during the pen d ency of the appeal, the license a utomatically stood terminated and could not be in h erited by his legal heirs. Relia n ce was also placed on Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, AIR 1931 Madras 216 , reiterat i ng that a license is only a pers o nal right and does n ot create any interest in the pro p erty. 35. It w as therefore submitted that th e lower Courts had rightly dec r eed the counter cla i m of the respondent on the b a sis of the valid Sub-GPA and the termination of l i cense. The claim of ownership s et up by the appellant was illus o ry, unsubstantiated , and stood contradicted by his own documents and conduct. T he appellant’s con t inued possession was unauthori z ed after termination of the lice n se, entitling the res p ondent to both possession and mesne profits. The learned cou n sel prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

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Findings of this Court

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I h ave considered the submission s advanced by learned counsel for the appellant a n d for the respondent, the reco r d of the trial Court and the Lo w er Appellate Cour t , the evidence on record and the documents exhibited therein.

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Th e contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the Co u rts below erred in g iving relief to the counter-clai m ant on the basis of a Sub-Gen e ral Power of Atto r ney (Ex.DX-36) because, he s ays, a Power of Attorney ca n not convey title an d therefore the counter-claimant had no locus to seek possessio n or damages consi d ered. It is settled law that a po w er of attorney, be it general or s ubpower, cannot i t self operate as a registered co n veyance of immovable propert y so as to vest abso l ute title in the attorney. The transfer of immovable propert y is effected by a r egistered deed. That principl e does not, however, answer the narrower quest i on which the counter-claim r a ised and which the Courts be l ow examined, na m ely, whether on the basis of the chain of instruments and the specific power s contained in Ex.DX-36 th e counter-claimant had suffic i ent authority to m a nage the property, to let it o ut, recover rents, and to insti t ute proceedings fo r eviction of persons wrongfull y occupying the premises. The t rial Court and the A ppellate Court carefully read clause 6 of Ex.DX-36 and found t hat while it did not purport to create title, it did expressly empower the Sub- G PA holder to initia t e legal proceedings for recov e ry of possession and rent. On the record before t h is Court, the Courts below w ere justified in distinguishing the abstract princip l e that a power of attorney doe s not confer title from the narro w er rule that a pers o n clothed with authority under a valid power may, in the exer c ise of those specif i c powers, maintain proceeding s to recover possession and m e sne profits on behalf of the principal. This Court concurs with that approach becau s e it respects both t h e settled principle regarding t r ansfer of title and the agency law principle that a n agent may enforce the specific powers delegated to him on be h alf of the principa l . The relief granted in the co u nter-claim was for possession and mesne profits a n d not for declaration of title in t he Sub-GPA holder’s favour.

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Th e appellant further argued that e ven on the agency point the S ubGPA relied up o n by the respondent was viti a ted and could not be acted u p on because the ch a in of title and the antecedent i nstruments show cancellation a nd inconsistent tr a nsactions, and because mate r ial original documents were not produced.

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It is true that the existence of an u nbroken chain of authority and the validity of ant e cedent instruments are fact-se n sitive inquiries, the Courts be l ow examined Ex. D X-33, Ex.DX-34, Ex.DX-35 and the attendant evidence and reached concur r ent findings that the Sub-GP A in favour of Sandeep Kumar w as subsisting and had not been effectively revo k ed prior to his institution of the counter-claim. The argument that cancellation of some antecedent Sub-G P As rendered Ex.D X -36 a nullity is answered by t h e fact that cancellation of a S ubGPA does not i p so facto annul Sub-GPA exec u ted subsequently by the compe t ent GPA-holding a u thority unless there is specific proof that the later instrument w as itself revoked. T he burden to prove revocatio n or invalidity of Ex.DX-36 re s ted upon the appel l ant who asserted the contrary. On a careful reading of the re c ord this Court find s that the appellant failed to lea d positive and convincing evidence to show that E x .DX-36 had been rescinded or that the person executing it lac k ed capacity. The m ere pendency of other suits and the existence of litigation about the ultimate title be t ween different parties does not , without more, destroy the effi c acy of a power of a t torney which on its face empo w ers the attorney to institute evic t ion proceedings an d to recover rents. The Courts below therefore rightly held that the Sub-GPA had, f or the purposes of the counter-c l aim, sufficient operative effect. 40. Th e contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appel l ant had paid the f u ll consideration and had bec o me owner by purchase from o ne

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Gurdial Singh D hillon in 1997 and that he h a d constructed the first and sec o nd floors at his ow n cost, therefore his possession w as that of an owner and could not be treated as p e rmissive is devoid of any forc e . The appellant relies on affida v its and indirect sal e documents to support his ow n ership claim. That contention r uns into significant evidentiary difficulties on thi s record. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Pr o perty Act a sale of immovab l e property must be effected by a registered instr u ment, the mere existence of a ffidavits, unregistered or indi r ect documents and photocopies is insufficient to c r eate title. The Courts below pl a ced emphasis on t h e failure of the appellant to p r oduce the original documents for example Ex. P - 178 and Ex.P-178/A and on t he fact that the alleged vend o r’s affidavit and in d irect documents were not exec u ted in the form required by la w to transfer immov a ble property. In addition, the a p pellant himself withdrew his m ain suit for perman e nt injunction during the trial, w h ich demonstrates that he could not or did not wis h to press an independent, affi r mative claim to ownership at t hat stage. He conti n ued only to contest the counter - claim. Withdrawal of the main suit is a relevant ci r cumstance because it shows th a t the appellant had not establis h ed his clear and le g al right over the suit property. T his Court finds no legal error in the conclusion that the appellant’s evidence fell s h ort of proving title. The appellate Court’s re-appr e ciation of the documentary evi d ence is sustainable and not viti a ted by perversity.

¶104

It w as further argued on behalf of the appellant that the lower Co u rts wrongly place d the burden of proof upon hi m and relieved the responden t of proving owner-ship or the right to possession. A careful reading of the trial and appellate judg m ents shows that the Courts bel o w correctly stated and applied the rule on burden. When a party asserts a right t o possession based on a powe r of TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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attorney he m u st establish the particular aut h ority which enables him to cl a im possession, once the respondent produced Ex. D X-36 and relied upon clause 6 to show that he w a s empowered to recover posses s ion and rents, the burden shifte d to the appellant to show that the Sub-GPA was n ot operative or that the appella n t’s possession was supported by valid title. The ap p ellant’s failure to produce orig i nal title document s , his withdrawal of the main suit and the absence of conc r ete evidence of pa y ment and registered conveyan c e meant that he did not meet t hat burden. In othe r words, the Courts below did n ot invert the burden, they requ i red each party to p rove the facts that buttresse d his asserted legal position. T he respondent pro v ed a subsisting Sub-GPA with eviction powers and the appel l ant failed to prove a registered transfer of title. 42. Th e appellant’s counsel fiercely attacked the quantum of m e sne profits and the assessment of damages at ₹25, 0 00 per month, contending tha t no evidence supported that figure and that the tr i al Court erred in awarding m e sne profits from 15.04.2009. The trial Court expressly found that the defendants h ad not proved the extravagant figure of ₹40,000 p er month claimed in the cou n terclaim and that e vidence on record supported a l ower but reasonably assessed s u m. Assessment of mesne profits is a fact-inte n sive exercise, the Courts be l ow examined evid e nce of market rent for similar a ccommodation in the vicinity and applied princip l ed exercise of judicial discreti o n to arrive at ₹25,000 per mo n th. There is no mat h ematical or legal perversity in t hat approach, the award is justi f ied by the contemp o raneous evidence on rent in th e locality and by the absence of any precise or relia b le rent-agreement establishing t he higher figure. The trial Co u rt’s computation fr o m 15.04.2009, the date specifie d in the termination notice give n to

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the appellant, is consistent with the pleadi n gs and the evidence about the termination of p ossession and is therefore susta i nable.

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Th e appellant further submitted that the relationship between the parties was that of owner and occupier and not o f licensor-licensee, and that ev e n if a licence existe d it could not be terminated to t h e detriment of the appellant’s heirs on the death o f the original licensor. The law i s clear that a licence is a pers o nal and permissive right which does not create an interest in the land and ordin a rily terminates with the death of the licensor unless t here are circumstances showin g an intention that t h e licence should survive. On th e facts the trial and appellate Co u rts recorded that th e appellant was allowed to occu p y the ground floor as a license e by the owners and their agents and that the lice n se was terminated by notice d a ted 30.03.2009 wi t h effect from 15.04.2009. T h e appellant’s contention that he enjoyed owner s hip rights was rejected for the r easons stated earlier. The pers o nal nature of a li c ence and its termination upo n death of the licensor are l e gal principles that o perate where indeed the licenso r was the true owner, whereas h e re, the person as s erting ownership itself faile d to produce registered title, the contention that the licence survived as a propr i etary right is without substance. In any event, the C ourts below have considered t he question of survival of lic e nce upon death an d have correctly applied the le g al test to the material facts be f ore them. There is n o reason for this Court to substi t ute its view. 44. Le a rned counsel for the appellant a lso raised specific objections to the admissibility a n d probative value of certain d o cuments, in particular photoco p ies of affidavits a n d receipts exhibited on behal f of the appellant and relied u p on allegations of f orgery and fabrication. The tri a l Court and the Lower Appel l ate Court examine d those allegations. It is axiomat i c that allegations of forgery req u ire

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robust proof a n d, normally, the production of originals or appropriate secon d ary evidence. The a ppellant’s failure to produce th e originals of Ex.P-178/P-178A and other crucial d o cuments substantially weakene d his case. The Courts below w ere entitled to atta c h little weight to mere photoc o pies in the absence of satisfac t ory explanation for non-production. Further, whe r e the record contains instance s of conflicting litigations and criminal complaints, the Court must sift the evidence and accept wha t is proved on preponderance. O n this record, both the Courts be l ow applied that ap p roach and accepted the respond e nt’s documentary evidence ins o far as it was suf fi cient to show a subsisting p ower to recover possession. T he appellant’s evidentiary shortcomings justifi e d the rejection of his cont r ary narrative.

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Th e appellant advanced a further legal proposition that even if the Sub-GPA con fe rred eviction powers, the S u b-GPA holder could not rec o ver possession fro m a person who had obtained ow n ership by adverse possession o r by a sale with regi s tered deed, in short, that a lis b e tween strangers as to title could not be resolved b y a counter-claim in the m a nner permitted. That submis s ion overlooks the procedural posture i.e. the a ppellant had instituted and l a ter withdrawn his m ain injunctive suit. What was b efore the trial Court was a cou n terclaim by an au t horised agent to recover possession from a person in unauthor i sed occupation. Th e remedy sought and granted w a s possessory in nature and did not adjudicate upo n conclusively who the absolute o wner was for all purposes. Wh e re, as here, possession is permissive and the agent h olds specific authority to eject, the counter-claim f o r possession is maintainable e v en though the ultimate questio n of title may be t h e subject matter of a separa t e proceeding. The Courts be l ow

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correctly confi n ed their decree to possession and mesne profits and did not pur p ort to decide title f o rever; that restraint is sound an d conforms to settled procedure. 46. Th e contention that there is so m e fundamental illegality bec a use concurrent fin d ings are contradictory i.e., tha t the Courts below both held t Ex.DX-36 did n ot convey title but nevertheles s allowed possession, is, in vie w of this Court, a m isreading of the judgments. T h e Courts distinguished owner s hip from authority to manage. A power of attor n ey may not create title yet it can validly empow e r the attorney to manage the p roperty and to evict unauthor i sed occupiers. Thi s distinction is at the heart of th e concurrent findings and is leg a lly correct. The Courts below meticulously explai n ed that the Sub-GPA did not m ake the respondent t he owner but it gave him autho r ity to recover possession on be h alf of the principal, that is a legally coherent stance and not a contradiction. 47. I h ave also carefully considere d the judgments cited by lear n ed counsel for the appellant, namely Smt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. v. M. Chinniyan & Anr., 2016 AIR (SCW) 609 , and Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another, 2011(4) RCR (Civil) 669 . There can be no qu a rrel with the proposition of law laid down in t h ose authorities that ownershi p of immovable pro p erty cannot be transferred or c onveyed through an agreemen t to sell, a will, or a power of attorney, and that on l y a duly registered sale deed u n der Section 54 of t h e Transfer of Property Act can c reate or convey title. However, the reliance placed on those authorities by the app e llant is misplaced in the context of the present cas e . The impugned decrees of th e Courts below have not confe r red ownership upon the respondent–counter cl a imant, rather, both Courts h ave categorically h e ld that the Sub-General Power o f Attorney (Ex.DX-36) did not and could not tran s fer ownership. The relief gr a nted to the respondent was not TRIPTI SAINI 2025.11.10 13:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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declaration of o wnership but recovery of po s session and mesne profits in the capacity of a d uly authorized Sub-GPA hol d er empowered under clause 6 to manage the pr o perty and initiate eviction proceedings on behalf of the princi p al. Hence, the prin c iple in Suraj Lamp (supra) and Kasthuri Radhakrishnan (supra) decisions does not advance the appellant’s c a se. It, if anything, reinforces the reasoning of th e Courts below that title could n ot pass through GPA but that v a lid authority under the GPA could sustain the coun t er-claim. 48. O n the other hand, the judgment s cited by learned counsel for the respondent Hari Dass v. Sagar Chand, 2017(2) RCR (Civil) 80, Sunder Lal v. Sita Bali, 2003(3) RCR (Civil) 243 and Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, AIR 1931 Mad 216 , were aptly relied upon by the Courts below. These authorities unifor m ly hold that a lic e nse is a mere personal permission, does not create any righ t or interest in prop e rty, and terminates on revocat i on or on the death of the licen s or. The application of these authorities to the prese n t facts is direct and justified, s i nce the appellant was found to be in permissive p o ssession and the license had been terminated by n o tice dated 30.03.2009. The rati o of these cases, therefore, squa r ely supports the co n current findings of the Courts b e low. Conclusion

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In t he result, for the reasons recor d ed above, this Court finds no m erit in the Regular Second Appeal. The concur r ent judgments and decrees d a ted 03.07.2015 an d 09.05.2019 passed by the lea r ned trial Court and learned lo w er appellate Court, respectively, are affirmed. T h e decree in favour of respon d ent No.1 for poss e ssion of the ground floor o f House No. 222, Sector 4 4 -A, Chandigarh, to g ether with mesne profits at th e rate of ₹25,000 per month f r om 15.04.2009 till actual delivery of possession, a s computed by the trial Court and

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reduced/confir m ed by the Appellate Court, shall stand. The balance amount (as recorded in the appeal papers up to 14.10.202 5 ) shall be paid in accordance w ith law subject to t he usual adjustments for amou n ts already realized. The appel l ant shall pay costs of this appeal to the responden t , parties shall bear their respec t ive costs below.

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Pe n ding application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

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November 04, 2 025 (MANDEEP PANNU) tripti JUDGE

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W h ether speaking/non-speaking : Speak i ng W h ether reportable : Yes/N o

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Puran Chand v. Sandeep Kumar and Another

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Puran Chand v. Sandeep Kumar and Another

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