Regular second appeal (RSA-258-2025 O&M) by Lakhwinder Singh, plaintiff, whose suit against Gur Iqbal Singh (his son) for recovery of `20 lacs as damages/compensation for defamation, mental pain, agony, harassment, tension and financial loss allegedly caused by the defendant's filing of a false complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (cheque No.823669 dated 09.03.2015 for Rs. Ten Lacs on IndusInd Bank, the Mall Branch, Amritsar, dishonoured; plaintiff acquitted by Sh. Jaginder Singh, JMIC, Amritsar vide order dated 16.02.2017) had been partly decreed with costs for `2 lacs by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amritsar (judgment and decree dated 09.03.2020), but was reversed and the suit dismissed by the learned District Judge, Amritsar (impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.2024). CM-770-C-2025 for condonation of 16 days' delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was allowed. Held (NIDHI GUPTA, J.): merely moving a complaint, instituting legal proceedings, or the plaintiff's acquittal therein does not by itself constitute malicious prosecution; the plaintiff failed to prove the enumerated ingredients — institution/continuance by the defendant, absence of reasonable and probable cause, malice, unsuccessful termination, and damage to person, property or reputation — with nothing on record showing defamation, harassment or damage, and damages never quantified even in the plaint, so there was no cause to have partly decreed `2 lacs; such a proceeding is actionable in tort only on proof of damage either to reputation or to property. Relying on Bolandauda Pemmayya & Another v. Ayaradara Kushalappa (Mysore HC), Mohamed Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee & Others (Privy Council, From Calcutta) and K.B. Mathur & Another v. Sh. Sheel Kumar Saxena & Another (Delhi HC), and endorsing the first appellate court's finding that the Section 138 proceedings were not instituted out of malice (PWs 3 and 4 admitted ignorance of the litigation; no news of the complaint was published; the plaintiff's image was not lowered), the Court found no ground to interfere and dismissed the regular second appeal; pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.