National Insurance Company Limited Vs Sudesh Rani and Others

FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

105 FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) Date of Decision:12.08.2025

National Insur a nce Company Limited ... Appella n t Versus Sudesh Rani a n d others ... Respond e nts 2. X-Objection No.239-CII-2015 (O&M) in/and FAO-2156-1996 (O&M) National Insur a nce Company Limited ... Appella n t Versus Saroj Bala and others ... Respondents

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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL

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Present: M r . Sanjiv Pabbi, Advocate fo r the appellant in both cases.

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M r . Rohit Singh, Advocate fo r respondent No.5 in FAO-2077 - 1996. fo r respondent No.7 in FAO-2156 - 1996. M r . Animesh Sharma, Advocate fo r respondent No.6(i) to 6 (iii). M r . Harish Goyal, Advocate fo r the respondents No.1 to 6-cros s objectors in FAO No.2156-1996 (through V C ).

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AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)

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B o th the appeals bearing FAO N o s.2077 and 2156 of 1996 are f iled by the appell a nt-insurance company challe n ging the impugned award d ated 13.01.1996 pa s sed by the learned Motor A c cident Claims Tribunal, Jaga d hari (hereinafter re f erred to as the learned Tribun a l) and the cross objections in F AO No.2156 of 1 9 96 by respondents No.1 to 6 / claimants seeking enhanceme n t of compensation a warded by the learned Tribunal in MACT No.43/93 with respe c t to death of one S o m Dutt.

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PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.08.19 09:18 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -2-

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In brief, the facts are that on 01.05.1993, Subhash Kumar and S om Dutt (both sin c e deceased) were coming on a motor cycle bearing No.HR- 0 2A2832 from Y a muna Nagar to their village Mehra, Tehsil Thanesar, Di s trict Kurukshetra a n d when they reached near Dew a ki Petrol Pump in the revenue e s tate of village Cho t ta Bans, Tehsil Jagadhari near Radaur at about 7:30 PM, a t r uck bearing registration No.HR-01A-8211 (in s h ort offending vehicle) came f rom behind and hit their motor cycle. Due to said impact, both of them fell down and they were run o ver by the speeding truck, as a r esult of which they died on the s pot. In the claim p e titions preferred by legal repre s entatives of both the deceased , the learned Tribu n al while awarding compensat i on to the legal representative s of deceased, held d river, owner and the insurance company of the offending vehic l e to be jointly and s everally liable to pay the com p ensation so awarded by it. H e nce, the insurance c ompany filed aforesaid appea l s challenging the liability fast e ned upon it and cr o ss-objections have been prefer r ed by the cross-objectors-clai m ants seeking enhancement of compensation awarde d qua death of Som Dutt. 3. L e arned counsel for the appellant - insurance company submits tha t the learned Tribun a l gravely erred in fastening lia b ility upon the insurance compa n y to first pay the compensation, while holding owner, driver and insurer of the offending vehi c le to be jointly and severally l i able to pay the same. It is ar g ued that owner an d driver of the truck had produced the driving licence Mark ‘B’ on the record, which was not renewed after expir y of period for which it was init i ally issued, till the time of accident occurred on 0 1.05.1993 and, therefore, reco v ery rights ought to have been provided to the insu r ance company from the insure d . In support of his contention, he relies upon th e judgment passed by the Ho n ’ble

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PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.08.19 09:18 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -3Supreme Cour t in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and others (2004) 3 SCC 297.

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Per contra, learned counsels appearing for respondent No.5 in F A O- 2077-1996 an d respondent No.7 in FAO-215 6 -1996 i.e. driver of the offen d ing vehicle and re s pondents No.6(i) to 6(iii) i.e. legal representatives of own e r of offending vehi c le submit that no evidence wa s led before the learned Tribun a l by the appellant-i n surance company to prove th a t the driving licence produce d as Mark ‘B’ and c ertificate Mark ‘A’ by the dri v er Daljit Singh was not renewed as on the date of a ccident and, therefore, at this s t age, the insurance company ca n not raise such defe n ce.

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L e arned counsel for the cross o b jectors in FAO No.2156 of 1 995 submits that w h ile awarding compensation to t h e tune of Rs.1,80,000/- for dea t h of deceased-Som Dutt, the learned Tribunal as s essed the monthly income o f the deceased as Rs.1400/- per month whereas he w as earning Rs.5000/- per mont h , as he was workin g in Bharat Starch Chemical, Y amuna Nagar, besides indulgi n g in dairy business. Furthermore, nothing was pr o vided for future prospects, lo s s of consortium, lo s s of love and affection and fu n eral expenses, therefore, pray s for enhancement o f compensation.

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I h ave heard learned counsel fo r the parties and perused the paper book with their able assistance. 7. T h e paper book and record of t h e present case was burnt in a fire accident occur r ed in the High Court and the a v ailable documents are photoc o pies of partially bu r nt papers and papers which m ade available after reconstruc t ion. Vide order da t ed 31.08.2022, the aforesaid documents were taken on re c ord, subject to all just exceptions and further verific a tion.

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PANKAJ KUMAR 2025.08.19 09:18 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Punjab and Haryana High Court Chandigarh

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -4-

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A perusal of the record shows th a t the learned Tribunal based o n the pleadings, fra m ed Issue No.3 with regard to g enuineness of the driving lic e nce, which is as un d er:-

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“ 3 . Whether respondent No.1 w a s not duly licenced driver, if s o to w h at effect? OPR

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T h e onus to prove said issue was on the respondent-insur a nce company, how e ver, while dealing with the said issue, the learned Tribunal rendered following findi n g:-

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“16. Issue No.3 in MACT case N o .41 of 93

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Onus was upon the insura n ce co. to prove that Daljit Si n gh, w a s not duly licenced driver, if i t wanted to escape its liability. No ev i dence has been led by the res p ondent-insurance company, de s pite re p eated adjournments to prove t h is fact. So this issue in both t h ese ca s es is held as not proved and is decided against the respon d entin s urance company in favour of th e petitioners.”

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A perusal of the above clearly shows that the appellant-insur a nce company did n o t lead any evidence to prove t h at the driver was not duly lice n ced. Merely submit t ing a photocopy of driving licence alleged to be driving licen c e of Daljit Singh, d river of offending vehicle be f ore this Court is not sufficie n t to absolve the ins u rance company from its liabilit y , as it is not feasible to ascerta i n in appeal whether the document produced is the s ame document which was prod u ced before the lear n ed Tribunal as Mark B, especia l ly when the record is burnt in a fire incident. Furt h ermore, the Hon’ble Suprem e Court in the judgment passe d in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and others (supra) has held that the breach of p olicy condition e.g. disqualif i cation of driver or invalid dri v ing licence of the d river, as contained in sub-secti o n (2) (a)(ii) of Section 149, ha v e to

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -5-

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be proved to h ave been committed by the i n sured for avoiding liability b y the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid drivi n g licence or disqualification o f the driver for drivi n g at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences availab l e to the insurer aga i nst either the insured or the thir d parties. Admittedly, in the ca s e in hand, the insu r er did not lead any evidence b e fore the learned Tribunal to p r ove that the drivin g licence produced by the driver as Mark ‘B’ was not a valid dri v ing licence. In the absence of any evidence, the l e arned Tribunal has rightly hel d the owner, driver a nd the insurance company to b e jointly and severally liable to pay the compensati o n. 11. In view of the above, the award passed by the learned Tribun a l is upheld and the appeals of the appellant-insuran c e company are dismissed. 12. N o w coming to the cross-objecti o ns filed by respondents No.1 to 6- cross objectors in FAO No.2156-1996, which are accompanied by an applic a tion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking c ondonation of delay of 17 years 361 days in filing t h e same. The condonation of d e lay of almost 18 years is soug h t to be condoned o n the ground that notice of the a ppeal was given to the counse l for the cross-obje c tion on 27.08.1997 and on 05 . 11.1997, the appeal was admi t ted. Thereafter, the appeal was listed for hearin g in the year 2014 and the c r ossobjectors were under the impression that no a p peal is required to be filed on t heir behalf as the i s sue of enhancement would be d ecided in the same appeal. It i s in this backdrop o f the matter, delay of almost 1 8 years occurred in filing the c r ossobjections, which delay is neither intentional n o r willful. 13. T h e primary function of a Court i s to adjudicate the dispute bet w een parties and to advance substantial justice. R u les of limitation are not mea n t to destroy the rig h ts of parties and they are mea n t to see that parties do not resort to

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -6-

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dilatory tactics , but seek their remedy promp t ly. However, the Hon’ble Sup r eme Court also cau t ioned that if the delay is occa s ioned by party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against a c ceptance of the explanation. The explanation sh o uld not be fanciful and conco c ted. The Courts while dealing w ith an application t o condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and should dea l with such application with utm o st care and caution. 14. T h us, question for consideration i s whether there is sufficient cau s e to condone the de l ay of 17 years 361 days in filin g the cross-objections. 15. In the judgment rendered by H on’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon’ble Supreme C ourt has culled out the follo w ing principles:

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i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, n onpe d antic approach while dealing w ith an application for condon a tion of delay, for the courts are not s u pposed to legalise injustice bu t are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms sufficient cause sh o uld be understood in their pr o per sp i rit, philosophy and purpose re g ard being had to the fact that t h ese te r ms are basically elastic and ar e to be applied in proper perspe c tive to the obtaining fact- situation. iii ) Substantial justice being pa r amount and pivotal the tech n ical co n siderations should not be give n undue and uncalled for empha s is. iv ) No presumption can be attac h ed to deliberate causation of d elay but, gross negligence on the par t of the counsel or litigant is t o be ta k en note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonatio n of de l ay is a significant and relevant f act. vi) It is to be kept in mind that a dherence to strict proof shoul d not af f ect public justice and cause pu b lic mischief because the court s are

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -7-

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re q uired to be vigilant so that i n the ultimate eventuate there i s no re a l failure of justice. vii ) The concept of liberal appro a ch has to encapsule the conce p tion of reasonableness and it cannot b e allowed a totally unfettered f ree pl a y. viii) There is a distinction betwe e n inordinate delay and a del ay of sh o rt duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudi c e is at t racted whereas to the latter it m ay not be attracted. That apart , the fir s t one warrants strict approa c h whereas the second calls f o r a li b eral delineation.

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ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating t o its in a ction or negligence are re l evant factors to be taken into co n sideration. It is so as the fun d amental principle is that the c o urts ar e required to weigh the scale o f balance of justice in respect of b oth parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by i n the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is co n cocted or the grounds urged i n the ap p lication are fanciful, the court s should be vigilant not to expos e the ot h er side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind t h at no one gets away with fr a ud, mi s representation or interpolation by taking recourse to the te c hnicalities of law of limitation.

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xii) The entire gamut of facts ar e to be carefully scrutinized an d the ap p roach should be based on t h e paradigm of judicial discr e tion w h ich is founded on objective reasoning and not on indivi d ual pe r ception.

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xiii) The State or a public body o r an entity representing a colle c tive ca u se should be given some accep t able latitude. 1 6 . To the aforesaid principles w e may add some more guide l ines ta k ing note of the present day sce n ario. They are: - a) An application for condonati o n of delay should be drafted w ith ca r eful concern and not in a h a lf hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are require d to condone delay on the bedro c k of

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -8-

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th e principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to ju s tice di s pensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt wi t h in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy whic h is ba s ically subjective. c) Though no precise formula ca n be laid down regard being h a d to th e concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving co n sistency and collegiality of t he adjudicatory system shoul d be m a de as that is the ultimate institu t ional motto. d ) The increasing tendency to pe r ceive delay as a non serious m a tter and, hence, lackadaisical propens i ty can be exhibited in a non-ch a llan m a nner requires to be curbed, of c ourse, within legal parameters.

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In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556 , while refusing to condone the delay of 56 5 days, it is observed by the Ho n ’ble Supreme Cour t that in the absence of reasona b le, satisfactory or even approp r iate explanation fo r seeking condonation of dela y , the same is not to be cond o ned lightly. It is f u rther observed that the law o f limitation may harshly affect a particular part y but it has to be applied wit h all its rigour when the statut e so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitatio n on equitable grou n ds. It is further observed t h at while exercising discretion for condoning the d elay, the court has to exercise d iscretion judiciously.

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In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448 , the Hon ’ ble Supreme Court has observ e d as

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under:-

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“ T he laws of limitation are fou n ded on public policy. Statut e s of li m itation are sometimes descr i bed as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitati o n is essential for public order. The pr i nciple is based on the maxi m “interest reipublicae ut sit f inis

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -9-

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lit i um”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there shoul d be en d to litigation but at the same ti m e laws of limitation are a mea n s to en s ure private justice suppressi n g fraud and perjury, quicke n ing di l igence and preventing oppres s ion. The object for fixing time- l imit fo r litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal re m edy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that th e parties do not resort to dil a tory tactics but avail their l e gal re m edies promptly. Salmond in hi s Jurisprudence states that the l aws co m e to the assistance of the vigil a nt and not of the sleepy.”

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In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 , it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the discretion to con d one the delay has t o be exercised judiciously base d on facts and circumstances of e ach case. It is furth e r observed that the expression “ sufficient cause” cannot be libe r ally interpreted if n e gligence, inaction or lack of b o na fides is attributed to the par t y. It is further obse r ved that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a p arty but it has to b e applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is fu r ther observed that i n case a party has acted with ne g ligence, lack of bona fides or t h ere is inaction the n there cannot be any justified g r ound for condoning the delay e ven by imposing c o nditions. It is observed that e ach application for condonatio n of delay has to be decided within the framework l aid down by this Court. It is fu r ther observed that i f courts start condoning delay w h ere no sufficient cause is mad e out by imposing c o nditions then that would amou n t to violation of statutory princ i ples and showing ut t er disregard to legislature. 17. In the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and ors v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024 INSC 286) , the Hon’ble Supreme C ourt while dealing w ith the issue where petitioners s ought condonation of delay of 5 659 days (over 15 y ears) in filing the appeal, has he l d as under:-

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -10-

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“ 2 6 . On a harmonious consider a tion of the provisions of the la w , as af o resaid, and the law laid down b y this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upo n public policy that there shoul d be an end to litigation by forfeiting t he right to remedy rather tha n the ri g ht itself;

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(ii ) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed o f for a l ong time must come to an end o r cease to exist after a fixed p e riod of time;

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(ii i ) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be const r ued di ff erently, such as Section 3 ha s to be construed in a strict s e nse w h ereas Section 5 has to be const r ued liberally; (i v) In order to advance substant i al justice, though liberal approach, ju s tice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be u sed to defeat the substantial la w of li m itation contained in Section 3 o f the Limitation Act; (v ) Courts are empowered to exer c ise discretion to condone the d elay if s ufficient cause had been expl a ined, but that exercise of pow e r is di s cretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if suffi c ient ca u se is established for variou s factors such as, where the r e is in o rdinate delay, negligence and w ant of due diligence; (v i) Merely some persons obtaine d relief in similar matter, it doe s not m e an that others are also entitled t o the same benefit if the court i s not sa t isfied with the cause shown for t he delay in filing the appeal; (v i i) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condo n ing th e delay; and

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(v i ii) Delay condonation appli c ation has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condonin g the de l ay for the reason that the conditions have been imp o sed, ta n tamounts to disregarding the st a tutory provision.

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xx x x xxxx xxxx 32. Moreover, the High Cour t , in the facts of this case, has not fo u nd it fit to exercise its discreti o nary jurisdiction of condonin g the de l ay. There is no occasion for u s to interfere with the discretio n so

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FAO-2077-1996 (O&M) -11-

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ex e rcised by the High Court fo r the reasons recorded. First, the cl a imants were negligent in purs u ing the reference and then in fi ling th e proposed appeal. Secondly, m ost of the claimants have acce p ted th e decision of the reference court . Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and m a de party to the reference befor e its de c ision, they could have applie d for procedural review which they ne v er did. Thus, there is apparen t ly no due diligence on their pa r t in pursuing the matter. Accordingl y , in our opinion, High Cou r t is ju s tified in refusing to condone th e delay in filing the appeal. 33. In the above situation, we do n ot deem it proper and necessa r y to in t erfere with the decision of the H igh Court refusing to condon e the in o rdinate delay in filing the prop o sed appeal.” 18. U n der such circumstances as per the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supre m e Court, while condoning th e delay, sufficient rights of pa r ties alone is not t h e criteria and unless sufficien t cause is shown, inordinate d elay cannot be con d oned. In the present case, the c ross-objectors have failed to s h ow sufficient caus e to condone the delay of 17 years 361 days in filing the c ross objections and t hus, this Court does not find an y ground to condone the same.

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R e sultantly, the cross-objection s are dismissed on the groun d of

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delay.

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M i sc. application(s) pending, if an y , also stand disposed of.

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	(A M	ARINDER SINGH GREWA JUDGE L)
August 12, 202 5
Pankaj*	Whether speaking/reasoned	: Yes/No
	Whether reportable	: Yes/No

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National Insurance Company Limited v. Sudesh Rani and Others

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National Insurance Company Limited v. Sudesh Rani and Others

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