Harshit Jain Vs State of Punjab and Others

Learned counsel states that aga i nst the revised answer key d a ted 29.08.2024 u p loaded/issued by respondent N o s.2 and 3, the petitioner had ra i sed objections, o n e out of which, stands corre c ted, however, 4 answers re m ain unchanged.

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Learned State counsel refers to para 5 of the short reply filed by Secretary, Examinations, Punjab Public Se r vice Commission, Patiala, d a ted 08.05.2025, w h ich reads thus:-

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“That it is also noteworthy t o mention here that with regar d to the e-mail sent by the petitio n er on 02.01.2025 (Annexure P7 ) , it is brought to the notice tha t in paragraph no.4 of the Pu b lic Notice dated 05.05.2024 (Annexure R-1), the follo w ing provision was already incl u ded for the information of the candidates, relevant part o f the above said provision is mentioned hereinafter for the k ind perusal of the Hon’ble Co u rt:‘There will be no separate r eplies given to the candidates w ho may have put objections. The revised answer key is an indication, if his/her objecti o n has been accepted or rejected.’

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A reference can be made to judgment dated 28.05.2025 passe d in CWP-19486- 2 021 titled as Lakshay Chahal vs. Haryana Staff Selection

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ASHOK KUMAR 2025.07.02 15:38 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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CWP-2934-2025

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Commission and another, wherein issue of answer key has been extensively dealt with by referring to the law laid down in this regard by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relevant paras whereof read thus:-

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“34. This Court reiterates the settled principle of law that in matters pertaining to academic evaluation; the setting and assessment of questions in competitive examinations, the opinion of the Expert Committee is to be accorded primacy and deference. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. reported as (2018) 2 SCC 357 has held as under:

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30. The law on the subject is therefore, quite clear and we only propose to highlight a few significant conclusions. They are: 30.1. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then the authority conducting the examination may permit it;

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30.2. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from prohibiting it) then the court may permit reevaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any ” inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation” and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed;

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30.3. The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the an- swer sheets of a candidate—it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics;

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30.4. The court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and

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30.5. In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examina- tion authority rather than to the candidate.

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(Emphasis supplied) 35. Moreover, this court cannot sit in appeal over academic decisions unless shown to be palpably wrong, irrational, or perverse. In the present matter, there is no credible material to demonstrate that the decision of the Expert Committee suffers from any such vice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of U.P. Public Service Commission v. Rahul Singh , reported as (2018) 7 SCC 254 , while addressing the issue of correctness of answers provided in an official answer key, held that the key prepared by subject experts is entitled to a presumption of correctness. The Court observed that judicial interference with such expert-determined answers should be minimal and exercised only when it is demonstrated that the answer provided is patently erroneous, indisputably incorrect, or in conflict with established and accepted knowledge. The operative part is as under:

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” 12. The law is well settled that the onus is on the candidate to not only demonstrate that the key answer is incorrect but also that it is a glaring mistake which is totally apparent and no inferential process or reasoning is required to show that the key answer is wrong. The Constitutional Courts must exercise great restraint in

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ASHOK KUMAR 2025.07.02 15:38 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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CWP-2934-2025

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such matters and should be reluctant to entertain a plea challenging the correctness of the key answers.”

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The Commission, in discharge of its statutory functions, has constituted a body of subject-matter experts who have collectively and after due deliberation prepared the final answer key. The said key has been uniformly applied across the board to all candidates. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has been treated differently or that there is any discriminatory application of standards. On the contrary, it is evident that all answer scripts were evaluated strictly in accordance with the said key, thereby ensuring parity, transparency, and fairness in the selection process.

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This Court also takes notice of the fact that competitive examinations of this nature are marked by intense competition and minimal margins for error, where even a difference of one mark may result in a candidate’s success or failure. In such a scenario, it is imperative that the sanctity of the evaluation process is preserved. Allowing individual candidates to question the correctness of answers as determined by domain experts would open floodgates of litigation and undermine the finality of the selection process.

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Furthermore, no irregularity, procedural lapse, or violation of rules has been brought to the fore by the petitioner. Mere disagreement by a candidate with the expert determination of an answer does not vest a cause of action in his favour, nor does it confer jurisdiction upon this Court to interfere with matters that lie squarely within the academic domain.

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This Court is constrained to observe that the petitioner, by relying on responses received under the Right to Information Act and misapplying the content of scholarly research papers, has sought to project his own understanding as superior to that of a duly constituted Expert Committee comprising subject-matter specialists. This approach not only undermines the credibility of objective expert determination but also reflects a lack of due diligence and academic discipline. Courts cannot be expected to reopen settled academic findings at the instance of a candidate who, without requisite expertise, challenges well-considered decisions of those duly qualified and empowered to do so.

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It is further disconcerting that such petitions, filed with misplaced confidence and without adequate legal or academic foundation, have the tendency to encourage similarly ill-founded litigation by other unsuccessful candidates. This results in an undue burden on the judicial system and a diversion of precious time and resources from matters involving genuine constitutional or legal questions.

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Let it be made abundantly clear that in future, if similarly misconceived and unmeritorious petitions are brought before this Court seeking to substitute judicial opinion for expert academic conclusions without any demonstrable illegality, arbitrariness or mala fides, the same shall be dealt with sternly, and appropriate costs shall be imposed to deter abuse of the judicial process. The sanctity of competitive examinations and the integrity of expert assessments cannot be allowed to be eroded through unwarranted litigation.

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ASHOK KUMAR 2025.07.02 15:38 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

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CWP-2934-2025

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In light of the above, this Court does not find any merit in the petitioner’s challenge. The function of this Court is not to substitute its own judgment in place of academic experts. The answer provided by the Expert Committee stands accepted for the purpose of evaluation, and no case is made out for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

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