Manphool and Others Vs State of Haryana and Others

U nder challenge in the prese n t writ petition filed under Article 226 o f the Constitution of India ar e the impugned notifications dated Decem b er 24, 2007 (Annexure P-2) i s sued under Section 4 of the Land Acquis i tion Act, 1894 (hereinafter re f erred to as “the 1894 Act”) and the declaration dated December 23, 2 008 (Annexure P-3) issued under Sectio n 6 of the 1894 Act, seeking to acquire the land of the petitioners.

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T he petitioners have also p rayed for restraining the respondents f rom taking possession of their l and, during the pendency of the writ peti t ion and finally for release of their land from acquisition proceedings.

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T he facts of the case in brief are narrated hereinafter:

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i) T he petitioners were owners in possession of the land admeasuring 34 Kanals 09 Marlas comprisi n g in Khewat No.727 Khasra No.46 Killa N o.11/2, 12, 13, Khasra No.86 Killa No.14, 15 situated in village Sunar i a Kalan, District Rohtak. ii) O ut of the said land, 19 Kanal s 05 Marlas belonging to the petitioners w as sought to be acquired by t he government of Haryana, Urban Estat e Department vide notification dated December 24, 2007 issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act for d eveloping a special zone in Sector 21, R o htak.

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iii) T he total land notified un d er Section 4 notification admeasured 2 31.52 acres. Declaration unde r Section 6 of the 1894 Act was issued o n December 23, 2008 for acquiri n g 161.32 acres. iv) A n award was passed on Jun e 23, 2010 for determining compensatio n for an area of 159.46 acres in c luding the land admeasuring 19 Kanals 05 Marlas belonging to the petitio n ers. Consequently, the State deposited th e determined compensation b e fore the Land Acquisition Collector. T h e petitioners had neither cha l lenged the land acquisition proceedings w hich were initiated in 2007 nor withdrew the compensation. v) A representation was made by o nly petitioner No.2-Bala for release of he r land. Vide letter dated December 20, 2024 such request was forwarded b y the Administrator, Haryana Sh e hri Vikas Pradhikaran to the Senior Town Planner, Rohtak. Vide office m e mo dated April 23, 2025 the District Tow n Planner informed the Senior T own Planner that the land in question is e armarked for proposed resid e ntial project in Sector-22, Rohtak. Ther e fore, the same could not be rel e ased.

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L earned counsel for the petitio n ers argues that under policy dated Octob e r 26, 2007 (Annexure P-8) t h e government should have released the acquisitioned land of the peti t ioners. The petitioners had raised const r uctions over the land and th e refore, under the aforesaid policy of the State of Haryana, the authoritie s were under an obligation to release the l a nd of the petitioners. Further m ore, the petitioners had not accepted the compensation awarded by t h e government and were in physical pos s ession of the land in question . As a natural corollary, the representatio n of petitioner No.2 should be considered in proper perspective a n d the land of all the petitioners should be released.

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I ssue Notice.

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M r. Mittal, learned Additional A dvocate General, Haryana, accepts notice and submits that the petition is completely misconceived since the lan d had been acquired for a public purpose and is required to be utilized in f u ture. He submits that Section 101-A of the Right to Fair Compensatio n and Transparency in Land A c quisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”), gives liberty to th e State government to de-notif y unviable and non-essential land on such premise as is considered expe d ient by the State, including payment of c o mpensation on account of dam a ges, if any, sustained by the land owner due to such acquisition. The power lay with the State government t o assess whether the land has become unviable or nonessential. No land owner had a vested righ t to assert that the land has become eithe r unviable or non-essential and claim release of the land. He relies on a j u dgment of Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.16421 of 2021

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“ Ram Swaroop (dead) through LRs and another v. State of Haryana

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and others ” a rising out of SLP (Civil) No.16 4 21 of 2021.

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L earned State counsel further relies on a recent Supreme Court judgm e nt dated November 10, 2023 i n Civil Appeal No.7634 of 2023 “ Nandkishor Babulal Agrawal v. The State of Maharashtra and others ” to s u bmit that High Courts should b e extremely circumspect to issue a writ of mandamus in exercise of i t s extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articl e 226 of the Constitution of I ndia directing release of a lawfully acq u ired land, on the premise that s u ch land has not been utilized for the publi c purpose for which it was acqui r ed. Furthermore, he submits that no timef r ame is specified for utilization o f land under the 1894 Act. 8. T his Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the m aterial on record.

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T he petitioners have sought t o challenge the acquisition proceedings initiated by issuance of notificat i on dated December 24, 2007 under Sectio n 4 of the 1894 Act, after a peri o d of almost 18 years. Out of nine writ petitioners, only petitioner No.2 made a representation for release of h e r land. The other petitioners h ave approached this Court directly afte r 15 years of passing of the a ward dated June 23, 2010 (Annexure P - 4). Such inaction on the part o f the petitioners is directly hit by the princi p les of delay, laches and acquiescence. At this stage, it would be expedient t o discuss the law governing the field.

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I n “ Leela Wanti and others v. State of Haryana and others ” reported in ( 2 012) 1 SCC 66, the Apex Court held that delay and laches in approaching the Court would negate the c hallenge to the acquisition

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proceedings. The relevant extract of the s a id paragraph is reproduced herein below :

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“ 18. A reading of the above r e produced Paragraph of the

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L and Administration Manual no w here suggests that the State G overnment is duty-bound to re s tore the acquired land to the o wners after the purpose of ac q uisition is accomplished. It m erely mentions that as a matte r of grace the government is u sually willing to restore agric u ltural and pastoral land to t h e owners on their refunding th e amount of compensation. x x xxx 1 9. If paragraph 493 is read in the manner suggested by t h e learned counsel for the ap p ellants then in all the cases t h e acquired land will have to be returned to the owners i r respective of the time gap bet w een the date of acquisition a nd the date on which the purp o se of acquisition specified in S ection 4 is achieved and the g o vernment will not be free to u se the acquired land for any o t her public purpose. Such an i n terpretation would also be c ontrary to the language of S ection 16 of the Act in terms of which the acquired land v ests in the State government fre e from all encumbrances and t h e law laid down by this Cou r t that lands acquired for a p articular public purpose can b e utilized for any other public p urpose .”

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I n “ Raghubir Singh and another v. State of Haryana and

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others ” repo r ted in (2022) 4 SCC 728, it wa s held by the Apex Court that the issue of non-viability or non-essentiality o f the land was to be decided by the gove r nment and it is for the State to decide whether or not it chooses to d e -notify the same. Relevant ex t ract of the said judgment is reproduced h e rein below:

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“ xxx

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5 . After hearing the learne d counsel for the parties, we h ave no hesitation in observing that the conclusion reached b y the Division Bench of the H igh Court in the impugned j u dgment is not an accurate s t atement of law. Indeed, the C onstitution Bench considered the question of lapsing of a cquisition proceedings in ref e rence to Section 24 of the 2 013 Act. While examining that question, it had also noticed S ection 101 of the 2013 Act, which deals with return of u nutilized land. In that context, the Constitution Bench had o bserved that Section 101 of t h e 2013 Act cannot apply to a cquisition made under the 18 9 4 Act. However, it had no o ccasion to deal with the effic a cy of Section 101-A of the

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2 013 Act, as applicable to the S t ate of Haryana. Whereas, in t h e present cases, the landowne r s had approached the High C ourt with twin reliefs. The p rimary relief being for a d eclaration of lapsing of acqui s ition proceedings under the 1 894 Act and in the alternative to permit them to approach t h e State of Haryana for invokin g power under Section 101-A o f the 2013 Act as applicable to the State of Haryana, which h as come into force w.e.f 1-1- 2 014 vide publication of the R ight to Fair Compensation a nd Transparency in Land A cquisition, Rehabilitation a n d Resettlement (Haryana A mendment) Act, 2017 – inserte d w.e.f 24-5-2018. x xx 7 . The Statement of Object s and Reasons for inserting S ection 101-A of the 2013 Act b y the State Legislature, makes it amply clear that there is also a need to ensure that land is r eturned back by the State G overnment as per the due p rocess, in case the land acqu i red under the old 1894 Act b ecomes unviable or non-essent i al. Further, Section 101-A of t h e 2013 Act is proposed to b e added to provide for such e xpediencies. x xx 9 . Notably, the validity o f Section 101-A is not the s ubject-matter of challenge bef o re us from any quarter, for t h e time being. As long as the p r ovision exists on the statute b ook, it enables the State Gov e rnment to take appropriate d ecision in public interest on the factum of the lands in q uestion, having become unvi a ble or non-essential. This p ower vested in the State is, in d eed, coupled with a duty to p eriodically evaluate the situati o n or at least soon after it is b rought to its notice by the ers t while landowners or by any p ublic-spirited person that the i m movable public property is b eing wasted, unutilised or ha s become unviable or non- e ssential. After receipt of such r e presentation, it would be the b ounden duty of the State to ex a mine the relevant facts and fo rm suitable opinion as may b e advised, regarding lands h aving become unviable or n o n-essential or not. If it is s atisfied that the acquired lan d s have become unviable or n on-essential, it is expected of t h e State, nay the State would b e obliged in larger public inte r est to denotify such land on s uch terms and conditions as ma y be necessary.

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1 0. Thus understood, there is no reason to assume that the l a ndowners cannot request the S tate Government to consider s uch representation inviting a d ecision of the State, within t h e realm of Section 101-A of th e 2013 Act. This provision is c ertainly not in the nature of g iving a vested right to the l a ndowners regarding denotific a tion of the acquired land nor d oes it follow that upon denotif i cation, the lands in question m ust return to the erstwhile ow n ers only. It will be open to t h e State Government to denoti fy the acquired land on such terms and conditions as may be expedient, in public interest.

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T hus, the provision empowers t h e State to denotify the lands a cquired under the 1894 Act.

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1 1. Viewed thus, the conclus i on of the Division Bench in t h e impugned order, that the la n downers cannot be allowed t o approach the State Govern m ent to exercise its power u nder Section 101-A of the 2013 Act, may not be an accurate s tatement of law and needs to be understood in the above terms. x xx 1 3. The fact that the landown e rs have already constructed s ome structures on the acquired land, which has vested in the S tate Government, by itself can be no reason to denotify the a cquired land. It can be done o n ly if the State Government is fu lly satisfied that the land h a s become unviable or non- e ssential for the purpose of deve l opment and in particular for r eason for which it was so acqui r ed.

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x xx”

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T he said aspect was thereafte r reconsidered by the Apex Court in Ram Swaroop’s case (supra) and t he Apex Court clarified that Section 101- A did not give a vested right t o the land owner to seek denotification. I t is not for the Court to sit in a p peal over the opinion of the competent a u thority which had to ensure eff e ctive town planning and the issue of req u irement of land, which stood vested once the award was passed. The claim could not be sustain e d only on the ground of possession, s ince the petitioners continu e d to be in unauthorized possession o n ce the award was passed. The relevant observations are as follows:

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“ 8. Section 101-A of 2013 A c t (as inserted in State of H aryana) gives liberty to the S t ate Government to de-notify s uch land, on such terms, as c onsidered expedient by the S tate Government, including the payment of compensation on a ccount of damages, if any, sus t ained by the landowner due t o such acquisition. Section 10 1 -A is an enabling provision w ith the State Government to d e -notify the land vested with S tate if it finds that any public p urpose for which land was a cquired under the Land Acq u isition Act, 1894 becomes u nviable or non-essential. In ot h er words, the power is with t h e State Government on its satisfaction that the land a cquired has become unvia b le or non-essential. No

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l a ndowner has a vested right to assert that the land acquired h as become unviable or non-e s sential mainly because the l a ndowner continued to be in possession by virtue of an i n terim order passed by the Hig h Court. Xxx

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1 1. The claim of the appell a nts for release of land on a ccount of Section 24 (2) had been rejected by the State G overnment on 12.09.2016. The writ petition against the said o rder stands dismissed on 12.10.2020. Thus, the present a ppeal is merely an attempt to c o ntinue to be in possession of t h e land on one pretext or the ot h er so as to defeat the public p urpose of acquisition of the land for development and u tilization of residential, comm e rcial and institutional area, S ector-51, Gurgaon (now G urugram). This Court in R aghubir Singh has held that S e ction 101-A does not give a v ested right to the landowner t o seek denotification or even t h at upon denotification, the la n d in question must return to t h e erstwhile owners only. The state Government is at liberty t o pass such order other than re l ease of land in favour of the l a ndowners. x xx”

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I n Nandkishor Babulal’s case (s upra), the issue whether the acquisition p r oceedings under the 1894 Act s tood lapsed, was considered. It was held b y the Apex Court that once the l and stood vested in the State government, the public purpose for which it stood acquired could be changed late r and there was no time limit w ithin which the authorities would be ex p ected to utilize the acquired la n d. Relevant paragraph of the said judgmen t reads as under:

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“ xxx

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1 1. In our considered view, the High Court would be e xtremely circumspect to issue a mandamus in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the C onstitution, directing to relea s e a lawfully acquired land o nly on the premise that such l a nd has not been utilized for t h e public purpose for which i t was acquired. There is no g ainsaying that once the lan d vests in the State or its a uthorities, the ‘public purpos e ’ of its acquisition can be c hanged at a later stage. All tha t is required is that such land s hould be utilized for public purposes only. In fact, there c annot be a time limit within which the authorities are e xpected to utilize the acquired land. The Municipalities or s uch other agencies are expecte d to have long-term plans for

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r egulated development of urban areas and for that purpose, c ertain pockets of land are re q uired to be kept vacant as r eserve pool to cater the future n eeds. x xx”

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T he unambiguous exposition of l aw does not create any legal right or equit y in favour of the petitioners. R eliance on Section 24 of the 2013 Act als o does not aid the case of the pe t itioners in any manner as the said Section i s deemed to have come into force on January 01, 2014 and would only b e applicable in case all the aw a rds which were passed five years prior t o the deemed date of coming i n to force of the said Section. The award i n the present case was passed o n June 23, 2010. Clearly, it was within a p eriod of five years from the de e med date of commencement of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. 15. F urthermore, once the compen s ation was deposited before the Land Ac q uisition Collector, it would h a ve to be deemed to be paid following th e law laid down in Indore Development’s case (supra) . Once the possession is taken over by the State aut h orities recording the same in Rapat Rozn a mcha (memorandum of posse s sion), it could not be later contended b y the petitioners that the physical possession remained with them. Any p ossession retained by the pet i tioners thereafter would be unauthorized and cannot augment the case o f petitioners in any manner. Relevant ext r act from the above said jud g ment is reproduced herein below:

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“ xxx

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2 43. It is clear that once lan d is acquired, award passed a nd possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It h ad been allotted to ben e ficiaries. A considerable i n frastructure could have been developed and a third-party i n terest had also intervened. Th e land would have been given b y the acquiring authorities to t he beneficiaries from whose s cheme the land had been acqui r ed and they have developed

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i m mense infrastructure. We a re unable to accept the s ubmission that merely by de p osit of amount in treasury i n stead of court, we should in v alidate all the acquisitions, w hich have taken place. That i s not what is contemplated u nder Section 24 (2). We are also not able to accept the s ubmission that when law opera t es these harsh consequences n eed not be seen by the court. In our opinion, that submission i s without merit as such consequ e nces are not even envisaged o n proper interpretation of S e ction 24 (2), as mentioned a bove.

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2 44. The proviso to Section 2 4 (2) of the 2013 Act, intends t h at the Collector would have s ufficient funds to deposit it w ith respect to the majority of landholdings. In case c ompensation has not been pai d or deposited with respect to m ajority of landholdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for h igher compensation. In case money has not been deposited w ith the Land Acquisition Coll e ctor or in the treasury or in c ourt with respect to maj o rity of landholdings, the c onsequence has to follow of hi g her compensation as per the p roviso to Section 24(2) of the 2 013 Act. Even otherwise, if d eposit in treasury is irregular, t hen the interest would follow a s envisaged under Section 34 o f the 1894 Act. Section 24(2) i s attracted if acquisition proce e ding is not completed within 5 years after the pronounce m ent of award. Parliament c onsidered the period of 5 y e ars as reasonable time to c omplete the acquisition proc e edings i.e. taking physical p ossession of the land and paym e nt of compensation. It is the c lear intent of the 2013 Act, th a t provision of Section 24(2) s hall apply to the proceeding w h ich is pending as on the date o n which the 2013 Act, has be e n brought into force and it d oes not apply to the conclude d proceedings. It was urged b efore us by one of the counsel t h at lands in the Raisina Hills a nd Lutyens' Zones of Delhi w ere acquired in 1913 and c ompensation has not been pai d . The 2013 Act applies only t o the pending proceedings in w h ich possession has not been t a ken or compensation has not p aid and not to a case where p roceedings have been conclud e d long back, Section 24(2) is n ot a tool to revive those proc e edings and to question the v alidity of taking acquisition proceedings due to which p ossession in 1960s, 1970s, 19 8 0s were taken, or to question t h e manner of deposit of amou n t in the treasury. The 2013 A ct never intended revival of such claims. In case such l a ndowners were interested in q u estioning the proceedings of t a king possession or mode of d ep osit with the treasury, such a challenge was permissible w i thin the time available with t h em to do so. They cannot w a ke from deep slumber and r aise such claims in order to d efeat the acquisition validly m ade. In our opinion, the la w never contemplates -nor p ermits- misuse much less gro s s abuse of its provisions to r eopen all the acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the duty o f the court to examine the deta i ls of such claims. There are

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s everal litigations before us w h ere landowners, having lost t h e challenge to the validity of acquisition proceedings and a fter having sought enhance m ent of the amount in the r eference succeeding in it ne v ertheless are seeking relief a rguing about lapse of acquisi t ion after several rounds of litigation.

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x xx 2 74. It was submitted on beh a lf of landowners that under S ection 24 the expression used i s not possession but physical p ossession. In our opinion, u nder the 1894 Act when p ossession is taken after awar d is passed under Section 16 o r under Section 17 before the passing of the award, land a bsolutely vests in the State o n drawing of panchnama of t a king possession, which is the mode of taking possession. T hereafter, any re-entry in p ossession or retaining the p ossession is wholly illegal a nd trespasser's possession i n ures for the benefit of the o w ner and even in the case of o pen land, possession is deem e d to be that of the owner. W hen the land is vacant and is l ying open, it is presumed to b e that of the owner by this C o urt as held in Kashi Bai v. S udha Rani Ghose. Mere re-entr y on government land once it i s acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the 1894 A ct) does not confer any right t o it and Section 24(2) does n ot have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the S tate.

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x xx 2 79. The Court is alive to th e fact that there are a large n umber of cases where, after acquisition land has been h anded over to various cor p orations, local authorities, a cquiring bodies, etc. After dep o siting compensation (for the a cquisition) those bodies and a u thorities have been handed p ossession of lands. They, in tu r n, after development of such a cquired lands have handed o ver properties; third-party i n terests have intervened and now declaration is sought u nder the cover of Section 2 4 (2) to invalidate all such a ctions. As held by us, Section 24 does not intend to cover s uch cases at all and such gros s misuse of the provisions of l a w must stop. Title once ve s ted, cannot be obliterated, w ithout an express legal provis i on; in any case, even if the l a ndowners' argument that afte r possession too, in case of n on-payment of compensation, t he acquisition would lapse, w ere for arguments' sake, be accepted, these third-party o wners would be deprived of t h eir lands, lawfully acquired b y them, without compensation o f any sort. Thus, we have no h esitation to overrule the decis i ons in Velaxan Kumar and N armada Bachao Andolan wit h regard to mode of taking p ossession. We hold that draw i ng of panchnama of taking p ossession is the mode of t aking possession in land a cquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any r e-entry or retaining the poss e ssion thereafter is unlawful a nd does not inure for conferri n g benefits under Section 24 ( 2) of the 2013 Act.

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X xx”

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C onsequently, this Court has n o hesitation to hold that the claim in the p resent writ petition is only an a ttempt to hold on to the land and no symp a thy can be shown on account o f construction raised later by the petitione r s, as they had taken a chance by raising the same without even challen g ing the acquisition proceedin g s. In such circumstances, it has no other o ption but to reject the plea of t h e writ petitioners. However, this Court re f rains from imposing any costs in the matter. In the light of the discussio n made hereinabove, the petitio n ers are granted two months time from th e date of this judgment to vac a te the land in dispute, after which the St a te would be free to take over t h e possession of the acquired property, as t h e status of the petitioners is only now that of encroachers.