Hardaman Singh Vs State of Punjab — Punjab & Haryana HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

Hardaman Singh Vs State of Punjab — Punjab & Haryana HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Appeals against conviction dismissed as withdrawn (conviction found based on proper appreciation of evidence); impugned order of sentence set aside; both appellants directed to be released on probation for 02 years on furnishing probation bonds of ₹50,000/- each with surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the CJM concerned within four weeks; prosecution costs of ₹50,000/- each imposed, the trial Court fine of ₹5,000/- each converted into prosecution cost and adjusted; on failure to comply within stipulated time, the probation order automatically stands vacated and the actual sentence imposed by the trial Court is to be undergone.

Issue for consideration

Whether the appeals against conviction, which the appellants do not wish to press, should be dismissed as withdrawn. +1 more

Court's answer

Both appeals against the impugned judgment of conviction dated 12.02.2004 are dismissed as withdrawn, the Court recording that the conviction is otherwise also found to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence on record.

Ratio / Principle

Having noticed the legal position discussed in detail in Aditya Kumar, which is squarely applicable to the facts of this case, and noting that in Tarak Nath Keshari the Supreme Court granted probation in a case under the Essential Commodities Act despite the minimum prescribed sentence, the prayer of both appellants for release on probation is accepted.

Key takeaways

The impugned order of sentence passed by the trial Court is set aside; both appellants are to be released on probation for 02 years on probation bonds of ₹50,000/- each with surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the CJM concerned within four weeks, and to pay prosecution costs of ₹50,000/- each, the fine of ₹5,000/- each being converted into prosecution cost; failure to comply within the stipulated time automatically vacates the probation direction and revives the sentence imposed by the trial Court.ratio¶89

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Punjab and Haryana (Deepak Gupta, J.; decision 22.04.2025) — CRA-S-437-SB-2004 (Hardaman Singh) and CRA-S-424-SB-2004 (M/s Munak Chemical Ltd. & Anr.) v. State of Punjab. Appellants, convicted under S.7, Essential Commodities Act, 1955 by the Special Judge, Kapurthala (judgment and order dated 12.02.2004; 02 years' rigorous imprisonment and ₹5,000 fine each) because fertilizer 'Pooja Brand Singal Super Phosphate' kept for sale by M/s Chadha Khad Store and manufactured by M/s Munak Chemicals Ltd. was found 'non-standard', withdrew their appeal against conviction, which was dismissed as withdrawn, the Court finding the conviction based upon proper appreciation of evidence. On sentence: appellants now approximately 89 and 75 years of age; offence of 1996; conviction in 2004; appeals heard only in 2025 — about 30 years of agony of proceedings. Following Aditya Kumar v. State of Haryana (CRR-43-2010, decided 03.04.2025) and Tarak Nath Keshari v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605 (probation granted under the Essential Commodities Act despite minimum sentence), the impugned order of sentence was set aside and both appellants released on probation for 02 years on bonds of ₹50,000/- each with surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the CJM within four weeks, with prosecution costs of ₹50,000/- each (trial Court fine adjusted therein); default in compliance vacates the probation order and revives the sentence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

101 CRA-S-437-SB-2004

HARDAMAN SINGH …..APPELLANT

Vs.

STATE OF PUNJAB …..RESPONDENT

2. CRA-S-424-SB-2004

M/s MUNAK CHEMICAL LIMITED AND ANOTHER …..APPELLANTS Vs.

STATE OF PUNJAB …..RESPONDENT

Date of Decision: 22.04.2025

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present: Mr. Vishal Gupta, Advocate for the appellant in CRA-S-437-SB-2004.

Mr. Dinesh Goyal, Advocate and Mr. Jugansh Goyal, Advocate for the appellant in CRA-424-SB-2004.

Mr. R.K. Takkar, DAG, Punjab.

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

In complaint case No. 7 of 1997 filed by Chief Agricultural Officer, Kapurthala before learned Special Judge, Kapurthala, accusedHardaman Singh, sole proprietor of M/s Chadha Khad Store, Nadala, District Kapurthala; and accused Nirbhai Singh, Chief Produc�on Officer of M/s Munak Chemicals Limited, Bathinda were convicted by the Court of learned Special Judge, Kapurthala under Sec�on 7 of the Essen�al Commodi�es Act, 1955 vide judgment dated 12.02.2004, on the allega�ons that fer�lizer kept for sale by M/s Chadha Khad Store, Nadala, in the brand name of ‘Pooja Brand Singal Super Phosphate’, manufactured by M/s Munak Chemicals Limited, on analysis was found to be ‘non-standard’. Vide a separate order dated 12.02.2004, both these accused i.e. Hardaman Singh and Nirbhai Singh were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 02 years

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each and to pay a fine of ₹5000/- each with default sentence of one month rigorous imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.

Against the aforesaid convic�on and sentence, the two convicts namely Hardaman Singh and Nirbhai Singh have filed the present two separate appeals.

At the outset, learned counsel for both the appellants submit that offence in ques�on was commi�ed way back in 1996; that convic�on was recorded in 2004 a�er trial of approximately 08 years; that the appellants are facing agony of trial and further proceedings for the last almost 30 years; that both the appellants are now quite aged and so, considering all these circumstances, they be released on proba�on, as none of the appellants want to press their appeal against convic�on.

Specific statement is made by learned counsel for both the appellants withdrawing the appeal against convic�on and confining their prayer only against the order of sentence so as to release the appellants on proba�on.

It is contended by learned counsel that in the similar facts and circumstances as in the present case, in a case pertaining to Essen�al Commodi�es Act, 1955, Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to release the appellant on proba�on in case �tled Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West Bengal , 2023 SCC Online SC 605 , which was also relied by this Court in CRR43-2010 �tled Aditya Kumar Vs. State of Haryana decided on 03.04.2025.

Learned State counsel has opposed the prayer.

This Court has considered submissions of both the sides and have appraised the record.

Considering the statement as made by learned counsel for the appellants, both the appeals against the impugned judgment of convic�on

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dated 12.02.2004 are hereby dismissed as withdrawn, inasmuch as convic�on is otherwise also found to be based upon proper apprecia�on of evidence on record.

As far as the impugned order of sentence is concerned, it is no�ced that at the �me of commission of offence, appellant-Hardaman Singh was 61 years of age, which means that as of now, he is approximately 89 years of age. Similarly, appellant-Nirbhai Singh was aged 47 years at the �me of commission of offence, which means that as of now, he is 75 years of age. The offence in ques�on was commi�ed in 1996. Convic�on was recorded in February, 2004. Both these appeals were filed and admi�ed in 2004. The same could not be listed earlier due to huge pendency and have ul�mately been listed for final hearing in 2025. Meaning thereby, from the date of commission of the offence, the two appellants have already faced agony of approximately 30 years including the trial proceedings and then the appeal proceedings.

The ques�on is that whether in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, par�cularly considering the advanced age of the two appellants, it will be jus�fiable to send the appellants behind bars to carry out the sentence as imposed by the trial Court.

A similar ques�on was considered by this Court in Aditya Kumar Vs. State of Haryana (supra). It is relevant to reproduce the observa�ons as made by this Court, which are as under:-

“19. As far as the impugned order of sentence is concerned, the accusedpe��oner has been sentenced to undergo the minimum sentence as provided under the Statute i.e. rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and fine of ₹500/- with default sentence of one month.

As per the custody cer�ficate, pe��oner has already undergone the actual custody period of seven days and he is not involved in any other offence. It is also no�ced by this Court that offence in ques�on was commi�ed in September, 1999 and a�er a protracted trial of more than 8

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years, he was ul�mately convicted in October 2007 and then his appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court in January 2010. The sentence of the pe��oner was suspended by this Court in January 2010 and this way, he is out on bail for the last more than 15 years.

In the above circumstances, whether it will be jus�fiable to send him behind bars to carry out the remaining sentence; or can he be released on proba�on; or whether sentence can be reduced for the period already undergone by him?

As per Sec�on 20AA of the PFA Act , the provisions of Proba�on of Offenders Act 1958, or Sec�on 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to a person convicted of an offence under the provision of the PFA Act, unless that person is under the 18 years of age.

In this case, at the �me of recording convic�on in 2007, the age of the pe��oner is men�oned to be 36 years as per the custody cer�ficate, which means that at the �me of commi�ng the offence, he was 27 years of age and not less than 18 years of age. As such, he cannot be granted benefit of proba�on in view of Sec�on 20AA of the PFA Act.

Although, in Ishar Dass Vs. State of Punjab, 1972 PLR 475, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme court that provisions of Proba�on of Offenders Act, 1958 are not excluded in the case of person found guilty of offence under the PFA Act, but it is important to no�ce that Sec�on 20AA was inserted in PFA Act, 1958 by way of an amendment in 1976 and therefore, the case of Ishar Dass (supra) is not applicable in the present case.

25.1 In yet another case �tled State of Punjab Vs. Mithu Singh, 1988 (3) SCC 607 , it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Sec�on 20AA of the PFA Act applies also to the offences commi�ed prior to its enactment.

25.2 In the present case, since the offence was commi�ed in 1999; whereas, the amendment by inser�ng Sec�on 20AA was brought in 1976, as such this authority is also of no help to the case of the pe��oner so as to give him the benefit of proba�on.

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In Joginder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1980 PLR 585 , a Full bench of this Court held that benefit of provisions of the Proba�on of Offenders Act, 1958 can be extended even in a case, where minimum sentence is provided. However, in that case before this Court, the accused had been convicted for the offence under Sec�on 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. That was not a case commi�ed under the provisions of the PFA Act and so, not applicable to the facts of present case.

In Lakhvir Singh etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and another, 2021 AIR (Supreme Court) 555 , benefit of proba�on was extended in a case, where minimum sentence was provided. However, that was the case under the provisions of Indian Penal Code. Similarly in Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605 , the benefit of proba�on was granted despite the fact that minimum sentence of imprisonment was provided, but that was the case under the provisions of Essen�al Commodi�es Act, 1955. Thus, in none of these cases, the provisions of the PFA Act were applicable.

In State of Haryana Vs. Yad Ram 1987(1) RCR (Criminal) 264 , a Full Bench of this Court has held that when convic�on is recorded under the Preven�on of Food Adultera�on Act, then the minimum sentence provided in the provision cannot be further scaled down.

Thus, from the legal posi�on as above, it emerges that when a convic�on is recorded under the provisions of PFA Act, neither the accused can be granted the benefit of Proba�on of Offenders Act, 1958 nor he can be sentenced to the period of imprisonment lesser than as provided in the Act.

However, in the case of Yad Ram (Supra) , the effect of Ar�cle 21 of the Cons�tu�on of India was not discussed, providing for speedy trial.

It cannot be disputed that right to speedy and expedi�ous trial is one of the most valuable and cherished right guaranteed under the Cons�tu�on. Ar�cle 21 of the Cons�tu�on of India takes in its sweep the right to expedi�ous and fair trial. Even Ar�cle 39A of the Cons�tu�on of India recognizes the right of ci�zens to equal jus�ce and free legal aid. To put it

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simply, it is the cons�tu�onal duty of the Government to provide the ci�zens of the country with such judicial infrastructure and means of access of jus�ce so that every person is able to receive an expedi�ous, inexpensive and fair trial.

Though our Cons�tu�on does not expressly declare the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right, but the said right was recognized in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 , wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Ar�cle 21 of the Cons�tu�on of India. Subsequently, in the serious of judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a reasonably expedi�ous trial is an integral and essen�al part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Ar�cle 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent that speedy trial is of the essence of criminal jus�ce and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself cons�tute denial of jus�ce.

Speaking about the need of speedy trial, the Cons�tu�onal Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 has observed as under: -

“The concept of speedy trial is read into Ar�cle 21 as an essen�al part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Cons�tu�on. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarcera�on and con�nues at all stages, namely, the stage of inves�ga�on, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the �me of the commission of the offence �ll it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the cons�tu�onal guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Sec�on 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

As has been observed in the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors (supra), no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Ar�cle 21.

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It has been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Dass Vs. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 149 that right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stages of inves�ga�on, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. Each case has to be decided on its own merits. As has been held in P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 , it must be le� to the judicious discre�on of the Court seized of an individual case to find out from the totality of the circumstances of the case, if the �me consumed up to a given point of �me amounted to viola�on of Ar�cle 21. In State vs. Narayan Waman Nerukar (2002) 7 SCC 6, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while considering the ques�on of delay, the Court has a duty to see whether the prolonga�on was on account of any delay in tac�cs adopted by the accused and other relevant aspects, which contributed to the delay. There cannot be any empirical formula of universal applica�on in such ma�ers.

In Chander Bhan Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 1 RCR (Crl) 125 , it has been observed by a Coordinate bench of this Court as under: -

“8. Now it cannot be disputed that the right to speedy and expedi�ous trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Cons�tu�on. Fundamental rights were not a teasing illusions to be mocked at. These were meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Ar�cle 21 of the Cons�tu�on creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Ar�cle 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of inves�ga�on, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This is how the Court shall understand this right and have gone to the extent of quashing the prosecu�on a�er such inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended anima�on for 10 years or more without any case at all cannot be within the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is

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correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Ar�cle 21 of the Cons�tu�on of India and the interpreta�on thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony, which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecu�on by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdic�on.

An iden�cal ques�on had arisen before the apex Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1988) 2 FAC 13 ; wherein their Lordships were pleased to observe as under:-

"Coming to the ques�on of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acqui�ed by the trial Court and High Court while reversing the judgment of acqui�al made by the appellate judge has not made clear reference to Clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of �me for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an an�-social offence punishable under the Preven�on of Food Adultera�on Act, the Court should take strict view of such ma�er."

This view was followed by this Court in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana (1992) 1 Rec. Cri R. 82 and Ishwar Singh v. State of Haryana 1994(1) RCR 160. The present case is fully covered by the view expressed by the Apex Court and by this Court in the judgments cited above and I have no reason to differ therewith.

For the reasons men�oned above, the convic�on of the pe��oner for an offence under Sec�on 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sec�on 7 of the Act is hereby maintained. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the pe��oner has already

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faced the agony of the protracted prosecu�on and suffered mental harassment for a long period of ten years, his sentence is reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. Sentence of fine is, however maintained along with its default clause.”

Another Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken the similar view in Vikas Mehta Vs. State of Haryana, Law Finder doc ID #2041916 by placing reliance upon Des Raj Vs. State of Haryana, 1996(1) RCR (Criminal) 689.

Keeping in mind the abovesaid legal principles, when facts and circumstance of the present case are examined, it is noted that pe��oner faced protracted trial from 1999 �ll 2007, when he was ul�mately convicted by the trial Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that there was any a�empt on the part of the accused-pe��oner to delay the trial. His appeal was dismissed in 2010. A�er the present Criminal Revision was admi�ed by this Court in 2010, because of the huge pendency, the file could not be listed for final hearing and when it has now been listed for final hearing in 2025, it is almost more than 15 years from the date of its admission.

Thus, the sword of convic�on kept on hanging on the head of the pe��oner for the last 26 years. It is easy to say that for almost all the �me, the pe��oner was on bail, but one cannot imagine the agony & trauma, which is faced by such a person, whose convic�on has been recorded by the Court. The Court also cannot ignore the age factor, inasmuch as at the �me when the offence was commi�ed in 1999, pe��oner was hardly 27 years of age. Now, a�er passing of the 26 years, he is 53 years of age and so, sending him behind bars at this stage to undergo the remainder of the sentence, will not be in the interest of jus�ce.”

It is to be noted that in Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605, which has also been referred by this Court in Aditya Kumar’s case (Supra) , the benefit of proba�on was granted by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case under Essen�al Commodi�es Act, despite the fact that minimum sentence of imprisonment was provided. The present case is also under the Essen�al Commodi�es Act.

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Having no�ced the legal posi�on as has been discussed by this Court in detail in Aditya Kumar’s case (supra) , which is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, the prayer of both the appellants to release them on proba�on, is hereby accepted.

As such, the impugned order of sentence as passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside. It is directed that both the appellants be released on proba�on for a period of 02 years on furnishing requisite proba�on bonds in a sum of ₹50,000/- each with a surety of like amount to the sa�sfac�on of CJM concerned, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of cer�fied copy of this order. At the same �me, both of them are directed to pay prosecu�on costs to the tune of ₹50,000/- each. The fine of ₹5,000/each, as imposed by the trial Court, shall be converted into prosecu�on cost, which will be adjusted in above amount; and in case the same has not been paid, the appellants are required to pay the en�re amount along with the furnishing of the bonds. It is further made clear that in case the appellants failed to make compliance of this order within s�pulate �me, the present order direc�ng the appellants to release on proba�on, shall automa�cally stand vacated and in that eventuality, they will have to undergo the actual sentence as imposed by the trial Court.

Both these appeals stands disposed of accordingly.

A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected

case.

22.04.2025 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Pry JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes Whether reportable? Yes

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