Sulbhi and Ors. Vs Bhavnesh Kumar

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pe��on on the ground that the child – Rehanshi born on 18.05.2019 is ordinarily residing at Jalandhar (Punjab) and therefore, the Court did not have territorial jurisdic�on to entertain the pe��on.

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3.3 However, the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.)/Guardian Judge, Chandigarh rejected the said applica�on by way of the impugned order dated 29.05.2024 (Annexure P-1). The reasoning given by Ld. Court is that both father and mother of the child are residing in Chandigarh; that the custody of a child below 05 years of age (especially female child) would naturally lie with the mother and therefore, the deemed custody would be with the mother, even if the actual custody was with the parents of the mother. With this reasoning, the Court held that the Chandigarh Court has the jurisdic�on in the ma6er and as such, dismissed the applica�on.

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Assailing the aforesaid order by way of present pe��on, it is contended by Ld. Counsel for the pe��oners i.e. mother of the child alongwith her parents that as per the own case of the father, the child was residing at Jalandhar ever since 12.06.2021. Learned counsel contends that the said child is pursuing her studies for the last more than 03 years at Jalandhar and therefore, in view of Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, the ordinary place of residence of the child is Jalandhar and therefore, the Court at Chandigarh do not have the jurisdic�on to entertain the pe��on. Learned counsel has referred to FAO No.2294 of 2024, �tled as “Rajesh v. Komal” , decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 27.08.2024; “J K v. NS”, 2019: DHC: 3125-DB , a decision of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court, besides “Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo” (2011) 6 SC 479.

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Refu�ng the aforesaid conten�ons, it is urged by learned counsel for the father of the child, i.e. respondent herein that both the par�es, i.e. father as well as mother of the child are residing in Chandigarh; that as per the own conten�on of the mother of the child, i.e. pe��oner No.1 herein, the child was removed from the custody of her ordinary residence of Chandigarh on 12.06.2021 and therefore, such removal from the ordinary residence of the child will not oust the jurisdic�on of the Chandigarh Court. It is also the

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conten�on of learned counsel that par�es are under li�ga�on in numerous cases, all of which are pending before the Chandigarh Courts. With these submissions, he prays for dismissal of the present pe��on.

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I have considered submissions of both the sides and have appraised the record carefully.

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Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 reads as under:-

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“9. Court having jurisdic�on to entertain applica�on

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(1) If the applica�on is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdic�on in the place where the minor ordinarily resides .

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(2) If the applica�on is with respect to the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the District Court having jurisdic�on in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having jurisdic�on in a place where he has property.

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(3) If an applica�on with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a District Court other than that having jurisdic�on in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the applica�on if in its opinion the applica�on would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other District Court having jurisdic�on.”

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Sec�on 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 reads as under:-

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“6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.—

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The natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are—

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(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and aAer him, the mother:

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provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother;

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(b) in case of an illegi�mate boy or an illegi�mate unmarried girl—the mother, and aAer her, the father;

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(c) in the case of a married girl—the husband: Provided that no person shall be en�tled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this sec�on—( a)if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or(b)if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an asce�c (ya� or sanyasi).”

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9.1 A Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh vs. Komal’s case ( supra ), considered the same issue rela�ng to the jurisdic�on of the Court in the case of custody of the minor child. AAer referring to the aforesaid provisions, i.e. Sec�ons 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 and Sec�on 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 besides Sec�on 12, 17 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890; and Sec�on 4 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, this Court has held as under:-

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“8. The ques�on which is to be decided by this Court is interpreta�on of the expression “the place where the minor ordinarily resides” referred to in Sec�on 9(1) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890.

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ANALYSIS OF JUDGMENTS REFERRED TO BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT AND THE FAMILY COURT

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1.Smt. Sarabjit Vs. Piara Lal and Another (2005(3) RCR (Civil) 213);

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2. Amit Kashyap Vs. Pooja [2017(1) Law Herald)

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3. Akshay Gupta Vs. Divya [2021(1) RCR (Civil) 7221

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In all the above referred to judgments learned Single Bench of this Court decided the ques�on of jurisdic�on by interpre�ng the expression "minor ordinarily resides" as used in Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 to mean, for the children below 5 years of age to be residence of the mother in view of Sec�on 6 (a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. We find that all the above referred to decisions of learned Single Judge are per-incuriam and Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act 1890, has been wrongly interpreted.

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A perusal of the defini�on of 'Guardian' shows that the guardian is the person who is having the care of the person of a minor or his property or both his person and property which includes natural guardians.

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Sec�on 6 defines natural guardian of the Hindu minor, as per which the natural guardian of Hindu minor in respect of minor's persons as well as in respect of minor's property is in case of boy or unmarried girl, the father and aAer him, the mother. Proviso to this sec�on states that the custody of minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother.

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By using the language "shall ordinarily be with the mother" the inten�on of the legislature is that since the child below 5 years is normally breastfeeding child and requires love and affec�on from the mother and since mother gives birth to the child, the child is more comfortable in the lap of the mother, therefore the inten�on of the legislature is welfare and the comfort of the child. For that the language is "shall ordinarily be with the mother" and not "shall be with the mother". By using the words "shall ordinarily be with the mother", the inten�on of the legislature is to see the welfare of the child. The custody of the minor cannot be with the mother who is unchaste, insane, leading immoral life, insensi�ve, leading to estranged matrimonial rela�onship with her husband (the father of the child), sick, physically or mentally suffering from any disability, not conducive for ideal upbringing of the child. Therefore, the inten�on of the legislature is that the proviso to Sec�on 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is not mandatory but depends upon the welfare of the child. If the inten�on of the legislature under Sec�on 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 would have been that the natural guardian of Hindu minor who has not completed the age of 5 years shall be the mother, then the provisions under Sec�ons 12, 17 and 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 would be redundant for the minor below the age of 5 years.

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A bare perusal of the provision of Sec�on 17 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 shows that this is mandatory provision, which reads that in appoin�ng or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of Sec�on 17 of Guardian and Wards Act 1890, be guided by

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what, consistently with the law to which minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. It further reads that in considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor.

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Sec�on 25 deals with the �tle of guardian to custody of ward. It reads that if a ward leaves or is removed from the custody of the guardian of his person, the Court, if of the opinion that it will be for the welfare of the ward to return to the custody of his guardian, may make an order for his return and for the purpose of enforcing the order may cause the ward to be arrested and to be delivered into the custody of the guardian.

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A conjoint reading of all the above referred to statutory provisions shows that the inten�on of the legislature in Sec�on 9 with respect to the jurisdic�on is that applica�on for the guardianship of the person of the minor shall lie to the District Court having jurisdic�on in the place where the minor is actually and physically residing and not as per the proviso to Sec�on 6 (a) of Hindu Minority and Guardians Act, 1956.”

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9.2 Hon’ble Division Bench of this High Court in Rajesh vs. Komal’s case ( supra ), further referred to “Rosi Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal” 1973 AIR Supreme Court 2090, and held as under:-

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“17. A perusal of the above referred to judgment shows that the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpre�ng Sec�on 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act held that the object and purpose of this provision being ex facie to ensure the welfare of the minor child, which necessarily involved due protec�on of the right of his guardian to properly look aAer the ward’s health, maintenance and educa�on, this sec�on demands reasonably liberal interpreta�on so as to effectuate that object. It is further held hypertechnicali�es should not be allowed to deprive the guardian of the necessary assistance from the Court in effec�vely discharging his du�es and obliga�ons towards his ward so as to promote the la6er’s welfare.”

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In “Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo”, 2011(6) SCC 479 , para 3 of the judgment refers to the facts of the case, which is reproduced as under:-

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"3. The present happens to be one such case where legal proceedings have engaged the par�es in a bi�er ba�le for the custody of their only child Kush, aged about 11 years born in America, hence a ci�zen of that country by birth. These proceedings included an ac�on f i led by the father-respondent in this appeal, before the American Court seeking divorce from the respondent- wife and also custody of master Kush. An order passed by the Superior court of California, County of Ventura in America eventually led to the issue of a red corner no�ce based on allega�ons of child abduc�on levelled against the mother who like the father of the minor child is a person of Indian origin currently living with her parents in Delhi. The mother took refuge under an order dated 4th April, 2009 passed by the Addl. District Court at Delhi in a pe��on filed under Sec�ons 7, 8, 10, 11 of the Guardians And Wards Act gran�ng interim custody of the minor to her. Aggrieved by the said order the father of the minor filed a pe��on under Ar�cle 227 of the Cons�tu�on of India before the High Court of Delhi. By the order impugned in this appeal the High Court allowed that pe��on, set aside the order passed by the District Court and dismissed the custody case filed by the mother primarily on the ground that the Court at Delhi had no jurisdic=on to entertain the same as the minor was not ordinarily residing at Delhi - a condi=on precedent for the Delhi Court to exercise jurisdic=on. The High Court further held that all issues rela=ng to the custody of child ought to be agitated and decided by the Court in America not only because that Court had already passed an order to that effect in favour of the father, but also because all the three par=es namely, the parents of the minor and the minor himself were American ci=zens . The High Court bu�ressed its decision on the principle of comity of courts and certain observa�ons made by this Court in some of the decided cases to which we shall presently refer."

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Three ques�ons were framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for determina�on. In the present case only the first ques�on would be relevant "whether the High Court was jus�fied in dismissing the pe��on for custody of the minor on the ground that the Court at Delhi had no jurisdic�on to entertain the same"

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ruchi Majoo (supra ) while dealing with Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, held as under:-

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"5. There is no gainsaying that any challenge to the jurisdic�on of the court will have to be seen in the context of the averments made in the pleadings of the par�es and the requirement of Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890. A closer look at the pleadings of the par�es is, therefore, necessary before we advert to the legal requirement that must be sa�sfied for the Court to exercise its powers under the Act men�oned above.

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* * * * *

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13. Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 makes a specific provision as regards the jurisdic�on of the Court to entertain a claim for grant of custody of a minor. While Sub-sec�on (1) of Sec�on 9 iden�fies the court competent to pass an order for the custody of the persons of the minor, sub-sec�ons (2) & (3) thereof deal with courts that can be approached for guardianship of the property owned by the minor. Sec�on 9(1) alone is, therefore, relevant for our purpose. It says:

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"9. Court having jurisdic�on to entertain applica�on- (1) If the applica�on is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having Jurisdic�on in the place where the minor ordinarily resides."

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14. It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test for determining the jurisdic�on of the court under Sec�on 9 of the Act is the 'ordinary residence' of the minor. The expression used is "Where the minor ordinarily resides". Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a ques�on of inten�on which in turn is a ques�on of fact. It may at best be a mixed ques�on of law and fact, but unless the jurisdic�onal facts are admi�ed, it can never be a pure ques�on of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. The factual aspects relevant to the ques�on of jurisdic�on are not admi�ed in the instant case. There are serious disputes on those aspects to which we

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shall presently refer. We may before doing so examine the true purpose of the expression 'ordinarily resident' appearing in Sec�on 9(1) (supra). This expression has been used in different contexts and statutes and has oCen come up for interpreta�on. Since liberal interpreta�on is the first and the foremost rule of interpreta�on it would be useful to understand the literal meaning of the two words that comprise the expression. The word 'ordinary' has been defined by the Black's Law Dic�onary as follows:

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"Ordinary (Adj.) Regular; usual; normal; common; oCen recurring, according to established order; se�led; customary: reasonable; not characterised by peculiar or unusual circumstances; belonging to, exercised by, or characteris�c of. the normal or average individual."

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15. The word 'reside' has been explained similarly as under:

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"Reside live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. (WesternKnapp Engineering Co. V. Gillbank, C.C.A. Cal., 129 F2d 135, 136.) To se�le oneself or a thing in a place, to be sta�oned, to remain or stay, to dwell permanently or con�nuously, to have a se�led abode for a �me, to have one's residence or domicile; specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding place, to be present as an element, to inhere as quality, to be vested as a right. (State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen Mo., 359 S.W.2d 343, 349.)"

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16. In Websters dic�onary also the word 'reside' finds a similar meaning, which may be gainfully extracted:

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“1. To dwell for a considerable �me; to make one's home; live.

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2. To exist as an a�ribute or quality with in. 3. To be vested: within"

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16A. In Mrs. Annie Besant v. Narayaniah AIR 1914 Privy Council 41 the infants had been residing in the district of Chingleput in the Madras Presidency. They were given in custody of Mrs. Annie Besant for the purpose of educa�on and were geKng their educa�on in England at the University of Oxford. A case was, however, filed in the dis-

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trict Court of Chingleput for the custody where according to the plain�ff the minors had permanently resided. Repea�ng the plea that the Chingleput Court was competent to entertain the applica�on their Lordships of the Privy Council observed:

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"The district court in which the suit was ins�tuted had no jurisdic�on over the infants except such jurisdic�on as was conferred by the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. By the ninth Sec�on of that Act the jurisdic�on of the court is confined to infants ordinarily residing in the district.

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It is in their Lordship's opinion impossible to hold that the infants who had months previously leC India with a view to being educated in England and going to University had acquired their ordinary residence in the district of Chingleput."

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17. In Mst. Jagir Kaur and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1521 , this Court was dealing with a case under Sec�on 488 Criminal Procedure Code and the ques�on of jurisdic�on of the Court to entertain a pe��on for maintenance. The Court no�ced a near unanimity of opinion as to what is meant by the use of the word "resides" appearing in the provision and held that "resides" implied something more than a flying visit to, or casual stay at a par�cular place. The legal posi�on was summed up in the following words:

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“…… Having regard to the object sought to be achieved, the meaning implicit in the words used, and the construc�on placed by decided cases there on, we would define the word "resides" thus: a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily, whether a person has chosen to make a par�cular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case....."

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18. In Kuldip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2006(7) SCC 1 , the expression "ordinary residence" as used in the Representa�on of People Act, 1950 fell for interpreta�on. This Court observed:"

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243. Lexicon refers to CicuJ v. Suffolk County Council (1980)3 All England Reporter 689 to denote that the word "ordinarily" is primarily directed not to dura�on but to purpose. In this sense the ques�on is not so much where the person is to be found "ordinarily", in the sense of usually or habitually and with some degree of

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con�nuity, but whether the quality of residence is "ordinary" and general, rather than merely for some special or limited purpose.

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244. The words "ordinarily" and "resident" have been used together in other statutory provisions as well and as per Law Lexicon they have been construed as not to require that the person should be one who is always resident or carries on business in the par�cular place. 245. The expression coined by joining the two words has to be interpreted with reference to the point of �me requisite for the purposes of the provision, in the case of Sec�on 20 of the RP Act. 1950 it being the date on which a person seeks to be registered as an elector in a par�cular cons�tuency.

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246. Thus, residence is a concept that may also be transitory. Even when qualified by the word "ordinarily" the word "resident" would not result in a construc=on having the effect of a requirement of the person using a par=cular place for dwelling always or on permanent uninterrupted basis. Thus understood, even the requirement of a person being "ordinarily resident" at a par=cular place is incapable of ensuring nexus between him and the place in ques=on."

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19. Reference may be made to Bhagyalakshmi and Anr. v. K.N. Narayana Rao, AIR 1983 Madras 9, Aparna Banerjee v. Tapan Banerjee, AIR 1986 Punjab and Haryana 113, Ram Sarup v. Chimman Lal and Ors., AIR 1952 Allahabad 79, Smt. Vimla Devi v. Smt. Maya Devi & Ors., AIR 1981 Rajasthan 211, and in re: Dr. Giovanni Marco Muzzu and etc. etc., AIR 1983 Bombay 242, in which the High Courts have dealt with the meaning and purport of the expressions like 'ordinary resident' and 'ordinarily resides' and taken the view that the ques=on whether one is ordinarily residing at a given place depends so much on the inten=on to make that place ones ordinary abode.”

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AAer above referred to discussion the Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the ques�on in nega�ve.”

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9.3 AAer observing as above, the Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh vs. Komal’s case ( supra ), held that it is the Court at the place, where the child was ordinarily residing, which will have the jurisdic�on in the ma6er.

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Similarly, J K v. N S (cited supra), a Division Bench of Delhi High Court was considering the same ques�on and it was held as under:-

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“71. We would now decide on the issue of interplay between Sec�on 9 of GWA and Sec�on 6 of HMGA. Sec�on 9 of the GWA vests jurisdic�on in a Court where the minor ordinarily resides. Sec�on 6 of HMGA deals with natural guardians of a Hindu minor and 6 (a), more par�cularly, deals with the custody of a minor who is below 5 years of age and provides that ordinarily the custody would be with the mother. We have already quoted Sec�on 9 of GWA and Sec�on 6(a) of HMGA in the earlier part of the judgment.

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a. In the case of Sarbjit (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court had held that under Sec�on 6(1) HMGA, it is mandatory that the custody of a child below five years of age should be with the mother and the expression "where the minor ordinarily resides" was held to mean the residence of the mother and thus the residence of the child would follow the residence of the mother. However, we find that the said judgment was categorically dissented to by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan respec�vely in the cases which have referred to above. What has been held in these judgments is that Sec�on 6(a) of HMGA and Sec�on 9 of GWA operate in different fields. Both are independent of each other. While Sec�on 6 deals with natural guardian of a Hindu Minor, Sec�on 9 lays down the rules with respect to territorial jurisdic�on of the Court in which the applica�on for custody of the child has to be filed. The ordinary residence of a child would determine the jurisdic�on of the Court under Sec�on 9 and thus, the natural guardianship of a minor will not determine the jurisdic�on and the two cannot be superimposed. If the legislature intended that the residence of the mother should determine the ordinary residence of the child, it would

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have used this expression in Sec�on 9. However, this is not how Sec�on 9 reads. Thus, in our view, HMGA of 1956 does not make any overriding provision, and therefore, provision of Sec�on 6 cannot be imported to interpret Sec�on 9 of GWA….. “

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Calcu6a High Court in “Smt. Soumi Mukherjee v. Manas Mukherjee”, AIR Online 2019 Cal 431 considered the similar ques�on and held that requirement of the statute is where the ward for the �me being ordinarily resides. It does not require that a father or mother must ordinarily reside with the ward and that such ques�on may be raised at the �me of final hearing of the applica�on under Sec�on 25 of the said Act. It will be relevant to reproduce the observa�ons made by the Calcu6a High Court in this regard:-

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“29. Mr. Bardhan tries to impress upon this Court that the minor child of the par�es actually does not reside under the care and protec�on of his mother, the pe��oner herein, because the pe��oner is an employee of Eastern Coal Fields Limited and works as a nurse at Sanctoria Hospital near Asansol. Since the pe��oner does not ordinarily reside at Makhla in the district of Hooghly with the minor child, the said residence cannot be treated as ordinary residence of the minor. I cannot accept such submission made by Mr. Bardhan. Requirement of the statute is "where the ward for the �me being ordinarily resides". It does not require that the father or mother must ordinarily reside with the ward. Such ques�on may be raised at the �me of final hearing of the applica�on under Sec�on 25 of the said Act. The opposite party may raise the ques�on, if the said minor normally gets love and affec�on, care and protec�on of the mother or not. In the instant proceeding, we are concerned with the ques�on as to whether the minor ordinarily resides at Makhla in the district of Hooghly or not. In view of uncontroverted facts and circumstances, irresis�ble answer to the ques�on is in the affirma�ve.”

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Thus, the legal posi�on which emerges is that Sec�on 6 (a) of HMGA and Sec�on 9 of GWA operate in different fields, independent of each other. While Sec�on 6 of 1956 Act deals with natural guardian of a Hindu Minor, Sec�on 9 of 1890 Act lays down the rules with respect to territorial

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jurisdic�on of the Court, in which the applica�on for custody of the child has to be filed. The ordinary residence of a child would determine the jurisdic�on of the Court under Sec�on 9 of 1890 Act and thus, the natural guardianship of a minor will not determine the jurisdic�on and the two cannot be superimposed. If the legislature intended that the residence of the mother should determine the ordinary residence of the child, it would have used this expression in Sec�on 9 of 1890 Act. However, this is not so and therefore, provision of Sec�on 6 of 1956 Act cannot be imported to interpret Sec�on 9 of 1890 Act. It is further clear that jurisdic�on of the court to decide custody ma6er of the child is where the ward/child for the �me being ordinarily resides. It does not require that a father or mother must ordinarily reside with the ward and that such ques�on may be raised at the �me of final hearing of the applica�on under Sec�on 25 of the said Act.

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Learned counsel for the respondent-father of the child has referred to “Akshay Gupta v. Divya & Ors.” 2021(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 722, wherein it was held that even though minor below 05 years may not be in physical custody with the mother, but her/his custody would be deemed to be at place where mother is residing for purpose of jurisdic�on the Court.

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I am afraid that the above judgment rendered by the Single Bench is indirect contrast to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh’s case (supra ) and so it does not advance the case of the respondent. For the same reason, “Tejbir Singh v. Baljit Kaur”, Law Finder Doc ID # 1501557, relied by the counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the facts of this case.

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Learned counsel for the respondent has also argued that in order to adjudge the point of jurisdic�on being mixed ques�on of law and fact, it cannot be decided summarily and that while dealing with the applica�on for rejec�on of the pe��on on the ground of jurisdic�on, the Court has only to consider the averments made in the plaint/pe��on as a whole. Learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to “Dr. Arun

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Kant v. Rekha Tanwar”, 2017(4) PLR 192.

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Sarita Rani 2025.01.07 15:54 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order

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Page 14 of 15

¶130

CR No.3925 of 2024 (O&M)

¶131

2025:PHHC:000299

¶132

There can be no dispute to the aforesaid proposi�on, but in this case also, it is the admi6ed posi�on that ever since June 2021, the child is residing at Jalandhar at the place of her maternal grandparents. This pe��on was filed in November 2022, i.e. aAer 1-1/2 years from the �me, when the child started residing at Jalandhar. It would be ques�on of trial, whether the child was removed from the custody, as is alleged by the husband; or whether the wife was compelled to take away the custody of the child to her parents. The fact remain that the child is residing at Jalandhar with her maternal grandparents since June, 2021 and is studying there in the school. The pe��on has been filed aAer 1-1/2 year from the date when the child started residing at Jalandhar. Thus, for all intents and purposes, it is the courts at Jalandhar, where the child presently ordinarily resides within the meaning of Sec�on 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 and therefore, relying upon the legal posi�on as explained in Rajesh’s case (supra) and also by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rosi Jacob’s case (supra), this Court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order as passed by the trial Court cannot be sustained. The Court at Chandigarh would not have the jurisdic�on to entertain the pe��on.

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The pe��on is allowed accordingly and the impugned order is hereby set aside.

¶134

January 0	7, 2025		(DEEPAK GUPTA)
*Sarita*			JUDGE
	Whether speaking/reasoned?	Yes
	Whether reportable?	Yes

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Sarita Rani 2025.01.07 15:54 I attest to the accuracy of this document/order

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Page 15 of 15

Sulbhi and Ors. v. Bhavnesh Kumar

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sulbhi and Ors. v. Bhavnesh Kumar

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

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