������������������ is affiliated, or with the permission of the bank by a lawyer. It is thus clear that under the aforesaid agreement, the representation of a delinquent employee by a lawyer in departmental inquiry proceedings is permissible, though subject to the prior permission of the bank. It appears that ordinarily, such representation should be by a representative of the trade union, but there is nothing in the said Para. 19.12 as to imply that only when the representative of the union is not available, the representation by lawyer can be permitted. It is clear to us that the said Para. 19.12 leaves the question open and it is for the bank in its discretion to grant, in any given case, permission to a delinquent employee to be represented by lawyer in the departmental inquiry proceedings. Hence, the question that arises is whether this discretion can be used according to the whims of the bank management. Manifestly, the answer is in the negative, for while dealing with an application of a delinquent employee seeking such permission, the bank management should not act arbitrarily, but should on the contrary, be reasonable and fair. Apparently, however, this approach did not find favour with the respondents. We say so, because in the course of his arguments, Sri P. Mulgaokar, the learned counsel representing respondents 1 to 5, while making a feeble attempt to justify the rejection of the petitioner's request, merely contended that if such permission is granted, it will open the “floodgates” and so, in each and every case delinquent employees will ask as of right for permission to be represented by lawyers. Obviously, there is no merit in this submission of the learned counsel, for if discretion is properly used and permission is given in deserving cases, the question of opening the “floodgates” does not at all arise. But such submission is an eye opener and we may point out that in the present case it is apparent that