636] and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra) [(2011) 2 SCC 703] as afore quoted, the facts and the allegations were similar and that too the prosecution for the offences under Section 138 of the NI Act and, under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC were also similar. In the judgment of SangeetabenMahendrabhai Patel (supra)it was held that the requirement to prove an offence under the NI Act and an offence under the IPC is different, and it was observed that there may be some overlapping of facts but the ingredients of the offences are entirely different, therefore, the subsequent cases are not barred by any statutory provisions. While in the case of G. Sagar Suri (supra)and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra), the Court concluded that as per Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence on the same facts, therefore, the prosecution under Section 420 of the IPC is barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C and accordingly liable to be quashed. It is to observe that in the case of SangeetabenMahendrabhai Patel (supra)the judgments of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra)have been referred but distinguished on the ground that it was not raised and decided that ingredients of both offences were not same, and the bar of Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. would not attract. It is relevant to note here that the judgments cited by both the parties are rendered by benches having the strength of two Judges. In our considered view, the bench of this Court in the case of SangeetabenMahendrabhai Patel (supra) followed in M/s. V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra) has taken a different view from the previous judgments of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra) rendered by the bench of the same strength. The view taken in both the cases are conflicting to each other. Needles to observe that it is a trite law, if any issue is decided in a previous judgment by a bench of the same strength, conflicting view in the subsequent judgment should not be rendered on the pretext that the issue has not been raised or considered in the previous judgment. In this regard the judgment in District Manager, APSRTC, Vijaywadav.K. Sivaji, (2001) 2 SCC 135,Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P.2002 AIR SCW1573can be profitably referred whereby it is observed that judicial decorum demands that if judgments passed by two judges’ bench of equal strength are conflicting, the issue of law involved must be referred to a larger bench as the same is desirable to avoid confusion and maintain consistency of law. In our view, the aforesaid judgments cited by the respective parties are conflicting, however, to avoid any further confusion and to maintain consistency, we deem it appropriate to refer this issue for decision by the larger bench to answer the following questions:
