literally so as to render their compliance impracticable. The Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh’s case (supra) drew a conclusion that conveying of secret information should normally precede entry, search and seizure by the officer and that delay, if any, in communication such information to superior officer, if sufficiently explained, can be accepted while considering compliance of Section 42 of the Act. In other words, under normal circumstances, sending beforehand such written information was underlined without there being any qualification as regards the form in which such written information is required to be sent. Thus, the essence lies in sending information beforehand and in writing, whatever the form of such written information be. The petitioner can’t be said to be prejudiced in any manner on account of such prior secret information having been sent in the shape of ‘ruqa’ and not by way of a separate document. Rather, in such circumstances it would look absurd to send another document to the SHO pertaining to the information when one document in the nature of ‘ruqa’ had already been sent. The factual position of the instant case, when examined in light of ratio of Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh’s case(supra) would lead to one and only one conclusion that there has been due compliance of Section 42 of the Act before the recovery was effected inasmuch as the ‘ruqa’ sent before conducting raid did contain particulars of secret information.
