touching his proceedings, and may make such further inquiry in the matter as it thinks fit. Rule 19, therefore, does not make an endorsement as final and mandates the Court to require the examination of the serving officer. In this case, the serving officer himself does not seem to have been examined. The endorsement is, therefore, not sufficient to make an inference that there had been an impact of refusal of receipt of summons. All this is only to show that there has been a material irregularity in the manner of appreciation of the relevant provisions of law relating to service and the Court when it ordered substituted service did no more than take one step of what would constitute a terminus a quo of the service before the Court effectively passed an order setting a defendant ex parte and then pass a decree. If there was a failure of process of service in the manner that the law mandated, and when a petition was filed for an adjudication on merit, the Court was bound to give an opportunity to the parties. It is no argument to pick holes on minor contradictions of inability to recall an incident relating to particular date of when the Patwari informed about the decree and when he met with the counsel to apply for the certified copy of the order. They are relatively trivial, which do not mean that the most vital issue relating to lack of proper service which the law requires before an ex parte decree could be passed.
