The High Court quashed an FIR registered under Section 498-A IPC and subsequent proceedings based on a voluntary compromise between the petitioner and the complainant, holding that it secures the ends of justice.
FIR No 69 dated 12.5.2010 under Section 498-A IPC and all subsequent proceedings were quashed.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011
Date of decision: 10.3.2011
Kuldeep Singh and others
......Petitioners
Vs.
State of Punjab and others
...Respondents
CORAM:HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY.
PRESENT: Mr.Dinesh Nagar, Advocate, for the petitioners. Ms.Rajni Gupta, Addl. A.G. Punjab.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed on behalf of petitioners Kuldeep Singh and Darshan Kaur for quashing of FIR No 69 dated 12.5.2010 under Section 498-A IPC registered at Police Station Model Town, Hoshiarpur and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise.
Notice of motion was issued on 20th January, 2011 and parties were directed to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate on 3rd February, 2011 for recording their statements with regard to compromise. The Illaqa Magistrate was also directed to submit a report in this regard to know its genuineness after recording the statements of the parties whether the same is not the result of any pressure or coercion in any manner and to send a report along with statements of the parties with regad to validity or otherwise of the compromise effected between the parties. In compliance of the directions issued by this Court on 20th January, 2011, the parties appeared before the Illaqa Magistrate and their statements were
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011 [2]
recorded. A report along with statements of the parties has been sent by the JMIC, Hoshiarpur, wherein it has been mentioned that as per statements of the parties, compromise has been effected which is voluntary and the same is free from any pressure whatsoever. The complainant has also stated that she has no objection with regard to quashing of the FIR.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the matter has been compromised between the parties and the complainant has no objection in quashing of the FIR and the petitioners are not habitual offender and they are having no criminal background and no case is pending against them and compromise has been effected as per free will and without any pressure on either side.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that continuation of impugned criminal proceedings between the parties would be an exercise in futility. The complainant herself does not want to pursue these proceedings and it shall be merely a formality and sheer wastage of precious time of the Court as complainant would not support the case of prosecution in view of compromise between the parties. It would be in the interest of the parties as well as in the large interest of the society and to maintain peace and harmony and in order to save both the families from avoidable litigation that the compromise arrived at between them is accepted by this Court.
It has been observed by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Mrs.
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011 [3]
Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney (1980)1 SCC 63 that “the finest Hour of Justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion.” The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice. Relying on the views adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Five Judges Bench of this Court also observed in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab 2007(3) R.C.R. (Cri) 1052 that compounding of offence which are not compoundable under Section 320(9) Cr.P.C., offence non-compoundable but parties entering into compromise, High Court has the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to allow the compounding of non-compoundable offences and quash the prosecution where the High Court felt that the same was required to prevent the abuse of the process of Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
While dealing with issue of quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise a Bench consisting of Five Hon'ble Judges of this Court in Kulwinder Singh's case (supra) while approving minority view in Dharambir v. State of Haryana 2005 (3) RCR (Criminal) 426: 2005(2) Apex Criminal 424: 2005 (2) Law Herald 723 (P&H) (FB), opined as under:-
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011 [4]
“ To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482, of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e, “to prevent abuse of the process of any Court” or “ to secure the ends of justice”.
No embargo, be in the shape of section 320 (9) Cr.P.C. or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is “finest hour of justice.” Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.
The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011 [5]
is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in noncompoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.
The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined parameters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The Court is vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.
Compromise in modern society is the sine qua non of
Crl.Misc. No. M- 1862 of 2011 [6]
harmony and orderly behaviour. As observed by Krishna Iyer J., the finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion. Inherent power of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not limited to matrimonial cases alone. The Court has wide powers to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences in order to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice, notwithstanding bar under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Exercise of power in a given situation will depend on facts of each case. The duty of the Court is not only to decide a lis between the parties after a protracted litigation but it is a vital and extra-ordinary instrument to maintain and control social order. Resolution of dispute by way of compromise between two warring groups should be encouraged unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of society or would promote savagery, as held in Kulwinder Singh's case (supra).
For the reasons recorded above and having regard to the principles laid down by the Five -Judges Bench of this Court in case of Kulwinder Singh's case (supra), this petition is allowed and FIR No 69 dated 12.5.2010 under Section 498-A IPC registered at Police Station Model Town, Hoshiarpur as well as all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.
(DAYA CHAUDHARY) JUDGE
March 10, 2010. raghav
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the High Court can quash the proceedings in a non-compoundable offence under Section 498-A IPC on the basis of a compromise between the parties.
Whether the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of court despite the bar under Section 320 Cr.P.C.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya SawhneyReferred¶19
(1980) 1 SCC 63 · Who else cites this
Kulwinder Singh v. State of PunjabFollowed¶21
2007(3) R.C.R. (Cri) 1052
Dharambir v. State of HaryanaReferred¶22
2005 (3) RCR (Criminal) 426
3 provisions across 2 enactments
Kuldeep Singh
Darshan Kaur
State of Punjab
Daya Chaudhary
As recorded by the court registry
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