“A close analysis of the aforesaid would show that the definition is in two parts. The basic limitation imposed is that the land is to mean agricultural land. However, this basic concept is extended by expressly including therein certain things, which though may be corelated to agriculture, are not strictu sensu land as such, for example, homesteads, tanks, wells and water channels which in ordinary parlance, are not understood as land simpliciter or agricultural land as such. However, the second part of the definition brings those things also within the definition of land, by an inclusive definition. I am inclined to hold that though the inclusive portion of the definition may be interpreted somewhat widely and liberally, yet they have still to be read as ejusdem generis to the basic definition of „land‟ as agricultural land. Therefore, the over-all meaning of „land‟ and „agricultural land‟, cannot be either wholly eroded or evaporated. The inclusive part of the definition does not liberate it from the corner stone of the land being agricultural in nature or co-related to the same. Therefore, the subject matter of consolidation has still to be „land‟ as defined in section 2(9) and the re-arrangement of the parcels thereof for the purpose of rendering the holding more compact. The Mirza Sulaiman Beg and others v. Harihar Mahto‟s case (supra), therefore, cannot be extended or expanded to mean that any or every thing dehors its relationship to either land or agriculture can come within the definition of section 2(9). This view is also in consonance with the earlier Division Bench judgment in Ram Pratap Mahto and others Vs. Diplal Mahto and Others. (1979 BBCJ 738).”
