Kailash Chandra Panda Vs State of Odisha

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C ) Nos.248 & 289 of 2026

In the matter of an application under Article-226 of the Constitution of India

Kailash Chandra Panda Petitioner …. -versus- State of Odisha & Others …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner : M/s. S.K. Purohit, Adv. & Mr. N.Rath, Adv. For Opp. Parties : M/s. C.K. Pradhan, Addl. Govt. Advocate

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PRESENT:

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THE HONBLE MR.JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------Date of Hearing: 11.02.2026 and Date of Judgment:07.03.2026 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J .

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1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.

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2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

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3. Since the issue involved in both the cases is

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identical, both the matters were heard analogously and

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disposed of by the present common order.

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4. Both the Writ Petitions have been filed inter alia seeking a direction on the Opp. Parties to extend the benefit of pension and other pensionary benefits, in terms of the provisions contained under OCS (Pension) Rules 1992.

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5. It is the case of the Petitioners that Petitioners were engaged as NMR prior to the cut-off date i.e. 12.04.1993 so prescribed by the Finance Department in its resolution dt.15.05.1997.

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5.1. It is contended that though the Petitioners were engaged and allowed to continue as NMR/DLR prior to 12.04.1993, but in terms of the resolution issued by the Finance Department on 15.05.1997, Petitioners were never absorbed in the regular establishment. Not only that, in terms of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Uma Devi Others, (2006) 4 SCC-1 , no step was also taken to absorb the Petitioners in the regular establishment. Stipulation contained in Resolution dt.15.05.1997 and the decision in the case of Umadevi reads as follows:

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Finance Deptt. No. 22764/F., dated the 15th May 1997

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SUBJECT: Scheme for absorption of N.M.R./D.L.R/Job contract Workers under Regular Establishment - Preference to be given to work-charge employees. It has been brought to the notice of Finance Department by the different Departments of Government that directives from Hon'ble Supreme Court, High Court and Orissa Administrative Tribunal have been received for preparation of a scheme to absorb the above categories of workers under regular establishment.

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As per the above directive, Government have been pleased to formulate the following norms and conditions for the N.M.R/D.LR/Job contract workers.

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Separate Gradation/Seniority list shall be prepared by the Appointment Authority for each category of workers determining the length of engagement of a particular person. The workers should have worked under the administrative control of the Department concemed directly for a minimum period of 10 years. The engagement of 240 days, in a year shall be constructed as a complete year of engagement for this purpose.

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The workers should have been engaged prior to 12.4.1993. i.c.. prior to promulgation of ban on engagement of N.M.R/D.L.RJJob contract workers, etc.., vide Finance Department circular No. 17815-W.F.-II 180/92-F., dated the 12th April, 1993.

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They should have the minimum educational/Technical qualification prescribed of the post against which they would be absorbed.

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They should be within the age-limit prescribed for 1st appointment to Government service after deduction of the number of years they have worked under the Department concerned:

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Provided that the age-limit can be further relaxed with the approval of Appointing Authority.

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Absorption against the post for which regular recruitment sules have been framed will be made in relaxation of the relevant provisions by the competent authority.

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Vancancies reserved for S.CJS.T/O.B.C/ women candidate/physically handicapped, etc., will be filled up according to reservation rules issued by Government from time to time

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Absorption in Classes III and IV posts against the vacant posts shall be made keeping in view the austerity measures issued in F.D.O.M. No. 50791/F., dated the 10th December, 1996, read with O.M.No.4986, dated the 7th February, 1997.

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While filling up the regular vacant posts, preference shall be given to work-charged employees first. Where no suitable work-charged employees are available to man the post, preference shall be given in the following order, ie., N.M.R., D.L.R., Job contract workers and others.

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On absorption in a regular establishment, the worker shall draw the minimum of the time-scale attached to the post and other allowance as admissible under the rules from time to time.

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The date of regularisation shall be reckoned as the 1st appointment to the service for pension and other service benefits.

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The authority competent who shall issue the order of regularisation shall certify that the person (s) who are being regularized in the order were engaged as such prior to 12th April, 1993, i.e., prior to promulgation of ban issued by Finance Department and this has been agreed to by the Finance Adviser of the Department.

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This order shall supersede all the Orders/ Resolutions/ Notifications, etc., issued by various Departments of Government for regularisation of N.M.R/D.L.R/Job Contract and other such category of workers.

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Copy of all regularisation order issued in this connection shall be forwarded simultaneously to

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the Administrative Department concerned and Finance Department.

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5.2. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi in

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Para-44 of the said judgment has held as follows:-

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“ 44 . One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra) and B.N. Nagarajan (Supra), and referred to in paragraph-15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one- time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wages are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgement, but there should be no further by passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”

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5.3. It is however contended that while continuing as

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NMRs/DLRs, instead of absorbing the Petitioners in the regular establishment, in terms of the decision in the

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case of Uma Devi and Resolution dt.15.05.1997, Petitioners were brought over to the work-charged establishment w.e.f. 1.3.2009.

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5.4. It is further contended that while so continuing in the work-charged establishment w.e.f 1.3.2009, Petitioners were brought over to the regular (wages) establishment. However, after retirement of the Petitioners from the regular (wages) establishment, Petitioners were not extended with the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits in terms of the provisions contained under OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992 (in short, “Rules”) on the ground that Petitioners have not rendered the required qualifying service in the regular establishment. In terms of the provision contained under Rule 47(5) (i) of the Rules, Petitioners were held not eligible and entitled to get the benefit of pension and other pensionary benefits. Rule 47(5)(i) of the Rules reads as follows:

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47(5)(i) In the case of a Government Servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of these rules before completion of the minimum qualifying service of ten years shall not be entitled for pension, but he

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shall be entitled to service gratuity to be paid at a uniform rate of half month’s emoluments for every completed six monthly period of service.

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5.5. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners vehemently contended that since because of the inaction of the Opp. Parties in not absorbing the Petitioners in the regular establishment, on the face of such long continuance as NMR prior to 12.04.1993 in terms of Resolution dt. 15.05.1997 and the decision in the case of Uma Devi so cited supra and further continuance in the work-charged establishment w.e.f 01.03.2009, Petitioners on the ground that they have not rendered the required qualifying service of 10 years, and accordingly not eligible to get the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits in view of the aforesaid Rules, cannot be held as legal and justified.

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5.6. Since for the latches on the part of the Opp. parties, Petitioners could not complete the required qualifying service, for the purpose of getting pension and pensionary benefits under the Rules, they cannot be deprived of the same. In support of the submissions, reliance was placed to the following decisions:

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1. Uday Pratap Thakur and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, Civil Appeal No.3155 of 2023 @ SLP (C ) NO.10653 of 2018, decided on 28.04.2023

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2. Dharam Singh & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Another, 2025 INSC 998

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3. State of Himachal Pradesh & Another Vs. Sheela Devi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 662

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4. Bhola Nath Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others , 2026 INSC 99.

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5.7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uday Pratap

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Thakur in Para-3.3 & 6.3 of the said judgment has held as follows:

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3.3 It is submitted that as observed and held by this Court in the case of Prem Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 516, the services rendered as work charged is to be counted for pensionary benefits. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has heavily relied upon the paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32 and 36 of the said decision. xxx xxx xxx

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6.3 The decision of this Court in the case of Prem Singh (supra), therefore, would be restricted to the counting of service rendered as work charged for qualifying service for pension.

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5.8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dharam Singh

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in Paragraph-13,14,15 & 17,18,19 & 20 held as follows:

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13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra) , outsourcing cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission’s further contention that the appellants are not “full-time” employees but continue only by virtue of interim orders also

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does not advance their case. That interim protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the pendency of the challenge to the State’s refusals. It neither creates rights that did not exist nor erases entitlements that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality of those refusals. 14 . The learned Single Judge of the High Court also declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not specifically assailed the subsequent decision dated 25.11.2003. However, that view overlooks that the writ petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the High Court itself directed a fresh decision during pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the State’s stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the High Court compounded the error by affirming the dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts, in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about “rules” and “vacancy” while ignoring the core question of arbitrariness in the State’s refusal to sanction posts despite perennial need and long service, cannot be sustained.

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15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State’s refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003,in so far as they concern the Commission’s proposals for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed.

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xxx xxx xxx

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17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends

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the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

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18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is an institutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.

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19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and the material indicating vacancies and comparator regularisations, we issue the following directions:

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i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts: All appellants shall stand regularized with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above.

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ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular paylevel for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization

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/retirement/death, as the case may be. Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment.

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iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgement.

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iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgement.

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v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgement.

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20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling “reconsiderations,” and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance .As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore

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a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

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5.9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sheela Devi in Para-2,3,4 & 11 of the said judgment has held as

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follows:

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2. The appellant (hereinafter “State”) is before this Court complaining that the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, granting relief to the respondents (hereby referred to as ‘employees’) is erroneous.

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3. The respondents (or their legal representatives - as is the case in some instances) before this Court were employed on contract basis by the State in its Education and in the Ayurvedic Department. Their services as contractual employees were regularized at different points in time.

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4. Many of these contractual employees were engaged prior to the introduction of the Rules framed in 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “2004 Pension scheme”) whereby entitlement of pension per se was abolished. On different dates thereafter, the employees were regularized. In some instances, they were employed even after the 2004 Pension Scheme came into force. Their claim was that upon regularization, they were entitled to reckon the period of contractual employment, for the purposes of pension. The State rejected this contention which led them to approach the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment allowed the writ petitions and directed the State to extend pensionary benefits on the basis of the benefit of including contractual service claimed by them on the reasoning that upon their regularization, the period of contractual employment was also reckonable for the purposes of future benefits including – whereby applicable, pension.

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xxx

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11. In view of the above reasoning, this court is of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal however, the following directions are issued:-

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(i) The state shall take immediate steps to indicate the mode and manner of exercising option by all the employees concerned (who had been regularized after spells of contractual employment) regardless of the dates on which they were engaged i.e. prior to the year 2003 or subsequently, within a time frame, of within eight weeks from today. (ii) After receiving the options within the time indicated in the notice, the concerned employee(s) who exercise the relevant options should be notified about the amounts they would have to remit in case any amount towards contribution is required, clearly. (iii) The options should be processed and completed within eight weeks from the last date of receiving options.

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(iv) Time limit for payment too should be indicated and entire process should be completed within four months and all orders fixing pensions or family pension as the case may be, shall be issued.

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5.10 . Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bholanath in

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Para-13.5 to 14 of the judgment has held as follows:-

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“13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular.

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13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of

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“part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India , this Court underscored that government departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization.

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13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam , and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India , this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.

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13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P ., this Court strongly deprecated the culture of “adhocism” adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices.

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13.9. The State must remain conscious that parttime employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and reason.

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13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondentState’s contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement

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denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.

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FINAL CONCLUSION:

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14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:

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I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.

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II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

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III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny. IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual labels or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-serving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.

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V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all

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consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment.”

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5.11. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the High

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Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered in the case of Harbans Lal Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, CWP 2371 of 2010. High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the said judgment has held as follows:

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This view has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in case of Hans Raj Vs. State of Punjab and others, 2005(3) RSJ, 262. In this case the Division Bench examined the Punjab Municipal Employees Pension and General Provident Fund Rules, 1994. Vide instructions dated 8.1.1999, the State of Punjab had provided that since the Pension Rules has been made applicable in lieu of CPF, the period to be considered as qualifying for pension has to be restricted to the period for which the employee was contributing to his CPF. These instructions were held contrary to the Pension Rules by the Division Bench. The Division Bench held that the said instructions cannot substitute or supplant the substantive provisions of the Pension Rules. The petitioner was held entitled to count his entire service from 1962 to 1998 as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. The condition that qualifying service would commence from the date of contribution to the CPF, has been rejected by the Division Bench.

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From the above discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the entire daily wage service of the petitioner from 1988 till the date of his regularization is to be counted as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. He will be deemed to be in govt. service prior to 1.1.2004. The new Re-structured Defined Contribution Pension Scheme (Annexure P-1) has been introduced for the new entrants in the Punjab Government Service w.e.f. 01.01.2004, will not be applicable to the petitioner. The amendment made vide Annexure P-2 amending the Punjab Civil Services Rules, cannot be further amended by issuing clarification/instructions dated 30.5.2008 (Annexure P-3). The petitioner will

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continue to be governed by the GPF Scheme and is held entitled to receive pensionary benefits as applicable to the employees recruited in the Punjab Govt. Services prior to 1.1.2004.

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5.12. Reliance was also placed to decision of this Court

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rendered in the case of Rabindra Kumar Jena Vs. State of Odisha & Others, in W.P.(C ) Nos.36009 of 2021 & batch . This Court in Paragraph-20,21 & 22 of the said judgment has held as follows:

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20. In view of the provisions contained in Sub-rule(3) of Rule-18 the entire work charged period of service rendered by the petitioner shall be counted while calculating the pensionary benefits payable to the petitioners. There is no ambiguity in the said provision and the same stand in absolute clear terms. Therefore, anyway and argument that Rule 18(8) stands in the debars persons like pensionary benefits would be illegal and 10 the petitioner to get pensionary fallacious.

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21. The next question that falls for consideration is whether the new Special Rule(4) to the Pension Rules 1992 which was amended in the year 2005by virtue of Notification Dated 17.09.2005 creates ORISSH an embargo for the petitioner to get pension under of OCS Pension Rules, 1992. The embargo newly introduced by Special Rule 4 to the Rules, 1992 in the year 2005 provides that all persons appointed under the Government of Odisha with effect from 1" day of January, 2005 shall not be eligible for pension as defined to Sub-rule(1) of Rule-3 of the Rules, 1992. In new Sub-rule(4) the word that has been used as "appointed" and the cut-off date is 01.01.2005. At this juncture, this Court requires to examine as to whether the word "appointed" used in Sub-rule(4) would be restricted in its application only to regular appointment/recruitments against the sanctioned post after 01.01.2005. The word "appointment" or "appointed" has not been defined in the Rules, 1992. However, the definition clause. under 1992 provides that the words which have not been defined in the said Rules, shall ordinarily have the same meaning as has been provided under the Odisha Service Code. Under the Odisha Service Code appointment has

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been categorized in several categories further there exists no straight jacket definition of the word appointment in Odisha Service Code. Therefore, in absence of any specific definition of the word in the Rules, the same would be interpreted in its common parlance and the way it is understood generally. Further, this Court cannot interpret a particular word so as to restrict its not such an approach would Book meaning, amount re-casting or rewriting the rules. Under such circumstances, this Court would obviously adopt the golden rule of interpretation and give the word its common meaning and the way its ordinarily understood i.e. without any categorization or classification. Therefore, the embargo which was imposed by introducing new Sub-rule(4) is general in nature and applies to all appointments irrespective of all the classification category, nature etc. made after 01.01.2005. And such appointments made after 1.1.2025 shall be governed by the new rule appended to Sub-rule(4) of the Rule, 1992.

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22. Considering the fact that the petitioner was initially appointed by the Government although in a work charged establishment and allowed to continue in service uninterruptedly for a period of three decades and it is only w.e.f. 31.10.2009, the service of the Petitioners were regularized, in such factual background, this Court is of the considered view that the embargo imposed by introduction of new Subrule(4) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Even otherwise also learned counsel for the State does not dispute the fact that the petitioner was appointed by the Government prior to 2005 although on ad hoc basis. However, it was submitted that he was appointed in a work charge establishment in entitled to be coered under the year 1981 and, therefore, they are the Pension Rules, 1992.

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5.13. Reliance was also placed to decision of this Court

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rendered in the case of Surendranath Panda Vs. State of Odisha & Others, W.P.(C ) Nos.32883 of 2023 ,

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decided on 22.01.2026. This Court in Para-5 & 5.2 of the said judgment has held as follows:

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5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that petitioner was engaged as a NMR in the year 1979 and while continuing as such, he was regularized vide order dated 19.06.2001 under Annexure-1, where he joined on 22.06.2001. Petitioner while continuing in such regular establishment, he retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.06.2009 as found from Annexure-2. Though it is not disputed that petitioner does not have the required qualifying service to get the benefit of pension and other pensionary benefits, placing reliance on the order passed by the Tribunal, so confirmed by this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court with due implementation of the same in the case of Kulamani Mishra, petitioner raised his claim under Annexure-3.

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Xxx xxx xxx

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5.2. Since similar claim allowed by the Tribunal confirmed by this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court has been implemented, as found from the documents available under Annexure-4 series, it is the view of this Court that the ground on which petitioner’s claim has been rejected, is not sustainable in the eye of law. Once a person similarly situated has been extended with the benefit, petitioner being similarly situated, is also entitled to get similar benefit in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Ram Gopal so cited (supra).

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5.14. It is also contended that similar claim when was

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allowed by this Court vide order dt.04.10.2023 in W.P.(C ) No.31366 of 2023, Writ Appeal filed by the State against such order in W.A. NO.1131 of 2024 was dismissed vide order dt.29.01.2026. Order dt.29.01.2026 passed in

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W.A. No.1131 of 2024 reads as follows:

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“This Intra-Court Appeal by the State and its officers calls in question a learned Single Judge's Order dated 04.10.2023, whereby Respondents' WP (C) No.31366 of 2023 having been favoured, relief has been accorded to him as under

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Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on careful examination of the background facts of the present case and keeping in view the well settled position of law that once an employee who was working initially as DLR, thereafter brought over to Work Charged establishment and finally his service was regularized shall be considered for payment of pensionary benefit by taking into consideration as how much period of service rendered on Work charged and DLR establishment, calculate the minimum qualifying period of service for grant of pensionary benefit. Such a proposition of law as has been propounded by this Court has already been accepted by many judgments of this Court Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, this Court deems it proper to dispose of the Writ Petition by directing the Opposite Parties to calculate the minimum qualifying service period of the Petitioner taking the shortfall period from the service period of the Petitioner as work Charged employee/DLR to calculate the minimum qualifying service period, the benefit which is due und admissible to the Petitioner on the basis of his last pay drawn accordingly, the same be sanctioned and disbursed to the Petitioner within a period of two months from the date of communication of the certified copy of this order. In the event, the Petitioner though is getting any other pensionary benefit, the same shall be surrendered before the Government. Any decision taken be communicated to the Petitioner within 10 days of taking such decision.

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With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ application stands disposed of"

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2 Appeal is filed after brooking a delay of 186 days and an application is moved supported by an affidavit in L.A. No.2913 of 2024 seeking its condonation. We have not come across one

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Single Appeal of the State filed without brooking delay. Be that as it may,

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Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents very fairly and appreciably submits that the subject application be allowed and delay be condoned

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We do it and accordingly I.A. is disposed off.

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4 The subject matter of this appeal is substantially similar to the one in Writ Appeal No. 975 of 2025 between Principal Secretary to Government, Works Department, Govt. of Odisha, Bhubaneswar v. Ashok Kumar Pattanayak and Another heard & disposed off by this Bench vide order dated 12.01.2026. The State Appeal was dismissed in the said case and therefore, this appeal by the State has to meet the same fate. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent is justified in telling that the case of his client is far better than the cognate case, inasmuch as his services were regularized w.e.f. 30.10.2018 and he retired on 30.06.2023.

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Ordered accordingly and Writ Appeal is dismissed. Order of the learned Single Judge shall be implemented within an outer limit of two months, failing which contempt action would follow.

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5.15. Not only that following the order in W.P(C ) NO.31766 of 2023, this Court in its order dt.28.02.2024

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in W.P.(C ) No.4162 of 2024 held as follows:

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Furthermore, considering the fact that the petitioner has rendered coupled with the fact that he more than 33 years of continuous service couple was initially appointed by the Government in the year 1990 in N.M.R. and work charge establishment, this Court is bound to give a liberal interpretation to the rules and would like to remove the obstacles which stand in the way of the petitioner in getting the pensionary benefits after working

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uninterruptedly for a period of almost three decades. This view is supported by a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Sukumaran vrs State of Kerala and and another, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 106, which was delivered by relying upon two other judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of V. Lakra vrs. Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 and Deokinandan Prasad vrs. State of Bihar; reported in AIR 1971 SC 1409 holding that the pension provisions must be given a liberal consideration as social welfare measure.

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In Prem Singh vrs. State of U.P. and others; reported in (2019) 10 SCC 516, it was observed that appointment of work charged employee not made for a particular project work and the nature of work was regular and perennial in nature on a monthly salary where employees were required to cross efficiency bar and were also subjected to transfer like regular employees, as such, their services were not qualitatively different from regular employees and hence the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that it would be unfair on the part of the State Government to take work from them for periods depriving them of their due emoluments, during period they works on less salary in work charged establishment and also declining to count that period as qualifying service for pensionary benefits which amounts to adopting exploitative device and it was further held that in the said case the service rendered in work charged establishment directed to be treated as qualifying service for grant of pension. In the aforesaid reported cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also directed to count service rendered in work charged establishment for the purpose of pensionary benefits by regularized have also been extended with pensionary benefits under the OCS Pension Rules, 1992. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has also filed several office orders in the Writ Petition.

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In the case at hand, the services rendered by the Petitioner in N.M.R. and work charge establishment also qualifies for the purpose of

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calculating their pensionary benefits under Rule 18/3) of the Rules, 1992. Additionally, the newly added, Sub-rule(4) which applied to the appointments made after 01.01.2005 will have no application to the case of the Petitioner, who was admittedly appointed in the N.M.R. establishment on 1990 and subsequently retired from service w.e.f. 31.03.2023. Moreover, in absence of any rule specifying any particular category of appointment in the newly added Sub-rule(4) to Rule-3, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not appointed prior to the cut-off date i.e. 01.01.2005. Therefore, by taking into consideration, the initial date of appointment i.e. 1990 as Clerk on N.M.R. basis, it cannot be said that the petitioner was appointed prior to 01.01.2005 and, as such, the embargo Rule-3(4) would be attracted to the facts of the petitioner's case Moreover, similarly situated employees, who were initially engaged in work charged establishment and were subsequently regularized have also been extended with pensionary benefits under the OCS Pension Rules, 1992. In this context, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has also filed several office orders in the Writ Petition.

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Therefore, this Court directs the Opposite Parties to consider the case of the Petitioner for pensionary benefits by permitting the Petitioner to submit the pension papers afresh and in that event, if the pension papers, in proper form, is submitted before the authority concerned within a period of one month from today, the authority concerned shall do well to consider the same and grant pensionary benefits as due and admissible to the Petitioner within a period of two months thereafter, if there are no otherlegal impediment.

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5.16. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners

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also contended that similar claim made by one Kulamani Mishra when was allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dt.03.09.2013 in O.A. No.2639(C) of 2012,

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the same was assailed by the State before this Court in W.P.(C ) No.20762 of 2015. However, after dismissal of the Writ Petition by this Court vide order dt.22.03.2016 as well as by the Apex Court vide order dt.30.09.2016 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil Appeal No.18127 of 2016), benefit of pension and pensionary benefit has been extended in favour of the said Kulamani Mishra with extension of the benefit of pension from the date of his eligibility vide order dt.23.02.2019 of Executive Engineer, Jagatsinghpur Irrigation Division.

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5.17. It is accordingly contended that since similar benefit has been extended in favour of Kulamani Mishra, Petitioners being similarly situated, they cannot be discriminated, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of (i) State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastav and Others, (2015) 1 SCC (ii) State of Karnataka Vs. C. Lalitha (2006) 2 SCC 747. Not only that, order passed in the case of Harbans Lal so cited supra was confirmed by the Apex Court while dismissing the appeal vide order

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dt.30.07.2012 in SLP(C) No.23578 of 2012 & SLP (C )

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No.17901 of 2011 (State of Punjab and Others Vs.

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Harbans Lal).

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5.18. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastav in Para-13 & 22 has held as follows:

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13. In State of Karnataka v C. Lalitha state of Karnataka v C Lalitha, (2006) 2 SCC 747 2006 SCC (L&S) 447), which is the next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, our attention was draum to the following passage from the said judgment (SCC p. 756, para 29)

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“29 Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently. It is furthermore well settled that the question of seniority should be governed by the rules. It may be true that this Court took notice of the subsequent events, namely, that in the meantime she had also been promoted Commissioner which was a Category I post but the direction to create a supernumerary post to adjust her must be held to have been issued only with e view to accommodate her therein as otherwise she might have been reverted and not to which she was not otherwise entitled to.”

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xxx xxx xxx

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22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents can be summed up as under.

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22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike would by extending that benefit. Not doing so amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did

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not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

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22.2. However, this principle is subject to wellrecognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

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22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721: 1998 SCC (L&S) 226/). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.

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5.19. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the

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Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Others Vs. C. Lalitha, (2006) 2 SCC 747 . Hon’ble

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Apex Court in para 29 of the decision in the case of C.

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Lalitha has held as follows:

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“29. Justice demands that a person should not be allowed to derive any undue advantage over other employees. The concept of justice is that one should get what is due to him or her in law. The concept of justice cannot be stretched so as to cause heart-burning to more meritorious candidates. Moreover, at the end of the day, the Respondent has got what could be given to her in law. As of now, she had already been enjoying a higher scale of pay than what she would have got if she was to join the post of Assistant Controller. We, therefore, are of the opinion that interest of justice would be sub-served if she is allowed to continue in her post and direct the Appellant to consider her seniority in the Administrative Service in terms of the order of this Court dated 15th March, 1994 that she would be the last in the seniority list of the appointees in the post of Category I Assistant Commissioner (Karnataka Administrative Service).”

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5.20. Making all these submissions, learned counsel

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appearing for the Petitioners contended that appropriate direction be issued to the Opp. Parties to extend the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits in favour of the Petitioners as provided under OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992

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6. Learned Addl. Government Advocate on the other

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hand raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the Writ Petition contending inter alia that since prior to approaching the Opp. Parties, the present Writ Petitions have been filed inter alia seeking a direction to extend the benefit of pension and

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pensionary benefits, the Writ Petitions at it’s threshold

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is not maintainable.

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6.1. Bereft of the aforesaid submission, it is contended

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that since Petitioners admittedly have not the required qualifying service to get the benefit of pension as provided under Rule 47(5)(i) of the Rules, no such benefit can be extended in their favour. It is also contended that knowing fully well that Petitioners will not have the required qualifying service in the regular establishment, since they accepted the benefit of regularization while continuing in the work-charged establishment, after retirement from the said establishment, Petitioners cannot claim extension of the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits under the Rules. It is accordingly contended that since Petitioners do not have the required qualifying service, no direction be issued directing for extension of the benefit, as prayed for.

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7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considering the submission made, this court finds that both the Petitioners which is not disputed are

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engaged as NMR/DLR prior to 12.04.1993 i.e. the cut-off

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date fixed by the Finance Department in its resolution dt.15.05.1997. However, it is found that on the face of such continuance as a NMR/DLR prior to 12.04.1993, Petitioners were never regularized on completion of the required tenure of engagement as NMR/DLR in terms of the resolution dt.15.05.1997.

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7.1. Not only that, on the face of the order passed by the Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi so cited supra, no step was taken to absorb the Petitioners in the regular establishment, who had completed more than 10 years of services without being protected by any interim order from any Court of law.

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But in order to circumvent the direction of the Apex Court, Petitioners were brought over to the workcharged establishment w.e.f 01.03.2009.

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7.2. It is also found that both the Petitioners were brought over to the regular (wages) establishment, prior to their retirement and both of them retired on attaining

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the age of superannuation, but without having the

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required qualifying service to get the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits.

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7.3. Placing reliance on the decisions so cited supra, this Court is of the view that Petitioner’s claim is required to be considered by the Opp. parties to get the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits under the Rules. For the admitted latches on the part of the State authority in not absorbing the Petitioners on the face of such long continuance, Petitioners cannot be deprived of the benefit of pension and other pensionary benefits. This Court accordingly while disposing both the Writ Petitions, permits the Petitioners to make a detailed representation before Opp. Party No.1 claiming the benefit of pension and pensionary benefits as provided under the Rules.

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7.4. It is observed that if such a representation will be filed within a period of three (3) weeks hence, Opp. Party No. 1 shall do well to take a lawful decision on the same within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of such representation. The order so passed by

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Opp. Party No. 1 be communicated to the Petitioner.

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7.5. It is however observed that, while taking such a decision relevancy and effect of the decisions, so cited supra, be taken into consideration and so also the benefit

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extended in favour of Kulamani Mishra in its proper perspective.

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8. With the aforesaid observation and direction, both the Writ Petitions stand disposed of.

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9. Photocopy of the order be placed in the connected

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case.

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(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge

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Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 7^th March, 2026 /Sangita