Radhamohan Joshi Vs Sub-Collector Cum Cala by-Pass, Bolangir

2. The Memo dated 06.04.2026 filed by the learned counsel for the appellant is handed over to the learned counsel who is present in Court. He carries out correction in the said Memo by mentioning the LAA number in place of the earlier diary number, which is counter-signed by the Court Master. The Memo is again filed and taken on record.

¶15

LAA No.47 of 2026

¶16

Page 1 of 7

¶17

3. Learned counsel for the appellant was heard at some length on 24.02.2026 and is again heard today.

¶18

The Land Acquisition Appeal has been filed invoking the provision of section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement (RLFTCAR&R) Act, 2013 challenging the order dated 09.10.2025 passed by the Collector-cum-Arbitrator, Balangir in LA (Arbitration) Case No. 1 of 2025 (arising out of L.A. Case No.2 of 2021) under section 3(G) of the National Highway Act, 1956.

¶19

4. The Stamp Report dated 31.12.2025 indicates that question of nomenclature/maintainability of LAA has been pointed. Apparently, the Stamp Reporter has raised the issue of maintainability of LAA as the challenge is to an order by the statutory authority/Arbitrator under the N.H.Act, 1956.

¶20

5. By order dated 24.02.2026 the following was directed in the lead matter LAA No.50 of 2026 as the matters were tagged and taken up together:

¶21

“The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the State has adjournment to address on the said issue on the next date as the Section 3(J) of N.H.Act, 1956 provides that land acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply- Nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to an acquisition under this Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner shall also address regarding applicability of the RLFTCAR&R Act, 2013 to the acquisitions made on the National Highway Act, 1956.”

¶22

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 2 of 7

¶23

6. The learned counsel for the appellant referring to above quoted order dated 24.02.2026 submits that he has remedy available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as provided in Section 34, to approach the learned District Judge having jurisdiction. It is further submitted that Stamp Report does not reflect the details regarding the delay that would be applicable for entertaining the appeal.

¶24

7. The fact remains that the judgment is dated 09.10.2025, the appeal was presented on 24.12.2025. It is submitted that for the purpose of calculation of the limitation it has to be noticed that the certified copy of the order under challenge has been issued on 20.11.2025, pursuant to the copy application dated 04.11.2025, appeal has been filed on 24.12.2025 before this Court; the prescribed period of limitation being ninety days. It is submitted that even if there would be any delay it would be only of few days.

¶25

8. It is submitted that in moving the application before the learned District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act the delay need be condoned as the petitioner pursued the litigation before this Court bona-fide and Section 14 of the Limitation Act would come to the aid of the appellant.

¶26

9. In a recent decision, The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s. S.V.

¶27

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 3 of 7

¶28

Global Mill Limited¹ the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a large batch of civil appeals arising out of judgments of various High Courts, wherein the High Courts had dismissed the First Appeal filed by the appellants under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act, 2013 as being barred by limitation. The Apex Court has set aside all the judgments of different High Courts and has laid down the law regarding condonation of delay by courts in appeal in such matters. The relied upon paragraphs-96 and 97, iv, vii and viii are reproduced herein (from INSC print) and are also applied in adjudicating the present matter;

¶29

“96. As repeatedly mentioned in our judgment, we are concerned with a special law which provides for just and fair compensation, along with the relief of rehabilitation or resettlement. Therefore, without discussing the decisions relied upon by the parties any further, we only say that one must see the exclusive mechanism provided under a statute to be used for achieving the goal. Suffice it is to state that after the exhaustive and threadbare analysis of the provisions available under both the 2013 Act and the 1963 Act, we find that the decisions cited by the Bar do not have any application to the present batch of matters and therefore, deserve to be discarded.

¶30

CONCLUSION

¶31

97.We conclude as follows:

¶32

xxx xxx xxx (iv) Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act.

¶33

1 2026 INSC 138

¶34

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 4 of 7

¶35

xxx xxx xxx (vi) All the impugned judgments are set aside insofar as the issue of application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act is concerned.

¶36

xxx xxx xxx

¶37

(viii) High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.”

¶38

[Undersigned to supply emphasis]

¶39

10. In Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr.² , it has been held (paragraphs-74,75,76,77 of AIR print):

¶40

“74. As held by this Court in Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board and Ors. v. Mohanlal & Co. Section 14 of the Limitation Act has to be interpreted liberally to advance the cause of justice. Section 14 would be applicable in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum.

¶41

75. There can be little doubt that Section 14 applies to an application Under Section 7 of the IBC. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the IBC does not exclude the operation of Section 14 of the IBC. The question is whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act do not qualify for the exclusion of time Under Section 14, inasmuch as they are not civil proceedings in a Court, as argued by Mr. Dave.

¶42

76. Even if it were to be held that the benefit of Section 14 would be available to an applicant under IBC, for proceedings initiated bona fide and prosecuted with due diligence under the SARFAESI Act, another question raised in this appeal is, whether exclusion of time Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, would only be available if the proceedings which could not be entertained for

¶43

2 AIR 2021 SC 2637: AIROnline 2021 SC 161: (2021) 7 SCC 313: 2021 INSC 199

¶44

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 5 of 7

¶45

defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, had ended, in view of the Explanation at the end of Section 14, which says that for the purposes of the said Section, the day on which the earlier proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted for exclusion of time. Much emphasis has been placed by Mr. Dave on the explanation at the end of Section 14, to argue that the Financial Creditor would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act since the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act are still pending, as also the writ petition in the High Court.

¶46

77. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a whole. A conjoint and careful reading of Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 makes it clear that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence, before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time during which the applicant had been prosecuting such proceeding, in computing the period of limitation. The substantive provisions of Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 do not say that Section 14 can be invoked on only termination of the earlier proceedings, prosecuted in good faith.”

¶47

[Undersigned to supply emphasis]

¶48

11. Applying the principles of law as enunciated in the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is further directed that an application being filed by present appellant(s) under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the court of appropriate jurisdiction within a period of five weeks from uploading

¶49

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 6 of 7

¶50

of this order in the official website of this Court, the same shall be considered by condoning the delay.

¶51

The period for five weeks is granted considering the fact that the intending appellant/appellants come from a remote location in the district of Bolangir. Further, the direction issued for condonation of delay is for the fact that the intending applicant/appellant prosecuted the present litigation bonafidely and the present appeal before this Court has been filed within time. 12. With the aforesaid observations, the petition stands disposed of.

¶52

The certified copies of annexures annexed to the appeal shall be returned, upon the same being substituted by attested photo copies.

¶53

(Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge

¶54

Orissa High Court, Cuttack The dated 10^th April, 2026/Gs

¶55

Signature Not Verified

¶56

Digitally Signed Signed by: GAGAN BIHARI SAMAL Reason: Authentication Location: ohc Date: 15-Apr-2026 18:18:26

¶57

LAA No.47 of 2026 Page 7 of 7

Radhamohan Joshi v. Sub-Collector Cum Cala by-Pass, Bolangir

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Radhamohan Joshi v. Sub-Collector Cum Cala by-Pass, Bolangir

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Susanta Behera Vs Debasish Bera

Satyanarayan Sahu Vs Srikrishna Sahu

Maneswar Nath Vs Arati Nath

Bhishma Rana Vs Sub-Collector Cum Cala by-Pass, Bolangir

Krushna Chandra Parida Vs Soubhagini Baliarsingh

Orissa Rashtra Bhasa Parishad Vs Inspector General of Registration