Sambit Rath Vs State of Odisha

2. Mr. Jagabandhu Sahu, learned Advocate enters appearance on behalf of Opposite Party No.2 and files Vakalatnama in Court today. The same be kept on record.

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3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

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4. By filing the present CRLMC, the Petitioner has prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceedings initiated against him in connection with Berhampur Mahila P.S. Case No.144 of 2024 corresponding to G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024, pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur.

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Apart from the above, the Petitioner has also prayed for quashing Signature Not Verified Digitally SignedSigned by: SIPUN BEHERADesignation: SeniorStenographerReason: AuthenticationLocation: HIGH COURT OFORISSA, CUTTACKDate: 08-Apr-2026 18:59:33 the order dated 17.12.2024 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur in G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024.

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5. Learned counsel for the respective parties submit that, in the interregnum, the dispute between the parties has been amicably settled. In support thereof, a joint affidavit dated 29.03.2026 has been filed, which is taken on record.

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6. The relevant portion of the joint affidavit filed by both the parties is extracted hereunder:

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2. That the opp. party no.2 being the informant in Berhampur Mahila P.S. Case No.144 of 2024, does not want to proceed with the case as the matter has been settled in between the parties. Parties to the lis have agreed to live separate for all time to come and to that effect mutual divorce has been filed before the learned Judge, Family Court, Berhampur in C.P. Case No.248 of 2025. The opp. party no.2 and the petitioner filed the divorce on mutual consent without coercion.

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3. That it is humbly submitted here that the opp. party no.2 and the petitioner have mutually agreed to the conditions as has been mentioned in Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act petition. The opp. party no.2 has already taken the articles from her matrimonial house and the petitioner would pay the agreed amount as per the condition in the mutual divorce proceeding. At this juncture the opp. party no.2 does not want to proceed with the case for all time to come and she intends to drop the proceeding.”

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7. This Court has considered the joint affidavit filed by both parties and is conscious of the settled legal position that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is distinct from the power of compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and may be invoked to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court. At the same time, such power is not to be exercised mechanically merely because the parties have arrived at a settlement;

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the Court is required to examine the nature and gravity of the allegations, the real genesis of the dispute, the stage of the proceeding and whether, in view of the stand now taken by the victim, the possibility of conviction has become remote and continuation of the prosecution would amount to futility or oppression.

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8. In the present case, Opposite Party No.2 has joined the Petitioner in filing a sworn affidavit and has categorically stated that Opposite Party No.2 and the Petitioner have mutually agreed to the conditions as has been mentioned in Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act. The Opposite Party No.2 has already taken the articles from her matrimonial house and the Petitioner would pay the agreed amount as per the condition in the mutual divorce proceeding. The Opposite Party No.2 does not want to proceed with the case for all time to come and she intends to drop the proceeding. Thus, the Court is not proceeding on the basis of a bare compromise alone, but on the subsequent stand of the complainant herself, which substantially erodes the factual substratum of the prosecution. Having regard to the materials on record, the stage of the case, and the unequivocal position taken by the complainant, this Court is satisfied that the possibility of a successful conviction is remote and bleak and that continuation of the impugned proceeding would serve no useful purpose but would instead amount to abuse of the process of law.

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9. The Supreme Court in the case of Navneesh Aggarwal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr¹ . has held as follows:

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“14. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view that where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by way of divorce, and the parties have since settled into their respective lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of harassment. In the cases of Mala Kar vs. State Of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated 19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of Delhi, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9178 of 2018 dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”), this Court, while exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord against the husband. The Court took note of the fact that the couple therein had divorced and held that in such a situation, to continue with criminal prosecution wouldamount to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted therein applies with equal force to the facts of the present case. Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in Arun Jain are extracted respectively as under:

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“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant case, we have already noted that there has been a decree of divorce passed between the parties dated 18.10.2014. It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014. More significantly, both the appellant No.2 and respondent No.2 have since remarried and are leading their independent lives. Therefore, both parties have accepted the decree

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1 2025 INSC 963

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of divorce passed by the Family Court on 18.10.2014. Moreover, the appellant No.2- former husband of the respondent No.2 has agreed to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex- gratia to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this Court to do complete justice in this matter and for invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

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Xxx xxx xxx

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Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it is noted that the appellants and respondent No.2 were married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the appellants that appellant No.1 left the matrimonial home on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No.2 sought divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on 04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that respondent No.2 filed the complaint against the appellants herein and the FIR was registered on 13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.

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15. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 (“Ramawatar”), while considering quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC, in the context of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the parties in the said case and therefore, exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court quashed the complaint, the FIR, and

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subsequent criminal proceedings against the accused therein. The relevant portion of the said judgment is at paragraph 15 which is extracted as under:

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“15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Another. has eloquently clarified this point as follows:

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“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the

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same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject .”

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10. The Supreme Court in the case of Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan² has held as follows:

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“ 36. The reason is that the courts must not encourage matrimonial litigation, and prolongation of such litigation is detrimental to both the parties who lose their young age in chasing multiple litigations. Thus, adopting a hypertechnical view can be counterproductive as pendency itself causes pain, suffering and harassment and, consequently, it is the duty of the court to ensure that matrimonial matters are amicably resolved, thereby bringing the agony, affliction, and torment to an end. In this regard, the courts only have to enquire and ensure that the settlement between the parties is achieved without pressure, force, coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence, and that the consent is indeed sought by free will and choice, and the autonomy of the parties is not compromised. The latter two decisions in Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] and Jitendra Raghuvanshi [Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] observe that the inherent power on the High Court under Section 482CrPC is wide and can be used/wielded to quash criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court,

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2 (2023) 14 SCC 231

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albeit it has to be exercised sparingly, carefully, and with caution ."

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11. In the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr .³ , the Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decisions has laid down the principles governing quashing of matrimonial disputes where there has been an amicable settlement, by holding as follows:

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“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.

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13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude

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3 (2003) 4 SCC 675

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and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts .”

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12. In the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr .⁴ , where a larger Bench of the Supreme Court had been constituted to decide the correctness of the decisions in the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. and Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors . and held as follows:

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“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim

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4 (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303

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and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

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62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the Bench(es) concerned .”

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13. In light of the aforesaid and applying the same to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the continuance of the impugned criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and would not subserve the ends of justice.

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14. Tested against the aforesaid principles and the facts of the present case, this Court finds that allowing the prosecution to continue would be futile and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 15. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the background facts, particularly the fact that the marriage between the Petitioner and Opposite Party No.2 has ended in a divorce and the Opposite Party No.2 is not interested to proceed with the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the case pending. Hence, this Court consider this to be a fit case for exercising of power under Section 528 of BNSS to quash the impugned order dated 17.12.2024 as well as the entire criminal proceedings in G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024, pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur, arises out of Berhampur Mahila P.S. Case No.144 of 2024 in the interest of justice.

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16. Accordingly, the CRLMC is allowed.

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17. Issue urgent certified copy of this order as per Rules.

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( Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge

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Sipun

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Sambit Rath v. State of Odisha

Case brief

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Sambit Rath v. State of Odisha

Case brief

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