Smt.Hemalata Vs Rabindra

S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is preferred by the complainant assailing the judgment of acquittal dated 21.06.1995 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Kendrapara acquitting the respondent while dismissing I.C.C. Case No.34 of 1991.

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2. The complainant-appellant had filed CRLMC No.2319 of 1995 seeking leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal. The Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 10.01.1996

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granted leave to appeal against the impugned judgment dated

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21.06.1995 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Kendrapara in I.C.C. Case No.34 of 1991. The appeal has been pending since then.

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3. The notice was issued to the respondent accused persons and trial Court records have also been summoned.

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4. Heard Ms. Sartika Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, but none has appeared for the private respondents.

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5. The appellant has filed complaint case before the learned J.M.F.C., Kendrapara, inter alia, alleging that she had married with the respondent no.1- Rabindra Kumar Sutar on 17^th day of Asadha, 1989 as per hindu rites and customs. She was subjected to physical and mental cruelty by the respondent no.1-husband, the respondent no.2, the father-in-law, respondent no.3- mother-in-law and respondent no.4- brother-in-law. It is also alleged that the respondents demanded Rs.5,000/- from the father of the appellant besides demanding the articles like watch, cycle and gold ornaments etc. Out of the said demand of Rs.5,000/-, the father of the appellant could only arrange and gave Rs.2,000/- to the accused persons particularly respondent no.2. The accused persons kept on persuading the appellant to bring the balance amount of Rs.3,000/- from her father on the pretext that the respondent no.1 wanted to start a carpentry

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business. Since the father of the appellant could not satisfy the demand, the appellant was subjected to the physical cruelty. It is also alleged that the accused persons did not provide food to the appellant till the demand is fulfilled. Lastly on 30.09.1990, at about 10 a.m., on the direction of the respondent no.2, the accused persons brutally assaulted the complainant and snatched away her wearing ornaments. Finding no way out, the appellant had to leave the house of the accused persons. Eventually on 05.02.1991, the complaint case has was filed.

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6. The appellant has examined four witnesses to substantiate her case.

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7. The learned trial Court, by analyzing the evidence brought on record by the appellant, arrived at a conclusion that the appellant could not prove her case beyond all reasonable doubt, hence, turned down the complaint while recording the acquittal of the charges for the alleged commission of the offence punishable under Section 498A/34 of the IPC. The learned trial Court, by analyzing the evidence brought on record by the appellant, returned the following finding:

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“8. From the above evidence of P.W.1 (complainant) in her examination-in-chief, it is seen that she has somehow or other corroborated with the facts mentioned in the complaint petition. It is also seen from her cross-examination that she was

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physically assaulted by the accused persons 10 to 12 times by means of their hands and staves. She also speaks to have sustained red weals and bleeding injuries on her person due to assault of the accused persons. But in support of all her injuries, he does not prove any medical certificate. As appears from her evidence as well as complaint petition, she alleges to have been brutally assaulted by the accused persons. But it is of great doubt as to why she did not report this fact before the police as the allegation is very serious in nature. Similarly, it is of great doubt as to why her father (P.W.2) did not report the matter at the P.S. Both the complainant and her father do not prove any manner that the local police personnels were hostile to them. In the absence of such proof, they make their case to be doubtful. Apart from these, the complainant is unable to say the exact day or date of the alleged ill treatments made on her by the accused persons. So the prosecution case appears to be doubtful. If at all the accused persons ill treated her in cruel manner just 1-1/2 months of her marriage, it is of great doubt as to how she continued in their house for a period of one year and three months without bringing this fact to the notice of her father or police. The matter being so, I do not place safe reliance on the case of the complainant.

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10. Since P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 are not the direct witnesses to the occurrence of cruelty on P.W.1, I do not discuss their evidence especially when the evidence of complainant and her case as a shole appears to be doubtful. Besides, not a single man of the accused’s village or any neighbor has been examined by the prosecution to make the complainant’s case undoubtful. The matter being so, it can be held that the complainant’s case is no way appears to be free from doubts.”

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8. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken this Court to the

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evidence of P.W.1 in extenso and submitted that the evidence of P.W.1 stood corroborated with the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. The learned trial Court, however, misread the entire evidence and recorded the acquittal only on the ground that the

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complaint was filed belatedly. She also submitted that the learned trial Court has grossly failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and doubted the unimpeachable evidence of the witnesses by reading between the lines.

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9. After careful consideration of the material available on record and by appreciating the evidence on record, it could be easily inferred that the view taken by the learned trial Court particularly as reflected in paragraphs- 8 and 10 sounds to be a plausible view. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record, the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on

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misreading or omission of material evidence, or where compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

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(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.

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(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused

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was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported

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in 2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-

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“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal.”

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10. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is, therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or nonconsideration of material evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (supra), the reinforced presumption of innocence following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.

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Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely

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because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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11. The present Criminal Appeal was filed on 15.01.1996 against

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the judgment of acquittal passed on 21.06.1995. Three decades have already been lapsed in between. During this long interval, the presumption of innocence flowing from the acquittal judgment has remained undisturbed. It would be a travesty of justice to reverse the judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the respondents. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in favour of the respondents for more than 30 years, as they were acquitted by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of reformatory criminal jurisprudence.

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12. In view of the aforementioned, the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed.

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Signature Not Verified

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The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Dated the 30^th Day of July, 2026/ Subhasis Mohanty

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Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 30-Jul-2026 13:38:04

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Smt.Hemalata v. Rabindra

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Smt.Hemalata v. Rabindra

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