Krushna Chandra Naik Vs State of Odisha

This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Krushna Chandra Naik with a prayer to quash the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Subarnapur in rejecting his petition dated 14.03.2024 with a further prayer to direct the opposite parties to settle the land in favour of the petitioner to which the petitioner has acquired or alternative land in the nearby place to be settled in favour of the petitioner as he is a displaced person.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner during course of argument placed the Resolution of the Government of Odisha, Department of Water Resources dated 27.08.1994, wherein it is stated under the heading of Allotment of Land that land for land should be the main objective of R & R and land may be allotted in the benefited zone and for that matter, ceiling surplus land may be assessed for allotment to affected persons. Government may also consider the acquisition of land for such allotment. But land gradually becoming scarce, should not be allotted indiscriminately. Displaced persons losing whole of their land will get priority over those losing land partially and displaced persons losing homestead land will be given developed homestead plot in the colony with all civic amenities.

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The petition, which was filed before the Additional District Magistrate on 14.03.2024 was filed by Krushna Chandra Naik, the father of the petitioner so also the petitioner, who seems to have approached this Court in W.P.(C) No.38969 of 2023 and it is stated that W.P.(C) No.38969 of 2023 was disposed of on 01.03.2024 directing the Collector, Subarnapur to dispose of the representation of the petitioner keeping in view the enquiry report submitted by the opposite party no.5.

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From the impugned order, it appears that both the petitioner and his father received the Rehabilitation Assistance package on 24.08.1994 and it is also mentioned in the order that both the petitioner and his

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father have occupied Government land. Though reliance was placed during the hearing before the Additional District Magistrate, Subarnapur on the Resolution of the Government in Water Resources Department dated 27.08.1994 that claiming themselves to be coming under Tribal Community, but on enquiry and documents available, it was found that the petitioner belonged to ‘KEUTA’ by caste which comes under Scheduled Caste (SC) and moreover, the occupied land is un-settable in nature and coming under Forest Rights Act, 2006.

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When the lands have been acquired since 1993-94 and the petitioner and his father have received the Rehabilitation Assistance package way back on 24.08.1994, if in terms of the Resolution of the Government, they were claiming land for land, which was not provided to them, they should have approached the authorities at the earliest and also to the Court but it seems that the petitioner approached this Court for the first time in 2023. No explanation has been offered in the writ petition regarding the delay approach of the petitioner to claim the relief as sought for.

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Although the Limitation Act is not strictly applicable to a writ petition, but the principles apply. It is also the settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. While exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be kept in mind by the High Court as a party who is guilty of delay and laches

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cannot be granted any relief.

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In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board -Vrs.- T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 108 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the effect of laches in litigation and held as follows:

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“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

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17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court

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to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”

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In the case of Mrinmoy Maity -vrs.- Chhanda Koley and others : A.I.R. 2024 S.C. 2717 : 2024 LiveLaw SC 31 8 , where an application under Article 226 had been filed by an applicant for grant of LPG distributorship after a delay of four years challenging the selection of a rival applicant, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

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“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been

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nonsuited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

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10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary

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jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be nonsuited. If it is found that the writ Petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others - vrs.- State of W.B and others reported in (2009) 1 S.C.C. 768 has held to the following effect:

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“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution

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is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

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57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 ], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).

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58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on

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and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”

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In view of the settled principle of law and particularly after going through the impugned order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Subarnapur, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the aforesaid order more particularly since the writ petition suffers from delay and laches, we are not inclined to entertain the same.

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Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.

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Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application.

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( S.K. Sahoo)

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Judge

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( Chittaranjan Dash)

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Judge