Bidyadhar Mallick Vs U.Co Bank

Questioning the legality and propriety of Order dated 29.12.2010 of the Disciplinary Authority-Zonal Manager, Zonal Office, UCO Bank, Cuttack vide Annexure-7 as confirmed in Appellate Order dated 25.04.2011 passed by the General Manager, Human Resource Management, Kolkata (Annexure-10), the instant writ petition has been filed to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayer(s):

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“It is therefore, prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may be graciously pleased to:

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(i) Admit the writ application,

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(ii) to call for the records;

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(iii) to issue Rule NISI calling upon the opposite parties to as to why the said Rule shall not be made absolute.

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Upon return thereto hear the parties and/or their counsels;

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And for insufficient cause this Hon‟ble Court may be further pleased to quash the Order dated 29.12.2010 imposing major penalty like dismissal from service by the opposite party No.3 vide Annexure-7 and the Order confirming the same dated 25.04.2011 by the Appellate Authority, opposite party No.2 vide Annexure-10.

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(iv) This Hon‟ble Court may be further pleased to hold that the initiation of proceeding against the petitioner is bad and discrimination has been committed in case of the petitioner

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And direct the opposite parties to grant monetary benefits as entitled to the petitioner after quashing the Orders vide Annexures-7 and 10.

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(v) Any other order/orders that may deem fit and proper be passed for the facts and circumstances of the case.

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And for which act of kindness, the petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray.”

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Facts:

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2. The career graph of the petitioner as narrated in the writ petition does deserve to be reflected.

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2.1. Having joined as a Clerk- cum -Cashier in the Branch Office of UCO Bank at Nilgiri on 10.10.1984, the petitioner got promoted to the post of Zonal Manager, Scale-1 Officer on 01.07.1986 and continued as such till 06.02.1988. Being promoted to the post of Assistant Manager (Advance), joined at Oupada Branch on 08.02.1988 where he worked till 28.09.1991. Thereafter, joining at Langaleswar Branch on 30.09.1991, he worked there up to 23.08.1996 as Assistant Manager (Advance). Being promoted to the post of Manager in the year 1996, he was directed to join at Debhog Branch as Manager and accordingly the petitioner took charge of Debhog Branch on 24.08.1996 and worked there up to 25.10.2000. Thereafter the petitioner joined as Assistant Manager (Account) at Baliapal on 27.10.2000, where he worked there up to 31.06.2003. Subsequently on 02.06.2003 he was transferred to Jamsuli Branch of UCO Bank to function as Manager and worked there up to 15.08.2006. From there the petitioner was transferred to Raibania Branch as Manager where he worked from 16.08.2006 to 11.07.2009 and having got transferred to Nilgiri Branch, he joined on 13.07.2009 as Manager.

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2.2. While working as Manager at Nilgiri Branch, the petitioner received Letter dated 20.11.2009 from the Disciplinary Authority-opposite party No.3 instructing him to offer explanation against show cause as to why

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suitable action would not be taken against him for irregularities committed by him at Jamsuli Branch while working as Branch Manager during 02.06.2003 to 17.08.2006. In the said Letter dated 20.11.2009, the opposite party No.2 has alleged seventeen numbers of irregularities committed by the petitioner while working at Jamsuli Branch. The opposite party No.3 by Letter dated 04.12.2009 putting the petitioner under suspension in exercise of power conferred on the Disciplinary Authority by Regulation 12 of the UCO Bank Officers Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (For brevity, “Regulations, 1976”) with immediate effect, ordered that during the period of suspension the Head Quarter of the petitioner would be at Cuttack and he would not leave the Head Quarter without obtaining permission of the Disciplinary Authority.

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2.3. In obedience to Letter dated 20.11.2009, the petitioner submitted his explanation point-wise denying all the allegations levelled against him.

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2.4. A Letter No.CZ/I&V/2010-11/84, dated 19.05.2011 was served attaching therewith statement of allegations and articles of charges on the petitioner containing therein that while functioning as Manager of Jamsuli Branch during 02.06.2003 to 17.08.2006, he was indulged in

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various acts of omission and commission for which he is charged as under:

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“1. Sri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676) failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence, which is violative of Regulation 3(i) of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation 1996 as amended.

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2. Sri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676) in the exercise of powers confirmed on him acted otherwise than in his best judgement, which is violative of Regulation 3(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Conduct) Regulations 1975, as amended.”

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2.5. Denying all charges and allegations written statement of defense was furnished, which the Disciplinary Authority, opposite party No.3, did not accept, but instituted an enquiry by appointing one Sri Ananda Chandra Sahu, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Zonal Office, Cuttack, as the Enquiry Officer by notification dated 26.06.2010.

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2.6. The Enquiry Officer issued notice to the petitioner to attend the inquiry on 08.07.2010. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer on 27.07.2010, 04.08.2010, 05.08.2010, 28.08.2010, 14.09.2010 and 08.10.2010, thereby cooperated with the process of inquiry.

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2.7. The Enquiry Officer by Letter dated 12.11.2010 submitted Report to the Disciplinary Authority in respect

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of Charge Sheet dated 19.05.2010 containing therein his opinion on the seventeen allegations as per Statement of Allegations in seriatim and concluded that:

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“(1) Charge No.1: Shri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676, failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence, which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended:

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Proved.

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(2) Charge No.2: Shri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676), in the exercise of powers conferred on him acted otherwise than in his best judgment, which is violative of Regulation 3(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended:

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Proved.”

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2.8. The Disciplinary Authority attaching copy of the Report of the Enquiry Officer with his Letter dated 19.11.2010, requested the petitioner to submit his comments thereon. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted his comments on 29.11.2010 refuting all the allegations.

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2.9. The Disciplinary Authority had passed Order dated 29.12.2010 in respect of the enquiry held against the petitioner arising out of the Charge Sheet dated

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19.05.2010. The conclusion being arrived at, the following punishment is awarded by the Disciplinary Authority:

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“In view of the foregoing and considering the gravity of charges, in exercise of the powers conferred on me vide Regulation 4 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, I award the following penalties on Sri B.D. Mallick (PFM No.27676):

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Charge No.1 (Proved): Mr. B.D. Mallick is dismissed from Bank‟s service, which shall be a disqualification for future employment.

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Charge No.2 (Proved): Mr. B.D. Mallick be dismissed from Bank‟s service, which shall be a disqualification for future employment.”

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2.10. Dissatisfied with the award of punishment/penalty, being not commensurate with the imputations, and major penalty of dismissal from service, the petitioner alleging the same to be grossly and shockingly disproportionate to the allegations levelled against him, an Appeal was preferred before the General Manager, Human Resources Management Department, Head Office (be called “Appellate Authority”) on 27.01.2011.

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2.11. The Appellate Authority upholding the penalty imposed upon Shri B.D. Mallick (PFM No.27676) by the

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Disciplinary Authority vide Order dated 29.12.2010 disposed of the appeal by Order dated 25.04.2011.

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2.12. Against the confirming Order of the Appellate Authority, alleging mechanical acceptance of decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner is before this Court by way of filing the instant writ petition.

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Response of the opposite parties:

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3. The Appellate Order confirming the Order of the Disciplinary Authority based on the Report of Enquiry Officer being reasoned and speaking orders, there is no need for intervention in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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3.1. Elaborating the factual findings with respect to irregularities committed with reference to the allegations vis-à-vis finding of the Enquiry Officer, it is asserted that the charges being proved, the conduct of the petitioner fell within the ambit of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations 1975.

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3.2. The petitioner not only extended loans in contravention of authority and flouted banking procedure but also acted in violation of guidelines. He recruited strangers/ outsiders without due authority and given them access to the records maintained in the bank. By virtue of such engagement of two persons and allowing them to handle

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all records and documents the petitioner exposed the bank to grave risk. This apart, on account of irregularities in sanctioning loan and beyond limits, the petitioner was instrumental for huge loss caused to the bank.

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3.3. All the charges were proved as a consequence of establishment of seventeen numbers of allegations and the fact finding of the Enquiry Officer was accepted as proved by the Disciplinary Authority, which in turn got confirmed in the Appeal.

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3.4. It is affirmed that the Disciplinary Authority before awarding penalty at each stage not only heard the petitioner but also afforded ample opportunities to explain charges vis-à-vis allegations.

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Hearing:

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4. Pleadings being completed and exchanged between the counsel for respective parties, on their consent this matter was taken up for hearing on 05.02.2025.

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4.1. Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner advanced arguments on 05.02.2025 and on the request of Sri Bibekananda Ugdata, learned Advocate for the Bank the matter stood adjourned for preparation. He was also requested to furnish copy of Enquiry Proceedings Register. After couple of days’ of

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adjournment, finally hearing was concluded on 21.03.2025.

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4.2. On 21.03.2025, while Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate submitted a Memo enclosing therewith copy of relevant rules relating to Conduct and Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate, serving a copy of affidavit enclosed therewith copy of Enquiry Proceeding Register on the learned counsel for the petitioner, filed the same before this Court.

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4.3. On conclusion of hearing, the matter stood reserved for preparation and pronouncement of Judgment/Order.

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Rival contentions and submissions:

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5. Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate commenced his argument by urging that violation of “Procedure for imposing major penalties” as envisaged under Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulation, 1976, vitiates entire proceeding; as such the Orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are liable to be set aside.

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5.1. He referred to the following fact as mentioned in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner:

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Allegation	Date of irregularity	Date of	No. of years passed
No.		charge sheet	from incident
1.	October, 2004	19.05.2010	After 5years

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2.	Date of sanction of advance 20.10.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years
3.	Date of sanction of advance 09.08.2006	19.05.2010	After 4.6 years
4.	Date of sanction of advance 01.03.2005	19.05.2010	After 5 years
5.	Date of sanction of advance 18.12.2004	19.05.2010	After 5 years
6.	Date of sanction of advance 07.10.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years
7.	Date of sanction of advance 09.08.2006	19.05.2010	After 3 years and 4 months
8.	Date of sanction of advance 02.11.2005, 10.12.2005, 17.05.2006	19.05.2010	After 4 years
9.	Date of sanction of advance 22.12.2004	19.05.2010	After 5 years
10.	Date of sanction of advance 11.12.2004	19.05.2010	After 5 years
11.	Date of sanction of advance 15.02.2004	19.05.2010	After 4 years
12.	Date of sanction of advance 17.01.2006	19.05.2010	After 4 years
13.	Date of sanction of advance 17.11.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years
14.	Date of sanction of advance 06.06.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years
15.	Date of sanction of advance 05.11.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years
16.	Date of sanction of advance 20.07.2006	19.05.2010	After 3 years and 8 months
17.	Date of sanction of advance 23.06.2005	19.05.2010	After 4 years

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5.2. He, therefore, submitted that the incidents/events or transactions alleged being more than 4 years prior to service of Charge Sheet on the petitioner, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding is hit by limitation as specified in Paragraph 22 of the “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” which was made effective from 25.08.1998. Stressing on the same, he

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submitted that limitation set forth for initiation of disciplinary proceeding in the said document, this Court is competent to intervene in the matter.

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5.3. The last plank of argument of Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate stemmed on the quantum/nature of punishment imposed. He submitted that such penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority ought to have been interfered with by the Appellate Authority considering that the major penalties imposed are disproportionate to the charges framed and allegations levelled against the petitioner.

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6. Per contra, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate for the opposite parties refuting the questions raised by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the principles of natural justice have been followed at every stage— by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. No prejudice has been demonstrated by the petitioner to have suffered on account of such lapses, if any. Merely setting up technical pleas at the time of hearing of the matter cannot give scope for this Court to adjudicate upon such aspects.

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6.1. Justifying the initiation of disciplinary proceeding based on Report of the Enquiry Officer, the learned Advocate

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for the opposite parties, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, drew attention of this Court to the copy of Enquiry Proceeding Register being enclosed to affidavit dated 19.03.2025. He has taken this Court to proceeding dated 20.07.2010 when the petitioner was provided with list of management witnesses for examination on 27.07.2010. On 27.07.2010, 04.08.2010, 05.08.2010, 28.08.2010, 14.09.2010 and 15.09.2010 the enquiry proceeded. The learned counsel for the Bank has referred to proceeding dated 15.09.2010 when after examination and crossexamination got completed with respect to Management Witness-1 and Management Witness-2, the Presenting Officer asked questions to the petitioner and the defence counsel also examined the petitioner on the said date.

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6.2. For illustration, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate has referred to following statements made by the petitioner during the course of enquiry on the examination and cross-examination, which is extracted herein below from Enquiry Proceeding dated 15.09.2010:

“PO to CSOE

Allegation-1

***

12. You have told that Zonal Officer Verbal has told you to engage a computer Instruction literate from outside. Can you was given show the letter of Z.O.

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Allegation-2

***

2. Is it a loan policy or you I have no yourself are telling knowledge of loan policy

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Allegation-4

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***

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5. What is your delegated power I do not know for sanction of a TL (MMGS-II Officer)

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Allegation-6

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***

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1. You have sanctioned a TL Delegated of Rs.6.50 Lacs to Sri Bijay Kumar Power is Mohanty on 07.10.2005. not Whether you have exceeded your known to delegated power which is Rs.4.00 lacs me”

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6.3. The learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that against each of the allegations questions were put to the petitioner and, therefore, he contended that there is no doubt that there was irregularities committed by the petitioner and finally the petitioner on the said date before the Enquiry Officer has stated thus:

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“The P.O. told that he has completed cross-examination of the CSOE (petitioner). Then the E.O. asked the CSOE it has anything to tell regarding the allegations/charges

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levelled against him; The CSOE told that “I was the single officer at the branch and was under tremendous work pressure. Whatever I have done are only for interest of the Bank.” The hearing of enquiry process is over. The EO asked the P.O. to submit his written brief within two weeks‟ time. The E.O. requested the DC to submit his defence brief within a week in receiving the PO‟s brief.”

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6.4. With the above factual details on record, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner having been given such opportunity and was given scope to examine himself during the course of enquiry, the contention of the petitioner that there was infraction of Regulation 6(17) of the Regulations, 1976 is without any foundation.

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6.5. With respect to point of limitation, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned counsel would submit that the document based on which the learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded such mixed question of fact and law has no statutory support, more particularly when “fraud” has been alleged and proved. He further submitted that being not pleaded ever before the Authorities or this Court in the writ application, the same is not liable to be adjudicated upon. In this connection it is submitted that beyond pleadings this Court need not travel and may not allow the petitioner to argue the matter on the principles laid down in State of Karnataka Vrs. C. Lalitha, (2006) 1 SCR 971. Wherein it

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has been stated that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party.

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Analysis and discussion:

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7. At the stage of hearing of the present matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily contested that the Enquiry Officer has violated the procedure envisaged in Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976.

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7.1. Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, copy of which is made available by the petitioner by Memo dated 15.01.2025, read thus:

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“(13) On the date fixed for the enquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority shall be examined by the Presenting Officer. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any points on which they have cross-examined, but not on a new matter, without the leave of the Inquiry Authority. The Inquiry Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.

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(17) The Inquiry Authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined, generally question

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him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.”

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7.2. Scrutiny of the copy of the Enquiry Proceeding Register forming part of affidavit dated 19.03.2025 of the opposite parties-Bank, as referred to herein supra , it is surfaced that after examination and cross-examination of the Management Witnesses are completed, the Enquiry Officer has asked questioned to the petitioner on each of the allegations/charges on 15.09.2010 and thereby given opportunity to the petitioner to examine himself and be cross-examined.

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7.3. In the writ petition the petitioner craves to challenge the Order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority on the following grounds:

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“16. That the petitioner has challenged the order of the opposite party Nos.2 and opposite party No.3, which are annexed herewith as Annexure-7 & 10 to this writ application on the following amongst other grounds:

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i) The findings are based on prosecution document, which are abided to all and not admitted during the course of inquiry.

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ii) The Inquiry Officer while dealing with the inquiry, he deliberately has not perused certain documents filed by the petitioner.

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iii) That the petitioner has put to serve under the Bank for 30 years in various capacities and always tried his best to serve the bank with utmost devotion and with an unblemished record. Due to acute shortage of staffs, heavy pressure of work some procedural irregularities might have been committed without any ulterior motive cannot be awarded with the punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner left with lurch with a stigma of dismissal from service at the fag end of his career, which he has to carry on the rest of his life with bereaved heart.

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iv) For the allegation No.1 the petitioner most humbly submitted that since the engagement of a person was of dire necessity and within the knowledge of the Zonal Office, the petitioner cannot be singularly held responsible for the lapse on his part.

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v) For the allegation No.2 the petitioner further submitted that he cannot be responsible for the nonrecovery of loan after his relief from the said Branch and the allegation is un-founded.

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vi) For the allegation No.3 the petitioner submitted that he was relieved from the Nilgiri Branch on 16.8.2006 7 days after sanction of loan and disbursement of only Rs.45,000/- of loan amount, he cannot be held responsible on subsequent disbursement any account and for non-repayment in the loan account.

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vii) The petitioner further submitted that he was not aware of his delegated power, which was a definite lapse on his part as Branch Manager, but there was no deliberate breach of authority on his part as other sanction was being promptly

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reiterated to the Zonal Office and the Zonal Office has never pointed out him that his action was not in accordance with law, therefore his appeal to take a lenient view has not been properly considered and so far as the allegations Nos.5 to 17 are concerned very specifically he has denied all the allegations, but neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has dealt with the same in its proper prospective and awarded major penalties against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has held upon and supported the irrelevant material of the prosecution charges, which are not alleged in the charge sheet, but shows that the Inquiry is not conducted in impartial manner.

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viii) That the opposite party No.2 has not either lapses on the part of opposite party No.3 and on the other hand in a mechanical manner and in a non-speaking order dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.”

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7.4. Though such grounds were taken in the writ petition, the petitioner could not establish factual perversity in the finding of the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority. The pleadings/grounds of attack are silent about challenge as to procedural lapses as contended during the course of hearing with respect to infraction of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976.

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7.5. This Court may take notice of well-settled principles as propounded in the case laws cited at the Bar.

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In Abubakar Abdul Inamdar Vrs. Harun Abdul Inamdar, (1995) 5 SCC 612 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed that if the party has not raised a plea regarding adverse possession in its pleadings, it cannot substitute the pleadings with the evidence as pleadings form the foundations of the claim of a litigating party. In this connection, a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India titled Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LRs Vrs. Bishun Narain Inter College and others, (1987) 2 SCC 555 , is relevant, wherein it has been held that

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“*** all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. In the absence of pleadings, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. No party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings and not the form to determine the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, it would not

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be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. The substance of the pleading in the present case was clear. The plaintiff went to trial knowing fully well that defendant‟s claim was that the licence was irrevocable.”

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7.6. Nonetheless, this Court examined the extended averment of learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Surendra Kumar Panda, learned Advocate submitted in his written note filed before this Court on 15.01.2025, which reads as follows:

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“The Enquiry Officer conducted the Enquiry Proceeding from 08.07.2010 to 08.10.2010. The following witnesses on behalf of Bank were presented by the Presenting Officer in the Enquiry Proceeding:

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Management Witness (MW 1) Susil Kumar Das

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(MW 2) Subash Chandra Mishra

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On behalf the CSO (Charge Sheeted Employee) Defence Representative (DR) was present along with Charge Sheeted Employee. No witness was produced from Defence side.

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According to Regulation 6 sub-regulation (17) of the UCO Bank Conduct and Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976, under Heading “Procedure for imposing major penalty” the following provisions are to be followed. ***

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As this provision of the Regulation has not complied, the enquiry has been vitiated. Hence the Order of Dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as confirmed by the Appellate Authority need to be quashed.”

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7.7. In order to test the veracity of such expanded argument, this Court requested the counsel for the Bank to furnish Enquiry Proceeding Register, responding to which an affidavit dated 19.03.2025 being sworn to by Zonal Manager of UCO Bank, Balasore Zonal Office has come to be filed enclosing therewith complete set of Enquiry Proceeding Register.

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7.8. Cursory glance at the record available it is manifest that each of the allegations/charges as explained by the petitioner was taken into consideration. The Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have carefully considered every explanation with reference to allegations/charges.

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7.9. When no mala fide or bias is alleged against the authorities and the Enquiry Proceeding Register depicts correct position of fact that the petitioner was given scope to examine and be cross-examined during the course of the Enquiry Proceeding, the allegation of noncompliance of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations would not hold water.

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7.10. This Court in the case of Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra Vrs. The Disciplinary Authority, UCO Bank, 2015 (II) OLR 1042 made the following observations:

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“To the above facts pleaded by the parties, it appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 19 of

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the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, the Board of Directors of UCO Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank and with previous sanction of the central Government framed regulation called “UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976”. Regulation 4 deals with penalties wherein it has been stated penalties mentioned therein may be imposed on an officeremployee for act of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons and entire penalties have been classified as minor penalties as indicated in SubRegulations (a) to (e) and major penalties has been classified from Sub-Regulation (f) to (j). Dismissal which shall be a ordinarily disqualification for future employment has been classified under sub-clause (j) of Regulation 4, which has been imposed on the present petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order and has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority.

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The apex Court time and again in State Bank of India Vrs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and another, (2011) 10 SCC 249, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vrs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and State Bank of India and others Vrs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde 2006 (7) SCC 212 has held that the Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority over the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in exercise of judicial review, this Court can only examine whether there is infraction of any statutory provision governing the field while following the procedure and if there is procedural lapses, in that case, the Court can interfere with the same.”

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7.11. Having observed thus, this Court in said reported case

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in Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra (supra) went on to

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analyse the scope of Clause (13) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976, in the following manner:

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“6. On perusal of the above mentioned provisions, it appears that on the date fixed for enquiry, oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charges are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of disciplinary authority, shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and the witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. Therefore, in the present context no such evidence, oral or documentary, has been produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority before enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. On the basis of the materials available with the Presenting Officer, the proceeding was continued resulting thereby that the enquiring officer has not complied with the provisions as mentioned in subRegulation (13) of Regulation 6, which is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Though several documents have been relied upon in course of enquiry but such documents have not been produced on the date fixed for enquiry so as to enable the delinquent officer to go through the same and to either dislodge this evidence by adducing rebuttal documents or adducing oral evidence, as the case may be.

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7. It also appears that the charges basing upon which the proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner were framed on the irregularities pointed

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out in the name of commission and omission in course of due discharge of duty during inspection by the competent authority and inspection report dated 09.12.2005 of the very Branch of Faujadari (1702) reveals that the same have been rectified and there was recommendation for closure of the inspection report dated 09.12.2005 by the authority vide Annexure-12 dated 31.10.2007. If the commissions or omissions have been rectified by the authority and it has been reflected in the inspection report itself, for the self-same cause of action, the present proceeding as against the petitioner is unwarranted, rather it smacks of malafide against the authority concerned. The track record of the petitioner clearly indicates that he has got an unblemished service career for last 35 years and at the fag end of his career, he has been put to some difficulties and on the basis of irrational and unreasonable allegations made against him, he has been dismissed from service, otherwise he would have superannuated from service from 01.11.2010 on attaining the age of superannuation.

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Even though the lapses revealed in course of enquiry conducted by the enquiring officer with regard to non-application of sub-Regulation (13) of Regulation 6 had been brought to the notice of the Disciplinary Authority, the same had not been taken into consideration and therefore, the order of punishment so inflicted on the petitioner may not be sustained.”

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7.12. However bearing in mind such analysis of Clause (13) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations 1976, and reading of Clause (17) thereof alongside in order to construe the

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effect of such provisions harmoniously, on examination of the record it could factually be discerned that the Enquiry Officer has afforded opportunity to the petitioner to proffer explanation and the petitioner also offered his explanation which was taken into consideration. The Disciplinary Authority had given scope to the petitioner to rebut all the allegations/ charges vis-à-vis findings contained in the Report submitted by the Enquiry Officer. It is transparent from the Enquiry Proceedings Register that on 15.09.2010 it is recorded as follows:

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“The DC (defence counsel) asked to examine the CSOE (Charge Sheeted Officer Employee-the petitioner). It was allowed by EO (Enquiry Officer).”

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7.13. Minute scrutiny of Enquiry Proceeding Register would go to show that the defence counsel has cross-examined the Management Witnesses-1 and 2 on behalf of the petitioner. The Defence Counsel/Defence Representative also examined the petitioner on 15.09.2010. On the very date the Presenting Officer also cross-examined the petitioner, certain relevant portions of which have been culled out supra. The above procedural safeguards under Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, provided in favour of the petitioner have been followed.

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7.14. During the course of hearing of instant case, Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate alleged that lapses in adhering to procedure laid down in Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976 would vitiate entire proceeding. Though not conceded by the counsel for the opposite parties-Bank that there was procedural defect in conduct of enquiry as alleged by the petitioner, it deserves to be take notice that entire proceeding does not get frustrated in view of what has been spelt out in the case of Chairman, LIC of India Vrs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein it has been held that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment on the ground of improper conduct of the enquiry, it must remit the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated and conclude the same.

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7.15. Nevertheless, it is manifest from the Enquiry Proceedings Register that on 15.09.2010, i.e., last date of enquiry proceeding, after closure of examination and cross-examination of the Charge Sheeted OfficerEmployee (the petitioner) vis-à-vis seventeen numbers of allegations, the Enquiry Officer asked general question on the circumstances appearing against him, to which the petitioner has responded by saying, “I was the single officer at the branch and was under tremendous work pressure. Whatever I have done are only for the interest

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of the Bank.” Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer has recorded that “The hearing of enquiry process is over. The Enquiry Officer asked the Presenting Officer to submit his written brief within two weeks’ time. The Enquiry Officer requested the defence counsel to submit his defence brief within a week on receiving the Presenting Officer’s brief”. In addition to this, from the grounds as taken in the writ petition (extracted herein above) abundant indication is available to perceive that the petitioner has conceded to have committed irregularities.

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7.16. As has already been culled out certain portions of statements/answers of the petitioner during the course of examination before the Enquiry Officer (illustratively), it needs to be highlighted that while admitting to have sanctioned loans, the delinquent has made it clear in his statement in the examination by Presenting Officer with respect to each allegation that on “verbal instructions” he engaged computer literate person from “outside” and that he had “no knowledge of loan policy”, but sanctioned loan beyond his delegated authority. These revelations of the petitioner are tell-tale.

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7.17. It is well established proposition of law that rule of evidence does not apply to the departmental proceedings in its strict sense. The Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Amninder Singh Vrs. The Hon‟ble High Court of

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Uttarakhand at Nainital Through its Registrar General, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3338 has held as under:

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“The case diary which the petitioner wants to be exhibited was not permitted by the Enquiry Officer on the ground of lack of proof for the said document as required under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to a Departmental Enquiry. There is no prejudice caused to anyone if the case diary is placed on record. The case diary which is shown as exhibit 44 in the application by the petitioner shall be exhibited as a document in the departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry may be expedited and completed soon.”

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7.18. This Court in absence of any rebuttal by the petitioner with respect to facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Proceedings Register, accedes to the contention of Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate for the opposite parties that there was compliance of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulations, 1976. Therefore, it seems consciously no ground in this respect has been agitated neither in the writ petition nor was pressed into service before the Appellate Authority. Before the Disciplinary Authority also such plea was absent with respect to procedural slackness with respect to enquiry.

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7.19. Having said thus this Court reaches at the conclusion that no palpable procedural lapse in the Enquiry Proceeding qua Clause (13) and Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976 is found.

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Therefore, the contention raised by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner stands dismissed lacking merit on facts.

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8. The second limb of argument of Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate proceeds on the basis of new stance taken by way of rejoinder affidavit dated 27.08.2024. It is contended by the learned counsel that the incidents/events or alleged transactions under allegations/charges being beyond more than four years, the enquiry could not have been conducted for such stale allegations being hit by limitation as stipulated in a document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” . He relied on Clause (22) of said document which reads thus:

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“Every Bank has evolved a system of credit audit/ inspection for non-borrowal/borrowal accounts under which they are subjected to close scrutiny. This audit/ inspection would scrutinize pre-sanction appraisal, documentation and disbursement of loans/advances and post-sanction follow up. If any irregularity is missed out by auditors/inspections in the first audit/inspection, it is reasonable to expect that the remaining undetected irregularities will be detected in the second audit/inspection and necessary disciplinary proceeding initiated against the concerned officials in the follow up action. Normally the second audit/inspection would be completed within 3-4 years. The Commission has accordingly approved the proposal that no disciplinary

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proceeding will ordinarily lie against any official for any lapse not detected within two successive internal regular audits/inspections of the same account or 4 years from the date of event, whichever is later. In case any irregularity is detected subsequent to the second audit/inspection, the auditors/inspectors concerned will be held accountable and be liable for disciplinary proceedings. This time limit will not apply cases of (i) fraud, (ii) other criminal offences, or (iii) cases where mala fides are inferable.”

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8.1. For the following reasons, this Court is not inclined to entertain such a plea taken at the belated stage:

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i. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to explain the authenticity of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” . Complete document is not placed on record by the petitioner. As if said document is made effective from 25.08.1998, heavy reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rather bare reading of said document reveals “The Commission has been accorded statutory status with effect from 25.08.1998 through the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998”. In absence of any material to show that such document as enclosed to rejoinder affidavit has been brought to force by way of valid law and that the document relied upon has been issued in

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exercise of statutory provisions with duly delegated authority conferred on the competent authority, this Court is not obligated to examine the issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

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ii. As such a plea is not available neither before the Enquiry Officer nor the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority or did the petitioner raise the plea of limitation based on such document in the writ application, the same does not deserve examination in view of Rule 10 of Chapter-XV of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, whereby it is stipulated that “a further reply or counter-affidavit by any party to the proceedings , as the circumstances may require may be filed with the leave of the Court ”. No such leave has been sought for by the petitioner before this Court. Therefore, the ground of limitation based on inchoate document “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” without demonstrating the statutory force of such document could not be argued by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner. Resultantly, such a plea, being vexatious, would have attracted imposition of costs regard being had to the change of stance by the petitioner from time

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to time, but recognizing the anxiety on behalf of the petitioner and taking note of age of the petitioner who is stated to be about 60 years in the year 2011 and dismissed from service, this Court desists from doing so.

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iii. Glance at the said document enclosed to rejoinder affidavit does not reveal its statutory support. As it appears, said document relates to the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC).

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iv. It is not cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner whether the enquiry and disciplinary proceeding in question emanates from the audit/ inspection undertaken by the CVC.

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v. Recital of Clause (22) of the document “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” does not reveal the period of limitation is having statutory force. Careful reading of such clause would suggest that the proceeding is to be drawn up against the auditors/inspectors who were accountable for having not detected irregularity at the first instance, but detected the same subsequently.

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vi. The words “normally” and “ordinarily” employed in the said document have significance.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vrs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671 held,

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“ The expression „ordinarily‟ indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.”

¶242

In Commissioner of Customs Vrs. J.D. Orgochem Limited, (2008) 6 SCR 200 it has been held,

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“ The expression „ordinarily‟ may mean „normally‟. It has been held by this Court in Kailash Chandra Vrs. Union of India and Krishangopal Vrs. Shri Prakashchandra and Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 12, that the said expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used and, thus, „Ordinarily‟ may not mean „solely‟ or „in the name‟, and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the Court would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression „ordinarily‟ is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out. It is

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never used in reference to a case where there is no exception. It never means „primarily‟. ”

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This Court in Division Bench in the case of Union of India Vrs. Krishna Chandra Biswas, 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 6002, taking note of aforesaid decision, observed as follows:

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“49. Taking into account the principles of construction of meaning of word in the provision of a statute, the meaning of the word „ordinarily‟ can be couched as interpreted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. In Kailash Chandra Vrs. Union of India, (1962) 1 SCR 374 = AIR 1961 SC 1346; Eicher Tractors Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner of Customs, (2001) 1 SCC 315 = AIR 2001 SC 196; State of Andhra Pradesh Vrs. Sarma Rao, (2007) 2 SCC 159 = AIR 2007 SC 137, the meaning of the word „ordinarily‟ has been given to understand as „in the large majority of cases but not invariably‟ . The expression „ordinarily‟ means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. „Ordinarily‟ excludes extraordinary or special circumstances.

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50. In Mohan Baitha Vrs. State of Bihar, (2001) 4 SCC 350 the use of the word „ordinarily‟ has been meant to have indicated that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Criminal Procedure Code. That apart, the Court has taken the view that the exceptions implied by the word „ordinarily‟ need not be

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limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on considerations of convenience or may be implied from other provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court.

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51. In Krishan Gopal Vrs. Shri Prakashchandra, (1974) 1 SCC 128, it has been discussed that the word „ordinarily‟ does not indicate that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 80-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are not mandatory and that relaxation in compliance with those provisions is permissible. The word „ordinarily‟ only qualifies the number of judges who can exercise the jurisdiction, which is vested in the High Court to try an election petition. The said word indicates that normally it would be a single Judge of the High Court who can exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in the High Court, but in appropriate cases, such jurisdiction can also be exercised by two or more judges.”

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Taking cue from above interpretation of the expression “normally” and “ordinarily”, natural corollary would be that, the limitation specified in Clause (22) of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” cannot be the “sole” or “primary”

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factor to obliterate entire proceeding as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

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8.2. It is trite that limitation being mixed question of fact and law, the same ought to be raised at appropriate stage before the proper authority or the Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate issue on facts.

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8.3. For the above reasons as discussed above, this Court is not persuaded to accede to the argument advanced by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner that the entire disciplinary proceeding including the enquiry proceeding is barred by time and therefore, vitiated.

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9. The last ditch attempt valiantly made by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate to render relief to the petitioner was that imposition of major penalty does not commensurate with the misconduct or irregularities established by the quasi- judicial authorities and such penalty being disproportionate to the material on record, the Orders in Annexures-7 and 10 are liable for intervention of this Court.

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9.1. Scanned through the Enquiry Proceeding Register it would reveal that to the questions put by the Presenting Officer on 15.09.2010, the petitioner has responded by saying “verbal instructions was given”, “I have no knowledge of loan policy”, “I do not know” about

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delegated power for sanction of TL, “Delegated power is not known to me” while sanctioning TL beyond Rs.4 lakhs, “Lien was not marked in the renewed two KYs nor in the related CFD ledgers”. These are viewed very seriously by the Disciplinary Authority. After threadbare discussion factually the Disciplinary Authority justified the finding contained in the Report vis-à-vis seventeen allegations in seriatim and imposed major penalty in respect of charges framed. The Disciplinary Authority passed order to dismiss the petitioner. Such finding of fact as also the penalty so imposed has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority after factual discussion with reference to material available on record on the grounds set out before him.

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9.2. During the course of hearing in the present case on a query from this Court, Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner candidly admitted that no plea was raised before any of the Authorities with respect to infraction of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976. The plea with respect to limitation as stated to be contained in “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” has been taken for the first time by way of rejoinder affidavit, which was filed without compliance of Rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. It is

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also not the case of the petitioner that fact-finding by the Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority is perverse and contrary to record.

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9.3. In Rajendra Singh Vrs. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460 it has been stated thus:

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“6. It has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar Vrs. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, (1975) 1 SCC 737 = AIR 1975 SC 1121 that: (SCC p. 748, para 22)

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„[T]he writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred.‟

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At the same time, it was observed that the licensees are not precluded from seeking to enforce the statutory provisions governing the contract. It must, however, be remembered that we are dealing with parties to a contract, which is a business transaction, no doubt governed by statutory provisions. [Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner Vrs. Issac Peter, (1994) 4 SCC 104.] While examining complaints of violation of statutory rules and conditions, it must be remembered that violation of each and every provision does not furnish a ground for the court to interfere. The provision may be a directory one or a mandatory one. In the case of directory provisions, substantial compliance would be enough. Unless it is established that violation of a directory provision has resulted in loss and/or prejudice to the party, no interference is warranted.

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Even in the case of violation of a mandatory provision, interference does not follow as a matter of course. A mandatory provision conceived in the interest of a party can be waived by that party, whereas a mandatory provision conceived in the interest of the public cannot be waived by him. In other words, wherever a complaint of violation of a mandatory provision is made, the court should enquire— in whose interest is the provision conceived. If it is not conceived in the interest of the public, question of waiver and/or acquiescence may arise — subject, of course, to the pleadings of the parties. This aspect has been dealt with elaborately by this Court in State Bank of Patiala Vrs. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 and in Krishan Lal Vrs. State of J&K, (1994) 4 SCC 422 on the basis of a large number of decisions on the subject. Though the said decisions were rendered with reference to the statutory rules and statutory provisions (besides the principles of natural justice) governing the disciplinary enquiries involving government servants and employees of statutory Corporations, the principles adumbrated therein are of general application. It is necessary to keep these considerations in mind while deciding whether any interference is called for by the court— whether under Article 226 or in a suit. The function of the court is not a mechanical one. It is always a considered course of action .”

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9.4. In Chintamani Industries Vrs. Commissioner, Sales Tax, 107 (2009) CLT 232 it has been laid down that,

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“16. Mr. Paikray, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also not been able to satisfy this court in what

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manner any prejudice was caused to the petitioner because of cancellation of registration certificate of the petitioner with effect from April 1, 1999, when it had no business during the preceding three consecutive financial years and also in the year 1999-2000. The honourable apex court in Rajendra Singh Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 2736 held that while examining complaints of violation of statutory rules and conditions, it must be remembered that violation of each and every provision does not furnish a ground for the court to interfere. The provision may be a directory one or a mandatory one. In the case of directory provision, substantial compliance would be enough. Unless it is established that violation of a directory provision has resulted in loss and/or prejudice to the party, no interference is warranted. Even in the case of violation of a mandatory provision, interference does not follow as a matter of course.

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17. It is also well-settled principle of law that the courts are meant to determine the rule on living issues and not any academic question as it would be a futile exercise. The honourable Supreme Court in Loknath Padhan Vrs. Birendra Kumar Sahu AIR 1974 SC 505 held that it is a well-settled practice recognised and followed in India that if an issue is purely academic in that its decision, which one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the parties, it would be a wastage of public time and indeed not proper exercise of authority for the court to engage itself in deciding such issue.”

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9.5. Though as many as eight grounds have been taken by the writ petitioner at paragraph 16 of the writ petition (already extracted hereinabove), Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner has not pressed them which are based on factual analysis of the material on record. The arguments with regard to violation of procedural aspect as contained in Clause (13) and Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, and the objection as to limitation have been repelled hitherto. In such view of the matter this Court is loathe in intermeddling with the punishment imposed on factual analysis of the matter by the authorities.

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9.6. The learned counsel for the petitioner stemming on paragraphs 15 and 19 of Commissioner of Police Vrs. Sat Narayan Kaushik, (2016) 6 SCC 303 sought to impress upon this Court that there is scope for indulgence in the Orders impugned imposing major penalty and matter can be viewed leniently with pragmatic approach by way of judicial discretion in favour of the petitioner. Said reported judgment reads as:

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“15. Coming to the first two submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, has power to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the appointing authority in an appropriate case provided the High Court has taken into consideration the totality of the facts and

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circumstances of the case such as nature of charges levelled against the employee, its gravity, seriousness, whether proved and, if so, to what extent, entire service record, work done in the past, remaining tenure of the delinquent left, etc. In other words, it is necessary for the High Court to take these factors into consideration before interfering in the quantum of the punishment.

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19. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the respondent was not entitled to claim service any benefits from

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02.07.2009. Instead it should have been held that the respondent was not entitled to claim any service benefits from the date of his suspension order i.e. from 22.06.2008. In our view, the impugned order [Sat Narayan Kaushik Vrs. Commissioner of Police, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14456] of the High Court requires to be modified to this extent in favour of the appellants and against the respondent.”

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9.7. This Court on taking holistic view, does not feel it apposite to consider that the case of the petitioner falls within the parameters propounded in the Sat Narayan Kaushik (supra). In contrast, regard being had to Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra Vrs. The Disciplinary Authority, UCO Bank, 2015 (II) OLR 1042, where ratio of very many decisions have been taken note of, would lead to show that judicial review, on facts, is impermissible. This Court has been pleased to observe that,

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“8. So far as the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment is concerned, it is well settled that it is within the complete domain of the Disciplinary Authority. Whether on the basis of facts alleged the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is proportionate or not or it is required to be reduced that can be considered at the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, what is appropriate quantum of punishment to be awarded to a delinquent is a matter that primarily rests at the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority. An authority sitting in appeal over any such order of punishment is by all means entitled to examine the issue regarding the quantum of punishment inasmuch as it is entitled to examine whether the charges have been satisfactorily proved. But when any such order is challenged before a service Tribunal or the High Court the exercise of discretion by the competent authority in determining and awarding punishment is generally respected except where the same is found to be so outrageously disproportionate to the charge of misconduct and the Court considers it to be arbitrary and wholly unreasonable. The superior Courts and the Tribunal invoke the doctrine of proportionality which has been gradually accepted as one of the facets of judicial review. Where punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience of the Court and is unacceptable even then Courts should be slow and generally reluctant to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The law on the subject is well settled by a series of

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decision rendered by the superior Court. This view has also been taken in Ranjit Thakur Vrs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 = AIR 1987 SC 2386, Dev Singh Vrs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Limited, (2003) 8 SCC 9 = AIR 2003 3712, Union of India Vrs. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 = AIR 1997 SC 3387, Ex-Naik Sardar Singh Vrs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 213 = AIR 1992 SC 417, Om Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 = AIR 2000 SC 3689. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in Girish Mohanty Vrs. Union of India represented through its Secretary in Home Department, New Delhi and others in OJC No. 2607 of 2001 disposed of on 03.03.2015 [2015 SCC OnLine Ori 70].

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9. In Deputy Commissioner, KVS & others Vrs. J. Hussain, AIR 2014 SC 766, the apex Court has held that host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist. Therefore, in exercise of power under judicial review, the apex Court time and again has held that the Court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of

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good faith. In paragraph-11 of the said judgment, the apex Court held as follows:

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„*** In all cases dealing with the penalty of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirements, hardship would result . That would not mean that in a given case punishment of removal can be discarded by the Court. That cannot a ground for the Court to interdict with the penalty. This is specifically held by this Court in H.G.E. Trust & Anr. Vrs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 430 in the following words:

¶304

„ A person, when dismissed from service, is put to a great hardship but that would not mean that a grave misconduct should go unpunished. Although the doctrine of proportionality may be applicable in such matter, but a punishment of dismissal from service for such a misconduct cannot be said to be unheard of. Maintenance of discipline of an institution is equally important. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, we may hereinafter notice a few recent decisions of this Court.‟

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Similar view has also been taken in Krushna Chandra Behera Vrs. Union of India and others in W.P.(C) No. 1845 of 2006 disposed of on 12.03.2015 [2015 (I) OLR 725].

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10. In Jogeswar Bagh Vrs. Registrar (Admn) Orissa High Court, 2009 (II) OLR 483 referred to above, though the apex Court has held the scope of judicial review is limited to the extent that Court may examine whether the enquiry has been conducted inconsonance with the statutory requirement and

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authority has given strict adherence to the principle of natural justice, the decision has been taken relying upon relevant materials and order is not perverse being based on irrelevant materials and the delinquent had been given a fair opportunity to meet the charge and punishment is not disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exceptional circumstances, where the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the delinquency to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the Court, the Court may interfere with the quantum of punishment also. But this principle of interference on quantum of punishment is not applicable to the present context in view of the fact that there is a procedural lapses in conducting the inquiry. More particularly the provisions contained under sub-Regulation (13) of Regulation 6 has not been complied with since the imposition of penalty is well within the complete domain of the Disciplinary Authority. In judicial review, this Court refrains from interfering with the same in the present application.

¶310

11. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 484, the Apex Court observed that in exercise of powers of judicial review, the Court cannot “normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by the Authority “shocks the conscience” of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. This principle of the

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Apex Court cannot be applicable in the present context in view of the fact that since there is a procedural lapse by the authority while conducting the inquiry as the discretion lies with the Disciplinary Authority to impose the particular punishment.

¶314

12. Reference has been made to the case of Ram Prit Singh Vrs. Union of India, 2010 (I) OLR 51 where a minor penalty imposed by withholding one increment of pay for a period of one year without cumulative effect has been considered to be disproportionate to the nature of misconduct established against him. Accordingly, this Court let off with the punishment of censure or warning, but this principle is not applicable to the present context.

¶315

13. So far as applicability of the case of Nirmala J. Jhala Vrs. State of Gujarat, 2013 (I) CLR (SC) 940 = (2013) 5 SCR 200 and R. Mahalingam Vrs. Chairman, Tamilnadu PSC, AIR 2013 SC 2225 is concerned, the same has been decided by the apex Court in its own facts and circumstances of the case itself.

¶316

14. So far as Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Ltd. Vrs. Kitab Singh, AIR 2013 SC 1172 = (2013) 1 SCR 611 is concerned the same arose out of industrial dispute case where the apex Court held that if the finding of the facts recorded by Labour Court is in disregard to evidence interference by writ Court would be sustained.

¶317

15. Reliance has been placed on Lucknow K. Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, U.P. Gramin Bank) Vrs. Rajendra Singh, AIR 2013 SC 3540 by the opposite party-Bank, wherein the apex Court has held that

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punishment which is to be awarded to the delinquent is for the Disciplinary Authority to decide not for the Court. The quantum of punishment even if found disproportionate matter has to be referred back to disciplinary authority to take fresh decision and Court cannot usurp jurisdiction of Disciplinary Authority and decide the punishment subject to exception laid down in the said judgment.”

¶321

9.8. This Court finds the finding returned by the Disciplinary Authority is on analysis of evidence on record with reference to Report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the Appellate Authority having regard to grounds and objections of the petitioner upheld the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, this Court has little scope in exercise of power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to meddle with the concurrent view expressed by the quasi- judicial authorities on factual matrix.

¶322

Scope of judicial review— Legal perspective:

¶323

10. This Court feels it expedient to discuss on the principles laid down with respect to scope of judicial review in the matter of conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority and appreciation of evidence.

¶324

10.1. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vrs. Heem Singh , (2021) 12 SCC 569 has held as under:

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“37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The Judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the Judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy— deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a factfinding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination is an of fact. Proportionality

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entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the Judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the Judges‟ craft is in vain.

¶331

***

¶332

40. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a

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disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force .”

¶336

10.2. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. N. Gangraj , (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:

¶337

“8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.

¶338

9. In State of A.P. Vrs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:

¶339

„7. *** The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the

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Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.‟ ***”

¶343

10. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:

¶344

„12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives

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fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with

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the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

¶351

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India Vrs. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued .‟

¶352

11. In High Court of Bombay Vrs. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under:

¶353

„16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil Vrs. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 of the High Court seems to have approached

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the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. ‟

¶357

12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vrs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry,

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nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:

¶361

„7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC

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749, Union of India Vrs. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 and Bank of India Vrs. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762, High Court of Bombay Vrs. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416.)

¶365

***

¶366

10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.‟

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13. In another judgment reported as Union of India Vrs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610¹ , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings:

¶370

„13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not :

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(i) reappreciate the evidence;

¶372

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

¶373

1 Paragraph 12 of said Judgment in P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 runs as follows:

¶374

“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

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(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

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(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

¶377

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

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(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

¶379

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

¶380

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

¶381

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

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(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

¶383

( i ) the f indin g o f f act is based on no evidence.”

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(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

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(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

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(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

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(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

¶390

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.‟

¶391

14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank Vrs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308, wherein this Court held that if the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

¶392

15. The Disciplinary Authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the

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State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in State of A.P. Vrs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 and B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.‟ ***”

¶396

10.3. The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vrs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held as under:

¶397

“6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review do not act as an Appellate Authority:

¶398

„Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority.‟ [See Govt. of A.P. Vrs. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373].

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9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record.

¶402

12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority, active connivance of the respondent is eloquent enough to connect the respondent with the issue of TDRs and overdrafts in favour of Bidaye.

¶403

15. In Union of India Vrs. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 = (1972) 2 SCR 218 it is held as under:

¶404

„A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that lender was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of dealing with all questions, either of fact or of law arising in the appeal, as the Single Judge of the High Court. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference from proved facts. (SCR p. 219)

¶405

16. In Union of India Vrs. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177 it is held at SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:

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„27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.‟

¶409

17. In Union Bank of India Vrs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12 as under:

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„12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four chargesheets which were enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to nonsupply of the enquiry authority‟s report/ findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of nonfurnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him.‟

¶413

18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank Vrs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 this Court held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14 as under:

¶414

„14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost

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integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed this Court in by Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager Vrs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/ employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one‟s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.‟

¶418

19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC Vrs. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 it was pointed out as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10)

¶419

„ If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the

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person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. ‟

¶423

20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. Vrs. G. Thirugnanasambandam, (2005) 3 SCC 241 this Court at SCC p. 247, para 15 held:

¶424

„15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.‟

¶425

***”

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10.4. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vrs. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794 has held as under:

¶427

“14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vrs. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 = [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA) the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision .

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15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.

¶431

16. The above position was recently reiterated in Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Vrs. Munna Lal Jain, (2005) 10 SCC 84.”

¶432

10.5. The Supreme Court in the case of Om Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 has held as under:

¶433

„70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur Vrs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 this Court referred to “proportionality” in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was “shockingly” disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 this Court stated that the court will not interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 [Union

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of India Vrs. G. Ganayutham, (1997) Supp.(3) SCR 549] .

¶437

71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.”

¶438

10.6. The Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Singh Vrs. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCC 309 has held as under:

¶439

“9. The only other plea is regarding punishment awarded. As has been observed in a series of cases, the scope of interference with punishment awarded by a disciplinary authority is very limited and unless the punishment appears to be shockingly disproportionate, the court cannot interfere with the same. Reference may be made to a few of them. [See, B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, State of U.P. Vrs. Ashok Kumar Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 302, Union of India Vrs. G.

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Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, Union of India Vrs. J.R. Dhiman, (1999) 6 SCC 403 and Om Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386].”

¶443

10.7. The Supreme Court in the case of General Manager (P), Punjab & Sind Bank Vrs. Daya Singh, (2010) 11 SCC 233 , has held as under:

¶444

“22. In view of what is stated above, it is very clear that the Bank had taken the necessary steps to establish the misconduct before the enquiry officer. The relevant documents including ledger entries were produced through the witnesses concerned. The respondent fully participated in the enquiry. He had no explanation to offer during the course of the enquiry or any time thereafter. When all the relevant entries were in the handwriting of the respondent, the Bank did not think it necessary to call the borrowers. In fact, as the enquiry officer states, the respondent should have produced the borrowers if he wanted to contend anything against the documentary evidence produced by the Bank. In the circumstances, the conclusions arrived at by the enquiry officer as stated above could not have been held as without any evidence in support. The High Court has clearly erred in holding that the documents produced were neither detailed nor their nature was explained.

¶445

23. We are rather amazed at the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the material on record. The enquiry officer is an officer of a Bank. He was considering the material which was placed before him and thereafter, he has come to the conclusion that the misconduct is established. He was

¶446

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶447

Page 70 of 93

¶448

concerned with a serious charge of unexplained withdrawals of huge amounts by a Branch Manager in the name of fictitious persons. Once the necessary material was placed on record and when the charge-sheeted officer had no explanation to offer, the enquiry officer could not have taken any other view. The order of a bank officer may not be written in the manner in which a judicial officer would write. Yet what one has to see is whether the order is sufficiently clear and contains the reasons in justification for the conclusion arrived at. The High Court has ignored this aspect.

¶449

24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge-sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics Vrs. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 = AIR 1994 SC 1341. Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu Vrs. State,

¶450

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶451

Page 71 of 93

¶452

(2009) 10 SCC 206. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained.

¶453

25. As held in T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. Vrs. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 the scope of judicial review for the High Court in departmental disciplinary matters is limited. The observations of this Court in Bank of India Vrs. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 are quite instructive:

¶454

„11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India Vrs. H.C. Goel,

¶455

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶456

Page 72 of 93

¶457

AIR 1964 SC 364 = (1964) 4 SCR 718 the Constitution Bench has held: (AIR p. 370, para 23)

¶458

„23. *** the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.‟ ***‟

¶459

26. In a number of cases including SBI Vrs. Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7 SCC 435 this Court has held that a bank employee has to exercise a higher degree of honesty and integrity. He is concerned with the deposits of the customers of the bank and he cannot permit the deposits to be tinkered with in any manner.

¶460

27. In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank case, (2005) 10 SCC 84 the manager of a bank who had indulged in unauthorised withdrawals, subsequently returned the amount with interest. Yet this Court has held that this conduct of unauthorised withdrawals amounted to a serious misconduct. Same is the case in the present matter. There was a clear documentary evidence on record in the handwriting of the respondent which established his role in the withdrawal of huge

¶461

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶462

Page 73 of 93

¶463

amounts for fictitious persons. The ledger entries clearly showed that whereas the FDRs were in one name, the withdrawals were shown in the name of altogether different persons and they were far in excess over the amounts of FDRs. The respondent had no explanation and, therefore, it had to be held that the respondent had misappropriated the amount. In spite of a well-reasoned order by the enquiry officer, the High Court has interfered therein by calling the same as sketchy. The High Court has completely overlooked the role of the bank manager as expected by this Court in the aforesaid judgments.”

¶464

Conclusion:

¶465

11. With the conspectus of legal position as enunciated through various decisions qua scope of interference with the findings and conclusions arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority with reference to Report of the Enquiry Officer in exercise of extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, on examination of factual scenario as obtained in the instant case, this Court wishes inter alia to make certain observations on the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs:

¶466

i. Ample opportunity has been afforded by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate Authority.

¶467

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶468

Page 74 of 93

¶469

ii. No plea respecting infraction of procedural provisions contained in Clauses (13) and (17) Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976 was ever taken before any authority or before this Court in the writ petition. Notwithstanding such fact, this Court on perusal of material on record finds that the appropriate authority has adhered to safeguard provided for the delinquent-Charge Sheeted Officer and at every stage, the petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case.

¶470

iii. Though grounds in the writ petition has been taken against certain factual aspects, at the stage of hearing of the present matter, nothing tangible could be established to demonstrate that there was perversity of factual finding returned by the authorities— the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. This Court finds no patent error of fact to depict that the findings recorded by the authorities are de hors material available on record and beyond weight of evidence. Evidence of the petitioner, for example, not knowing about the policy with respect to sanction of loan, unaware of delegated power so far as limit of sanction of loan is concerned and engaging strangers/outsiders on the basis of alleged verbal instructions, &c., evince that the

¶471

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶472

Page 75 of 93

¶473

petitioner was not sincere and has not shown sobriety in discharge of his duty as Manager. By engaging strangers and allowing them to handle official records and giving them access to official records definitely left the Bank at risk.

¶474

The stance of the opposite parties can be buttressed by referring to Disciplinary AuthorityCum-Regional Manager Vrs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69, wherein it has been observed as follows:

¶475

“7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/ employee of the bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It requires the officer/ employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him. Breach of Regulation 3 is „misconduct‟ within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show

¶476

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶477

Page 76 of 93

¶478

that in a number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank— for that matter, in the case of any other organisation— every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority— that too a

¶479

course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving

¶480

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶481

Page 77 of 93

¶482

innumerable instances— is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its a employees, Nick Leeson, minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one‟s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit— huge profit, as the High Court characterises it— they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterise them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class I Officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge 9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that in spite of instructions by the Regional Office to

¶483

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶484

Page 78 of 93

¶485

stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Inquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that in spite of reminders, the respondent did not submit “Control Returns” to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterised as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the Regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.”

¶486

iv. The petitioner was given opportunity to verify the genuineness of the documents which were relied upon by the authorities. The petitioner was represented by the Defence Counsel/Defence Representative who examined the petitioner and cross-examined Management Witnesses, which fact does clearly emanate from the Enquiry Proceeding Register, copy of which is made available to the Court by way of enclosure to the affidavit dated 19.03.2025 filed by the opposite parties.

¶487

v. Once the petitioner did not question the recording of statements made by him as also the Management Witnesses before the Enquiry Officer

¶488

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶489

Page 79 of 93

¶490

on the basis of documents/material on record, and he has not impeached any of the documents available on record, he cannot make a complaint that he was not examined as a witness to prove the documents and the documents were proved merely by presentation by the Presenting Officer. Once the authenticity is not disputed, in view of the dicta of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that strict rule of evidence in departmental enquiry is not applicable and the fact-finding of the Disciplinary Authority can be based on preponderance of probabilities (in contradistinguished with the principle of “beyond all reasonable doubts” as in criminal case), this Court is of the considered opinion that no fault could be attributed by the petitioner in the proceedings undertaken by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

¶491

vi. Though rejoinder affidavit dated 27.08.2024 has been filed by the petitioner without complying with the provisions of Rule 10 of Chapter-XV of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, setting up new and different stand with respect to limitation based on Paragraph 22 of copy of incomplete document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner”, this Court

¶492

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶493

Page 80 of 93

¶494

rejecting such attack on the initiation of proceeding makes it clear that nothing is placed on record as to the authenticity of such document. No material is available to show that such document has been notified and there is absence of source of power for issue of such document including fixation of limitation by proper and competent authority. Mere filing a document by way of an affidavit without disclosing its source and revealing the existence of power countenanced by statutory provisions would not obligate this Court to examine the issue.

¶495

11.1. So far as the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are concerned, it is sufficient to mention that in case there is some evidence to reasonably support the findings of the Enquiry Officer, and the Disciplinary Authority taking into consideration each allegation vis-àvis explanation offered by the petitioner confirms the charges to be proved, which got affirmation by the Appellate Authority, in absence of demonstrating that the facts are perverse, the petitioner cannot successfully plead by advancing arguments on technicalities, like procedural infirmity and limitation.

¶496

12. In course of hearing, Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner has confined his arguments to the following points to attack the Order dated 29.12.2010 of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-7)

¶497

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶498

Page 81 of 93

¶499

and Order dated 25.04.2011 of the Appellate Authority (Annexure-10):

¶500

i. Violation of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976;

¶501

ii. Limitation as envisaged in Paragraph 22 of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner”. Since no fraud element is involved in the allegations, the exception to such limitation so stipulated in the said Paragraph 22 would apply.

¶502

iii. The punishment awarded is disproportionate to the allegations levelled and charges proved against the petitioner.

¶503

12.1. With respect to the first contention this Court has already discussed with regard to non-adherence of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, which needs no reiteration. This Court came to hold in foregoing paragraphs that there was no violation of said provisions.

¶504

12.2. With respect to second aspect, this Court has already opined that the plea was absent throughout and this Court is not obligated to decide such issue which is sought to be set up by way of filing rejoinder affidavit.

¶505

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶506

Page 82 of 93

¶507

For the reason ascribed supra for non-entertainment of such plea without disclosure of source of such document, this Court declines to consider such plea.

¶508

However, in this context, this Court takes into consideration the argument advanced by Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned counsel for the Bank and finds force in such submission. It is strenuously urged that when allegations of fraud is available and proved on facts by the Authorities, such limitation specified in the aforesaid document does not attract. He has taken this Court to the following allegation contained in the Letter dated 20.11.2009 communicated to the petitioner pointing out irregularities committed at Jamsuli Branch:

¶509

“15. You sanctioned a bogus loan of Rs.50,147/- on 05.11.2005 in the name of Sri Purna Chandra Jena. The loan debit voucher dated 05.11.2005 mentions the account number as deposit loan 1/60. However, no particulars of the deposit against which it was sanctioned has been mentioned either on the voucher or on the relative loan ledger folio. You had not obtained any document from Sri Purna Chandra Jena for the above loan. The proceeds of this fraudulent loan was utilised to issue demand draft No.476735 for Rs.50,000/- to Sri Purna Chandra Jena, drawn on New Grain Market (1576) Branch, Ludhiana. You had thus connived with Sri Purna Chandra Jena in committing a fraud and gave undue financial advantage to Sri Jena at the cost of the bank.”

¶510

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶511

Page 83 of 93

¶512

Before the Enquiry Officer, on 15.09.2010, in the crossexamination of the petitioner by the Presenting Officer in the above aspect, the reply was:

¶513

“The loan was given against KY. But reference details are not mentioned in the loan ledger nor in the voucher.

¶514

I forgot totally to mention the security details in the ledger.”

¶515

As against this the Disciplinary Authority in his order vide Annexure-7 stated thus:

¶516

“Allegation No.15:

¶517

Based on the evidences adduced in the enquiry, EO has held that allegation No.15 was proved. I also concur with the finding of the EO. Mr. Mallick CSO only tells that he had obtained documents, but never brought any evidence to establish that he had taken any fixed deposit as security for the said loan. The preponderance of probability clearly establishes that Mr. Mallick in connivance with Sri Purna Chandra Jena created a fraudulent transaction in the books of the Bank without any tangible collateral and gave undue financial advantage to Sri Jena. The conduct of CSO is therefore reprehensible. In view of the above Mr. Mallick CSO exhibited lack of honesty, integrity and devotion. I have therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the Enquiry Officer‟s findings that allegation No.15 and Charge Nos.1 and 2 proved.”

¶518

The Appellate Authority having “examined the Charge Sheet dated 19.05.2010, his reply to the Charge Sheet, Enquiry Report dated 12.11.2010, Final Order dated

¶519

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶520

Page 84 of 93

¶521

29.12.2010 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appeal dated 27.01.2011 and all other related papers/ documents”, passed reasoned Order vide Annexure-10 by upholding the Order of the Disciplinary Authority in toto .

¶522

In such view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner that the limitation specified in Paragraph 22 of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-à-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” does not attract to factsituation of present case inasmuch as said paragraph contains the following:

¶523

“This time limit will not apply to cases of:

¶524

(i) frauds,

¶525

(ii) other criminal offences, or

¶526

(iii) cases where mala fides are inferable”.

¶527

12.3. With respect to disproportionate imposition of penalty, suffice it to observe that the fraudulent activity and misconduct with irregularities at the branch of the Bank are proved by concurrent view taken by all the authorities.

¶528

The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vrs. Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7 SCC 435 has been pleased to observe as under:

¶529

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶530

Page 85 of 93

¶531

“15. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cumRegional Manager Vrs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one‟s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance.”

¶532

Analysis of factual position on record it transpires that on 15.09.2010 during course of enquiry, the Charge Sheeted Officer-petitioner has admitted to have engaged strangers/outsiders on the verbal instructions, but could not lay evidence with respect to any instructions from Zonal Office or competent authority. Further, with respect to a query “whether term loan limit can be

¶533

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶534

Page 86 of 93

¶535

enhanced without liquidating the original limit”, the petitioner denied to have knowledge about “loan policy”. With respect to sanction of term loan of Rs.6.50 lakhs on 07.10.2005 beyond Rs.4.00 lakhs, the petitioner feigned ignorance about “delegated power”. Such answers are unbecoming of a responsible official of the Bank involved in dealing with financial transactions. It is generally expected that the managerial level officer is supposed to understand the roles and associated powers. This Court may view such ignorance not only involves lack of integrity, breach of faith and gross dereliction in performance of duty, thereby misuse of official position but also such negligence could lead to legal consequences.

¶536

12.4. As the facts and evidence available on record being taken into consideration by all the Authorities— the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority— and no perversity of factual finding recorded by the Authorities being demonstrated by placing contrary material on record, this Court does not deserve it to be a fit case to show indulgence in the penalty awarded.

¶537

13. The pleas raised at belated stage before this Court for the first time, being mixed questions of fact and law, they should have been agitated at the inception and at the first opportune time. The quasi judicial authorities,

¶538

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶539

Page 87 of 93

¶540

who are supposed to deal with factual aspects based on appreciation of evidence available on record, had no opportunity to examine such aspects.

¶541

13.1. This apart, such pleas being completely absent before the quasi judicial authorities as also before this Court while filing the writ petition, it is indicative of the fact that the petitioner was conscious about lack of merit in such plea(s) and, therefore, he waived. Such a view of this Court is fortified by the principle propounded in Rajendra Singh Vrs. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460 that:

¶542

“While examining complaints of violation of statutory rules and conditions, it must be remembered that violation of each and every provision does not furnish a ground for the Court to interfere. The provision may be a directory one or a mandatory one” .

¶543

Furthermore, a mandatory provision conceived in the interest of a party can be waived by that party, whereas a mandatory provision conceived in the interest of the public cannot be waived by him. In other words, wherever a complaint of violation of a mandatory provision is made, this Court is required to enquire— in whose interest is the provision conceived; if it is not conceived in the interest of the public, question of waiver and/or acquiescence may arise— subject, of course, to the pleadings of the parties.

¶544

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶545

Page 88 of 93

¶546

13.2. The petitioner had misused his official capacity as Manager in granting loans to the borrowers falling beyond the scope of his authority and the Bank’s funds were exposed to high risk of financial loss. Flaw in maintenance of record is also admitted by the petitioner.

¶547

13.3. In contrast, reference may be had to Biswanath Parhi Vrs. United Commercial Bank, 2023 (III) ILR-CUT 567, wherein this Court underscored the importance of following established procedures in disciplinary actions against employees and affirmed right to fair hearing within such process . This Court taking cognizance of the fact that the plea of challenge as to non-compliance of procedure laid down in Regulation 6(17) of the Regulations, 1976, was inclined to intervene in the order of the Disciplinary Authority for the reason that:

¶548

“11. In the case at hand admittedly the delinquent officer has not got himself examined and hence it was incumbent upon the inquiry authority to give an opportunity of hearing in terms of the said Regulation. The same allegedly having not been done such was taken in the ground

¶549

memorandum of appeal filed by the present Petitioner. Paragraph-9 of the memorandum of appeal refers to the same and is quoted hereunder:

¶550

„9. Sub-Regulation (17) of Regulation 6 of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, lays down as follows:

¶551

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶552

Page 89 of 93

¶553

The inquiring, authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence and shall, if the officer employees has not got himself examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.‟

¶554

In paragraph no.10, 16 (Page No.60) of Manual on Disciplinary Action and Related Matters, the Head Office directs as follows:

¶555

„The charge-sheeted officer employee may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. After the officer employee closes his evidence, the Enquiry Officer must, if the officer employee has not got himself examined during the inquiry, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him. ***‟

¶556

The above must-procedure was not followed by the Enquiry Officer. Even though I did not examine myself in the inquiry in my own behalf, the Enquiry Officer did not give me the chance scope of explaining my position as contemplated in the above obligatory provisions.‟

¶557

12. The appellate authority while passing the order at Annexure-11 confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority dealt with the charges leveled against the delinquent officer and the findings relating to the same and concurred with the views expressed by the disciplinary authority and referring to Regulation 1976 dismissed the appeal preferred by the delinquent-Petitioner. But conspicuously there is

¶558

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶559

Page 90 of 93

¶560

no reference to the stand of the Petitioner relating to infraction of Regulation 6(17) of Regulation 1976 in the memorandum of appeal adverted to hereinabove. ”

¶561

In the said case, though specific stand was taken by the petitioner, the opposite party-Bank did choose to ignore such specific assertion. Thus, said case law is not applicable to the present fact-situation as Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate, who was incidentally the arguing counsel for the petitioner in Biswanath Parhi (supra) , fairly conceded that the pleas were not available before the Authorities nor does the petitioner plead before this Court in the writ petition.

¶562

Be that be, from the discussions made in foregoing paragraphs it is crystal clear that there was no infraction in following the procedure laid down in Clause (13) read with Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976.

¶563

13.4. The departmental proceedings with respect to charges framed on the allegations are decided on preponderance of probabilities. This Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding as the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are reasonably supported by material available on record. In other words, the findings recorded in the instant case are not

¶564

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶565

Page 91 of 93

¶566

based on no evidence and there is no violation of principles of natural justice. Since this Court has limited scope of jurisdiction and can interfere only if there are procedural lapses leading to cause prejudice or violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner has failed to satisfy this Court that there was any procedural infirmity, which caused prejudice to him. The discussions and analysis of this Court leads to irresistible conclusion that the charges were duly proved following procedure laid down in the Regulations, 1976.

¶567

13.5. The restriction on the exercise power of judicial review in the present nature of facts and circumstances is fortified by exposition of law made in the case of General Manager (Operation-1)/Appellate Authority, UCO Bank Vrs. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 13 SCC 237. It has been observed that,

¶568

“17. So far as the scope of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiry is concerned, it has been settled that the constitutional courts while exercising their power of judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution would not assume the role of the appellate authority where jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. At the same time, the power of judicial review is not analogous to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.

¶569

W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011

¶570

Page 92 of 93

¶571

18. It was never the case of the respondent delinquent even before the High Court that the departmental enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the 1976 Regulations or there was violation of any provision of the 1976 Regulations or fair opportunity of hearing was not afforded to him in the course of inquiry or there was violation of the principles of natural justice. ”

¶572

13.6. Therefore, the Order dated 29.12.2010 of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-7) as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide Order dated 25.04.2011 (Annexure-10) cannot be disturbed with the limited scope to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings.

¶573

14. No other arguments are advanced by counsel for the petitioner.

¶574

15. In the wake of above, for the reasons stated with the discussions made supra, the Order of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-7) and the Order of the Appellate Authority (Annexure-10) do not warrant interference. In fine, the writ petition stands dismissed, being devoid of merit, but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.

¶575

Signature Not Verified

¶576

Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: Personal Assistant (Secretary-in-Charge) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 02-Apr-2025 18:38:20

¶577

(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE

¶578

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 02^nd A p ril , 2025//MRS/Laxmikant/Suchitra

¶579

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¶580

Page 93 of 93

Bidyadhar Mallick v. U.Co Bank

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Bidyadhar Mallick v. U.Co Bank

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