Allottee whose LIC housing flat was cancelled in 2014 challenged a fresh tender only in 2025. The Division Bench held he was guilty of gross delay and laches as a fence-sitter, had no subsisting right after unchallenged cancellation, and affirmed dismissal of his writ petition.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No.1249 of 2025
Nihar Ranjan Biswal
…. Appellant
-Versus…. Respondents
Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. (LIC) and others
Advocates appeared in these cases:
For Appellant : Mr. Prasanna Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr Prakash Ranjan Barik, Advocate (For Respondents No.1, 2 & 3-LIC)
Mr. Anupam Dash, Advocate (For Respondent No.4)
CORAM:
HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
J U D G M E N T
Date of Hearing and Judgment : 14th October, 2025
HARISH TANDON, CJ.
1. Dead wood is sought to be resuscitated by filing a writ petition, when
the cause of action, which accrued as far back as on 19th December, 2014,
is challenged in the instant writ appeal.
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2. Pursuant to the scheme floated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) for providing the housing to its policyholders, an invitation was made and undeniably, the appellant was selected in the draw of lots. He was requisitioned to deposit a sum of Rs.1.00 lakh and the balance consideration money was to be paid in terms of the said scheme or the tender to be floated in this regard. But before the same matured, a communication was made to the appellant that an objection is raised by the Government that the land over which such housing infrastructure is to be made is actually a forest land and unless a clearance and/or permission is granted, no construction shall be allowed as there is a clear prohibition imposed in the statutory law.
2.1. The appellant was provided an option either to continue with his application or may seek for refund of the amount paid in terms of the letter of allotment. Admittedly, the appellant continued with such allotment and declined to take back the amount so paid. By a subsequent letter dated 19th December, 2014, the LIC cancelled the allotment and indicated that the application fee deposited by the appellant shall be refunded by NEFT to the bank account provided the said details of the bank account is given along with the cancelled cheque.
2.2. The appellant remained silent, except a letter was subsequently issued raising a concern, but did not approach the Court assailing the said letter of cancellation dated 19th December, 2014. The silence can be
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reasonably gathered from the documents enclosed with the writ petition, that only in the year 2025, the writ petition is filed for the reliefs other than challenging the order of cancellation which are adumbrated hereinafter.
2.3. It is revealed from the record that the LIC challenged the decision of the Government in treating the land over which such housing infrastructure was undertaken to be on a forest land before this Court and the said writ petition remained pending for a pretty long period. Ultimately, the Government communicated to the Court that the land over which the said housing colony or infrastructure is constructed by the LIC does not come within the purview of a forest land. Since the said decision was taken in the year 2024, the appellant perceived the resurrection of the cause of action for allotment of flat as an integral part thereof and filed the instant writ petition, which is dismissed by the learned single Judge.
2.4. According to the counsel appearing for the appellant, the single Bench ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground enumerated therein. The single Bench proceeded to dismiss the said application on the premise that the moment the allotment is cancelled by the LIC, it does not create any right of revival thereof. It further held that since there was no concluded contract, no inchoate or a legally enforceable right accrued to the appellant. Since the right of the appellant after the
W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 3 of 13
cancellation is made does not appear to the single Bench enforceable in law, the writ petition came to be dismissed.
2.5. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that
the Court ought not to have taken such a stand, as the right to the order of cancellation having been founded upon a conscious decision of the Government, which is immuned from being challenged by a common man and the moment the Government has communicated that the land does not fall within the forest land, the ground for cancellation automatically eclipsed and cannot remain valid and, therefore, the LIC is prevented from retracting and/or resiling from their own commitment or contract.
2.6. In proceeding to invite fresh applications for allotment both in phase I and phase II structures, it is further submitted that the single Bench has discriminated the appellant with other similarly circumstanced person by allowing their writ petitions upholding their rights, on the other hand dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. By way of reference, reliance is placed upon the judgment and order dated 10th September, 2025 passed in W.P.(C) Nos.10837 of 2018, 6239 of 2015, 6240 of 2015 and 62 of 2018, where the writ petitions were decided in favour of the persons who stand on an identical footing to that of the appellant.
2.7. He further submits that there is no hard and fast rule that a writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as the Court is required to take into account the aspects which has been
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highlighted in the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in case of
Shankara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. M. Prabhakar and others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 . According to the learned counsel for the appellant, if there is a sufficient explanation offered which prevented the litigant to approach the Court promptly, it is not desirable that the High Court should dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay. He, thus, submits that a legally enforceable right is immediately created on issuance of a letter of allotment and the deposit of the money in terms of the conditions embodied in the scheme and, therefore, the finding of the single Bench that no legally enforceable right has accrued is unsustainable in law.
2.8. It is further submitted that the appellate Court should not venture to decide the appeal on a point not considered by the single Bench. In other words, it is sought to be contended that the single Bench proceeded to decide the writ petition solely on the ground that mere allotment of the flat does not create a concluded contract nor confers any legally enforceable right to be decided by the Court and, therefore, the delay and laches should not be taken as a ground to dismiss the instant appeal. Apart from the same, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that if there is a sufficient explanation offered in the writ petition which constrained the appellant to approach the Court in a time bound manner, the writ Court should
W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 5 of 13
not dismiss the writ petition on such ground. It is arduously submitted that if the substantive justice is confronted with the technical justice, the former must prevail. It is vociferously submitted before us that the right which is created by virtue of an allotment of the flat cannot be taken away if such right is postponed because of the ongoing litigation at the behest of the LIC and, therefore, the learned single Bench has committed an error in dismissing the writ petition.
3. Per contra , the learned counsel for the LIC took a formal stand
that there is a gross delay and laches attributable to the conduct of the appellant in approaching the Court and such point was taken before the single Bench and, therefore, it will not be deemed that the said point is abandoned by the contesting respondent. It is further submitted that the allotment of the flat was cancelled as far back as in the year 2014 which was duly communicated to the appellant, but the said decision to cancel the allotment was never challenged before the court of law, nor in the instant writ petition, such challenge is made. He submits that the entire relief claimed in the instant writ appeal revolves around the further tender and/or auction notice published by the LIC for allotment of the remaining flats and, therefore, the allottee whose allotment stood cancelled cannot come
W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 6 of 13
forward and challenge the subsequent tender/auction notice published by the LIC.
4. On the conspectus of the aforesaid submissions, let’s examine whether the conduct of the appellant instill any confidence that there is no delay or laches attributable to him in approaching the Court. Though the findings returned in the impugned judgment does not expressly and/or lucidly touches upon the delay and laches, but we find that the said point was agitated by the LIC from the submissions recorded in the impugned order. Once a plea is taken at the time of
an argument and if the single Bench omits to return its finding thereupon, there is no fetter on the part of the appellate Court to consider such point, if agitated by the same party. We do not find any obstacle in the appellate Court to decide the matter taking a different route in order to achieve the same destination. The appellate Court may substitute its own finding, if the ultimate decision taken
by the single Bench appears to be correct. We do not find any substance in the stand of the appellant that the appellate Court should stay away from deciding the plea of delay and laches. As we find that the said point was taken by the LIC before the single Bench and, therefore, if such point is agitated, there is no fetter on the part of the appellate Court to decide the same.
W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 7 of 13
5. We are conscious of the proposition of the law that for filing and/or initiating the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, no period of limitation is provided in the Limitation Act, 1963. Despite having not provided a specific timeline within which a litigant must initiate a proceeding before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a common law principle has evolved through a catena of decision rendered by the apex Court as well as High Court that the writ Court shall decline to exercise its discretion in entertaining the writ petition, if the delay and laches can be attributed to the conduct of the litigant.
6. In Shankara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra), the apex
Court traces the origin of the delay and laches as one of the determinant factor in denying the relief to the litigant, since the era of the privy council where in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd , (1874) LR 5 PC 221 , and held that the extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court may be refused to be exercised, if the litigant has approached the Court after a delay of considerable period.
7. The aforesaid concept is furthered after the establishment of the Supreme Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, AIR 1967
SC 1450 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 8 of 13
Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 wherein it has been held in unequivocal terms that the doctrine of delay and laches adopted by the Court is neither arbitrary nor a technical doctrine, but based upon the sound legal principles to cause a justice and on a substantial equity principles. The apex Court further took note of the other decision of the apex Court where the High Court refused to exercise the discretion on the ground of delay and laches and succinctly expressed in the following:
“54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts.
(2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the appellants.
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(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the appellant to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the appellant chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard-and-fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts.
(5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.”
8. There does not appear any cavil of doubt that despite having not provided a period of limitation for filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the concept of delay and laches has gained momentum in judicial dispensation and may be a factor to be taken into account in refusing to grant relief. It further augments the belated and the stale claim to be resuscitated after a lapse of time and it would not be conducive in a healthy judicial system to permit such claim to be adjudicated when it is apparent from the conduct of the litigant that he slept in a slumber for a considerable period of time and woke up only after sensing that such right is inchoate or vested.
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9. The letter of cancellation of the allotment was admittedly served
upon the appellant in the year 2014 and an objection to such cancellation was also filed within a close proximity of time, but thereafter, a silence can be noticed from the conduct of the appellant. The explanation is sought to be made that the LIC itself challenged the decision of the Government in declaring the land over which such construction was undertaken to be a forest land before this Court and, therefore, the ground of cancellation remained in limbo and, therefore, there was no occasion on the part of the appellant to approach the Court, being a law abiding citizen, to take a contrary stand to the decision of the State Government. On the ground of parity, it is sought to be contended that the other writ petitions have been decided by the same single Bench in a different manner and it is inconceivable that the appellant would be treated differently having standing upon the same pedestal.
10. In an earlier portion of the judgment, we have narrated the aforesaid fact and the writ petitions which were disposed of wherefrom it is manifestly clear that the approach was made by those writ petitioners within a short period of time and were pending for a considerable period until decided by the single Bench. It is undisputed that the LIC was taking steps in challenging the stand that
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the land is recorded as forest land and after the removal of any such doubts, proceeded with the project and invited the applications from the intending purchasers by issuing a tender inviting an application therefor. The challenge to the said tender notice is basically founded on the aforesaid fact, more particularly, that once the allotment is made, no further application could be invited, does not appear to be a ground to invalidate such tender notice. The reason being that the letter of cancellation issued by the LIC is never challenged by the appellant before the Court nor has been declared as illegal, invalid and not in consonance with the contractual terms and conditions. Mere filing an objection to a letter of cancellation does not automatically render such cancellation illegal unless the contracting party rescinding the contract recalls such cancellation or the same is declared by the competent Court to be illegal and invalid in law.
11. It is unacceptable that a litigant after filing an objection to a letter of cancellation issued to him remained silent for more than a decade in anticipation that the litigations which are filed by the LIC or the other writ petitioners, if decided would enure to its benefit. The fence sitter who is watching the litigation should not be encouraged to approach the Court after more than a decade. Apart from the same, the LIC has proceeded to allot the flats to the other
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intending purchasers, but according to the appellant, they have still certain flats left where the appellant can be accommodated. We do not find such submissions to have any substance. Once the allotment is cancelled and such cancellation is neither withdrawn nor declared to be illegal and invalid by a competent Court, the appellant cannot
be regarded to have a subsisting right. From whatever angle the matter is looked at, we do not find the ultimate decision taken by the single Bench to be infirmed and/or illegal.
12. The writ appeal, sans merit, is thus dismissed.
(M.S. Raman) (Harish Tandon) Judge Chief Justice
Aswini Sethy/PA S.K. Guin/ PA
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBASH KUMAR GUIN W.A. No. 1249 of 2025 Page 13 of 13 Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, C utta ck Date: 22-Oct-2025 12:09:46
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the writ appeal should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches despite no limitation period under Article 226.
Whether an allotment cancelled in 2014 and never judicially challenged conferred any subsisting or legally enforceable right.
Whether the appellate court could decide a delay plea not expressly dealt with by the single Bench.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Shankara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. M. Prabhakar and othersRelied on¶6
(2011) 5 SCC 607 · Who else cites this
Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong HurdReferred¶6
(1874) LR 5 PC 221
Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial CourtsReferred¶7
AIR 1967 SC 1450 · Who else cites this
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor ServiceRelied on¶7
AIR 1969 SC 329 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Nihar Ranjan Biswal
Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. (LIC)
Harish Tandon
Murahari Sri Raman
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
