M/S.Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd. Vs M/S. Adarsh Noble Corporation Ltd.

1. The review application is taken out by the unsuccessful litigant challenging the judgment/order dated 18^th June, 2024 passed by the Division Bench in W.A. No.1124 of 2022 taking multiple grounds, some of which were not argued at the time of the disposal

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of the appeal though claimed to have been taken and some are taken

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for the first time on the basis of discovery of new and important document subsequently unearthed by the petitioner.

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2. Though the review application is filed by the same Advocate on record but by engaging different Senior Counsel, the review application is sought to be argued. There appears to be confusion in the mind of the review petitioner on assimilation of the facts and the arguments advanced at the time of disposal of the writ appeal and, therefore, we feel it prudent to adumbrate the arguments advanced in the review application to ensure eradication of any such confusion arose subsequent to this judgment.

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3. The points argued in the review jurisdiction are summarized as under:

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Firstly, the Court while taking into consideration the fact whether the appellant/opposite party No.1 in the instant application can claim the status of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and a vital provision of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“GST Act” for short) i.e., Section 2(119) thereof was never taken into account.

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Secondly, the factum of registration under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSMED Act” for short) was never communicated to the petitioner by the appellant/opposite party No.1 herein and, therefore, it is not obligatory on the part of the petitioner to comply with the provisions of the MSMED Act by treating the petitioner in such capacity.

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Thirdly, subsequent to the judgment having delivered, the petitioner came to know of a Notification dated 24th January, 2024 by virtue whereof a scheme was framed, which postulates that “works contract” is outside the purview of the MSMED Act.

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Lastly, this court has delivered a judgment on 20th September, 2025 in a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.30966 of 2024 in which the appellant was arrayed as opposite party, wherein it is held that the provision of MSMED Act is not applicable. It is submitted that the award passed in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under the said Act is without jurisdiction and, therefore, to be set aside.

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4. The aforementioned four points taken by Mr. Gautam Mukherji, learned Senior Counsel needs scrutiny on the parameter of the scope and the jurisdiction exercised by the Court while RVWPET No. 186 of 2024 Page 3 of 16

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dealing with an application for review. The points have been coined and/or engineered at the time of argument and eloquently advanced before this court in pursuit of seeking review as the judgment dated 18^th June, 2024 contains a patent error and on the discovery of a new and important document, the same cannot occupy the space in the legal field.

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4.1. The rhetoric and the legal jargon of the learned Senior Counsel invited the Court to deeply ponder upon the aforesaid aspects to find out whether any case is made out in the review application or same being a pure question of law can be permitted to be agitated in the review jurisdiction.

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5. Before we embark our journey on the terrain of scope and jurisdiction exercised by the Court in dealing with an application for review, the broad principles are required to be recapitulated and/or restated. So far as the writ Courts are concerned, though they are not strictly guided by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), yet the principles akin thereto is ingrained and inhered in invoking such jurisdiction and in that sense the parameter concerning Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC becomes applicable. The power to review its own judgment is inhered and ingrained into

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the writ Court provided the parameters set forth in this regard is eminently and evidently manifest from the pleadings as well as the documents annexed in the proceedings. The power of review is primarily founded to eradicate any patent error and not for rehearing, re-visitation and/or rewriting of the judgment.

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5.1. In an adversarial system of adjudication, the importance of pleading is inevitable as the other side cannot be put on surprise at the time of argument, when a new point de hors the pleading is taken before the Court. The importance of pleading the facts is imbibed into the adversarial system of jurisdiction to advance the justice oriented approach by providing adequate opportunity to the adversary to meet the same and be not put on surprise at the time of argument. Even while exercising the review jurisdiction, the grounds for review must be explicitly, lucidly and with precision be pleaded. It would invite an anomalous situation if the Court permits the parties to argue a point de hors the pleading; in this regard, the importance of pleading assumes a pivotal role in adjudicatory process. The Court should not encourage the argument by making a case at the Bar in absence of any foundation laid in the pleading.

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5.2. The aforesaid observations become necessary for the reason that the points urged before us is to be scrutinized and/or determined on the score whether the same has been expressly and/or categorically pleaded in an application for review. Reverting back to the scope and the jurisdiction of review, it is to be remembered that there is a vast distinction between the order suffers from patent error and the order which may be termed as erroneous and/or infirm. In former case, the Court may exercise the review jurisdiction as the error apparent on the face of the record should not be permitted to remain on record; on the other hand, in the latter case, such judgment and order is susceptible to be challenged before the higher forum where the entire issue shall remain writ at large.

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5.3. The review can also be made on discovery of a new and important document which despite due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant provided such new and important document has a material bearing on the issue so decided. Any fringe material having no material bearing on the decision or may add something into the judgment without disturbing the core fabric of the ultimate decision, may not be permitted to be taken on record as

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it would simply invite the Court to articulate the judgment with a new get up.

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5.4. Mere discovery of a new and important document does not absolve the onerous duty cast upon the applicant to satisfy the Court on the concept of due diligence; the duty cast upon the applicant under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. It is a fundamental policy of the country that every litigation must attain finality to achieve such principles not only the Limitation Act, 1963 is promulgated so that the lethargic and dormant litigant should not be allowed to approach the Court after a considerable period of time but various forms of estoppel have also been imbibed within the legal parlance. If no restriction is imposed in pursuing the remedy after a considerable period of time, it would permeate the sense of uncertainty into the citizenry and no litigation would be treated to have been finally decided. Though the review is a statutory remedy, yet circumscribed by the conditions so recognized in order to bring it within the limited compass and to avoid rehearing and/or re-visitation of the case. Such being the broader principle, let us examine the aforementioned four points urged before us for the purpose of reviewing the judgment impugned in the instant review application.

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6. So far as the plea of discovery of a new and important document is concerned, the reliance is placed upon the Notification dated 24^th January, 2024 published in the Odisha Gazette Extraordinary on 1^st February, 2024 as well as a subsequent Office Memorandum dated 5^th March, 2025 reaffirming and/or restating the content of the Notification dated 24^th January, 2024. By virtue of such notification, a policy was framed by the Government which, in unequivocal terms, excludes the works contract outside the purview of the MSMED Act.

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6.1. The consideration which needs in this regard is whether the petitioner is able to satisfy by making adequate pleading on its discovery despite due diligence. The review petition running in several pages does not contain a single averment on the discovery of those documents nor any whisper can be traced out touching upon due diligence.

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6.2. Reliance is placed upon a recent judgment of the apex Court in the case of Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another , reported in 2025 INSC 1080 , wherein the apex Court succinctly jotted down the grounds which come within the ambit of the review in the following:

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“17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as follows:

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17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

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17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 . Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa : AIR 1954 SC 440. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137.

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17.3 Lastly, the phrase „for any other sufficient reason‟ means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 and approved in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, (1954) 2 SCC 42.”

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6.3. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in the

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aforesaid judgment with regard to the maintainability of a review

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application and exercise of power by the Court. While the Court

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considers the point must satisfy itself the grounds by way of which the review is permissible and to be satisfied that pleading of the party has discharged the onus cast upon him.

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6.4. In paragraph-17.1 of the above judgment, the apex Court has said that unless it is demonstrated by the applicant that despite due diligence the new and important matter or the evidence could not be discovered or within the knowledge or could not be produced at the time when the final order was passed, the Court should not proceed simplicitor on the ipse dixit of the said document. The expression "despite the exercise of due diligence" has to be given a due regard while considering a new and important piece of evidence and/or material.

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6.5. The legislators do not use any word or expression unnecessarily nor superfluously as every word and expression used in the statute is to be interpreted in the manner in which it is so used keeping in mind the intent and the purport underlying incorporation thereof. Omission or segregation of the word from a statutory provision which would render the core value thereof redundant or otiose should be eschewed. The Court while adopting the interpretative tools as recognized must give importance to each word

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and/or expression in order to decipher the legislative intent and above all to make the said provision workable in the legal field. Thus the exercise of due diligence having incorporated in relation to the discovery of a new and important piece of document and/or material the legislature has cast an onerous duty on the applicant not only to plead but also satisfy the conscience of the Court. The Court should not proceed to decide the matter or apply any document subsequently brought by way of an application for review on the eloquence of the Senior Counsel standing at the Bar, more particularly, when the foundational facts are conspicuously lacking in the pleading.

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6.6. As indicated hereinabove, the content of the review application narrated in several paragraphs does not contain a single whisper on the due diligence and, therefore, we do not find that the grounds taken by the applicant are acceptable. Taking a plea of an error apparent on the face of the record, it reminded us of our solemn duty to ascertain whether the "error" can come within the four corners of the record. Every error is not capable of being corrected while exercising the review jurisdiction but the error must

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be of such magnitude which can be detected on the face of the

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record. Any error required to be found after making a roving enquiry into the voluminous documents cannot be termed as an error apparent on the face of the record nor should the review jurisdiction be exercised under such parameter, solely on the basis of what can be logically deduced from the record.

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6.7. The error is sought to be brought within the bracket of the error apparent on the face of the record solely on the basis of the points, which according to the Senior Counsel, are relevant and germane from the record, which has not been taken into account while disposing of the appeal. According to him, Section 2(119) of the CGST Act has not been taken into account by the Court and, therefore, if the relevant provision of the statute is not considered, it comes within the four corners of the error apparent on the face of the record.

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7. It is further submitted that the Court has not taken into consideration the other grounds of challenge and having not taken so, it would be termed that the said judgment contains a patent error. As indicated hereinabove, the learned Senior Counsel engaged in the review application was not engaged to argue the appeal or the writ petition. There is no fetter on the part of the counsel to argue on a

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point which he feels would impinge the judgment and if such restricted point is taken and decided by the Court, it is not proper that the litigant by engaging another senior counsel termed the said judgment containing an error apparent on the face of the record. A litigant should not be permitted to prevaricate its stand at different stages of the litigation. Once the argument is restricted to a point which impliedly tantamount to abandonment of the other points, it is not open for the said litigant by engaging a new counsel to contend that other points which he took ought to have been decided by the Court and there appears to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

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7.1. Any such latitude given to the litigant who at the different tiers of the adjudicatory process involves different legal experts, it would invite a chaotic situation and an unscrupulous litigant may steal the march with its potential resources at its disposal. We do not find that any such plea was taken nor any foundation could be discerned before the division Bench which disposed of the appeal and, therefore, if such points are allowed to be taken under the purview of the error apparent on the face of the record, it will invite a re-visitation of the case and a new judgment would be delivered,

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which in our opinion, is not permissible under the review jurisdiction.

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8. A plea is also taken that the applicant cannot take the benefit under the MSMED Act as the factum of registration was never made known to the applicant/petitioner herein. It is arduously submitted by Mr. Mukherji, learned Senior Counsel that unless the applicant/petitioner was made aware by the appellant/opposite party No.1 herein that he has subsequently got himself registered under the said Act, it was not obligatory on the part of the petitioner to treat him as an MSME for availing all the benefits and the remedies provided under the said Act.

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8.1. The aforesaid submission, in our opinion, does not hold

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water from the fact deciphered from the judgment under review. In paragraph-1 of the impugned judgment, which contains the arguments advanced by the petitioner, we find the plea having taken therein relates to the applicability of the MSMED Act from the retrospective date when the agreement was entered into as admittedly the appellant/opposite party No.1 herein was not registered under the said Act on such date.

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9. A further plea was taken on a coram non-judice so far as the arbitration proceedings are concerned and apart from the same, we do not find any other point to have been taken. In paragraph-2 of the impugned judgment, the Court framed the question on the crucial date for determination of the applicability or otherwise of the provisions under Section 18 of the MSMED Act in case of a supplier coming within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the said Act whether to apply from the date of the contract or from the date of an actual supply.

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9.1. In pursuit of determining the aforesaid points, it is expressly recorded that the appellant/opposite party No.1 filed a Memorandum on 13^th December, 2015 with the authority and such memorandum conveys a laudable message that he has been subsequently registered under the MSMED Act. In paragraph-22.1, the Court also records the same and held that the petitioner is entitled to all the benefits under the said Act subsequent to the filing of the memorandum dated 13^th December, 2015. What can be logically deduced therefrom that any supply or transaction made prior thereto was not claimed as a beneficiary under the said Act but if such benefit was claimed only after the supply was made subsequent to the said

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memorandum dated 13^th December, 2015, it is inconceivable that the applicant was not aware that the appellant/opposite party No.1 has not registered himself within the provisions of the said Act and the moment the point has been taken and decided by the Court, we do not think that such point can be re-agitated in the garb of review.

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10. In view of the findings made hereinabove, we do not think that it is a fit case to review the judgment and order dated 18^th June, 2024 passed in W.A. No.1124 of 2022.

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11. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.

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(M.S. Raman) (Harish Tandon) Judge Chief Justice

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S. Behera/ Sisira

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: SISIRA KUMAR BEHERA Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 07-Nov-2025 15:44:44

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M/S.Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd. v. M/S. Adarsh Noble Corporation Ltd.

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M/S.Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd. v. M/S. Adarsh Noble Corporation Ltd.

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