Haridaspur Paradip Railway Co.Ltd. Vs Jagadish Ch.Samal

appeals are represented by the same learned counsel. The facts of the appeals are identical as they arises from the same land acquisition process for construction of

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Haridaspur-Paradip New Broad Gauge Railway Line. Issues are also similar and identical. The question of law is also the same to be decided by this Court. LAA No.110 of 2018 was heard as the lead case. For effective utilization of available time all the appeals were taken up and heard together. The learned counsel for the parties who represented the parties in all the cases were heard at length. This appeal is also disposed of by noting the contentions and arguments urged in all the appeals taken together.

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I.A. No. 158 of 2023

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2. In the I.A. the petitioner, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 namely, HaridaspurParadeep Railway Company Limited (HPRCL) is seeking leave to appeal. The Company was not arrayed as a party in a referral proceeding u/s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jajpur. By seeking leave the award is sought to be challenged in appeal. The I.A. has been filed under Rule 5, Chapter VII of

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the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948 by the intending appellant-petitioner Company seeking leave to the appellant to appeal against the award dated 08.02.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jajpur in L.A. Case No. 12 of 2009.

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3. The brief background of LA before the learned court below leading to the present LAA is that Govt. of Odisha by Gazette Notification dated 11.03.2005 u/s. 4(1) and 17(4) of the LA Act, 1894 notified acquisition of land for construction of New Railway line from Haridaspur to Paradip (“The New Rly Line” for short). Land of the opposite parties situated over three revenue plots total area Ac.0.35 decimals of ‘sarada ana jala sechita’ kisam were included in the notification to be acquired. Appellant HPCRL was incorporated for creating project specific Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The ‘New Railway Line’ was included in the National Rail Vikas Yojana being largely a non-budgetary initiative that envisages public-private partnership model of financing and implementation of railway infrastructure. Concession agreement dated 20.12.2007 was entered into

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between the Ministry of Railways, Govt. of India with the appellant HPRCL.

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4. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties

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refers to the counter affidavit filed by O.P. No.1 wherein at paragraph 3 it is stated that appellant-petitioner himself admitted that East Coast Railway was the party in the referral court. It is further submitted that East Coast Railway has not filed any appeal challenging the award.

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5. In considered opinion of this Court on the face of the pleadings and the judgment that was rendered and is under challenge, it would be evident that neither East Coast Railway nor the present petitioner-appellant were made parties. It is evident from the counter to the I.A. filed on behalf of opposite parties that conspicuously, they have not stated that the Ministry of Railways (MoR) or East Coast Railway or the appellant company (Special Purpose Vehicle) were made answering parties in the proceeding before the Civil Court in the reference U/s.18 of LA Act, 1894. The cause title of judgment and the lower court

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records indicate that these entities were not made party.

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6. By the award the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Jajpur, decided the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer u/s. 18 of the L.A. Act, 1894. The judgment dealt with valuation of the land that was acquired for and on behalf of the petitioner SPV and/or East Coast Railay without they being arrayed as party.

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7. The petitioner seeking leave to appeal relies on the decision of this Court dated 29.04.2018 passed by a coordinate Bench in LA No. 47 of 2015 in the matter of Pitambar Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda Railway Limited : 2016 (II) ILR-CUT 212 : (2016) (II) OLR 27 , wherein it was held that the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) : a company that has entered into agreement with the Ministry of Railways, Govt. of India is a person interested as would be defined under section 3(b) of the LA Act and can maintain the appeal under section 54 of the said Act. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that neither the SPV nor the East Coast Railway were made parties as would be evident from the cause title of the judgment passed in L.A. Case, as a result they were not aware of the proceeding nor

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did they have any scope to present their version before the referral court.

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8. Learned counsel Mr. Tripathy appearing for the opposite parties submits that the decision rendered in Pitambar Sahoo ( supra ) is distinguishable on facts but he does not deny the fact that that it is evident from the judgment in the reference rendered by the learned Civil Judge (SD), Jajpur, that the respondents chose to make the District Collector and District Magistrate of Jajpur (O.P. No.1), the Land Acquisition Collector under LA Act (O.P. No.3) and the contractor executing the construction work, i.e., Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (RVNL), a separate corporate entity as O.P. No.2.

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In considered opinion of this Court mentioning ‘East Coast Railway’ in the postal address of RVNL does not turn out to make East Coast Railway a party to the case.

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9. Learned trial Judge in the LA case also has not delved into the aspect whether any of the opposite parties were project proponents or they were the requisioning authority for land acquisition that was the subject matter of

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adjudication. The issues framed by the learned

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Referral/Trial Court in its judgment indicates the same and are reproduced :

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“(i) whether the petitioners are entitled to receive any higher rate of award/compensation ?

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(ii) what is the fair market value of the land acquired on the date of acquisition ?

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(iii) whether the petitioner are entitled to any other relief (s) ?”

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10. Somehow, the judgment in its ordering portion or any of its earlier paragraphs does not refer to who will deposit the enhanced amount of compensation before the LAO Collector.

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The list of witnesses examined on behalf of petitioners indicates that no witness was examined on behalf of opposite parties Special LAO nor any written statement was filed on behalf of the Special LAO. “Working sheet of the acquired land” was produced on behalf of Opp. Paty-L.A. Collector marked as Ext.A and statement of grounds of valuation was marked as Ext.B. Apparently, any contest to pay the enhanced amount as claimed or any contest to the basis of determination of enhanced amount has not been disclosed in the judgment.

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11. No material is brought to the notice of this Court by appellants or the respondent-opposite party LAO to show that East Coast Railway and the Company were made parties or were heard in he proceeding u/s.18 of the Act before the Court below. It is also neither pleaded nor demonstrated before this Court if impletion of East Coast Railway and/or the intending intervenor Company in the proceeding u/s18 would have prejudiced the appellants or the Land Acquisition Officer in any manner. The Special Land Acquisition Officer opposing the intervention by the intervener company is rather baffling, as the Special LAO is not an affected party who would pay the compensation if it is enhanced.

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In view of the above discussions, the petition seeking leave to appeal is allowed and leave granted.

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The appeal at the instance of petitioner shall be heard and dealt with in accordance with law.

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The I.A. stands disposed of.

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I.A. No. 52 of 2018

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12. Application has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 107 days in filing

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the appeal.

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13. In the objection filed on behalf of the respondentopposite parties to the petition for condonation of delay, it is contended that delay cannot be condoned if the appeal is filed at the behest of the Government entities.

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The appellant-petitioner relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 para-11; The Supreme Court held that in each and every case the delay in approaching the Court cannot be treated as a straight jacket and explanation to condone the delay cannot be rejected. It is held it depends on facts and circumstances of each of the case.

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14. In the case at hand the facts are somewhat striking. The land acquisition is made at the instance of the East Coast Railways and/or for a Special Purpose Vehicle [SPV : Haridaspur-Paradip Railway Company Ltd. HPCRL], a company incorporated to execute the rail track laying and allied development project. Neither the railway nor the special purpose vehicle have been made parties before the court adjudicating the reference under Section 18 of Land

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Acquisition Act, 1894.

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The reasons for the referral Court to entertain a reference without the requisitioning authority/Company executing the project being made parties and to proceed to adjudicate is unfathomable to say the least. The statutory authorities under the Land Acquisition Act who undertake the process of acquisition like the Collector and District Magistrate of the district and the Land Acquisition Collector, who are neither the project proponents nor the requisitioning authority, are made parties in the reference. The contractor engaged to construct the project is also made a party. The contractor engaged filed written statement. From the judgment it is apparent that the learned court did not deal with the factual aspect as to whether the project proponent or authority requisitioning the acquisition of the land were parties before it and were heard. The facts are so glaring that the appeal needs to be considered on its own merit. Applying the principles as held in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani ( supra ) reported

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delay of 107 days in filing the appeal is condoned.

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The I.A. is allowed and disposed of.

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LAA No. 112 of 2018

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15. The appeal has been listed along with the I.As. for orders, as the I.A seeking leave to appeal and for condonation of delay have been allowed. It is agreed by learned counsel for the appearing parties that after about seven years of filing the appeal, endeavour should be made for final hearing of the appeal.

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Accordingly, the appeal is taken up for hearing.

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16. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents as well as the learned AGA for proforma respondents.

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Admit.

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Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel who has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents in the connected I.As those have been dealt with and disposed of today submits that he has instructions to appear in the appeal and has already filed Vakalatnama on 25.06.2019 which is on record.

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Accordingly no further notice needs to be issued to the respondents who are already represented.

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In view of the order that is going to be passed in the

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present L.A.A., no notice is issued to the respondent no.7

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(Chief Engineer, Construction RVNL), who was the opposite party no.2 before the learned referral court.

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17. The appeal has been filed u/s. 54 of the L.A. Act, 1894 read with S.50(2) of the said Act challenging the judgment dated 08.02.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jajpur in L.A. Case No. 12 of 2009 adjudicating and answering a reference under section 18 of the L.A. Act.

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18. Heard Mr. S. S.Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 and Mr. S. Swain, learned AGA for proforma respondents 2 to 5.

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Learned counsel for the appellant reiterates his submissions made in the connected I.As. as noted above. It is submitted by learned counsel for appellant that they are a Company Registered under the Companies Act, 1956 : a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) incorporated to undertake and implement the project for which land was acquired for i.e. Haridaspur-Paradip New Broad Gauge Rail Link project.

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The judgment in LA Case No. 12 of 2009 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jajpur dated 08.02.2018 would

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indicate that the present appellants were not made parties in the said proceeding. State of Odisha and Land Acquisition Zone Officer-cum-LA Collector were made opposite parties no.1 and 3 respectively and the contractorcompany executing the work of construction of the railway line i.e. RVNL (Rail Vikas Nigam Limited) was arrayed as opposite party no.2.

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19. Learned counsel for the appellant refers to the averments made by the appellant in their dated 15.01.2025 filed on 16.01.2025 in response to the counter of the respondents in LAA No. 110 of 2018. He relies on para-5 thereof which quotes clause 3 of the MoU/concession agreement dated 12.12.2007 entered into between the appellants and the Union of India through Ministry of Railways. Said para-5 is reproduced herein :

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“5. That Clause No.3 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) explicitly stipulates that the land required for the project shall be acquired by East Coast Railway at the expense of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The relevant clause is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference :

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“3. The land for the project shall be acquired by the East Coast Railway at the cost of the SPV. RVNL will arrange to lease out the land to the SPV at appropriate terms and conditions as decided manually. The Land

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and existing assets, if any, will continue to be the property of Ministry of Railways.”

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20. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondents had impleaded opposite party no.2, who had filed written statement before the referral court. He supports the award. It is submitted that opposite party no.2, (RVNL) before learned Senior Civil Judge in the LA Case had filed written statement. But he fairly concedes that neither the project proponent: East Coast Railway nor any other requisitioning authority for land acquisition were made parties in the L.A. Case as is evident from the judgment. The judgment does not refer to any of the opposite party as the requisitioning authority or the SPV for whom the land was acquired.

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21. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the proforma respondent no.2 to 5 submits that as far as payment of compensation is concerned, the District Collector-cum-District Magistrate and Land Acquisition Collector have their role as the statutory authorities to the extent the LA Act provides. They are authorities under the statute, undertake the process of

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acquisition as per requisition of the Project Proponent. At best they can facilitate determination, deposit and disbursal of compensation as prescribed by the statute and also awarded by the referral court. The

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amount/enhancement (if any) is deposited with the authorities by the project proponent/requisitioning authority to be paid to the land oustees.

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22. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 that the matter is pending since 2018, the LA case was initiated in the year 2009, fifteen years have passed and the present appellants have challenged the award on the ground of not joining them as parties in the proceeding before the referral court. It is submitted no useful purpose would be served in keeping the appeal pending before this Court in absence of the written statement of the present appellant. The respondents would also have difficulty as they have to defend their case that was made in the reference in absence of the written statement of present appellants.

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Learned counsel submits that the matter may be remanded with a further prayer that it should be directed to be taken up and disposed of expeditiously.

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23. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that for achieving the ends of justice and for effective adjudication, the appellants would not oppose such a prayer. He further submits that the appellants undertake that they shall cooperate in the proceeding for expeditious disposal, if they are allowed to be impleaded as a party before the learned referral Court.

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24. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad v. Gyan

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Devi: AIR 1995 SC 724: (1995) 2 SCC 326, constitution

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Bench of five Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court held as quoted herein [at paragraphs-48 to 56 of

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SCC]:

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“48. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

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49. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition

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proceedings are pending on the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.

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50. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act.

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51. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

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52. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.

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53. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. 54. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the court. 55. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference court the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court.

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56. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis] 25. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely : (1995) 1 SCC 221 : AIR 1995 SC 1004 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court had the occasion to decide and lay down who can be ‘persons interested’ in terms of section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also in the context of the sections 18, 26, 50(2) and 54 of the Act. Upon discussing the law as laid down in the earlier decisions rendered by the Supreme Court it was held as quoted herein : (SCC-paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15):

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“12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings or right to be heard

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or to file an appeal under Section 54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass. The right given under subsection (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to

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xxx xxx xxx Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

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13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not

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generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States (sic Stakes) involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist upon proper explanation of every day's delay. In this attitudinal situation it would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would participate in the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation.

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14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation, who would be the affected person? Is it not interested to see that the appellate court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as per law? For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs 10,000. Who is to bear the burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired is

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served with the notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be interested to defend the award under Section 11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc. against the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party affected by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective we are of the considered view that the appellant-Company is an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party, if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside. 15. Since the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed, we set aside the orders and direct the High Court to treat them as appeals properly filed under Section 54 of the Act and be dealt with along with the appeals filed by the State pending disposal in the High Court. In the pending references under Section 18, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, it is directed to order impleading the appellant as a partyrespondent and would give reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witness examined by the claimants and to examine witnesses on its behalf to rebut the evidence for higher compensation, the appellant is entitled to be heard in support of the determination of just and proper compensation. In this view, the need to implead the appellant as a party-respondent in the pending appeals in the High Court does not arise.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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26. The principles enunciated in Neyvely Lignite ( supra )

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has been reiterated in the subsequent decisions as would be indicated herein.

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In Union of India v. Special Tehsildar (ZA) : 1996(2) SCC 332 the Supreme Court allowed the prayer of the beneficiary to be impleaded as a party in the regular First Appeals pending before the High Court following U.P. Awas Evam Vikash Parishad (supra) (paras 10 and 11 of the SCC).

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“10. It is an admitted case that the appeals are pending against the order passed by the subordinate court on reference having been made under Section 18 of the Act. The appellants wanted to be impleaded as a party in the said appeals. The proper and the only course which should have been adopted was to have applied to the appellate court for being impleaded as a party. Instead of doing this, writ petitions for writs of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were filed. Presumably, it must have been contended that the appellants should have been impleaded as respondents as they were interested parties because the acquisition was being effected at their expenses and for their benefits. Further, no effective relief could, possibly, have been sought by the appellants against the respondents. What was, in fact, desired by the appellants was an order of the Court for being impleaded in the appeals which were pending before the High Court. The collateral proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not have been instituted and as already observed, the only remedy which was

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available to the appellants was to apply, in the pending appeals, to be impleaded as a party by moving an appropriate interim application. The High Court unnecessarily entertained writ petitions and gave a detailed judgment on the question which, in fact, it could not consider when dealing with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This question should have been considered only if the proper application was filed in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. We may here observe that while dealing with merits of the case, the High Court did not have the benefit of the judgment of this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the other judgments referred to therein. 11. For the reason that the writ petition for being impleaded as a party in regular first appeals, which were pending, was not a proper remedy, the said writ petitions filed by the appellants have to be dismissed. Such dismissal will not be regarded as affecting the rights of the appellants in applying to the High Court by moving proper applications in the pending appeals for being impleaded as a party. Such applications may, if the appellants desire, be filed within two months and in case, the same are filed, they will be considered and disposed of by the High Court in accordance with law, keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad case [(1995) 2 SCC 326] and the other decisions which had been relied upon therein.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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27. In Delhi Development Authority vs. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others : (2011) 2 SCC 54 : AIR 2011 SC 428 both U.P. Awas Evam Vikash

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Parishad (supra) and Neyvely (supra) were followed and

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applied, holding that Delhi Development Authority was a person interested within meaning of S.3(b) therefore, entitled to participate in proceedings before Land Acquisition Collector as well as before High Court in the subsequent appellate proceeding when the High Court enhanced the compensation at the instance of land owners. It was observed that the High Court erred in enhancing compensation without directing the land owners to implead Delhi Development Authority to enable it to contest the case : Paragraphs 25, 29, 32 and 42 to 44 of SCC.

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“25. The definition of the expressions “local authority” and “person interested” are inclusive and not exhaustive. The difference between exhaustive and inclusive definitions has been explained in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995 Supp (2) SCC 348] in the following words : (SCC p. 356, para 19)

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“19. … A particular expression is often defined by the legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that ‘definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition’. (See Gough v. Gough [(1891) 2 QB 665 (CA)] ; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 71] , SCC p. 717, para 72.) The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend

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not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words ‘means and includes’, on the other hand, indicate ‘an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions’. [See Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps [1899 AC 99 : (1895-99) All ER Rep Ext 1576] (Lord Watson); Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 164 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 56] , SCC p. 170, para 11.] The use of the words ‘means and includes’ in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of ‘college’ is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended. Insofar as engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the reason that the opening and running of the private engineering colleges are controlled through the Board of Technical Education and Training and the Director of Technical Education in accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE from time to time.”

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29. Undisputedly, DDA is an authority constituted under Section 3 of the 1957 Act for promoting and securing development of Delhi according to plan and for this purpose it has the power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property, to carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage, etc. Therefore, it is clearly covered by the definition of the expression “local authority”.

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32. Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice. The object underlying this section is to afford an

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opportunity to the local authority or company to participate in the proceedings held before the Collector or the court for determining the amount of compensation and to show that claim made by the landowner for payment of compensation is legally untenable or unjustified. This is possible only if the Collector or the court concerned gives notice to the local authority or the company concerned. If notice is not given, the local authority or the company cannot avail the opportunity envisaged in Section 50(2) to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Therefore, even though the plain language of that section does not, in terms, cast a duty on the Collector or the court to issue notice to the local authority or the company to appear and adduce evidence, the said requirement has to be read as implicit in the provision, else the same will become illusory.

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42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that: (i) DDA falls within the definition of the expressions “local authority” [Section 3(aa)] and “person interested” [Section 3(b)] of the Act;

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(ii) DDA was entitled to participate in the proceedings held before the Land Acquisition Collector;

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(iii) the failure of the Land Acquisition Collector to issue notice to DDA and give an opportunity to it to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation payable to the landowners was fatal to the award passed by him;

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DDA was entitled to notice and (iv) opportunity to adduce evidence before the Reference Court could enhance market value of the acquired land entitling the respondents to claim higher compensation and, as no

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notice or opportunity was given to DDA by the Reference Court, the judgments rendered by it are liable to be treated as nullity;

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(v) the Division Bench of the High Court also committed serious error by further enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the contesting respondents without requiring them to implead DDA as party-respondent so as to enable it to contest their prayer for grant of higher compensation.

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43. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as also the judgments of the Reference Court are set aside and the matters are remitted to the Reference Court for deciding the two references afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties, which shall necessarily include opportunity to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The Reference Court shall decide the matter without being influenced by the observations contained in the judgment of the High Court and this judgment.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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28. In Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation

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v. Santosh Janba Warghane and another : (2019)12 SCC 650 , the principles laid down in Neyvely Lignite

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(supra) were reiterated and were applied to hold that the petitioner Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation being beneficiary of land acquisition is a necessary party and could file an appeal against award passed by reference

¶159

court. The decision of the High Court to the contrary was

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reversed as the High Court refused to grant leave to appeal

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to the Corporation against the award passed by the reference court.

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29. The appellants rely on the decision rendered by a coordinate Bench in Pitambar Sahoo v. Angul-Sukinda Railway Limited : 2016 (2) ILR Cut. 212, 2016(II) OLR 27 , the coordinate Bench dealt with the concession agreement/memorandum of understanding in extenso to hold that as per the agreement entered between the East coast Railway and the Company, the Company (SPV) was liable to indemnify all actions, suits, claims, demands and proceedings. It was held that the one who is under obligation or liable to indemnify against all actions, suits, claims, demands and proceedings has a right to be heard in it which has become more expedient when neither Union of India : Ministry of Railways nor the East coast Railways have been impleaded as a party to the reference. The decision of the coordinate Bench has attained finality as it has not been challenged/altered by any subsequent decision.

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30. The principles emanating from the judgments rendered

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by the Supreme Court indicated and discussed above can be summed up as follows :

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(i) The right conferred by Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act, 1894 carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the L.A. Collector as well as the reference Court before whom the acquisition proceedings are pending.

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(ii) The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A. Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act.

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(iii) Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.

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(iv) The local authority is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the L.A.

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Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard.

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(v) In the event of enhancement of amount of compensation by the reference Court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal, against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court.

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(vi) In an appeal in the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court filed by a person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal.

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(vii) A Company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2) the principles applicable to a local authority as noted above would also apply to a Company.

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(viii) The operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with subsection(2) of Section 50 of the L.A. Act cannot be limited

¶177

within a narrow compass. The right given under sub-

¶178

section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in

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substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice.

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(ix) The beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of compensation is an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC.

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It would be error of law if it is held that a beneficiary

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Company is not a person interested.

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(x) The definition of expression “local authority” and “person interested” are inclusive and not exhaustive. Inclusive definition used in a statute enlarge the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares they shall include.

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(xi) Denial of the right to be impleaded as a party and to be heard a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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(xii) Section 50(2) represents statutory embodiment of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice. The object underlying this section is to afford an opportunity to the local authority or company to participate in the proceedings held before the L.A. Collector or the court for determining the amount of compensation and to show that claim made by the landowner for payment of compensation is legally untenable or unjustified.

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31. It has to be observed that the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned AGA for the Special LAO did not point out as to how by impleading the project proponent East Coast Railway and/or Haridaspur-Paradip Rly. Company Ltd. (HPRCL) the appellants-land losers or the Special Land Acquisition Officer would have been prejudiced in any manner in the proceeding before the Court below.

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32. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent no.1, the learned Additional Government Advocate for the proforma respondent nos.2 and 3, in view of the discussions above and applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court as summarized above and the principles enunciated by this

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Court in Pitambar Sahoo (supra) the LAA is allowed. The impugned order dated 08.02.2018 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jajpur in L.A. Case No.12 of 2009 is set aside and quashed. The LA case is restored for adjudication afresh by the jurisdictional court in the manner as directed herein below.

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32.1 The parties in the present appeal shall appear before the learned court of jurisdiction as the L.A. Case No.12 of 2009 earlier pending before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jajpur as the said L.A. Case has been restored to file.

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32.2 It is further directed that the learned District Judge, Jajpur shall do well to find out after necessary enquiry the Court of jurisdiction which can decide the LA case, as it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents and also agreed by the learned counsel for the appellant that at present the jurisdiction is distributed between three courts : Courts of Civil Judge (Senior Division) : at Jajpur, at Jajpur Road and at Chandikhole in the district of Jajpur. The learned District Judge shall inform in the

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administrative side the court having jurisdiction to take up immediately the matter as restored.

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32.3 The respondents 1 to 4 shall appear before the learned referral court through their learned counsel. The appellants shall file petition for impleading themselves as parties before the learned court that would be in seisin of the matter after the case is assigned. The petition for impleading appellants shall be allowed and they shall be impleaded as opp. parties. The learned court shall also issue notice/inform the learned counsel for the present respondent nos.1 to 4 regarding the next date. As a matter of abundant caution intimating the next date notice be issued to the present appellant in the following address as indicated in the cause title :

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“Haridaspur-Paradip Railway Company Limited represented through its Managing Director, at J/7, Pal Heights, Jayadev Vihar, Bhubaneswar, DistrictKhurda.”

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32.4. The incumbent Managing Director/Authorised

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Officer of the company shall respond to such notice themselves/through their counsel.

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33. The learned referral Court shall expedite the matter without granting unnecessary adjournments. The respondents and the appellant undertake to appear on each date and cooperate for disposal of the reference. Registry shall communicate copy of this judgment to the learned District Judge, Jajpur for necessary action.

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34. It is clarified that no part of this judgment and order remanding the matter for adjudication regarding enhancement shall be treated to be expression of any opinion on the merits of the respective claims and contentions of the parties.

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35. The appeal is allowed with further directions as indicated above, There shall be no orders towards costs.

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This Court records its appreciation of the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondents and the learned Additional Government Advocate for their able assistance to the Court in finally hearing, deciding and disposing of the Land Acquisition Appeal that has been pending for more than seven years.

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Post Script

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36. Before parting with the matter it would be apt to put on record certain economic aspects which are significant, though may not have a direct bearing on the process of adjudication and the conclusion that may be arrived at. National Rail Vikas Yojana is largely a non-budgetary initiative that envisages public-private partnership model of financing and implementation of railway infrastructure. The said ‘Yojana’ has been envisaged for speedy development of rail infrastructure which includes de-bottlenecking of Golden Quadrilateral (a 5,846 Km. National Highway Project connecting four key cities Delhi, Kolkata Chennai and Mumbai) providing rail connectivity and developments of rail corridors to hinter lands. The Special Purpose Vehicle is a result of a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 16^th October, 2003 between Ministry of Railways and Rail Vikas Nigam Limited creating project specific SPV. Haridaspur-Paradip Railway Line Project was sanctioned by Ministry of Railways and was identified to be undertaken under the ‘Yojana’. The shareholders agreement for Haridaspur-Paradip Railway Company Limited (HPRCL) was signed on 11.10.2006 by Govt. of Odisha, large Public Sector Undertakings like Rail Vikas Nigam Limited (RVNL), Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), Paradip Port

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Trust (PPT) and also Public Limited Companies like ESSEL Mining and Industries Ltd. (EMIL), Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. (JSPL), MSP Steel and Power Ltd. (MSPL), POSCO India Private Ltd.(POSCO). The concession agreement was entered into to take over the responsibility for implementation of the Haridaspur-Paradip New Railway Line including necessary finances for the project.

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Public-private partnership for large infrastructure projects which are capital intensive is neo-normal. Financing of important infrastructure projects has gradually shifted to be non-budgetary initiative. In many instances for infrastructure projects public-private partnership model of financing has become the preferred mode.

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A Court applying various principles in adjudicating a matter may have to look for functional objectives of such arrangements to finance projects. Substantial cost of infrastructure project like a New Railway line is for payment of compensation for acquisition of land by State in exercise of power of eminent domain. Economic implications of judicial pronouncements are significant. HPRCL shall bear the cost of enhancement of compensation for acquisition. Complex financial arrangements need not be rearranged as it is not the purpose of

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adjudication. Rather, complex long term contracts involving finance, like the concession agreement to construct railway link should be predictably and credibly enforced even when entangled in litigation.

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Viewed from such a perspective, participation of project proponent and the company implementing the project as proper parties is essential in any proceeding before a Court

¶215

where cost of land acquisition is an issue to be adjudicated.

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(M.S.Sahoo) Judge

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Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 22^nd April, 2025/dutta/Gs

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Signature Not Verified

¶219

Digitally Signed Signed by: AJIT KUMAR DUTTA Reason: Authentication Location: ohc Date: 23-May-2025 21:37:49

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Page 38 of 38

Haridaspur Paradip Railway Co.Ltd. v. Jagadish Ch.Samal

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Haridaspur Paradip Railway Co.Ltd. v. Jagadish Ch.Samal

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