Rajendra Jain Vs State

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK JCRLA No. 23 of 2007

(Arising out of the Judgment and Order of Conviction dated 28^th of November, 2006 passed by Shri A. K. Patnaik, Addl. Sessions Judge, Jharsuguda, in Sessions Trial No.41 of 2006, for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860)

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… Rajendra Jain Appellant Mr. B.C. Parija, Advocate -versus… State of Odisha Respondent

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Mr. G Tripathy, AGA

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CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. K. SAHOO THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

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Date of Judgment: 29.04.2025

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Chittaranjan Dash, J.

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The Appellant, namely Rajendra Jain, faced the trial on the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jharsuguda, in Sessions Trial No.41 of 2006, wherein, the learned Court found him guilty for the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years.

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The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 27.12.2005, the informant (P.W.10), who is the husband of the deceased, Pinky Jain,

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lodged a written report at Belpahar Police Station. He stated that after their marriage, he and his newly-wed wife had been residing with the Appellant and one Manju, who were the foster father and mother of the deceased. The family earned their livelihood by collecting scrap iron and discarded materials such as polythene and tins from dustbins. On the date of occurrence, the Informant had left for Lakhanpur in the morning to transport some materials in his rickshaw for a Congress Rally. As usual, his mother-in-law had gone out to collect scrap materials, leaving the deceased and the Appellant alone in the house. When the Informant returned at around 5:00 p.m., he found the house locked. On peeping through the gap of the door, he noticed blood stains inside. Being alarmed, he called nearby shopkeepers and with their help, broke open the lock. Inside, they discovered the deceased lying in a pool of blood with severe injuries. A screw driver, an iron hammer, a small iron spade, and knives were found lying near the dead body. A brown-coloured full pant belonging to the Appellant was also found at the scene. Suspecting the Appellant to be responsible for the murder particularly as he was known to have a lustful eye on the victim, the Informant accused the Appellant in the written report. Consequently, Belpahar P.S. Case No. 161 dated 27.12.2005 was registered under Sections 302 of the IPC, and the investigation commenced.

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In course of the investigation, P.W.11, the Investigating Officer, registered the FIR on 27.12.2005 vide Ext.1/3 and 1/4 based on the written complaint lodged by P.W.10. He visited the spot on the same evening, secured the area, and made requisitions for the scientific team and an Executive Magistrate. On 28.12.2005, inquest was conducted in the presence of witnesses and the Magistrate, an inquest report was prepared (Ext.2). The I.O. seized blood stained

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weapons and articles from near the dead body, including a hammer (M.O.VI), a spade (M.O.IX), an iron slab (M.O.VIII), two knives (M.O.X and XI), and a screw driver (M.O.VII). These were sealed by the scientific team and seized under the seizure list marked as Ext.3. Medical opinion was sought for regarding these weapons, and it was opined that the injuries found on the deceased were possible by such weapons. Biological samples of the Appellant, including hair clippings and blood, were collected and seized under Ext.4. The Accused-Appellant, who had allegedly consumed poison, was later traced, identified, hospitalised, and formally arrested. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the charge sheet was submitted vide Ext.18, to face trial.

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The case of the defence is one of complete denial.

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To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses in all. P.W.1 is the scribe of the F.I.R., P.W.2 is the landlord of the Appellant, P.W.3 is a neighbour, P.Ws.4 and 9 are the inquest witnesses, P.Ws.5 and 6 are seizure witnesses, P.W.7 is a medical officer, P.W.8 is the doctor who conducted the P.M. examination, P.W.10 is the Informant, P.W.11 is the I.O. and P.W.12 is the scientific officer.

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The defence, on the other hand, examined one witness, D.W.1, who is the foster mother of the deceased.

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The learned trial Court leaning to the side of prosecution, found the prosecution to have proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and held the Appellant guilty and convicted him awarding sentence as described above.

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Mr. B. C. Parija, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, argues that the prosecution has failed to establish a

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complete and unbroken chain of circumstances to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the last seen theory is weak and inconclusive, as no independent witness had seen the deceased in the exclusive company of the Appellant at the relevant time. The testimonies of P.Ws.2, 3, and 4 did not support this theory, and there was no precise evidence indicating the time of death to link it with the Appellant's presence. Mr. Parija further submits that the house was jointly occupied by the deceased, her husband (P.W.10), her foster mother, and the Appellant, and as such, the recovery of a blood stained brown pant from the room could not be conclusively attributed to the Appellant. He adds that the motive alleged by the prosecution as to the inappropriate behaviour of the Appellant towards the deceased is also insufficient to establish the motive for murder, especially when P.W.8, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, clearly stated that there were no signs of sexual assault. Mr. Parija emphasises that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof, and that the evidence on record lacked the cogency and conclusiveness required for a conviction in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, and the Appellant is hence liable to be acquitted.

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Mr. Gautam Tripathy, learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, contends that the prosecution had successfully established a strong chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the Appellant. It was contended that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the Appellant, who was residing in the same house, and that he had no plausible explanation for his absence and subsequent conduct, including his alleged attempt to commit suicide by consuming poison. Mr. Tripathy emphasised that the recovery of blood stained weapons and a brown-

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coloured pant from the spot, linked to the Appellant, corroborated the sequence of events narrated by the prosecution witnesses. He further submitted that the motive behind the crime was rooted in the Appellant’s inappropriate conduct towards the deceased, which had caused tensions in the household and provided a compelling reason for the Appellant to eliminate her. The statements of key witnesses, particularly P.W.10, the husband of the deceased, gave a detailed account of the strained relationship between the deceased and the Appellant. As the case was based on circumstantial evidence, Mr. Tripathy asserts that the cumulative effect of the circumstances formed a complete chain unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the Appellant, warranting his conviction.

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Needless to mention that in a case where the offence charged is one under section 302 IPC, the nature of death of the deceased has to be decided first. Accordingly, we find it right to evaluate the evidence vide Ext.7 in this issue.

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External Injuries:

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(i) Lacerated wound on the left side of the head in front of the face 4” × 1 and 1/2” × muscle and vessels are exposed

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(ii) Lacerated wound on left side below left mastoid (behind left ear) which is 2” × 3/4” × muscle deep

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(iii) Lacerated wound on the left side of mandible area 4” × 1 ½” × bone deep

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(iv) Lacerated wound 1” below the left ear of size 1” × 1/2” × muscle deep

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(v) Lacerated wound on the left side of the frontal area of size 1” × 1/2” × muscle deep

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(vi) Lacerated wound on the left side of the frontal area 1” a part of the injury no. (v) of size 1” × 1/2” × muscle deep

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(vii) Lacerated wound on the left side of left eye brow of size 1” × 1/2” × muscle deep

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(viii) Lacerated wound on the upper part of left ear, upper 1/4^th of Pina was detached and not found on the body

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(ix) Lacerated wound on right cheek of size 1” × 1/2” × muscle deep

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(x) Lacerated cut injury below the right side of mandibular area on the neck of size 4 ½” × 1 ½” × deep in the trachea vessels. Vessel’s trachea and oesophagus were exposed

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(xi) Two bruises on the lower part of the neck towards right of size 1” × 1/2”

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(xii) Lacerated wound on the lower lip of size 1/2” × 1/4”

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(xiii) Lacerated wound on the back side of neck on the left in horizontal direction of size 2 ½” × 1” × muscle deep

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(xiv) Bruise on the medial side of right elbow joint of size 1” × 1/4”

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On dissection, it was found that the corresponding injury to no.(x) i.e. vessels, trachea, and oesophagus were cut. The deceased was not sexually assaulted.

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The medical evidence on record by P.W.8, clearly establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The deceased had sustained multiple lacerated wounds and bruises across her head, neck, face, and body, including a grievous injury (Injury No. x) that cut through the trachea, major vessels, and oesophagus, an injury which P.W.8 opined was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. All injuries were noted to be antemortem, indicating they were inflicted during the lifetime of the deceased. Notably, there were

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no signs of sexual assault, and the cause of death was consistent with deliberate, forceful violence. This finding has not been disputed by either party, and it conclusively supports that the death was indeed homicidal in nature.

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Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it is incumbent to deal with the testimonies of the relevant witnesses for better appreciation of the case.

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P.W.2 stated that more than a year prior to the incident, he had purchased a house from one Kishori Mohan Sahu in the name of his son. At that time, Rajendra Jain (the Appellant), his wife, daughter, and son-in-law were residing in that house as tenants. He stated that the Appellant used to collect scrap materials and sell them in the market. He also confirmed that Rajkumar Rout was the Appellant’s son-in-law. On the evening of the incident, around 5:30 p.m., P.W.2 heard about the murder of Pinky. In his sworn testimony, he denied having seen the dead body or the injuries on the deceased. He further denied having told the Investigating Officer that on 27.12.2005, Rajkumar Rout and his mother-in-law had left the house for work, and upon their return, found the bedroom locked and later discovered the deceased inside. He also denied suppressing the truth or seeing any specific injuries on the deceased’s body. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 stated that he was not called by Rajkumar Rout. His house was located about a five-minute walk from the house of the Appellant. He admitted that he did not know the character or nature of the Appellant and clarified that he had not given any statement to the police.

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P.W.3 deposed that he knew the Appellant and his family, who were residing in a house adjacent to his shop. On 27.12.2005, in the

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evening, Rajkumar Rout approached him and, in a distressed state, informed him that his wife had been killed by the Appellant. P.W.3 and others advised him to report the matter to the police. When the police arrived, P.W.3 accompanied them to the house of the Appellant. In their presence, Rajkumar broke the lock of the room. Inside, they discovered the body of the deceased, lying in a pool of blood with severe injuries. A hammer, screwdriver, two knives (one iron, one steel), a thick iron plate, and a brown-coloured pant, all stained with blood, were found near the body. These were seized by the police under seizure list marked Ext.3. The police took photographs, made inquiries, and prepared documents, which were explained to P.W.3. He also identified his signature on the inquest report (Ext.2), which had been prepared in his presence, along with Kartik Sahu and the informant. In cross-examination, P.W.3 stated that his shop remained open from 6 a.m. to 12 noon and again from 4 p.m. to 9 p.m. He confirmed not hearing any abnormal sound between 6 a.m. and 12 noon. The police arrived within 10–15 minutes of Rajkumar lodging the complaint. The lock was broken in the presence of the police, and about 4–5 other persons were also present. He noted that Rajkumar did not approach him before 5 p.m. and that he returned to his shop around 6–6:15 p.m., then again went back to the spot after 20 minutes and stayed until the end. His statement was recorded the following morning around 9–10 a.m., and he was called after a week to sign Ext.3.

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P.W.4 stated that he went to the house of the Appellant after hearing some commotion and, by then, the door lock had already been broken. He saw the body of the deceased, Pinky, with a cut injury on the neck and a bleeding head injury. He could not remain inside the room for long due to discomfort and was asked to step out. He further

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stated that he accompanied the police to Raigarh in search of the Appellant but returned that night around 2 a.m. On the following day, the inquest was held, and the inquest report (Ext.2) was prepared. An ambulance was called, and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. In cross-examination, P.W.4 stated that he had reached the scene about 15–20 minutes after the arrival of the police. On the night of the incident, the police did not take photographs or prepare any paperwork. He confirmed accompanying the police to Raigarh and signing 3–4 documents, though he could not specify which ones. He also mentioned that photographs were taken simultaneously.

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P.W.10 (Informant and Husband of the Deceased) stated that on the morning of 27.12.2005, around 8 a.m., he left the house for work, pulling a rickshaw. His mother-in-law, a rag picker, also left after him. His wife and the Appellant remained inside the house. He clarified that the Appellant was not married to his mother-in-law and that his wife had been fostered by them. P.W.10 returned home at around 5 p.m. and noticed the house locked. He usually kept the house key on the window pan, but that day the key was missing. Peering through the door gap, he saw a body inside. He broke the lock and entered, discovering the dead body of his wife with cut injuries on the left ear, right cheek, neck, and back, and heavy bleeding. Her saree, saya, and blouse were soaked in blood. He found a hammer (M.O.VI), a spade (M.O.IX), an iron slab with a hole (M.O.VIII), two knives (M.O.X, M.O.XI), and a screwdriver (M.O.VII), all blood stained, near the body. He immediately called nearby shopkeeper Rahamat and one K. Sahu. His mother-in-law was sitting outside the house at the time. Despite her objections, he went to the police station and lodged a written report, which was scribed by one Kishore Tanty under his instructions. The FIR was marked Ext.1. Police took photographs the

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next day. He stated that he married the deceased on 09.11.2005 and resided at Pipilimal before moving to Ahmad Nagar about a month prior to the incident, upon the Appellant’s invitation promising him a job. While they lived happily for about 15 days, the Appellant later began assaulting the deceased. When P.W.10 objected, he was also threatened. His wife had expressed fear and only agreed to disclose details if they lived separately. When he found a rented house, the Appellant did not allow them to leave. After the incident, the Appellant was found lying on a bridge at Brajarajnagar after consuming poison. He was admitted to a hospital and subsequently arrested. P.W.10 further stated that the deceased had confided that the Appellant used to call her at night to massage him, including his private parts, and that he would peep through the door whenever the couple was intimate. In cross-examination, P.W.10 stated that he had studied up to Class VII. He confirmed asking Kishore to write the FIR. He was working as an apprentice in a hotel at the time and was a trolley rickshaw puller. He denied keeping any tools like hooks or hammers used for work. He reiterated that the Appellant had informed them on the morning of the incident that he would keep the items they needed to carry for relocation. He also denied the suggestion that he killed his wife instead of the Appellant.

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D.W.1, the foster mother of the deceased, deposed that on the day of the incident, her husband (the Appellant) had left the house early in the morning for work. She stated that by the time she also left the house, the deceased and her husband (P.W.10) were still present inside. On the way, the Appellant informed her that he was going to Calcutta. According to her, two days after the occurrence, the Appellant returned from Calcutta. She then informed him about the deceased’s murder and that P.W.10 is accusing Appellant not only of

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the murder but also of having had an illicit relationship with the deceased. Upon hearing this, the Appellant was shocked and expressed that he would not show his face again, and walked away towards Brajarajnagar, saying he would commit suicide.

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In her cross-examination, D.W.1 clarified that the deceased was not her biological daughter. She stated that she had adopted Pinky as an infant after finding her abandoned by her mentally ill biological mother near Rourkela railway bridge. She also described her personal history, stating that she was originally from Howrah, had left her first husband Ramu Rao, and had been living with the Appellant as his partner for over 20 years. D.W.1 stated that on the evening of the incident, she was sitting in the verandah when her son-in-law returned. The house was locked and the Appellant was not present. The lock was broken open after the police arrived. She stated that the Appellant was brought to the police station four days later. She further confirmed that the room where the deceased was found dead was shared by the deceased and her husband, while she and the Appellant used to sleep in the verandah. D.W.1 denied all suggestions made in cross-examination about the Appellant being sexually exploitative towards the deceased, or that he had assaulted the deceased or herself. She also denied the suggestion that her testimony was false or that she was deposing under the influence of the Appellant.

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Coming to the culpability of the Accused-Respondents, the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, and it is trite law that in a case of circumstantial evidence, before reaching a conclusion, the Court is required to examine the evidence on the touchstone of the decision reported in the matter of Sharad Birdhi

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Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 –

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“3:3. Before a case against an accused vesting on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established the following conditions must be fulfilled as laid down in Hanumant’s v. State of M.P. [1953] SCR 1091.

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The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;

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The facts so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

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The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

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They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

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There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

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These five golden principles constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and in the absence of a corpus deliciti.

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Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 1091; Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1969] 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656; and Shivaji Sahabrao Babode & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [1973] 2 SCC 793 referred to.

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3:4. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no pure moral conviction.”

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One of the circumstances appearing in the prosecution case is with regard to the last-seen theory. While appreciating the prosecution

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case, in this regard, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Satpal vs. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 6SCC 610, para 6 , as under: –

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“Criminal jurisprudence and the plethora of judicial precedents leave little room for reconsideration of the basic principles for invocation of the last seen theory as a facet of circumstantial evidence. Succinctly stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence by itself to found conviction upon the same singularly. But when it is coupled with other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accused owes an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances under which death may have been taken place. If the accused offers no explanation, or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and there is corroborative evidence available inter alia in the form of recovery or otherwise forming a chain of circumstances leading to the only inference for guilt of the accused, incompatible with any possible hypothesis of innocence, conviction can be based on the same. If there be any doubt or break in the link of chain of circumstance, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Each case will therefore have to be examined on its own facts for invocation of the doctrine”

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In the instant case, a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals significant gaps and inconsistencies that weaken the evidentiary value of this theory. P.W.10, the husband of the deceased, stated that on the morning of 27.12.2005, he had left the house around 8:00 a.m. for work, and his mother-in-law also left soon after for rag picking, leaving the deceased and the accused alone in the house. While this assertion attempts to place the Appellant in the exclusive company of the deceased at the relevant time, it is unsupported by any independent or corroborative testimony. None of

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the neighbouring witnesses, including P.W.2, P.W.3, or P.W.4, have categorically deposed to having seen the deceased and the Appellant together on the morning of the incident. P.W.2, whose house is a fiveminute walk from the scene, explicitly denied having seen the deceased that day. P.W.3, a shopkeeper situated adjacent to the house, did not witness any unusual activity or interaction between the Appellant and the deceased during the day and only came to know of the incident after being informed by P.W.10 in the evening. P.W.4 arrived at the scene only after the door was broken open and also did not support the last seen theory. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating the exact time of death of the deceased to narrow the window of occurrence and connect it definitively with the Appellant’s presence. The prosecution has also failed to establish whether the Appellant was continuously present in the house until the discovery of the dead body. In the absence of any clear and unblemished chain of circumstances to prove that the Appellant was the last person seen with the deceased in proximity to the time of death, the “last seen” theory loses its probative force. It remains a mere suspicion and cannot, by itself, form the basis of conviction unless corroborated by other clinching evidence, which, in this case, is lacking.

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The second circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the recovery of a brown coloured pant, allegedly stained with blood, found near the dead body at the scene of occurrence. It is contended that this pant belonged to the Appellant and thereby links him to the offence. However, this piece of evidence fails to advance the prosecution’s case in any meaningful way due to the absence of conclusive proof regarding its ownership. None of the prosecution witnesses have deposed with certainty that the said pant belonged to the Appellant. No witness has stated that they had ever seen the

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Appellant wearing that particular pant, nor has the prosecution adduced any material evidence such as prior photographs, identification, or any statement by the Appellant acknowledging ownership. The mere presence of the pant at the scene, even if stained with blood, cannot by itself establish a nexus with the Appellant in the absence of such proof.

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Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the house in which the offence took place was not exclusively occupied by the Appellant. The deceased was residing there with her husband, the informant (P.W.10), as well as her foster parents, including the Appellant. In such a shared domestic setup, it is entirely plausible and even expected that clothing and other personal effects of different individuals would be found in common areas. This dilutes the evidentiary value of the pant being found near the body, as a different and more plausible hypothesis, such as the pant belonging to the informant himself or another family member cannot be ruled out. The prosecution has failed to exclude these reasonable alternatives. In a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, where every link in the chain must be firmly established and lead only to the guilt of the Appellant, the ambiguity surrounding the ownership of the brown pant renders this circumstance inconclusive and insufficient to support the prosecution’s narrative.

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The prosecution has further sought to establish motive by suggesting that the Appellant, being the foster father of the deceased, harboured inappropriate intentions towards her, which ultimately led to her murder. This allegation is primarily based on the testimony of P.W.10, the husband of the deceased, who stated that the Appellant used to call the deceased at night to massage him, including his

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private parts, and that he would peep through the door when the couple was intimate. He further alleged that the deceased had confided in him about the Appellant’s behaviour and had expressed a desire to live separately.

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However, even assuming that there was some discord or discomfort within the household, mere allegations of improper conduct, without any supporting evidence, are not sufficient to establish motive strong enough to impel the Appellant to commit murder. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing a motive of sexual misconduct on the part of the Appellant towards the deceased, that by itself cannot suffice to establish a motive for committing murder. The motive to commit sexual assault and the motive to commit homicide are distinct, each requiring its own set of circumstances and evidentiary support. Moreover, P.W.10 and the deceased had only recently moved into the house and were residing there for barely a month prior to the incident. During that short span, there is no evidence of any formal complaint or effort to distance themselves from the Appellant despite the alleged advances. No neighbour or third party has testified about any tension, quarrels, or observable discomfort between the deceased and the Appellant. The prosecution has also not explained why the Appellant, if truly driven by such a motive, would act in broad daylight in a shared home, and leave behind multiple incriminating objects without making any attempt to conceal the evidence.

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In cases resting on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes particular significance. It must be clear, cogent, and supported by the overall factual matrix. In the present case, the prosecution’s assertion of motive appears speculative and fails to inspire confidence. The

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testimony of P.W.10, being uncorroborated and delayed, does not rise above the threshold of suspicion. In the absence of independent verification or prior consistent statements, the alleged motive remains weak and unconvincing, further loosening the chain of circumstances necessary for establishing the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

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It is further noted that the prosecution’s own medical evidence undercuts the possibility of any sexual assault being the reason or trigger for the homicidal act. P.W.8, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, has clearly stated that the deceased was not subjected to sexual assault. When specifically questioned on this aspect, he categorically ruled out any signs of sexual violence. The injuries found on the deceased though undoubtedly homicidal in nature and caused by sharp and blunt weapons, do not indicate any struggle or resistance typically associated with sexual violence. This medical opinion significantly weakens the prosecution’s narrative of motive, leaving a wide evidentiary gap. When the alleged motive itself is neither established convincingly nor supported by objective medical evidence, it would be unsafe to draw adverse inferences against the Appellant solely on the basis of suspicion. As such, the prosecution’s case in respect of motive remains speculative and unsubstantiated.

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Furthermore, in considering the defence version, the testimony of D.W.1, the foster mother of the deceased, also merits attention. While the version of D.W.1, if true, could potentially displace the prosecution’s suggestion of the Appellant being present at the scene of the crime, her testimony does not conclusively establish his absence during the critical window of time. Her statement stands uncorroborated by any independent evidence such as travel details,

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witness accounts from Calcutta, or any proof of his location during the alleged period of absence. Further, being the long-time partner of the Appellant, her testimony cannot be viewed as wholly disinterested. Although her narrative offers an alternative possibility, it does not, by itself, firmly rebut the prosecution’s case or sufficiently establish an alibi. At best, it adds to the uncertainties already present in the prosecution’s version, reinforcing the existence of reasonable doubt rather than providing a definitive exoneration.

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It is also relevant to note that the Appellant was later found lying unconscious on a bridge at Brajarajnagar, having allegedly consumed poison. While the prosecution seeks to attribute this act as a sign of guilt, the defence submits that such conduct, in isolation, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of involvement in the crime. The circumstances surrounding the alleged suicide attempt remain unclear, and no medical or forensic evidence has been placed on record to definitively establish that the Appellant’s act was directly linked to the incident in question. In the absence of corroborative evidence, such conduct may at best raise suspicion, but falls short of the standard required to infer guilt.

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While the death of the deceased is undeniably tragic and the cause of death clearly homicidal in nature, the settled principles of criminal law require that the prosecution must prove its case against the Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. As reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 , in a case based solely on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete, each link must be established with clarity, and the entire sequence must point unerringly to the guilt of the Appellant, ruling out every

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possible hypothesis of innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to meet this threshold. The last seen theory is not established by consistent or corroborated evidence, the blood-stained pant allegedly recovered from the spot is not proven to be one belonging to the Appellant, the motive remains speculative in light of the post-mortem findings which rule out sexual assault, and the recovery of weapons is also doubtful. These glaring gaps and inconsistencies render the prosecution’s case insufficient to establish the guilt of the Appellant with the degree of certainty the law requires, and thereby entails a benefit of doubt in favour of the Appellant.

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In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, and the evidence on record falls short of the standard required to fasten criminal liability.

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Accordingly, the judgment and order of conviction dated 28.11.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jharsuguda, is hereby set aside. The Appeal is allowed. The Appellant, is acquitted of the charge under section 302 of IPC, who is in jail custody be released forthwith unless required in connection with any other case.

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(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

¶120

A.K.Pradhan/Bijay Signature Not Verified

¶121

Digitally Signed Signed by: BIJAY KETAN SAHOO JCRLA No. 23 of 2007 Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORI SSA Date: 29-Apr-2025 17:18:03

¶122

Page 19 of 19

Rajendra Jain v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Rajendra Jain v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

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