Goli Vs State

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRA No. 193 of 1997

(Arising out of the Judgment of conviction dated 01^st August, 1997, passed by Sri P. Patra, 1^st Addl. Sessions Judge, Puri, in S. T. Case No.20/122 of 1995/1992 & S. T. Case No. 21/246 of 1995/1992, for the offence under section 302/379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860)

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Rankanidhi Nayak and …. Appellants Others Mr. D. P. Dhal, Sr. Advocate For App.1 Mr. D. Nayak, Sr. Advocate along with Ms. Bini Mishra & Ms. Anwesha Mishra For Apps.2, 3 & 4 Mr. D. Panda, Advocate For App.5 -versus…. State of Odisha Respondent Mr. Aurobindo Mohanty Additional Standing Counsel

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CRA No. 47 of 1998

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(Arising out of the Judgment of conviction dated 01^st August, 1997, passed by Sri P. Patra, 1^st Addl. Sessions Judge, Puri, in S. T. Case No.20/122 of 1995/1992 & S. T. Case No. 21/246 of 1995/1992, for the offence under section 302/379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860)

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Goli @ Golakha Padhan and …. Appellants Others

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Mr. D. Nayak, Sr. Advocate Along with Ms. Bini Mishra & Ms. Anwesha Mishra For Apps.1 & 4

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CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998 Page 1 of 44

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Mr. H.S. Mishra, Advocate For App.6

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-versus-

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State of Odisha

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…. Respondent

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Mr. Aurobindo Mohanty Additional Standing Counsel

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CORAM:

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. K. SAHOO THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

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Date of Judgment: 11.09.2025

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Chittaranjan Dash, J.

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These Appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 30.07.1997 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No.20/122 of 1995/1992 and S.T. Case No.21/246 of 1995/1995. By the said judgment, the Appellants, namely, Rankanidhi Naik, Madhaba Pradhan, Kalu @ Durjodhan Pradhan, Abhi @ Rabi Pradhan, Kishore Chandra Pradhan, Dandu Pradhan, Subal Pradhan, Goli @ Golakha Pradhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Harihar Pradhan, Ladu Kishore Kar and Madhu Pradhan, were tried for the offences punishable under Sections 341/302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act.

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In order to appreciate the grievance of the Appellants, it is necessary to notice how the present Appeals came to be preferred. Two separate Criminal Appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 30.07.1997 passed by the learned 1st

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Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No.20/122 of 1995/1992 and S.T. Case No.21/246 of 1995/1995. Criminal Appeal No.193 of 1997 has been filed by accused–Rankanidhi Nayak, Madhaba Pradhan, Dandu Pradhan, Subala Pradhan and Kalu @ Durjodhan Pradhan, whereas Criminal Appeal No.47 of 1998 has been filed by accused–Goli @ Golakha Pradhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Harihar Pradhan, Kishore Chandra Pradhan, Abhi @ Abhimanyu Pradhan, Ladu Kishore Kar and Madhu @ Manu Pradhan.

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Since both the Appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 30.07.1997, they were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the facts are being taken from Criminal Appeal No.193 of 1997, unless otherwise indicated.

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Before the Appeals were taken up for hearing, it was reported that Appellants, namely, Bidhubhusan Pattnaik, Harihar Pradhan, Abhi @ Abhimanyu @ Rabi Pradhan and Ladu Kishore Kar in CRA No.47 of 1998, and Appellant Madhu Pradhan in CRA No.193 of 1997 had expired. Consequently, the Appeals stood abated as against them. However, since the near relatives of Appellant No.6 – Ladu Kishore Kar (CRA No.47 of 1998), namely his wife Haramani Kar and son Sachidananda Kar, expressed their intention to continue the Appeal, the same is being prosecuted at their instance.

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Accordingly, the present judgment is confined to the surviving Appellants, namely Rankanidhi Nayak, Madhaba

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Page 3 of 44

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Pradhan, Dandu Pradhan, Subala Pradhan and Kalu @ Durjodhan Pradhan in CRA No.193 of 1997, and Goli @ Golakha Pradhan and Kishore Chandra Pradhan in CRA No.47 of 1998.

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With the surviving Appellants thus identified, it is next necessary to advert to the nature of charges framed against them. Two sets of charges were framed by the learned trial court. While Appellant Rankanidhi Nayak faced an individual charge under Section 302 IPC, all the Appellants together, including Rankanidhi Nayak, faced charges under Sections 341/302/34 IPC and Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act. The accused having pleaded not guilty, the trial proceeded against them.

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The prosecution case, as unfolded before the learned trial court, is that on 28.06.1991, one Prafulla Kumar Kar (P.W.5) lodged an oral report before the Officer-in-Charge, Saranakul Police Station, stating that at about 4:00 p.m. on that day, he, along with the deceased Bhagirathi Pradhan and one Golakha Pradhan (P.W.1), had been to Godipada Bazar to purchase grocery articles. While returning to the village at about 6:00 p.m., Bhagirathi was riding a cycle separately, while Golakha (P.W.1) rode another cycle with the Informant (P.W.5) as pillion rider. When they reached village Sanagorada, they found accused persons Subal Pradhan, Rankanidhi Naik, Dandu Pradhan, Durjodhan @ Kalu Pradhan and Madhaba Pradhan standing in front of the cabin of Subala. The Informant and Golakha crossed the shop without any incident, but when the deceased Bhagirathi followed them, accused Rankanidhi Naik suddenly dealt a farsa blow on his back. Bhagirathi

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abandoned his cycle and attempted to run away, but two to three persons obstructed his path, whereupon Rankanidhi delivered another farsa blow on his left cheek, severing his ear, causing him to fall down. Thereafter, Kalu @ Durjodhan, Dandu and Subal assaulted him with farsa and kati , while Madhaba Pradhan assaulted him with bhali bhusa . Bhagirathi, lying on the ground, was indiscriminately attacked until he succumbed on the spot. On witnessing the assault, Golakha (P.W.1) fled to save his life. Villagers who attempted to reach the spot were deterred by hurling of bombs by accused Kishore Chandra Pradhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Harihar Pradhan, Abhi @ Rabi Pradhan and Goli @ Golakha Pradhan. It also surfaced that there had been a prior dispute between the accused and the Informant party concerning deity property, which was apparently resolved through intervention of village elders; however, the deceased was instrumental in pressing for settlement, which led to lingering animosity against him. The oral report of the Informant was reduced into writing by the OIC vide Ext.9 and, on the same night, treated as FIR. It is revealed from the records that prior thereto, P.W.4 had already informed the Police Station about the assault at 8:30 p.m., which was entered in the Station Diary vide Entry No.507. Thereafter, upon receiving the oral report, the OIC sent it to the Police Station for formal registration, whereupon S.I. B.P. Das registered Saranakul P.S. Case No.47 of 1991.

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In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer examined the complainant at the spot along with P.W.4-Uday Nath

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Kar, who had earlier informed the police. Learning that the deceased had been shifted to PHC, Saranakul, the I.O. sent information to guard the dead body at the hospital. He visited the scene of occurrence, seized blood-stained bamboo lathi, unexploded bombs, remnants of exploded bombs and other incriminating articles under seizure lists, and also examined witnesses present. From the house of Subal Pradhan and Dandu Pradhan, the weapons of offence and other articles were seized under seizure lists (Exts.7 and 8). The I.O. conducted inquest over the dead body (Ext.13) and sent it for post-mortem examination to Nayagarh Hospital under dead body challan (Ext.14). He also prepared the spot map, seized blood-stained clothes of the deceased handed over after postmortem, and arrested several accused persons, forwarding them to court. Some accused were arrested later on 15.08.1991. The incriminating articles were sent for chemical examination through court vide forwarding report (Ext.17). On completion of investigation, the I.O. submitted charge sheet against the accused persons, showing Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Harihar Pradhan, Ladu Kishore Kar and Madhaba Pradhan as absconders.

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The case of the defence is one of complete denial and false implications attributing it to the prior animosity. It is further plea of the defence that no such occurrence took place in Nuasahi, Sanagorada, the spot alleged.

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To bring home the charges, the prosecution examined ten witnesses in all. Among them, P.Ws.1, 5, and 6 were projected as eye-witnesses to the occurrence, with P.W.5 being the Informant.

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P.Ws.2 and 3, both co-villagers, were examined as seizure witnesses. P.W.4, another co-villager, deposed that he had informed the police regarding the assault on the deceased on the basis of what he had heard from village sources; his information was recorded in the Station Diary, pursuant to which the police proceeded to the place of occurrence. P.W.7, the father of the deceased, was examined as a formal witness. P.W.8, the Medical Officer, conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased. P.W.9 was the Investigating Officer, and P.W.10, an A.S.I. of Sarankula Police Station, proved the Station Diary entry. The prosecution further relied upon documentary evidence marked as Exts.1 to 20 and material objects marked as M.O.I to M.O.XIII.

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The defence, on the other hand, did not examine any witnesses, but exhibited and proved eight documents marked as Exts.A to F.

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The learned trial court, upon appreciation of evidence, found all the accused persons guilty of the charges and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302/34 IPC. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Section 341 IPC. Further, Appellants Goli @ Golakha Pradhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Abhi @ Rabi Pradhan, Harihar Pradhan and Kishore Chandra Pradhan were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each for the offence under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act, with a direction that all the sentences shall run concurrently.

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Mr. D. Panda, learned counsel appearing for Appellant No.5 in Criminal Appeal No.193 of 1997, took the lead in assailing the judgment in its entirety. He argued that the prosecution has utterly failed to establish any motive for the alleged crime. Drawing attention to the FIR, he submitted that although there was some past animosity between the Appellant and the Informant party concerning endowment property, the same had already been amicably resolved through a compromise. Therefore, on the date of occurrence, there existed no dispute, and in the absence of motive, the prosecution evidence required closer scrutiny. Mr. Panda next dissected the testimonies of the eye-witnesses P.Ws.1, 5, and 6, and urged that their versions were riddled with contradictions, exaggerations, and improvements. He pointed out that P.W.1 did not implicate several accused such as Madhu Pradhan, Ladu Kar, or Bidhubhusan Pattnaik as having obstructed the deceased when he attempted to flee. Likewise, P.W.6 contradicted himself by failing to mention before the I.O. that P.Ws.1 and 5 were on one cycle, though in court he stated they were going ahead of the deceased. He further highlighted omissions by P.W.6 in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., including details about the weapons allegedly held by individual accused and the supposed presence of the accused near Subala’s shop. According to Mr. Panda, P.W.6 introduced new allegations during trial, such as all five accused chasing Bhagirathi and others obstructing him, which were not part of his earlier version, rendering his testimony unreliable. Mr. Panda also argued that the place of occurrence itself was doubtful, given that the direction in which the deceased was said to be travelling did

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not align with the location of his house, and the testimony of the socalled eye-witnesses suggested an incident in Nuasahi, Sanagorada, which, according to him, never occurred.

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Mr. Panda further contended that the prosecution evidence on weapons was wholly inconsistent with the medical evidence. While witnesses described the use of farsa , kati , and bhali , the postmortem findings did not corroborate such use. He asserted that this inconsistency demonstrates a concocted case built to falsely implicate the Appellants on account of prior enmity. He also stressed that the inquest report, prepared at the earliest point of time, contained no names of assailants, merely mentioning that “some assailants killed him” as endorsed by the brother of the deceased, which cast serious doubt on the subsequent versions of the prosecution witnesses. Mr. Panda then drew attention to the delay in the examination of P.W.6, which, in his view, was unexplained and fatal to the prosecution, particularly since P.W.6’s testimony contained clear embellishments beyond his prior statements. He further urged that material witnesses, such as the Gramarakhi who allegedly called the Informant to lodge the FIR, and persons from the sahi where the incident occurred, were withheld from examination. This, he submitted, fatally affected the credibility of the prosecution case. In summation, Mr. Panda’s argument was that the prosecution case was riddled with contradictions, exaggerations, suppression of witnesses, and inconsistencies with medical evidence, and hence the conviction was wholly unsustainable.

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Mr. Dhal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Appellant No.1 in CRA 193 of 1997, while broadly supporting Mr. Panda’s submissions, supplemented them by drawing the Court’s attention to further contradictions in the evidence. He particularly emphasised discrepancies in the seizure of incriminating articles such as the cycle, pointing out that the version of seizure did not tally with the testimony of the supposed witnesses and lacked consistency. According to him, these contradictions undermined the prosecution case materially and indicated that the evidence was neither cogent nor trustworthy. He contended that when the foundational evidence regarding seizure and place of occurrence was shaky, the entire edifice of the prosecution must collapse.

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Mr. D. Nayak, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Appellants 2, 3 and 4 in CRA No.193 of 1997 and Appellants 1 and 4 in CRA No.47 of 1998, assailed the judgment of conviction primarily on the ground that the prosecution evidence suffers from inherent contradictions and exaggerations, rendering the version of the alleged eyewitnesses wholly unreliable. He submitted that there is no clear and consistent attribution of overt acts to the present Appellants and that their names appear to have been introduced by way of improvements at different stages of investigation. Mr. Nayak argued that the inquest report does not contain any reference to these Appellants, which creates a serious doubt about their participation. He further argued that the medical evidence is not in complete harmony with the ocular version, and therefore the ocular account should not be accepted at its face value. He also contended that the delay in recording the statement of material witnesses under

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Section 161 CrPC casts grave suspicion on the authenticity of their testimony, thereby opening scope for tutoring and false implication. Additionally, reliance was placed on the settled principle that when the substratum of the prosecution case is riddled with contradictions and embellishments, conviction cannot be sustained. On these premises, it was urged that the conviction of the present Appellants is unsustainable in law and that they deserve the benefit of doubt. 15. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for Appellant No.6-Ladu Kishore Kar, advanced distinct arguments specific to him. He submitted that the prosecution evidence is conspicuously silent regarding the presence of Ladu Kishore Kar at the place of occurrence. His name was absent from the earlier statements of key witnesses, and only one witness made a stray and sporadic reference to him as having obstructed the deceased, which cannot be relied upon to establish participation in a murder. Mr. Mishra further contended that the allegations of his client having hurled bombs were not consistently supported across the testimonies of the eye-witnesses, each of whom gave divergent accounts. In such circumstances, the learned trial court, according to him, committed serious error in holding Appellant No.6 guilty. The absence of consistent and corroborated evidence, in his submission, makes the conviction of Ladu Kishore Kar wholly unsustainable in law.

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All learned counsel for the Appellants also raised a common grievance that the accused were not properly confronted with incriminating circumstances during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They urged that vital and material circumstances relied

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upon by the prosecution were never put to the Appellants, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to explain the same. This, according to them, caused serious prejudice to the defence and vitiated the trial, furnishing further ground for acquittal.

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In reply, Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the State, strenuously supported the impugned judgment as being wellreasoned, lawful, and firmly grounded in the evidence adduced during trial. He submitted that the testimonies of the eye-witnesses, namely P.Ws.1, 5, and 6, were consistent, coherent, and mutually corroborative, and clearly implicated the Appellants as the assailants. According to him, their evidence, being natural and trustworthy, ought to be given full weight, particularly when it stood unshaken in material particulars during cross-examination. Addressing the defence contention regarding medical evidence, Mr. Mohanty argued that the version of P.W.8, the doctor, as recorded in his post-mortem report (Ext.11) and deposed in examination-inchief, is clear, cogent, and in line with the ocular version of the prosecution witnesses. The minor variations in his oral testimony during cross-examination, according to him, could not outweigh the otherwise reliable medical findings corroborated by documentary evidence. He urged that when direct eye-witness testimony of a consistent nature is available, opinion evidence such as that of the doctor cannot override or dilute the substantive evidence of occurrence.

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Mr. Mohanty further submitted that the alleged discrepancies highlighted by the defence in respect of weapons or place of occurrence are not material and do not go to the root of the

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prosecution case. The injuries on the vital parts of the deceased, as proved by the doctor, were never disputed, and the mere question whether they were inflicted by a farsa , katari , or other sharp-cutting weapon is inconsequential when the collective evidence unmistakably establishes homicidal assault. He also rebutted the argument regarding Section 313 Cr.P.C., submitting that the questions put to the Appellants were sufficient to afford them an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances. Mr. Mohanty thus maintained that the prosecution had successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction recorded by the learned trial court was justified, and the Appeals deserve to be dismissed.

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Now, it is incumbent for this Court, since all the Appellants stood charged under Section 302 IPC, to first examine whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. In this regard, apart from the ocular testimony of P.Ws.1, 5, and 6, the medical evidence adduced through P.W.8 assumes significance. P.W.8, the Medical Officer, deposed that on 29.06.1991, while serving as Assistant Surgeon at the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Nayagarh, he conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased, namely, Bhagirathi Kar, son of Fakira Kar of village Badagarda, Saranakula, District– Nayagarh P.S. The post-mortem commenced at about 1:00 p.m. on the said date. The dead body was identified by Constable No.378, M. Senapati, the Gramarakhi Sukuru Naik, and Brajabandhu Kar, the brother of the deceased. According to P.W.8, the deceased was aged about 40 years. During autopsy, the doctor recorded the following findings:

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Average body built, rigour mortis present on all limbs, on the right hand.

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(i) Incised wound 4”× 1”×2” on the middle of the forearm by sharp weapon. All muscles and bones have been divided.

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(ii) Incised would 4”× 1 ×” ×1” on lateral aspect of the elbow joint by sharp weapon.

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(iii) Incised wound 3”× 1”× 2” on the middle of the right hand, by sharp weapons.

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(iv) All muscles and bones of the right hand are divided.

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(v) Incised wound 3”×1” × 2” on the right wrist joint. The hand is separated from the right forearm, by sharp weapon.

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HEAD

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(i) Incised wound 3”×½”×1” scalp depth in oblique direction behind the left ear by sharp weapon.

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(ii) Incised wound 4”×1”×1” scalp depth behind the right ear in oblique direction, by sharp weapon.

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(iii) Incised wound 9”×3”×3” extending from the right angle of the mouth to left process. All muscles and tissues are divided, by sharp weapon.

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ON BACK

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(i) Incised would 3” × ½” × 1” on right scapular region.

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(ii) Incised wound 3” × ½” × 1” on the left scapular region. LEFT LEG

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(i) Incised would 4 “×1”× 2 ½ ” above left ankle joint, all the muscles and bones are divided by sharp weapon.

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(ii) Incised wound 3”× ½” × 1 ½” on dorsum of the left foot. 1st and 2nd metacarpal bones are divided.

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(iii) Incised wound 4”× 1”×1 ½” on upper portion of the left patella.

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RIGHT LEG

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(i) Incised wound 4”×1”×2 ½ ×” above the right ankle joint. All muscles and bones are divided by sharp weapon.

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(ii) Incised wound 5”×1” ×½” on medial part of the right knee.

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(iii) Incised wound 3”×2”×2” on first right metacarpal bone. The bone is completely divided by sharp weapon.

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(iv) Incised wound 2”× ½” × ½” on the left leg 2” below the tibial tuberosity.

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P.W.8 opined that the cause of death was hemoerrhagic shock resulting from multiple injuries inflicted by sharp weapons, and that the injuries were homicidal in nature. He further stated that the time since death was within 24 hours of his examination, proved the post-mortem report (Ext.11), and confirmed that all injuries were ante-mortem and dangerous to life. He specified that farsa and katari are sharp-cutting weapons, and injuries to the head being on a vital part of the body were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to him, the weapons produced before him (one katari , one sickle, one farsa , and one tangi ) could have caused the injuries found on the deceased, to which he responded in the affirmative upon query by the police. Although the defence raised objections to this opinion, it did not dispute either the nature of the injuries or the fact that the death was homicidal. Further, P.Ws.1, 5, and 6 consistently deposed to having witnessed the assault on the deceased resulting in his death. Taken cumulatively, therefore, the medical and ocular evidence leaves no room for doubt that the death of the deceased was homicidal, and the finding of the learned trial court to that effect stands affirmed.

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In a case where the charge of murder is alleged and the fact of homicidal death is established, the next question that arises for consideration is whether the Appellants were the perpetrators of the crime.

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Having heard the arguments advanced by the respective parties, this Court finds it imperative to deal with the evidence led before the learned trial court. Since the focus of arguments has primarily been on the credibility of the eye-witness account, at the very first instance it becomes necessary to examine the testimony and reliability of the eye-witnesses. It is trite that this Court, while assessing credibility of testimony, takes into account factors such as internal consistency, corroboration from other sources, and demeanour, so as to determine whether such evidence can be classified as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or requiring cautious corroboration. Before proceeding further, it is therefore appropriate to recapitulate the testimony of P.Ws.1, 5, and 6, on which the prosecution case essentially rests.

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P.W.1 deposed that on 28.06.1991 at about 4:00 p.m., he, along with Prafulla Kar (P.W.5) and the deceased Bhagirathi Kar, went to Godipada to purchase groceries on two cycles. While returning at about 6:00 p.m., Bhagirathi was riding one cycle, and P.W.1 another, with P.W.5 seated as pillion rider. They were ahead of Bhagirathi when, on reaching near the grocery shop of Appellant-Subala Pradhan, they noticed several accused persons standing there, namely, Ranka Naik, Subala Padhan, Madhaba Padhan, Dandu Padhan, and Durjyodhan @ Kalu Padhan. While P.W.1 and P.W.5 crossed the spot without incident, Bhagirathi, who

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followed them, was suddenly struck by Appellant-Ranka Naik with a farsa blow on his back. Bhagirathi ran a short distance throwing his cycle, but was obstructed by Madhu Padhan, Ladu Kishore Kar, and Madhusudan Patnaik, whereupon Appellant-Rankanidhi Pradhan assaulted him with a farsa on the left ear, which was half severed. The witness reiterated that once Bhagirathi fell to the ground, Ranka Naik, Subala Pradhan, Dandu Padhan, Madhaba Padhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Ladu Kishore Kar, and Madhu Padhan surrounded and dealt multiple farsa blows, while Subala wielded a kati and Madhaba a Bhali Bhusa. Bhagirathi succumbed on the spot. Out of fear, P.W.1 fled to his sahi.

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He further deposed that police arrived at 9:00 p.m., seized blood-stained earth, sample earth, one Hawai chappal (M.O.I) and a wrist watch (M.O.II) of the deceased, both identified by him. Police also seized two bamboo lathis with bloodstains, two live bombs from near the house of Kirtan Padhan, and bomb remnants from near the house of Sambari Naik.

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In cross-examination, the defence elicited that all accused persons belonged to Nua Sahi, while all non-official witnesses were from his sahi. He admitted to past disputes between Puruna Sahi and Nua Sahi since 16.10.1990 but claimed they were then on talking terms. He also conceded that while passing the accused near the shop, neither he nor P.W.5 was threatened or assaulted, nor was any abusive word hurled. He admitted that he only heard Bhagirathi’s scream upon the first blow. He denied defence suggestions that he had not stated before police about obstruction

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by Madhu Padhan, Ladu Kar, and Bidhubhusan Patnaik, or that he falsely implicated the Appellants due to village rivalry.

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P.W.5 , corroborating P.W.1, stated that on 28.06.1991 at about 4:00 p.m., he accompanied P.W.1 and deceased Bhagirathi to Godipada Bazar, returning around 6:00 p.m.. While he was pillion on P.W.1’s cycle, Bhagirathi followed them on his own. On reaching Subala Padhan’s shop, he saw Appellants Subala, Madhaba, Dandu, Rankanidhi, and Durjyodhan @ Kalu assembled there. As Bhagirathi passed, Rankanidhi struck him with a farsa on the back. Bhagirathi ran but was obstructed by two to three persons, following which Rankanidhi dealt another blow on his left cheek, severing his ear, causing him to fall. Thereafter, Subala with kati , Dandu with farsa , Kalu with farsa , and Madhu with Bhali Bhusa surrounded and indiscriminately assaulted him, leading to his death.

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He further deposed that bombs were thrown by Guli Padhan, Bidhubhusan Patnaik, Abhimanu Padhan, Harihar Padhan, and Kishore Padhan at people coming from his sahi, preventing them from reaching the spot. At about 9:00 p.m., police recorded his report, which he signed, and seized blood-stained earth, a chappal (M.O.I), and wrist watch (M.O.II) of the deceased, along with bombs and weapons including sickle, kati , farsa , tangia , and bhusa from various houses.

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In cross-examination, he conceded inability to name the persons obstructing Bhagirathi at the first instance but maintained that 2-3 persons did so. He admitted to leaving the spot with his cycle and groceries and informing his sahi, who rushed to the spot

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but were driven back by bombs. He denied defence suggestions that Bhagirathi had kidnapped a girl named Tuni, or that he and others killed Bhagirathi themselves and falsely implicated the Appellants. He reiterated that police visited the village for 15 days, seizing several items, and denied suggestions of planting evidence.

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P.W.6 stated that he saw Bhagirathi following P.Ws.1 and 5 on cycle when, near Subala Padhan’s shop, the accused persons including Subala, Madhaba, Ranka Naik, Durjodhan, and Bidhubhusan surrounded and chased Bhagirathi. As he fled, Kishore, Abhi, Ladu Kar, and Madhu obstructed him, whereupon Rankanidhi dealt a farsa blow on his left ear from behind, causing him to fall. Thereafter, Abhi, Madhu, Ladu, Kishore, Ranka, Durjodhan, Subala, Madhaba, and Bidhubhusan assaulted him indiscriminately. He identified all Appellants during trial. He further stated that bombs were hurled at villagers by Bidhu, Kishore, Goli, and Harihar, and that Harihar threw Bhagirathi’s cycle into a well.

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In cross-examination, he admitted returning home immediately after the assault and staying there for 5-6 days though police were investigating nearby. He conceded strained relations between Puruna Sahi and Nua Sahi prior to the occurrence. He admitted giving a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. two months later, but denied defence suggestions that he had not named specific accused or weapons before police or magistrate. He stood firm that he witnessed the assault and denied that his testimony was false due to village rivalry.

¶117

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶118

Having regard to the rival submissions, it becomes necessary to test the ocular version led at trial against settled standards of appreciation. On a holistic reading, the versions of P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 are not only mutually consistent but also coherent on material particulars that form the substratum of the prosecution case, namely, the place, time, and surrounding circumstances of the occurrence, the manner of assault, the participation of the assailants, the nature of injuries, and the overall sequence of events. Each of these witnesses underwent lengthy and incisive cross-examination; yet, their core narratives withstood scrutiny and were not shaken so as to render them unreliable.

¶119

That said, the criticisms urged by the Appellants must be addressed to determine whether these witnesses fall in the category of wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or those requiring corroboration. The principal attack is that the witnesses had no occasion to be at or to pass through the precise spot where the incident is alleged to have occurred. This submission is rested on the spot map and on the relative location of their houses, it being suggested that, to reach their sahi , they would have taken a different route, and that the “seat of occurrence” has been contrived to facilitate false implication. This hypothesis does not advance the defence for more than one reason. First, beyond pointing to the map, no material was elicited in cross-examination of the witnesses, much less of the I.O. to demonstrate that the stated route was impossible, improbable, or inconsistent with the topography or the normal flow of movement at that time.

¶120

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶121

Page 20 of 44

¶122

Secondly, a site plan by itself is not substantive evidence; unless the I.O. is confronted on its preparation, measurements, and bearings, a mere theoretical reading of directions cannot prevail over consistent ocular testimony. Thirdly, no circumstance has been brought on record to show that the witnesses could not have taken the path they say they took or that they must have taken a different approach. In the absence of such material, the defence plea remains speculative. We therefore see no reason to disbelieve the consistent testimony that the assault occurred at Nua Sahi, village Sanagarada; the trial court’s finding on the place of occurrence is, thus, beyond reproach.

¶123

A further point raised by the defence concerns the alleged contradictions in the versions of the eyewitnesses, and the inconsistencies in their accounts as to the precise presence of the Appellants, the weapons carried, and the overt acts attributed to each.

¶124

In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 525 it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows:

¶125

“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of

¶126

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶127

Page 21 of 44

¶128

evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefore should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 105]. In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed : (SCC pp. 514-15)

¶129

‘10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.’

¶130

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶131

Page 22 of 44

¶132

In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of M.P. [(1999) 8 SCC 649 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 26] this Court observed : (SCC p. 656, para 24) ‘24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally nondiscrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.’

¶133

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan & Ors vs. State of Kerala , reported in (2025) 3 SCC 273 , has further fortified the law, as follows –

¶134

The law relating to material contradiction in witness testimony has been discussed by this Court in the judgment of Rammi vs State of MP¹ . It was held that:

¶135

(25)“It is common practice in trial court to make out contradictions from the previous statements. Merely Because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No Doubt Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. Only such of the inconsistent statement which is capable to be “contradicted” would affect the credit of the witness’’

¶136

1 1999 8 SCC 649

¶137

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶138

Page 23 of 44

¶139

The abovementioned settled position of law was again reiterated by this Court in the judgment of Birbal Nath vs State of Rajasthan² wherein it was held as under:

¶140

“(19) No doubt statement given before police during investigation under section 161 are “previous statements” under section 145 of the Evidence Act and therefore can be used to cross examine a witness. But this only for a limited purpose, to “contradict” such a witness. Even if the defense is successful in contradicting a witness, it would not always mean that the contradiction in her two statements would result in totally discrediting this witness. It is ere that we feel that the learned judges of the High Court have gone wrong.

¶141

(21) In the landmark case of Tehshildar Singh v State of UP³ this Court has held that to contradict a witness would mean to “discredit” a witness. Therefore, unless and until the former statement of this witness is capable of “discrediting” a witness, it would have little relevance. A mere variation in the two statements would not be enough to discredit a witness. This has been followed consistently by this Court in its later judgement, including Rammi (Supra) ”.

¶142

Either a partial, untrue version of one of the witnesses or an exaggerated version of a witness may not be a sole reason to discard the entire prosecution case which is otherwise supported by clinching evidence such as truthful version of the witnesses, medical evidence, recovery of the weapons etc. At this stage, it may not be out of place to refer to the principle called as ‘ falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ’.

¶143

It is a settled position that ‘ falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ’ (false in one thing, false in everything) that the above principle is foreign to our criminal law jurisprudence. This aspect has been considered by this Court in a plethora of judgements. In the case of Ram

¶144

2 2023 INSC 957

¶145

3 AIR 1959 SC 1012

¶146

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶147

Page 24 of 44

¶148

Vijay Singh vs State of UP⁴ , a Three Judge bench of this Hon’ble Court had held that:

¶149

“..(20) We do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant. A part statement of a witness can be believed even though some part of the statement may not be relied upon by the Court. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not the rile applied by the courts in India. This Court recently in a judgement IIangovan vs State of T.N. held that Indian Courts have always been reluctant to apply the principle as it is only a rile of caution. It was held as under: (SCC Pg 536, Para 11)”

¶150

“..(11) The Counsel for the Appellant lastly argued that once the witnesses had been disbelieved with respect to the co accused, their testimonies with respect to the present accused must also be discarded. The Counsel is, in effect, relying on the legal maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”, which Indian Courts have always been reluctant to apply. A three Judge bench of this Court, as far back as in 1957, in Nisar Ali v. State of UP, held on this point as follows (AIR p 368, Para 9-10)

¶151

“(9) This maxim has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of Caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.

¶152

(10) The Doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of Evidence”

¶153

(21) Therefore, merely because a prosecution witness was not believed in respect of another accused, the testimony if the said witness cannot be disregarded qua the present Appellant. Still, further it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine all the witnesses who might have witnessed the occurrence. It

¶154

4 2021 SCC Online SC 142.

¶155

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶156

Page 25 of 44

¶157

is the quality if evidence which is relevant in criminal trial and not the quantity.”

¶158

Hence, as can be seen from above, it has being a consistent stand of this Hon'ble Court that the principle ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ is not a rule of evidence and if the court inspires confidence from the rest of the testimony of such a witness, it can very well rely on such a part of the testimony and base a conviction upon it.”

¶159

This Court is mindful that in every criminal trial, minor variations in detail are bound to occur. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, discrepancies which do not go to the root of the prosecution case cannot obliterate otherwise trustworthy testimony. What must be seen is whether the evidence, taken as a whole, bears the “ring of truth” and is consistent on material particulars. Applying that principle here, the inconsistencies pointed out by the defence are too trivial and natural to dislodge the core of the prosecution case. It is in this context also relevant to recall the caution sounded by the Apex Court that no true eyewitness can escape making some discrepant statements when examined at length; rather, it is the tutored witness who may present a version free of all variation. Therefore, the presence of minor discrepancies or embellishments in the testimony of P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 is in fact a guarantee of their naturalness, not a ground for rejection. Unless contradictions are of such magnitude as to strike at the root of the case, they cannot be pressed to jettison otherwise credible evidence.

¶160

The defence criticism that some contradictions or omissions in police statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. necessarily discredit the witnesses is misplaced. The law is clear that only those

¶161

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶162

Page 26 of 44

¶163

inconsistencies which are capable of impeaching the credit of a witness can be used as “contradictions.” Mere variations or omissions in earlier statements do not suffice to discredit a witness in entirety. Even if a part of the testimony is found to be an exaggeration or inaccurate, the Court is well within its right to rely on the remainder, provided it inspires confidence and is corroborated by medical or other evidence.

¶164

At this stage, it is apposite to note another well-settled principle. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in Indian criminal jurisprudence. Our Courts have consistently held it to be a mere rule of caution, not a rule of law. Consequently, merely because a witness may have erred in regard to some aspect or exaggerated certain details, the remainder of his evidence is not to be discarded if it is otherwise credible and trustworthy. The emphasis is on quality, not quantity, of evidence, and the testimony of a witness may be accepted in part and rejected in part, depending on whether it inspires confidence.

¶165

Applying these settled standards, this Court finds that the minor discrepancies or contradictions pointed out in the testimony of P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 do not, in any manner, erode the substratum of the prosecution case. Their depositions remain consistent and cogent on the material aspects: the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the role of the assailants, and the factum of the deceased having suffered fatal injuries at their hands. The corroboration furnished by the medical evidence further fortifies their testimony.

¶166

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶167

Page 27 of 44

¶168

The last limb of criticism relates to the delay in examining P.W.6, whose statement was recorded on the fourth day of the incident. The argument advanced is that since the I.O. was present in the village earlier and P.W.6 was also available, his belated examination indicates tutoring or planting. This submission cannot be accepted. Investigating Officers are required to perform multiple duties simultaneously securing the scene, conducting inquest, arranging post-mortem, effecting seizures, and preserving law and order and it is unrealistic to expect that the examination of every witness will be immediate. More importantly, the defence did not put specific questions either to P.W.6 or to the I.O. to elicit why his statement was delayed. Absent such confrontation, the plea is unsustainable. Even otherwise, the prosecution case does not rest solely on P.W.6; the consistent testimony of P.Ws.1 and 5, corroborated by medical and seizure evidence, is sufficient to sustain the charges, while P.W.6’s evidence only lends additional corroboration.

¶169

It is also to be borne in mind that human reactions to sudden and violent incidents differ from person to person. Law does not expect uniformity in conduct, nor does it require a witness to volunteer to the police immediately after the occurrence. The failure of a witness to come forward at the earliest opportunity does not, by itself, render his testimony abortive.

¶170

In conclusion, the criticisms raised by the Appellants are found to be without merit. The eyewitness account remains reliable and trustworthy on all material aspects, and is corroborated by

¶171

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶172

Page 28 of 44

¶173

medical and other evidence. The arguments built on minor discrepancies, spot map theories, or belated examination of one witness cannot be accepted to undermine the otherwise consistent and cogent prosecution case.

¶174

Next, the thrust of the argument advanced by the defence is that there exists a material contradiction between the ocular account of the eyewitnesses and the medical evidence, particularly with reference to the nature of weapons allegedly used and the injuries found on the body of the deceased as reflected in the post-mortem report.

¶175

This Court finds no merit in this submission. The testimony of P.W.8, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, is clear and categorical that the deceased sustained incised injuries at as many as ten places on his body. He has further opined that the injuries were caused by sharp cutting weapons. The defence, in crossexamination, sought to create an impression that the particular injuries noted in the post-mortem report could not have been inflicted by the weapons allegedly carried by the Appellants. However, apart from eliciting this speculative suggestion, the crossexamination does not demolish the crucial medical opinion that the injuries were ante-mortem, homicidal in nature, and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death by haemorrhagic shock.

¶176

When the ocular version of P.Ws.1, 5, and 6 is read conjointly with the medical evidence, there is substantial corroboration. The witnesses consistently deposed that the Appellants were present at the scene, armed with sharp cutting

¶177

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶178

Page 29 of 44

¶179

weapons, and inflicted repeated blows on the deceased. The postmortem findings of multiple sharp-cut injuries squarely align with these depositions. Thus, far from discrediting the ocular account, the medical evidence fortifies it. It is also significant that the defence has not disputed the nature of death as being homicidal, thereby leaving no scope for any alternative hypothesis.

¶180

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that ocular evidence is the best evidence. In Baban Shankar Daphal & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra , reported in 2025 INSC 97 , it has held as follows -

¶181

“32. It has been consistently laid down by this court that once there is a version of eyewitness and the same inspires confidence of the court it will be sufficient to prove the guilt ofthe accused. A profitable reference can be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Pruthviraj Jayantibhai Vanol vs Dinesh Dayabhai Vala and Ors.,⁵ wherein it was laid down that:

¶182

“ 17. Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it. The evidence of PW-2 and PW-10 is unimpeachable. It is only in a case where there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved .”

¶183

(Emphasis supplied)

¶184

Hence, a conviction can be based upon the version put forth by the eyewitness and the medical evidence must be considered only for the purpose of corroboration of the ocular evidence.”

¶185

5 (2022) 18 SCC 683.

¶186

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶187

Page 30 of 44

¶188

It is further held in Rameshji Amarsingh Thakor vs. State

¶189

of Gujarat , reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 804 , that “ Even if in the opinion of the autopsy surgeon there was mismatch of the knife with the injuries caused, the doctor’s evidence cannot eclipse ocular evidence .”

¶190

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pruthviraj Jayantibhai Vanol (Supra) clarified that only when the medical evidence renders the ocular testimony impossible or wholly improbable, can the latter be discarded. Minor variations do not warrant rejection. Likewise, in Rameshji Amarsingh (Supra), it has been held that even if the autopsy surgeon opines a mismatch between the weapon and the injuries, such opinion cannot eclipse credible ocular evidence. These principles directly apply to the case at hand.

¶191

Accordingly, the argument that the eyewitnesses did not give an exact account of the weapons or the precise number of blows is of no consequence. Eyewitnesses to a brutal assault are unlikely to recall, with photographic precision, the minutiae of every strike or weapon swing. What matters is that their account remains unwavering on the core particulars that the presence of the Appellants, their armed participation, and the infliction of repeated blows on the deceased. These aspects stand firmly established.

¶192

Much has been made of the fact that the doctor, during cross-examination, appeared to retract from aspects of his written opinion in the post-mortem report. This Court is not persuaded to

¶193

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶194

Page 31 of 44

¶195

place weight on such retraction. The post-mortem report, prepared contemporaneously and in the discharge of a statutory duty, constitutes the best medical evidence. Any later equivocation in oral testimony cannot override the clear and cogent opinion recorded in writing. If at all, such vacillation on the part of the doctor only reflects on his own credibility, not on the veracity of the prosecution case. The prosecution, no doubt, could have confronted the doctor with the proved weapons of offence to expose the inconsistency in his belated retraction. Yet, even in the absence of such confrontation, the written post-mortem report, unshaken and duly proved, must prevail. It must also be borne in mind that eyewitnesses are often subjected to intense trauma during violent incidents. Natural human frailties may cause them to falter in recalling specific details, such as the exact sequence of blows or the precise description of weapons. The law recognizes this reality and does not expect witnesses to possess photographic memory or clinical precision. What is expected is that their testimony, when read as a whole, must inspire confidence and bear the ring of truth. In the present case, the testimony of the eyewitnesses, read alongside the medical evidence, does precisely that.

¶196

This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that the ocular version and the medical evidence are not at variance, but are substantially corroborative of each other. The minor discrepancies or perceived contradictions highlighted by the defence are inconsequential and do not erode the substratum of the prosecution case.

¶197

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶198

Page 32 of 44

¶199

The further argument advanced by the defence that the credibility of the eyewitnesses stands doubtful on the ground that they attributed overt acts to certain villagers inconsistently, and even went so far as to exaggerate by naming additional persons as assailants, is again devoid of merit. This Court is unable to subscribe to such a proposition for more than one reason.

¶200

Firstly, it is evident from the record that the witnesses did not view the occurrence from a single vantage point. They were positioned at different places at the time of the incident. In a situation of mob assault or group attack, where several persons surge towards the victim, it is only natural that each eyewitness perceives and narrates the incident differently, depending upon his position, distance, and line of sight. Such variation in perception is a matter of human limitation, not an indication of falsehood.

¶201

Secondly, the evidence itself demonstrates that the assault was not confined to a few assailants but that several persons from the sahi rushed in and took part in the crime. In such a tumultuous scenario, absolute consistency in recounting who wielded which weapon, who struck which blow, or precisely which villagers joined the assault, cannot reasonably be expected. To expect mathematical precision in such testimony would be to demand the impossible, and would amount to setting an unrealistic standard for human recollection in the face of a violent and chaotic event.

¶202

Undoubtedly, if certain names of alleged assailants do not find mention in the earliest statements of the witnesses made before the police during investigation, such omission or subsequent

¶203

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶204

Page 33 of 44

¶205

introduction of names can be taken as contradiction under law. In that event, those parts of the testimony that are not corroborated by earlier statements must be disregarded for the limited purpose of fixing liability on such additional persons. However, this principle does not go so far as to mandate rejection of the testimony in its entirety. The settled position of law is that where exaggerations or embellishments make way into the testimony, the Court is to separate the chaff from the grain, reject the embellishments, and rely on the core truth that inspires confidence.

¶206

It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that because some names of alleged participants may have been exaggerated or inconsistently attributed, the entire testimony of the eyewitnesses must be discarded. To adopt such a view would be to allow the truth of the prosecution case to be buried under minor inconsistencies and natural human errors in narration. The law is clear that so long as the substratum of the prosecution case remains intact and the core allegations against the principal assailants stand firmly established, the testimony of witnesses cannot be discredited wholesale merely for containing embellishments or inconsistent attribution of overt acts. Accordingly, the defence argument on this score bears little significance save and except to the limited extent that such inconsistent portions of the testimony cannot be acted upon. The remainder, which is consistent, coherent, and corroborated on material particulars, fully deserves acceptance.

¶207

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶208

Page 34 of 44

¶209

Coming to the criticism that the names of the accused persons did not find place in the inquest report, thereby creating a doubt on the prosecution case.

¶210

The Hon’ble Apex Court has time and again clarified that the object of an inquest under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. is limited and circumscribed. It is well settled that while an inquest report is a valuable document for recording the factual aspects surrounding a death, it is not a substantive piece of evidence. Its evidentiary value lies in corroborating the factum of death and the apparent nature of injuries, and not in fixing liability upon individuals.

¶211

Palpably, in the matter of Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Others vs. State Of U.P . , reported in 2006 (2) SCC 450 , it is held as follows –

¶212

“13. In Podda Narayana v. State of A.P. AIR 1975 SC 1252 it was held that the proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited scope. The object of the proceedings is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under S. 174. Neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to mention those details in the inquest report. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter all the details of the overt acts in the inquest report. Their omission is not sufficient to put the prosecution out of Court. In Shakila Khader v. Nausher Gama AIR 1975 SC 1324 the contention raised that non-mention of a person's name in the inquest report would show that he was not a eyewitness of the incident was repelled on the ground that an inquest under Section 174 Cr.P.C. is concerned with

¶213

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶214

Page 35 of 44

¶215

establishing the cause of death and only evidence necessary to establish it need be brought out. The same view was taken in Eqbal Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1987 SC 923 that the non-mention of name of an eye-witness in the inquest report could not be a ground to reject his testimony. Similarly, the absence of the name of the accused in the inquest report cannot lead to an inference that he was not present at the time of commission of the offence as the inquest report is not the statement of a person wherein all the names (accused and also the eye-witnesses) ought to have been mentioned. The view taken in Podda Narayana v. State of A.P. (supra) was approved by a three-Judge Bench in Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1991 SC 1853 and it was held that the testimony of an eye-witness could not be discarded on the ground that their names did not figure in the inquest report prepared at the earliest point of time. The nature and purpose of inquest held under Section 174 Cr.P.C. was also explained in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh 2003 (2) SCC 518. In the said case the High Court had observed that the fact that the details about the occurrence were not mentioned in the inquest report showed that the investigating officer was not sure of the facts when the inquest report was prepared and the said feature of the case carried weight in favour of the accused. After noticing the language used in Section 174 Cr.P.C. and earlier decisions of this Court it was ruled that the High Court was clearly in error in observing as aforesaid or drawing any inference against the prosecution. Thus, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the purpose of holding an inquest is very limited, viz., to ascertain as to whether a person has committed suicide or has been killed by another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident or has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence. There is absolutely no requirement in law of mentioning the details of the FIR, names of the accused or the names of the eye-witnesses or the gist of their statement nor it is required to be

¶216

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶217

Page 36 of 44

¶218

signed by any eye-witness. In Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) the language used by the legislature in Section 174 Cr.P.C. was not taken note of nor the earlier decisions of this Court were referred to and some sweeping observations have been made which are not supported by the statutory provision. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the observations made in paras 11 and 12 of the reports do not represent the correct statement of law and they are hereby over-ruled. The challenge laid to the prosecution case by Shri Jain on the basis of the alleged infirmity or omission in the inquest report has, therefore, no substance and cannot be accepted.”

¶219

It is further held in the matter of Bimla Devi vs. Rajesh Singh & Anr. , reported in AIR 2016 SC 158 , as follows –

¶220

“The next factual lacunae raised was overwriting in the inquest report. The inquest report by the police officer is prepared under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The scope of the section is investigation by the police in cases of unnatural or suspicious death. However, the scope is very limited and aimed at ascertaining the first apparent signs of the death. Apart from this the police officer has to investigate the place wherefrom the dead body is recovered, describe wounds, fractures, bruises and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, stating in what manner or by what weapon or instrument, such injuries appear to have been inflicted. From the above, it thus becomes clear, that the section aims at preserving the first look at the recovered body and it need not contain every detail. Mere overwriting in the name of the Informant would not affect the proceedings. The fact of homicidal death was not in dispute and the manner in which the death was occurred is also not disputed. Then merely name being overwritten will not help the defence, when the contents of the inquest report was supported by the eye witnesses and also the medical evidences.”

¶221

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶222

Page 37 of 44

¶223

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, and that aspect stands conclusively proved through medical evidence as well as ocular testimony. The mere fact that the names of the accused persons do not appear in the inquest report, therefore, does not by itself render the prosecution version doubtful.

¶224

This is more so because the persons who witnessed the inquest proceedings are not the very witnesses who lodged the FIR or later deposed regarding the role of the accused. Hence, the omission of names in the inquest cannot be treated as a material infirmity. Viewed correctly, the inquest serves as a preliminary step in investigation to understand the “ how” and “ what” of a death, rather than the “ who” or “ why” . Accordingly, the non-mention of the names of the accused persons in the inquest report in no way undermines the credibility of the prosecution case.

¶225

On the next contention, the defence advanced argument regarding the infirmities under Section 313 CrPC. It was urged that the incriminating circumstances were not properly put to the Appellants, thereby causing prejudice.

¶226

“11. In the context of the issues thus involved, it is only proper to look into the very object of Section 313, Cr.PC. This aspect has been considered many a times by this Court to hold that it embodies one salutary principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem and empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder is to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. In the decision in V.K. Sasikala v.

¶227

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶228

Page 38 of 44

¶229

State⁶ , this Court held that examination of an accused under Section 313, Cr.PC, would not only provide an opportunity to him to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against him, but also would permit him to forward his own version with regard to his alleged involvement in the crime. Furthermore, it was held that such an examination would have a fair nexus with a defence he might choose to bring and, therefore, any failure in such examination might take the effect of curtailing his right in the event he took up a specific defence. The general position is that if any incriminating circumstance, appearing against an accused in the prosecution evidence, is not put to him it should not be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. At the same time, we may hasten to add that it is a well-neigh settled position that nonexamination or inadequate examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, on any incriminating circumstance, by itself, would not vitiate a trial qua the convict concerned unless it has resulted in material prejudice to him or in miscarriage of justice. In the decision in Suresh Chandra Bihari v. State of Bihar⁷ and in Wariyam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.⁸ , this Court held that mere defective/improper examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, would be no ground to set aside a conviction of the accused unless it has resulted in prejudice to the accused. In view of the said position which is being followed with alacrity we do not think it necessary to multiply the authorities on it.”

¶230

It is well settled that Section 313 Cr.P.C. embodies a valuable safeguard to the accused, ensuring that before being convicted, he is given an opportunity to personally explain the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. This provision is grounded in the principle of natural justice and

¶231

6 1(2012) 9 SCC 771

¶232

7 AIR 1994 SC 2420

¶233

8 AIR 1996 SC 305

¶234

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶235

Page 39 of 44

¶236

aims to secure a fair trial. However, the law is equally clear that not every omission or imperfection in the framing of questions under Section 313 will vitiate the trial unless it is shown that prejudice has in fact been caused.

¶237

Examining the record of the present case, it is manifest that almost every aspect of the prosecution evidence was fairly and distinctly put to the Appellants. The questions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were not vague or general but specific to their overt acts as deposed by the witnesses. In their answers, the Appellants did not take any particular defence or offer any explanation to rebut the incriminating circumstances. On the contrary, they availed the fullest opportunity by producing documents marked as Exts. A to F in order to support their case. Significantly, the statement of P.W.1 recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ext. C) corroborates his deposition before the Court and his earlier statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., narrating the sequence of events consistently from inception till conclusion. This lends further assurance to the truthfulness of his testimony.

¶238

Viewed in totality, the Appellants cannot be heard to say that they were denied a fair opportunity under Section 313 CrPC. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that the incriminating circumstances were fairly put, their explanations were duly recorded, and their documents were admitted into evidence. The plea of prejudice is therefore wholly unfounded. Accordingly, this Court finds no substance in the criticism of the defence on this score. The testimony of the material witnesses remains natural and

¶239

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶240

Page 40 of 44

¶241

consistent, supported by contemporaneous records, and has rightly been accepted by the trial court as worthy of credence to sustain the conviction.

¶242

As regards Ext. A/1 and the Station Diary Entry (Ext. D/1), the defence attempted to project these as the first information and thereby challenge the FIR recorded through P.W.5. This argument, however, is misconceived. The information given by P.W.4 was of a very general nature merely reporting that an assault had occurred, without naming the assailants or giving necessary particulars. Such information could not have set the criminal law into full motion. It was rightly entered in the Station Diary and treated as a preliminary step, following which the oral report of P.W.5 containing vivid details of the incident, the names of the assailants, and the circumstances of occurrence was formally recorded as the FIR. There is thus no infirmity in the manner in which the investigating agency proceeded.

¶243

Finally, coming now to the question of culpability of the Appellants, it can very well be stated that the witnesses have clearly and specifically attributed the assault made on the deceased in their evidence. Their version remains unimpeachably acceptable and unblemished, so as to fix liability upon the following Appellants:

¶244

(i) Convicted under Section 302/34 IPC

¶245

Appellant No.1 – Rankanidhi Nayak , Appellant No.3 – Dandu Pradhan , Appellant No.4 – Subala Pradhan , and Appellant No.5 – Kalu @ Duryodhan Pradhan

¶246

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶247

Page 41 of 44

¶248

(all in CRA No.193 of 1997)

¶249

These Appellants are found to have intentionally caused the death of the deceased and are thus liable under Section 302/34 IPC.

¶250

(ii) Acquitted of charge under Section 302/34 IPC

¶251

As regards Appellant No.6-Ladu Kishore Kar (CRA No.47 of 1998), there is no clear evidence attributing any overt act of assault upon the deceased. His mere presence also cannot be held sufficient to fix liability under Section 34 IPC for the grave charge of murder. Accordingly, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt and stands acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC.

¶252

(iii) Acquitted for want of cogent evidence

¶253

Similarly, Appellant No.1-Goli@Golakha Padhan and Appellant No.4-Kishore Padhan (CRA No.47 of 1998) are also entitled to acquittal under Section 302/34 IPC, there being no cogent evidence of their active participation either directly or in aid of Section 34 IPC.

¶254

(iv) Charge under Section 341/34 IPC

¶255

The Appellants namely Goli@Golakha Pradhan , Ladu Kishore Kar, and Kishore Padhan cannot be held liable under Section 341/34 IPC. They are accordingly acquitted of this charge by extending the benefit of doubt.

¶256

(v) Conviction under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act

¶257

As far as the offence under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act is concerned, the evidence of the witnesses is

¶258

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶259

Page 42 of 44

¶260

absolute, clear, and candid in attributing to Appellant No.1Goli@Golakha Padhan and Appellant No.4-Kishore Padhan @ Kishore Chandra Padhan (CRA No.47 of 1998) the act of hurling bombs. The learned trial court has, therefore, rightly convicted them under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act.

¶261

As a result, the order relating to the quantum of sentence for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC, as imposed on the Appellants found guilty thereof, being appropriate, warrants no interference.

¶262

However, in view of the fact that Appellants Goli @ Golakha Pradhan and Kishore Padhan @ Kishore Chandra Padhan in CRA No.47 of 1998 stand acquitted under Section 302/34 IPC but are found guilty under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act and sentenced to undergo RI for six months, considering the lapse of time and their advanced age, their sentence is modified to the period already undergone.

¶263

In the result, CRA No.193 of 1997 stands dismissed and the conviction and sentence of Appellant No.1-Rankanidhi Nayak, Appellant No.3-Dandu Pradhan, Appellant No.4-Subala Pradhan, and Appellant No.5-Kalu @ Duryodhan Pradhan under Section 302/34 IPC is affirmed.

¶264

CRA No.47 of 1998 is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. Appellant No.6-Ladu Kishore Kar, Appellant No.1-Goli @ Golakha Pradhan, and Appellant No.4-Kishore @ Kishore Chandra Pradhan are acquitted of the charge under Sections 302/34 and 341/34 IPC by extending the benefit of doubt. However, Appellant

¶265

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶266

No.1-Goli @ Golakha Pradhan and Appellant No.4-Kishore @ Kishore Chandra Pradhan shall stand convicted under Section 9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act, though their sentence is modified to the period already undergone.

¶267

Since the Appellants are on bail, they are directed to surrender before the learned trial court within four weeks from today to serve out the sentence imposed upon them. In case of default, the learned trial court shall take steps in accordance with law for securing their custody to serve the remaining sentence.

¶268

The Appeals are accordingly dismissed.

¶269

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

I, Agree

(S. K. Sahoo)

Judge

A.K.Pradhan

Signature Not Verified

¶275

Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 12-Sep-2025 10:10:02

¶276

CRA No. 193 of 1997 & CRA No. 47 of 1998

¶277

Page 44 of 44

Goli v. State

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Goli v. State

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