Narahari Das Vs State

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRA No.231 of 1991

(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973)

*Narahari Das*	*…….* *-Versus-*	*Appellant*
*State of Orissa*	*…….*	*Respondent*
For the Appellant	: Mr. Shyamananda Senior Advocate	Mohapatra,
For the Respondent	: Mr. A.K. Apat, Additional Govern	ment Advocate
CORAM:

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THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

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Date of Hearing: 04.12.2025 :: Date of Judgment: 16.12.2025

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S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal assails the judgment

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and order dated 13th August, 1991, passed by the learned Additional

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Sessions Judge, Bhadrak in S.T. No. 12/55 of 1991, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the

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Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned Trial Court sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence under Section 304-B IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, directing that all the sentences shall run concurrently.

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2. Heard Mr. Shyamananda Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel, for the appellant and Mr. A.K. Apat, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State.

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Brief Facts of the Case

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3. The prosecution asserts that the present matter concerns an alleged incident of dowry death. The deceased, Gedi @ Kaikei, was the daughter of P.W.3 Gayadhar Das of village Orada under Tihidi Police Station and was married to accused Narahari Das of village Senabad, under the same police station, on the 20th day of Falguna, 1990, corresponding to 3rd March, 1990. Accused Pakeli, the mother of Narahari and mother-in-law of the deceased, and accused Ahalya, the wife of Narahari’s elder brother, were inmates of the deceased in

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the matrimonial home. According to the prosecution, soon after the marriage, the accused persons began subjecting the deceased to persistent harassment and cruelty on the allegation that she had not brought an almirah and a palanka as part of the dowry. It is alleged that such ill-treatment continued unabated, compelling the father, uncle and other relatives of the deceased to visit the matrimonial home on several occasions to pacify the situation and to request the accused persons not to torture her, assuring them that the aforesaid dowry articles would be provided at a later stage. The prosecution further states that on the night preceding the death of the deceased, her relatives again came to take her to her parental home but were persuaded not to do so and returned. On the following morning, they received information about her death, and upon reaching the house of the accused, found her lying dead in the courtyard with burn injuries. P.W.3, being unable to bear the sight, had to be taken away. He lodged the written report (Ext.1) on the next day, whereupon a police case was registered, investigated, and finding a prima facie case, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

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Separately, on the report of D.W.1 (Ext.7), a U.D. case was also registered and an inquest was conducted over the dead body.

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4. The defence, on the other hand, has denied all allegations of harassment or cruelty and has asserted that the accused persons are innocent. According to them, the deceased had been suffering from a medical condition locally known as “Akash Mari Bata,” a form of epileptic seizure. They contended that on the night of the occurrence, the deceased had gone outside to answer the call of nature carrying a lantern, and at that moment, she suffered a sudden seizure resulting in her collapse and death by burning, after which the lantern is stated to have fallen upon her body, causing burn injuries. The defence thus maintains that the death was accidental and unconnected with any alleged acts of cruelty or dowry demand.

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5. The prosecution, in order to establish the charges against the accused persons, examined thirteen witnesses. P.W.1, Bhaskar Barik, deposed regarding the demand of dowry made at the time of the marriage between accused Narahari and the deceased. P.W.2, Durga Charan Naik, similarly spoke about the dowry demands and further stated that the deceased was subjected to torture and ill-treatment by

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the accused persons for non-fulfilment of such demands. P.W.3, Gayadhar Naik, the informant and father of the deceased, corroborated these assertions and deposed that his daughter was harassed and ill-treated for not providing a palanka and an almirah as part of the dowry.

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P.W.4, Nanda Das, the priest who solemnised the marriage, testified that a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and a gold chain were paid by the father of the deceased to accused Narahari towards dowry. P.W.5, Dukhi Barik, also stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused for non-fulfilment of the dowry articles, namely a palanka and an almirah. P.W.6, Bijoya Kumar Parida, likewise deposed about the dowry demand and the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased on account of the same.

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P.W.7, Bayani Naik, mother of the deceased, confirmed the dowry demands made on behalf of the accused at the time of marriage and testified to the subsequent torture inflicted upon her daughter for failure to provide the palanka and almirah. P.W.8, Bhagirathi Grahacharya, the astrologer associated with the marriage ceremony,

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also stated that the father of the deceased had paid Rs. 2,000/- and a gold chain to accused Narahari towards dowry.

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P.W.9, Dr. Suratha Kumar Biswal, conducted the post-mortem

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examination on the body of the deceased and proved the medical report. P.W.10, Ankura Barik, deposed regarding the seizure of blood-stained earth, saree, and other articles by the Investigating Officer in his presence. P.W.11, the Tahasildar of Tihidi, attended the inquest over the body of the deceased and proved the inquest report, Ext.6, bearing his signature marked as Ext.6/1 and his endorsement marked as Ext.6/2. P.W.12, Prafulla Kumar Mohapatra, submitted the charge-sheet, and P.W.13, Sarbeswar Pattnaik, was the Investigating Officer, who carried out the investigation.

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All these witnesses collectively supported the prosecution case on the aspects of dowry demand, cruelty, unnatural death, and the investigative steps undertaken.

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Three witnesses were examined on behalf of defence.

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Trial Court Judgement

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6. The learned Trial Court, upon a comprehensive appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence and after meticulously scrutinising the

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testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in the light of the defence plea, proceeded to record its findings. The Court, having evaluated

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the credibility of each witness and the consistency of the material

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placed on record, ultimately concluded as under:

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“To sum up the evidence of the witnesses as discussed above, has well proved that there was demand for dowry in the marriage of accused Narahari with deceased Gedi and that accused Narahari was harassing the deceased all the while some time after her marriage for not bringing the Palanka and almirah as part of dowry and she was treated cruelly. On consideration of the evidence I find that the prosecution has been able to establish that accused Narahari subjected his wife to cruelty for almirah and Palanka, as a part of dowry and this cruelty by the husband has culminated in murder of the deceased.

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23. In the result, accused Narahari Das is found guilty of the charge U/ss. 498-A,304(B) of the I.P.C and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted thereunder U/s 235, Cr. P. C. and accused Pakili Das and Ahaly Das are found not guilty of the charge levelled against them and they are acquitted on benefit of doubt U/s 235 Cr. P. C. They be set at liberty forthwith.”

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7. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned findings of the learned

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trial court leading to the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant, the appellant has filed the present appeal.

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Submission on behalf of Appellant

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8. Mr. Shyamanand Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel submitted

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for the appellant that the very substratum of the prosecution case is vitiated as the first information regarding the death of the deceased

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was the written report lodged by D.W.1 Baidhar Padhiary (Ext.7), on the basis of which U.D. Case No.34/1990 was registered, followed by inquest and seizure. It is contended that the subsequent written report of P.W.3 (Ext.1), lodged nearly 36 hours after the occurrence, was during the pendency of investigation and is, therefore, hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C., capable only of use for contradiction and not as an FIR for registration of a fresh case.

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Reliance is placed on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala¹ , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no second FIR lies in respect of the same occurrence and any further information can only be treated

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as a statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C. The paragraph relied is reproduced here under for the convenience of ready reference:

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“...This Court indicated that the real question was whether the two conspiracies were in truth and substance the same and held that the conspiracies in the two cases were not identical. It appears to us that the Court did not repel the contention of the appellant regarding the illegality of the second FIR and the investigation based thereon being vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in truth and substance were different — the first was a smaller conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as it turned out eventually. It was pointed out that even under the Code of 1898, after filing of final report, there could be further investigation and forwarding of further report…”

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1 (2001) 6 SCC 181

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9. It is further submitted that even P.W.3, the informant, admitted that he was present at the time of inquest; this is corroborated by P.W.11, the Executive Magistrate, who specifically recorded his presence. Thus, the prosecution has offered no satisfactory explanation for the delayed lodging of the F.I.R (Ext.1). According to the appellant, the unexplained delay, coupled with contradictory versions, renders Ext.1 an afterthought and creates serious doubt on the prosecution story, particularly in light of the settled principle that delay in lodging FIR invites suspicion of embellishment or fabrication, as noted in State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao² .

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10. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that several material prosecution witnesses named in Ext.1, including the deceased’s brother Surendra Naik, who alone was claimed to have knowledge of alleged torture and witnesses such as Baidhar Padhiary, Maheswar Jena, Kalandi Barik, Brundaban Malik, and others, were not examined, despite being cited. Their non-examination amounts to suppression of material evidence, warranting an adverse inference in view of the principle laid down in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore

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2 (2008) 15 SCC 582

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Kubersing Chamansing³ , that withholding material witnesses who could unfold the genesis of the occurrence undermines the prosecution case.

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11. It is argued that the evidence led regarding alleged demand of dowry and cruelty is wholly inconsistent, contradictory, and largely hearsay. PW-1 denies any dowry demand; PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW5, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-8 made improvements for the first time in court, which were not stated under Section 161 Cr.P.C., as admitted by the Investigating Officer. The alleged articles, palanka and almirah were never demanded as dowry, and even according to PW-3, these items were volunteered by him. It is submitted that such improvements render their testimony unreliable, and that no consistent or direct evidence exists connecting the accused with any harassment “for or in connection with” dowry.

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12. The appellant also contended that the deceased was suffering from a mental disorder locally known as “Akashmari Bata” (fits), for which she frequently received treatment at her parental home. D.W.1

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3 AIR 2001 SC 2328

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and D.W.2, both independent witnesses, have supported the existence of the illness and the fact that the accused regularly informed the parental family whenever she suffered episodes. On the night of the incident, the deceased is stated to have gone out with a lantern and suffered a seizure, and the burn injuries resulted from the lantern falling upon her. It is argued that this explanation is probable and has not been effectively rebutted by the prosecution.

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13. The investigation is also alleged to be defective by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. The seizure lists describe certain articles as “blood-stained”, yet the chemical examiner’s report (Ext.11) found no blood on key items such as the lungi, dhoti, and earth. There is inconsistency in the seizure of lantern and kerosene bottles. Prosecution witnesses stated these were near the body in the courtyard, whereas the I.O. claimed they were seized from inside the bedroom. The inquest report places the dead body “in front of the door of the room”, contradicting the prosecution case that it was in the courtyard. These discrepancies, it is urged, make the investigation suspect and the prosecution version unreliable.

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14. It is further argued that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case. PW-9, the doctor, opined that the death was due to “violent asphyxia”, possibly caused by smothering; however, no corresponding external injuries were found. The forensic report did not detect kerosene residues on the body or clothing. These inconsistencies weaken the allegation of dowry death or homicidal burning.

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15. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC namely, that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” in connection with dowry demand has not been proved. Relying on Kesab Ch. Panda v. State⁴ , he contended that the “proximity test” is not satisfied, and alleged incidents are remote and unconnected. It is urged that hearsay statements attributed to the deceased are inadmissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act for an offence under Section 498-A IPC, as held in Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa⁵ .

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4 1995 CriLJ 174 (Ori)

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5 (2002) 2 SCC 619

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16. It is finally contended that the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, and the chain of circumstances is incomplete and incapable of pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant. Reliance is placed on Birendra Poddar v. State of Bihar⁶ , wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the principles governing conviction based on circumstantial evidence. The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is rebuttable, and in the present case, the defence explanation is reasonable and supported by evidence. Therefore, conviction under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC is unsustainable.

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On these grounds, the appellant prays that the impugned judgment be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of all charges.

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Submission on behalf of Respondent

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17. Learned AGA for the State, Mr. A.K. Apat, on the contrary, supported the judgment of conviction and submitted that the prosecution has duly proved all ingredients of the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is urged that the deceased Kaikai @ Gedi Das died

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6 (2011) 6 SCC 350

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an unnatural death within four months of her marriage, the occurrence having taken place on 08.07.1990, whereas the marriage was solemnised on 03.03.1990. The FIR was lodged on 10.07.1990, and the medical evidence establishes that the cause of death was violent asphyxia, possibly due to smothering.

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18. It is submitted that the prosecution examined thirteen witnesses, while the defence examined only three, whose evidence was limited to asserting the alleged medical condition of the deceased and did not touch upon the material facts relating to the allegations of dowry demand or cruelty. The plea of denial taken by the defence does not hold, in the face of consistent evidence of prosecution witnesses regarding the demand for dowry and the torture inflicted upon the deceased.

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19. Learned AGA for the State, submitted that PWs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 have categorically testified to the demand of dowry both at the time of marriage negotiations and after the marriage. PW-1, the mediator, clearly stated that cash and other articles were demanded by the accused and that though many items were provided at the time of marriage, the almirah and palanka remained unfulfilled, leading to

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persistent harassment. He further accompanied the father of the deceased on two occasions to resolve the disputes arising out of such demands. The statements of PW-2, the paternal uncle of the deceased, and PW-6, a co-villager, fully corroborate the testimony of PW-1. PWs 3 and 7, the parents of the deceased, have also spoken not only about the initial dowry demands but also about continued harassment thereafter.

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20. It is also urged that PWs 1 to 3, 5, 6 and 7 have consistently deposed regarding the cruelty and ill-treatment inflicted on the deceased. PW-3 and PW-7 have specifically stated that the deceased was subjected to mental and physical torture for non-fulfilment of dowry articles such as palanka and almirah. PW-7, who had stayed at the matrimonial home shortly before the occurrence, learnt from the deceased herself about fresh acts of cruelty. Soon thereafter, PW-3 visited the matrimonial house to bring back his daughter but was prevented from meeting her. On the very next day, the deceased was found dead. These circumstances, taken together, clearly establish that the deceased was subjected to harassment “soon before her death”, thus satisfying the statutory requirement under Section 304-B

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IPC. The proximity between torture and death is therefore firmly established on the record.

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21. Learned counsel submitted that the death of the deceased occurred within seven years of marriage and was unnatural, as borne out from the medical evidence of PW-9, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination. According to him, the cause of death was severe asphyxia due to smothering, thereby ruling out natural causes. The defence has not furnished any plausible explanation for the circumstances leading to such death, nor has it rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Once the prosecution has proved (i) an unnatural death, (ii) within seven years of marriage, and (iii) cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before death, the burden shifts to the accused to furnish a credible explanation. The defence evidence, limited to assertions of illness, does not meet this burden and fails to displace the presumption arising against the accused.

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22. It is argued that the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined at length, but nothing substantial was elicited to discredit their testimony regarding dowry demand, torture or the unnatural

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circumstances of death. The defence witnesses have merely spoken of the deceased suffering from fits, without addressing the core issue of cruelty or giving any explanation consistent with the medical opinion of homicidal asphyxia.

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23. In view of the consistent and cogent evidence establishing demand of dowry, repeated cruelty and harassment, and the unnatural death of the deceased occurring within a short span after marriage, the ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC stand fully satisfied. The Trial Court, therefore, committed no error in recording conviction and imposing sentence. It is, accordingly, prayed that the impugned judgment be affirmed and the appeal dismissed

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Analysis and Observations

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24. The Court has carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the State, and has meticulously examined the evidence on record, the findings of the learned Trial Court, and the legal principles governing offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC read with Section 113-B of the

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Evidence Act.

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25. The principal contentions of the appellant relate to the alleged invalidity of the FIR, unexplained delay in lodging the same, suppression of material witnesses, inconsistencies in the evidence regarding dowry demand and cruelty, alleged medical condition of the deceased, and defects in investigation. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the prosecution has proved all essential ingredients of dowry death, namely, dowry-related cruelty soon before death, unnatural death within seven years of marriage, and a consistent chain of oral and medical evidence thus shifting the burden under Section 113-B, which the defence has failed to discharge.

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26. Upon scrutiny of the material, this Court finds no substance in the appellant’s plea that the written report of P.W.3 (Ext.1) is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. Merely because an earlier information resulted in registration of a U.D. Case does not preclude registration of a regular police case when material suggesting a cognizable offence subsequently comes to light. The reliance placed by the appellant on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (supra) is misplaced, as the gravamen of the two reports is not identical. Ext.7 merely conveyed information of an unnatural death under suspicious circumstances; Ext.1,

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however, disclosed specific allegations of dowry-related torture, thereby furnishing the foundational facts for investigation into cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court has rightly treated Ext.1 as the FIR.

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27. As to the delay of roughly 36 hours, the Court is mindful that delay in lodging the FIR is not, by itself, fatal if adequately explained by surrounding circumstances. Evidence shows that P.W.3 was in a state of shock and had stayed at the spot, and the sequence of events following the recovery of the body provides a plausible explanation. More importantly, the substratum of the prosecution case does not rest solely upon timing of the FIR but on the cumulative weight of the consistent testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding dowry demand and cruelty, read with the medical evidence.

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28. The contention of suppression of witnesses is equally unpersuasive. The law does not mandate that the prosecution must examine each and every witness; what is required is that the witnesses examined must be credible and sufficient to establish the case. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 provides a coherent, consistent account of demand of dowry at the time of marriage,

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continued insistence on supplying palanka and almirah, and the consequent ill-treatment meted out to the deceased. Minor discrepancies or omissions in Section 161 statements, when weighed against the overall consistency of material facts, do not dilute the prosecution case. The omissions pointed out by the defence pertain more to peripheral details rather than the core prosecution narrative.

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29. The defence plea that the deceased suffered from “Akashmari Bata” (fits) and accidentally died when a lantern fell on her is improbable and unsupported by medical evidence. The post-mortem report conclusively attributes the cause of death to violent asphyxia, possibly due to smothering, which rules out accidental burning. The absence of kerosene residues on the body further weakens the theory of accidental fire. The defence witnesses have only spoken of the alleged illness of the deceased; none offered any account consistent with the homicidal features noted by the doctor. Thus, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act stands unrebutted.

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30. The principal defence plea raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant to establish on record that the death of deceased is not

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homicidal rather due to her diseased suffering of the epileptic attack has not found favour by the Trial Court, which is emanating from the observation of the learned Court, as reproduced hereunder:

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“ 21. In the above mentioned circumstances both section 304(B) of I.P.C. and Section 113(B) of the Indian Evidence Act contemplate that the court shall presume that the accused has caused the death of the deceased. The accused examined defence witnesses to rebut the presumption and to show that the deceased suffered from epilepsy. D.W.l is Baidhar Padhiary has deposed that he has got visiting term with the house of accused persons and that in his bari, there is 'Gada' plant and that in the month of Chaitra the female accused 'Pakili' came to her Bari to take 'gada' telling that her daughter in law had fallen down so he followed her and he found that her daughter-in-law was lying down near a palm tree of their bari and that he also found that her limbs were stiff etc. and he also states that that disease is called 'Akasmari Bata' He further deposes that he saw Gedi suffering from that disease 4 to 5 times. In his chief examination he has also admitted to have reported the death of deceased before the police vide Ext. 7 wherein his signature is Ext. A.

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The evidence of D. W.1 does not show that the deceased suffered from epilepsy on the date of occurrence and died out of that. Ext.7 also does not breathe a word with regard to this aspect. D.W.2 also state that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy for which there was ill-feeling between the family of P.W.3 and of the accused persons. But he does not speak that the deceased was attacked with that disease and died out of that.

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The learned counsel for the prosecution submits that the defence plea is totally false and this false defence adds to the guilt of the accused. According to him Ext. 7 is the report lodged by D.W.1 at police station after the death of Gedi and he is a close relative of accused Narahari which is apparent from Ext. 7. and that it has not been mentioned in Ext, 7 that Gedi was suffering from epilepsy and that she suffered from that disease while she was going to pass urine and that the lantern fell on her body and got burnt. He further contends that on the other hand it has been mentioned in Ext. 7 that there were domestic problem and she was under great mental shock and there was conciliation on four to five occasions and that the

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father and uncle of deceased came to the house of the accused persons on the previous day of the death of Gedi and consoled her and that she committed suicide.

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It is further submitted on behalf of the Prosecutions that P.W.9 the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased in his report opined that the death was due to asphyxia possibly by smothering and the further contention of the prosecution is that if actually she was suffering from epilepsy she would have been treated at nearby hospital situated at Pirahat and Tihidi within a distance of 3 Kilometres from the house of the accused persons. D.W. Kalandi has stated that whatever he has stated in the court in his evidence he has not disclosed before anyone else.

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22. On a careful perusal of the evidence of P.Ws. in my view the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the deceased died out of epilepsy. The evidence of doctor that asphyxia may be caused due to epilepsy does not in any way prove the defence case in absence of any ocular or circumstantial evidence that the deceased was attacked by that disease in that fateful night and died out of that. It is needless to mention that evidence of doctor is a supporting evidence to corroborate the ocular evidence. In these circumstances the theory of natural death cannot be accepted. Had it been a natural death the deadbody of the deceased would not have been lying in the courtyard in that pitiable condition. She should have been brought to the room and she must have been attended up to by the inmates and they must have called a doctor and attempt must have been made to save her life. But no such thing has been done in this case which is apparent from the evidence on record. It is also nobody's case that it was accidental death and the defence has also not proved that the death is accidental. In the result, the death of Gedi is homicidal.”

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31. Regarding the evidence of “soon before her death” to attract the offence, the testimony of P.Ws. 3 and 7 are particularly significant. P.W.7, the mother of the deceased, stayed in the matrimonial home shortly before the occurrence and heard directly from the deceased about fresh acts of cruelty for dowry. P.W.3’s attempt to bring back

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his daughter was thwarted by the accused, and within a day of his return the deceased was found dead. This clearly establishes the livelink or proximate connection between dowry-related harassment and the death. The appellant’s reliance on the doctrine of remoteness is misplaced, as the evidence manifests proximity in both time and continuity.

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32. The argument regarding alleged investigative lapses such as discrepancies in seizure memos, bloodstain reports, or location of articles does not materially affect the prosecution case. Defects in investigation, unless they go to the root of the prosecution case and cause prejudice to the accused, cannot by themselves justify rejection of credible ocular and medical evidence. In the present case, the core of the prosecution case rests upon direct and consistent testimony regarding dowry demand and cruelty, corroborated by medical opinion indicating homicidal asphyxia. Such material remains unaffected by peripheral lapses in investigation.

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33. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution has successfully proved:

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(i) the death of the deceased occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances and within seven years of marriage;

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(ii) she was subjected to cruelty and harassment; and (iii) such cruelty was directly connected with dowry demands and was inflicted soon before her death.

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Once these foundational facts are established, the statutory

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presumption under Section 113-B operates, shifting the burden upon the accused to rebut. The defence has not furnished any credible or convincing explanation to substantiate the plea of innocence. In this context, it will be appropriate to rely upon the recent Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vrs. Ajmal Beg Etc.⁷ , wherein the Hon’ble Court held thus:

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“ 20. The position of law being clear, as referred supra let us now consider the evidence. The demand for dowry, and in particular, a motorcycle, a colour TV and Rs.15,000/- in cash, have been established beyond reasonable doubt, with such a version not to have been shaken at all. Equally so, in no manner could it be disputed that the said demand had been reiterated just a day prior to the deceased passing away. This ties in with the fact that PW1 and PW 2, both have testified to the effect of continuous harassment of the deceased. The expression “soon before her death”, as explained in Ashok Kumar (supra) would, in the considered view of this Court, be met and all the essentials, as noted in Pavan Kumar (supra) would be satisfied. Here itself, it may then be noted that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 came into effect as soon as it stood proved that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty soon before her death, and went unrebutted by the defence, since no evidence was led by them.”

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7 2025 INSC 1435

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34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the facts of aforesaid judgment in State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg & Ors. (supra), undertook a broader socio-legal examination of the pervasive practice of dowry and its corrosive impact on the fabric of Indian society. The Court did not confine itself merely to the facts of the case but adverted to empirical data, reports, and judicial experience to underscore that dowry-related cruelty and deaths continue to be a grim reality despite the existence of a comprehensive statutory framework. It is observed that the Dowry Prohibition Act and allied penal provisions were enacted with the salutary object of eradicating a deeply entrenched social evil and protecting married women from exploitation, harassment, and violence. However, the Court candidly acknowledged the complex dualities confronting the justice delivery system, namely, that while the legislative intent is progressive and remedial, the ground-level enforcement often remains inadequate, and at the same time, instances of misuse of dowry-related provisions cannot be altogether ignored. It is in this contextual backdrop of competing concerns, social menace, legislative purpose, enforcement

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challenges, and allegations of misuse, that the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court made the following pertinent observations:

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“XXX XXX XXX

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While on the one hand, the law suffers from ineffectiveness and so, the malpractice of dowry remains rampant, on the other hand, the provisions of this Act have also been used to ventilate ulterior motives along with Section 498-A, IPC. This oscillation between ineffectiveness and misuse creates a judicial tension which needs urgent resolution. While this urgent resolution cannot be stressed upon enough, at the same time it is necessary to be recognized that particularly when it comes to the giving and taking of dowry, this practice unfortunately has deep roots in society, hence, it not being a matter of swift change, instead needs concentrated effort on part of all the involved parties, be it Legislature, law enforcement, Judiciary, civil society organizations etc.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decision, did not

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rest its analysis merely on general observations but proceeded further to crystallize its concern into concrete and actionable directions aimed at addressing the deep-rooted social evil of dowry in a comprehensive manner. Taking note of the persistent prevalence of dowry-related offences, the inadequacy of effective enforcement mechanisms, and the inordinate delays that often plague such prosecutions, the Apex Court deemed it necessary to lay down guidelines to ensure both preventive and remedial intervention at multiple levels. These directions were intended to operate not only as legal mandates but also as instruments of social transformation, involving the

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Legislature, executive machinery, judiciary, and civil society at large. The Court was particularly conscious of the fact that such cases frequently remain pending for decades, thereby diluting the object of the law and causing prolonged hardship to all stakeholders. It is in this backdrop, and with a view to facilitating systemic reform, sensitization of institutions, and expeditious disposal of long-pending cases, including those, like the present one, which have remained pending since as far back as 1991, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court issued the following directions:

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“26. With an intent to further this change, we issue the following directions: -

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(a) to ensure that the change brought in is able to make an impact on the efforts to eradicate this evil, it is to be ensured that the future generation, youngsters of today, are informed and made aware about this evil practice and the necessity to eschew it. As such, it is directed that States and even the Union Government consider changes as are necessary to the educational curricula across levels, reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient to the other as is sought to be established by giving and taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage;

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(b) The law provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers40 in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area;

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(c) the police officials, as also the judicial officers dealing with such cases, should periodically be given training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and psychological implications which are often at the forefront of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law;

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(d) it is not lost on us that the instant case began in 2001 and could only be concluded 24 years later by way of this judgment. It is but obvious that there would be many such similar cases. The High Courts are requested to take stock of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the latest for expeditious disposal; and

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(e) in furtherance of (a) above, we also recognize that many people today are/have been outside the education fold, and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is an offence in law. The District Administration along with the District Legal Services Authorities, by engaging and involving civil society groups and dedicated social activists, is requested to conduct workshops/awareness programs at regular intervals. This is to ensure change at the grassroot level.”

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35. In view of the above discussion, the grounds urged by the appellant do not create any doubt on the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective, and this Court finds no reason to interfere with the findings so recorded. The appeal, therefore, does not hold any water and is liable to be dismissed.

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36. At this point, Mr. Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the matter pertains to the year 1990, the accused-

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appellant has already undergone the rigors of trial for about an year and the appeal has been pending since 1991. The appellant, who was about 26 years, then is about 60 years of age now. It is further submitted that the appellant has already been incarcerated for a period of about five months. Citing the long passage of time and the incarceration already undergone by the appellant, it is prayed that the sentence of the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone. 37. At this juncture, this Court finds merit in the plea advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, particularly in view of the considerable passage of time and the advanced age of the appellant. Nevertheless, it would not be just or proportionate to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. Accordingly, the appellant is sentenced to undergo a substantive term of Two years for all the offences, additionally to balance the scale of justice, a fine of Rs.30,000/- is imposed, to be paid within a period of one month, which shall be disbursed to the parents of the victims or their legal representatives in accordance with Section 357 Cr.P.C. In the event of failure to pay the fine the appellant shall undergo R.I. for further six months.

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The convict-appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court within one month from today to serve the remainder of the modified sentence, failing such appearance, he may be taken into custody in accordance with law.

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38. In the result, the appeal, insofar as it challenges the conviction, stands dismissed. The appeal is, however, conditionally allowed to the limited extent of modification/reduction of the sentence as indicated above.

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39. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.

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The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Dated the 16^th of August 2025/Ashok

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA Designation: Secretary Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 19-Dec-2025 18:37:09

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Narahari Das v. State

Case brief

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Narahari Das v. State

Case brief

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