Dismissed

State Vigilance v. Bhimasen Mangaraj

Orissa HC20 Nov 2023CRLLP/56/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioner filed an application seeking special leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondent in a corruption case involving bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act, praying for condonation of delay. The High Court held that the impugned judgment was not perverse and denied leave to appeal, dismissing the petition.

What did the court decide?

Application for special leave to appeal dismissed; condonation of delay refused. CRLLP disposed of.

State Vigilance Vs Bhimasen Mangaraj — Corruption | Orissa HC (2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

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CRLLP No.56 of 2014

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An Application U/s.378 of Cr.P.C.

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State of Orissa …..… Petitioner
-Versus-
Bhimasen Mangaraj …..… Opposite party
For Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das,
Standing Counsel (Vigilance)
For Opp.party :
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P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO
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Date of Hearing & Judgment:20.11.2023

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M.S.SAHOO, J. The petition has been filed under Section 378 Cr.P.C.,

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seeking leave to appeal against judgment dated 14.11.2014 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judgecum-Special Judge (Vigilance), Mayurbhanj, Baripada in T.C. No.174 of 2013 acquitting the opposite party, after the opposite party stood trial being charged for commission of offences punishable under Section 7 & 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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Misc. Case No.48 of 2014

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2. The misc. case has been filed praying for condoning the delay of 58 days in filing the petition.

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Page 1 of 14

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// 2 //

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3. Office note indicates that though notices on limitation were issued on 21.09.2015 directing requisites to be filed by 25.09.2015 for issuance of notice to the opposite party, no steps have been taken for filing of requisites.

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4. As the matter is pending since 2014 after issuance of notice on limitation, apart from considering the matter for condoning delay in filing the petition as prayed for, this Court has gone through the judgment impugned as annexed to the petition, and considered whether in terms of prayer made in the petition, leave can be granted for filing appeal challenging the judgment.

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5. On perusal of the judgment, it is indicated that the learned trial court has examined in detail the evidence adduced by the prosecution, i.e. P.W.1-complainantDecoy, P.W.2-over hearing witness, P.W.3- Magisterial witness, P.W.4-Officer who had laid the trap, P.W.5- the I.O. who partly conducted the investigation and submitted the charge sheet.

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6. It has been found by the learned trial court that the magisterial witnesses: P.Ws.4 & 5 were not present at the time of transaction of alleged demand and acceptance of bribe. It is further found from the evidence of P.W.2 is regarding demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused from the complainant is in the nature of hearsay and is, therefore, inadmissible.

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P.W.2 was also cross-examined by the prosecution, but that did not help the prosecution in improving their case.

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A factual finding has been given by the learned court that as per the statement of the complainant, he

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Page 2 of 14

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had not given any application before the accused on the date of occurrence. If the statement is accepted, existence of Ext.26, i.e. Form-K seized by P.W.5 becomes doubtful, inasmuch as, the prosecution case is that for issuance of Form-K bribe was allegedly demanded.

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The learned trial court has also not believed the prosecution story regarding recovery of the tainted money from the possession of the accused as the evidence presented by the prosecution is to the effect that the tainted money was found scattered in the floor of a vehicle (jeep). Apart from such depositions, other material objects as exhibited has been considered by the learned trial court.

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From the above analysis, it has to be concluded that the judgment of the learned trial court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality or perversity. The evidence presented by the prosecution having been evaluated correctly.

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7. In Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 776 (at page 179 of SCC), the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 CrPC and the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held:-

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14.1. In Babu [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 196-99)

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“12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 3 of 14

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court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837] , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar [Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 518] , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. [Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 432] , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. [Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893] , Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 377] , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 363] , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 645] , Arulveluv. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 176] and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1496] )

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13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 4 of 14

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// 5 //

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42 : (1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] , the Privy Council observed as under: (SCC Online PC: IA p. 404)

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„… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to

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such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.‟

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14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [Tulsiram Kanu v. State, 1951 SCC 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1] , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235] , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479] , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)

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15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

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„(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 5 of 14

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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.‟

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16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60] , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 6 of 14

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court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

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17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1069], the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)

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„20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.‟

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18. In State of U.P. v. Banne [State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include:(SCC p. 286, para 28)

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„(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

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(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

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(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

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(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

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(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

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(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 7 of 14

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interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.‟

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A similar view has been reiterated by this Court

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in Dhanapal v. State [Dhanapal v. State, (2009)

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10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] .

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19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other

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view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”

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14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , SCC p. 199)

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“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 8 of 14

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// 9 //

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& Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cumAssessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501] , Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”

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(emphasis supplied)

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It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

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14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 447-49)

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“31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 9 of 14

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reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233)

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„10. Once the appeal was rightly
entertained against the order of acquittal,
the High Court was entitled to
reappreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own
conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court
would give due importance to the opinion
of the Sessions Judge if the same were
arrived at after proper appreciation of the
evidence. This rule will not be applicable
in the present case where the Sessions
Judge has made an absolutely wrong
assumption of a very material and
clinching aspect in the peculiar
_circumstances of the case.‟ _

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31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCCp.416)

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 10 of 14

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// 11 //

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„8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid

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down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 11 of 14

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// 12 //

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support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.‟

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31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

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31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10)

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„5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 12 of 14

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the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

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It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

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It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122] ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.‟

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31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court has observed that (Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 13 of 14

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where the trial court allows itself to be besetwith fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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8. In view of the above discussions, apart from not condoning the delay in filing the petition as sufficient grounds have not been shown, by applying the principles laid down in Anwar Ali (supra), in considered opinion of this Court, the present case is not fit where leave can be granted to file appeal.

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The CRLLP stands disposed of accordingly.

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……………………
M.S.Sahoo, J. e
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 20 th November, 2023/Jyostna

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: JYOSTNARANI MAJHEE Reason: Authentication Location: OHC Date: 28-Dec-2023 19:37:53

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Page 14 of 14

State Vigilance v. Bhimasen Mangaraj

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State Vigilance v. Bhimasen Mangaraj

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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