“25. The crucial point, in the opinion of this Court, is that the Supreme Court in at least two places, held that Regulation 7.3.0 has to be treated as recommendatory in nature, in as much as it relates to Universities and Colleges under a State legislation. This conclusion is also recorded in para 62.4 quoted above. As a consequence, this Court is unable to accept the petitioner’s argument that if a State once adopts such a recommendatory regulation (i.e. Regulation 7.3.0), its legislature is denuded of the power to legislate anything in deviation for all times to come. This conclusion is based upon two considerations. One is that Section 26(1)(e) is not cast in mandatory terms but rather states that “ordinarily” the stipulations would be adhered to. The second important consideration is that Central or State Universities created by law are not only covered but the other species of institutions such as deemed universities (under UGC Act) would be covered. If what the petitioner contends was to be accepted (Vice Chancellor of University), the consequence would be that vice chancellors with a limited number of students – 1000, offering only 5 disciplines would be eligible, whereas Deans of a large University (or senior professors heading departments in such universities) with administrative experience of heading faculties, which control administrative and educational functions of a large number of colleges on various aspects (whose students may well run into over 10,000) in diverse disciplines like English, Sciences, Law, Commerce, etc. would be ineligible for consideration. Given that the standards for Vice Chancellors were framed for the first time in 2010, the choice of the State to either continue to adhere to them, or to make statutory provisions in its university legislation, cannot be dictated in this manner. It is clear that the State’s judgment based upon the experience gained in its higher educational activities, assumes importance. The State may then well decide to depart from the UGC Regulations, 2010 and legislate either independently or through amendments (which it is empowered to do in exercise of its plenary legislative powers), providing for eligibility conditions that may be wider than those stipulated by the UGC Regulations, 2010. That appears to be the case in the present proceedings.”