Act, 2017 cannot be said to be irrelevant. More so, even if an expression is not defined in the statute, the meaning of expression in general parlance has to be considered for finding out the meaning and purpose of expression. After making above observation in Promila Taneja's case (supra), this Tribunal did not dwell with the question as to what is the meaning of expression of 'service' used in Section 5(21) of the Code. Reference to Section 5(8)(d) regarding financial debt' by this Tribunal in the above case also was not relevant for finding out definition of expression 'service under Section 5(21). We, thus, are of the view that both in Mr. M. Ravindranath Reddy and Promila Taneja this Tribunal did not dwell upon the correct meaning of expression 'service' used in Section 5(21) of the Code. In any view of the matter, in the above mentioned two cases, the dues were in the nature of rent of immovable property whereas the present is a case of license granted for use of premises on Warm Shell Building with fittings and fixtures, electrical, flooring as per good corporate standards. Hence, the Licnesee was licensed for a particular kind of service for use by the Licensee for running a business of Educational Institution. Hence, in the present case, debt pertaining to unpaid license fee was fully covered within the meaning of 'operation debt under Section 5(21) and the Adjudicating Authority committed error in holding that the debt claimed by the Operational Creditor is not an 'operational debt'. The judgment of this Tribunal in Promila Taneja's case reiterate the law as laid down in Mr. M. Ravindranath Reddy's case. We having held that judgment of Mr. M. Ravindranath Reddy's case does not lay down correct law, the judgment in Promila Taneja's case can also not be followed.”
