Bharathy Vs The Commissioner of Land Administration

PRAYER : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the 2nd respondent, pertaining to impugned award bearing Ref.No.Na/Ka.No.224/2023/A1/Tha.Ma.Va.A/Thiruvallur (Award No.12/2025 V.No.9 Alagu 8 Block 8) dated 03.04.2025 received by the petitioners on 26.04.2025, quash the same as arbitrary, illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice and consequently deposit the compensation amount of Rs.2,60,85,556 (Rupees Crores, Sixty Lakhs, Eighty Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty Six Only) directly into the bank accounts of the petitioners while preserving the rights of the petitioners to seek enhanced compensation in the manner known to law.

¶25

For Petitioner(s) : Mr.T.Mohan, Senior Counsel for Mr.Vikram Veerasamy

¶26

For Respondent(s) : Mr.A.Selvendran,

¶27

Special Government Pleader

¶28

for R1 to R4

¶29

Mr.Abhishek Murthy, Government Advocate for R5

¶30

ORDER

¶31

The present writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned

¶32

award dated 11.04.2025, though wrongly stated as 03.04.2025 in the writ

¶33

petition*, insofar as it finds that petitioners failed to establish that ownership over subject properties acquired for industrial purposes vest

¶34

2/50

¶35

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶36

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶37

with the petitioners inasmuch as documentary evidence was not produced by petitioners to show how classification of subject properties changed from “Government poromboke” to “patta” resultantly not entitled to compensation. The writ petition also seeks a direction to deposit the compensation determined with liberty being sought to claim enhanced compensation.

¶38

2. Brief Facts:

¶39

2.1. Petitioners herein are joint owners of the property bearing

¶40

S.Nos.256/4A, S.No.257/3 and S.No.257/1B, measuring an extent of 4.46.50 hectares situated in Madharpakkam Village, Gummidipoondi Taluk, Thiruvallur District (hereinafter referred to as the "subject properties"). The impugned order raises the question as to whether subject properties are patta land owned by petitioners (or) Government Poromboke, it is thus necessary to trace the devolution of title of “subject properties” to resolve the controversy.

¶41

2.2. Devolution of title to subject properties is set out below:

¶42

2.2.1. Devolution of title for Old S.No.256/4, New S.No.256/4A,

¶43

measuring an extent of 3 acres & 53 cents :

¶44

3/50

¶45

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶46

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶47

(i) Lands in Old S.No.256/4, New S.No.256/4A, were originally owned by one Rani and her children, who sold the subject land measuring an extent of 3 acres and 53 cents in S.No.256/4 of Madarpakkam Village to one Vasunthara and Chandrammal vide Sale Deed dated 31.10.1979, registered as Document No.1595 of 1979, in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Gummudipoondi. Subsequently the said Vasunthara and Chandrammal sold the subject land to one M.A.Rajendra Prasad vide Sale Deed dated 25.01.1993, registered as Document No.45 of 1993, in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Gummudipoondi. The said M.A.Rajendra Prasad in turn sold the subject land to one S.A. Fernandez who is late father of petitioners no.1 to 3 and husband of petitioner no.4, from whom the property had devolved upon petitioners. The said property was always patta lands as evident from the UDR which stood in the name of Chandrammal vide Patta No.525. Further, Patta bearing No.525 was issued in the name of M.A.Rajendra Prasad. Subsequently, upon sale, patta was mutated in favor of S.A.Fernandez in respect of subject land measuring an extent of 3.53 Acres vide Patta No.956. At present, patta stands in the name of petitioners vide online patta No.4045.

¶48

4/50

¶49

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶50

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶51

2.2.2. Devolution of title for land in S.No.257/3, measuring an

¶52

extent of 5 acres:

¶53

(i) Land in S.No.257/3 was originally owned by one A.B.David who sold the subject land to one M.A.Rajendra Prasad. The said M.A.Rajendra Prasad vide Sale Deed dated 09.09.1996, registered as Document No.1896 of 1996, in the office of the Sub-Registrar Gummadipoondi sold the subject land to one S.A.Fernandez who is late father of petitioners no.1 to 3 and husband of petitioner no.4. After his demise, the subject lands devolved upon petitioners. The said property have always been patta lands as evident from the UDR patta which originally stood in the name of A.B.David vide Patta No.453. Further, patta in respect of subject land stood in the name of erstwhile owner M.A.Rajendra Prasad vide Patta bearing No.434. After sale to S.A.Fernandez, patta was mutated in his favor vide Patta bearing No.956. Presently, patta stands in the name of petitioners in respect of the subject lands vide Online Patta No.4045

¶54

2.2.3. Devolution of Title of land comprised in Old S.No.257/1,

¶55

New S.No.257/1B- measuring an extent of 2 acres and 50 cents:

¶56

5/50

¶57

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶58

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶59

(i) Lands in Old S.No.257/1, New S.No.257/1B were originally

¶60

owned by one Muthusamy Mudaliar who sold the subject land to one to Belsi Karunabai. Then, the said Belsi Karunabai died intestate on

¶61

20.02.1989 leaving the following persons as legal heirs:

¶62

(a) T.K.Moses @ Ezhumalai	: husband
(b) Sheela Grace	: daughter
(c) Grace	: daughter
(d) Vimala	: daughter
(e) Selvi	: daughter
(f) Beulah	: daughter
(g) Ruby	: daughter
(h) Moodhi	: daughter

¶63

(ii) Thereafter the legal heirs of Late Belsi Karunabhi, sold the subject lands to one R.Kamala @ Amalorepava Mary vide Sale Deed dated 20.06.1991, registered as Document No.1161 of 1991. The said Kamala @ Amalorepava Mary, died intestate on 31.03.1996, leaving the following persons as legal heirs ;-

¶64

(a) M.A.Rajendra Prasad : husband (b) Jesintha Shyamala : daughter (c) Irudhyaraj : son

¶65

6/50

¶66

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶67

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶68

(d) Silviya : daughter

¶69

(e) R.Nirmalraj : son

¶70

(iii) The aforesaid legal heirs of Late Kamala @Amalorepava Mary sold the subject lands to S.A.Fernandez, who is late father of

¶71

petitioners no.1 to 3 and husband of petitioner no.4, vide Sale Deed dated 09.09.1996, registered as Document No.1897 of 1996, in the office of the Sub-Registrar Gummudipundi. After his demise, subject lands devolved upon petitioners. Subject property was patta lands from the very inception and the same would be evident from UDR patta which originally stood in the name of one of Madanlal and Karunabai (Patta No.689). Subsequently, patta was mutated and stood in the name of R.Kamala alias Amalorepava Mary. After sale to S.A.Fernandez, patta was issued in his favor vide Patta bearing No.956. Presently, patta stands in the name of petitioners in respect of the subject lands vide Online Patta No.4045.

¶72

2.2.4. Having set out the devolution of title of subject properties, I

¶73

shall now briefly set out the acquisition proceeding in respect thereof.

¶74

7/50

¶75

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶76

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶77

2.3. Acquisition proceedings:

¶78

2.3.1. 2^nd respondent published a Gazette Notification No.220

¶79

dated 03.07.2024 in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purpose Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), wherein subject properties, along with several other parcels of land aggregating a total extent of 13.2700 hectares, were notified for acquisition for establishment of an industrial park viz., Manellur SIPCOT Industrial Park under the aegis of the State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT), the 5^th respondent / requisitioning body.

¶80

2.3.2. In the said Gazette Publication issued under Section 3(1) of the Act, petitioners name were specifically shown in the Notification as owners of the subject properties and subject properties were classified under the category "Dry Lands" under the column titled 'Type of Land', thereby establishing petitioners status being recognized under acquisition proceedings as lawful owners and 'person interested' in respect of subject properties.

¶81

2.3.3 Thereafter, petitioners herein received a Show Cause Notice under Section 3(2) of the Act , issued by 2^nd respondent vide R.C. No. 8/50

¶82

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶83

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶84

44/2023/A1/SPL DRO/Tiruvallur, dated 31.07.2023, on 14.08.2023. Petitioners were called upon to submit objections, if any, to the proposed acquisition of the subject properties for industrial purposes. In response petitioners submitted detailed objections along with documentary evidence inter-alia including those relevant to establish title to the properties sought to be acquired, vide representation dated 18.08.2023 though title of petitioners were not doubted by any authorities at that stage.

¶85

2.3.4. Pursuant thereto a communication dated 27.08.2024 was

¶86

issued by 2^nd respondent calling upon petitioners to appear for a personal hearing scheduled on 20.09.2024. The said communication directed petitioners to produce all relevant documents pertaining to the subject properties at the time of hearing. On 20.09.2024 petitioners appeared before the 2^nd respondent and submitted title documents including patta and other revenue records, evidencing lawful ownership and possession of subject properties and establishing the fact that petitioners herein are the lawful and absolute owners of the subject properties.

¶87

2.3.5. During the said personal hearing, petitioners were informed

¶88

of the provisions contained in Section 7(2) of the Act, whereby compensation may be determined based on an agreement between the 9/50

¶89

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶90

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶91

Government and the person to whom the amount has to be paid. While petitioners expressed their willingness to consider such a negotiated settlement, it was conveyed by the petitioners that such negotiation would be contingent upon the State offering a fair, just and reasonable compensation for the land and the trees appurtenant thereto and orally proposed that a sum of Rs.25,00,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Crores Only) be paid as aggregate compensation for the land as well as the standing trees and other assets situated thereon. Concerned authorities informed petitioners that the response of the State Government would be communicated in due course, after appropriate valuation of the trees is undertaken by the Department of Forest, Government of Tamil Nadu.

¶92

2.3.6. Whileso, 2^nd respondent issued a further notice dated

¶93

14.11.2024, calling upon petitioners to appear for another personal hearing scheduled on 29.11.2024 and to produce the requisite documents in support of their claim. Though all relevant documents had already been submitted by petitioners during the earlier personal hearing held on 20.09.2024. Petitioners appeared before the 2^nd respondent on 29.11.2024 and furnished relevant documents, again including registered title deeds, title documents pertaining to the erstwhile owners, patta and

¶94

10/50

¶95

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶96

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶97

other revenue records substantiating lawful title and continuous possession of petitioners over the 'subject properties'.

¶98

2.3.7. Petitioners, were informed that compensation in respect of

¶99

the subject properties has been fixed as Rs.50 Lakhs per acre as per the flat rate G.O.(MS) No.46 dated 15.03.2024.

¶100

2.3.8. 2^nd respondent passed the impugned award bearing Ref. No. Na/Ka.No.170/2023/A1/Tha. Ma. Va.A/Thiruvallur (Award No. 14/2025) dated 11.04.2025, wherein compensation of Rs.4,58,82,539 (Rupees Four Crores, Fifty Eight Lakhs, Eighty Two Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty Nine Only) was determined towards acquisition of subject properties. Importantly, impugned order proceeds to states that petitioners having failed to establish how “subject properties” was classified as “patta land” from “ Government Poromboke ”, thus not entitled for the compensation. Aggrieved, the present writ petition has been filed before this Court.

¶101

Case of the Petitioners:

¶102

(i) That the impugned award wherein the 2^nd respondent has observed that petitioners failed to produce adequate records to establish how subject properties came to be classified as "patta land" from

¶103

11/50

¶104

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶105

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶106

'muRg[wk;nghf;F' (Government Poramboke Land), is contrary to facts, wholly erroneous and bereft of any foundational material, documentary evidence, or even prima facie justification.

¶107

(ii) That petitioners are the owners of subject properties and thus would qualify as a 'person interested' within the meaning of Section 3(h) of the Act.

¶108

(iii) That petitioners did not agree to the said amount fixed under Section 7(2) of the Act. Respondent thus ought to initiate steps under Section 7(3) of the Act and proceed with determination of the compensation amount. Section 7(5) of the Act, mandates that 2^nd respondent shall finally determine the amount, after affording every person to whom the amount has to be paid an opportunity to state their case with regard to fixation of compensation. That the 2^nd respondent acted in excess of the power vested with him under Section 7(3) of the Act, by observing that the petitioners failed to produce records to establish how the subject properties came to be classified as "patta land" from 'muRg[wk;nghf;F' (Government Poramboke Land).

¶109

(iv) That the role of the 2^nd respondent, under Section 7 of the Act, is strictly limited to determining the compensation amount and nothing

¶110

12/50

¶111

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶112

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶113

beyond. Powers vested in 2^nd respondent under Section 7 of the Act are intended exclusively to aid in the determination of compensation and not for the purpose of determination of title.

¶114

(v) That for the purpose of determination of compensation under Section 7(3) of the Act, 2^nd respondent may call for materials as contemplated under Section 7(7) of the Act. Documents referred to under Sections 7(7) and 7(8) are solely for the purpose of determination of compensation and have no bearing on questions relating to title or entries in revenue records.

¶115

(vi) That 2^nd respondent does not possess the power to call for document pertaining to title. In any view petitioners have demonstrably established their clear and unambiguous title to the subject properties, having been in continuous and uninterrupted possession for over five decades, as substantiated by registered title deeds, revenue records, and valid patta. In the absence of any material to the contrary, it was impermissible for the 2^nd respondent to unilaterally conclude that the subject properties were Government Poramboke at an earlier point in time.

¶116

(vii) That the impugned award suffers from the vice of

¶117

unreasonableness and is ex-facie arbitrary, harsh, and illegal, stands 13/50

¶118

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶119

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶120

vitiated for non-application of mind and liable to be set aside as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

¶121

(viii) That all communications including public notice, Show Cause Notice under Section 3(2) of the said Act dated 31.07.2023 and subsequent hearing notices were addressed to and served upon petitioners, thereby reaffirming their status as lawful owners and 'persons interested'.

¶122

(ix) That 2^nd respondent after conducting enquiry under SubSection (2) of Section 3 of the Act and after passing an order under Section 3(3) of the Act, had placed all the materials before the Government for its consideration and the Government, after considering the objection given by the petitioners as well as the other land owners, scrutinizing the documents and the comments made by the 2^nd respondent, had taken the decision to publish the notification under SubSection (1) of Section 3 of the Act for acquiring the land. 1^st respondent, after due verification and satisfaction regarding the petitioners' title, had issued a Notification under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, showing the petitioners names. Thus respondents having recognized petitioners title over subject properties cannot subsequently undermine or contradict the same.

¶123

14/50

¶124

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶125

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶126

(x) That the acquisition proceedings undertaken by the 2^nd respondent are a direct and logical consequence of the said Notification under Section 3(1) of the Act, which continues to remain valid and binding. Thus any contrary stand if taken including erroneous classification of the lands as Government Poramboke would render the impugned award arbitrary, perverse, and unsustainable.

¶127

(xi) That 2^nd respondent has acted beyond the scope of his authority in unilaterally disputing petitioners' title to the subject properties. Petitioners have established unbroken title and possession for more than fifty years, supported by documentary evidence including registered sale deeds, patta, and revenue records.

¶128

(xii) That as per Rule 6(a) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Rules, 2001, at the stage of issuing the show cause notice and upon receipt of Petitioners' objections, 2^nd respondent was empowered to summarily reject the objections if petitioners are person found to have no interest in the subject properties, instead respondent invoked the procedure under Rule 6(b) and 6(c) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Rules, 2001, and by communication dated 27.08.2024, called upon the petitioners to appear for a personal hearing on 20.09.2024 and produce all relevant documents 15/50

¶129

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶130

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶131

in support of their claim. This act by itself is a clear acknowledgment that the petitioners are persons having a legitimate interest in the subject properties.

¶132

(xiii) That after crossing the above stages and having published Gazette Notification No.220 dated 03.07.2024 under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act, 2^nd Respondent is estopped from questioning title or classification of the subject properties moreso, while exercising his powers under Section 7 of the Act which is meant for determination of compensation thus impugned order is arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and vitiated by malice.

¶133

(xiv) That in land acquisition proceedings, it is trite law that compensation must be awarded to the persons in whose names the lands are notified under Section 3(1) of the Act. In the instant case, the Petitioners' names were mentioned in the said Notification, thus are rightful claimants for compensation.

¶134

Case of the Respondent:

¶135

4.1. The learned Additional Advocate General would submit that

¶136

on verification of revenue records it was found that land in Survey No.(s) 256 and 257 was classifed as 'Government Poramboke

¶137

16/50

¶138

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶139

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶140

Anadeenam' in the Settlement Land Register of 1956 of Madharpakkam village, Gummidipoondi Taluk, Tiruvallur district. Subsequently, it was updated in the 'A' register as 'Ryot punjai' and patta was issued in the name of petitioners predecessor's in title. However, petitioners has not submitted any document to show as to how the 'Government Poramboke land / Anadeenam land' was converted to 'Ryot land'. It is in those circumstances that the compensation amount was deposited with the civil court.

¶141

4.2. That the mere fact that the respondent authorities had

¶142

proceeded on the basis that the land belongs to the petitoners under the acquisition proceedings until it reached the stage of Section 7 by itself would not estop authorities from questioning the title. The authorities under the Act are questioning the title only in view of the fact that the lands were originally classified as 'Government Poromboke Anadheenam' and the petitioners claiming it to be a patta land had not produced any material evidence to show the basis for such change in classification of land.

¶143

Heard both sides. Perused the materials on record.

¶144

17/50

¶145

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶146

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶147

The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the

¶148

impugned order denying compensation under Land Acquisition proceeding doubting petitioners title/ownership over the subject properties only on the premise that petitioners had not produced documents to show the basis for change in classification of subject properties from “Government Poramboke” to “Patta” can be sustained or stands vitaited.

¶149

6.1. To answer the above question it may be relevant to refer to the

¶150

relevant portion of the impugned order which reads as under:

¶151

“g[y vz;/ 256-4A. 257-1A. 257-3y; nkw;gz;l gl;lhjhuh; 7(2) tprhuizapd; nghJ epu;zapf;fg;gl;l ,Hg;gPl;oid bgWtjw;F xg;g[jy; mspf;ftpy;iy/ nkYk; nkw;go g[y vz; muR g[wk;nghf;F epykhf ,Ue;J gl;lh epykhf khwpajw;fhd cupa Mtz';fis rkh;gpj;J cupikapid epiy ehl;lhj fhuzj;jpdhy; nkw;fz;l epyj;jpw;fhd ,Hg;gPl;Lj; bjhifapid tH';fpl khh;f;fkpy;iy/ vdnt ,Hg;gpl;Lj; bjhifia epyk; ifafg;gLj;Jjypy; epahakhd rupaPL kw;Wk; xspt[ kiwtpd;ik kWthH;t[ kw;Wk; kWFoakh;t[ cupikr;rl;lk 2013 d; fPH; nky; eltof;if bgjhlUk; bghUl;L nkw;go g[yj;jpw;fhd ,Hg;gPl;Lj; bjhifia khtl;l Kjd;ik ePjpkd;wk;. jpUts;Sh;?y; itg;gPL bra;J cj;jutplg;gLfpwJ/”

¶152

6.2. On reading of the above portions of the impugned order the

¶153

following aspects would emerge:

¶154

18/50

¶155

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶156

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶157

i) Petitioners has not agreed/consented to the compensation offered under Section 7(2) of the Act.

¶158

ii) Petitioners has not produced evidence to show how classification of subject properties was altered/changed from Government Poromboke (counter states as Government Poromboke Anadheenam) to Patta land, thus compensation cannot be paid to petitioners.

¶159

iii) Compensation is deposited in the concerned Civil Court.

¶160

6.3. It appears to me that the impugned proceedings is

¶161

misconceived and stands vitiated for the following reasons:

¶162

Classification of land in revenue records – Not conclusive of Title :

¶163

7.1. The entire case of the State is built on the basis of an entry in the Settlement Register 1956 of Madharpakkam village, Gummidipoondi Taluk, Tiruvallur District wherein it stated that subject properties are classified as “Government Poramboke”. It may thus be necessary to examine the relevance of such entry in determining title over property. It is trite law that classification of land in revenue records are not dispositive or conclusive of title. In this regard it may be relevant to 19/50

¶164

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶165

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶166

refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Narasamma v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 591. The relevant portion is extracted here under:

¶167

“29. So far as the decision of a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in Rita Premchand v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 4 Mah LJ 671] is concerned, there is no dispute about the proposition enunciated in the said decision which says that the entries in the revenue records are not dispositive or conclusive on questions of title and that the revenue record cannot create any title and are relevant only for fiscal purposes. This proposition is not disputed, nor can we dispute it.”

¶168

(emphasis supplied)

¶169

7.2. The Settlement Land Register of the year 1956 which is claimed to show/classify the subject properties as “Government

¶170

Poramboke”, on the basis of which the State has doubted the ownership of the petitioners is not conclusive of title. In this regard, it may be relevant to refer to the following judgment of the Apex Court in State of A.P. v. Hyderabad Potteries (P) Ltd., reported in (2010) 5 SCC 382 wherein while rejecting the States claim to title over a particular property on the strength of entry in TSLR it was found such entry as not conclusive of title. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

¶171

20/50

¶172

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶173

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶174

“26. The sole basis of the appellant to claim the land was on the strength of entries made in survey records showing that the schedule property was surveyed as TS No. 4/2, Ward No. 66 of Bakaram Village having an area of 19,214 sq m showing it as a gap area i.e. unsurveyed area as per the old survey records and as such it could only be declared to be government land as has been recorded in Column 20 of TSLR. Apart from the said revenue record and issuance of gazette notification as mentioned hereinabove, no other material document was filed by the appellant to show that the said land belonged only to the Government. It is trite that entry in the revenue record alone may not be sufficient as conclusive proof of title nor can be relied on for proof of establishing the title as such.

¶175

7.3. This Court in the case of N.S.Kuppusway Udayar v.

¶176

Narthangudi Panchayat, reported in 1971 (1) MLJ 190 , observed that a entry in the settlement register would not establish title of the Government. The above view was reiterated in the case of A.R.Meenakshi v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 1757 . The relevant portion of which reads as under:

¶177

“11. In N.S.Kuppuswamy Odayar v. Narthangudi Panchayat [1971 (1) MLJ 190 : (1971) 84 L.W. 120], it was held by M.M. Ismail, J that the mere fact that in the re-settlement register, a particular piece of land has been described as

¶178

21/50

¶179

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶180

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶181

poramboke, will not, by itself, establish title of the Govemmeni to the land in question.”

¶182

7.4. From a reading of the above judgments it appears to me that

¶183

classification in revenue records including Settlement Land Register are not dispositive nor conclusive of title, thus the State's denial of petitioners title and consequential denial of compensation on the strength of the above reasons appears to lack merit.

¶184

Relevance of Entries in Patta Pass Book:

¶185

8.1. On the other hand it is relevant to note that subject properties

¶186

are classified as “patta lands” for more than 4 decades and there have been multiple sale transactions registered under the Registration Act. It thus becomes necessary to examine the relevance of patta which is in the name of the petitioners and their predecessors in title for over 4 decades, in determining title.

¶187

8.2. To answer the question it may be relevant to refer to Section

¶188

2(4), 2(5), 2(6), 3, 4 and 6 of Patta Passbook Act which reads as under:

¶189

22/50

¶190

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶191

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶192

i) Section 2(4), 2(5) and 2(6) of Patta Pass Book Act, 1983:

¶193

“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise

¶194

requires-

¶195

(4) "land" means agricultural land, that is to say, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes sub-servient thereto and is either assessed to land revenue in the State or is subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such and includes horticultural land, forest land, garden land and plantations, but does not include house-site;

¶196

(5) "limited owner" means any person entitled to a life estate in any land and includes persons deriving rights through him.

¶197

Explanation.— A person who has a right to enjoy the land during his lifetime shall be deemed to be a limited owner notwithstanding that he has no power to alienate the land;

¶198

(6) "Owner" means any person holding land in severalty or jointly or in common under a ryotwari settlement or in any way subject to the payment of revenue direct to the Government and includes a full owner or limited owner but does not include a mortgage; lessee or a tenant;”

¶199

23/50

¶200

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶201

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶202

ii) Section 3 of Patta Pass Book Act, 1983:

¶203

“3. Issue of patta pass book.—

¶204

(1) The Tahsildar shall issue a patta pass book to every owner in respect of land owned by him, on an application made by him in this behalf. Any application received under this section shall be acknowledged by the Tahsildar or any other officer authorized by him in this behalf.”

¶205

iii) Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, 1983:

¶206

“4. Presumption of correctness of entries in the patta pass book.— The entries in the patta pass book and the certified copy of entries in the patta pass book shall be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor.”

¶207

iv) Section 6 of Patta Pass Book Act, 1983:

¶208

“6. Entries in the patta pass book to be prima facie evidence of title.— The entries in the patta pass book issued by the Tahsildar under section 3 shall be prima facie evidence of title of the person in whose name the patta pass book has been issued to the parcels of land entered in the patta pass book, free of any prior encumbrance ,unless otherwise specified therein.”

¶209

8.3. A reading of Section 2(4), 2(5), 2(6), 3 read with Section 4 and

¶210

24/50

¶211

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶212

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶213

6 of Patta Passbook Act, would show that Patta is issued under Section 3

¶214

of the Patta Passbook Act, to every owner in respect of the land owned by them. Importantly, Section 4 of Patta Passsbook Act provides that the entries in the Patta Passbook “shall be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary is proved” . While Section 6 of Patta Pass Book provides that entries in Patta Pass Book issued by Tahsildar under Section 3 “ shall be prima facie evidence of title of the person in whose name patta is issued” . It may thus be necesary to understand the scope and purport of the presumption under Sections 4 and 6 of the Patta Pass Book Act.

¶215

Role of Presumptions :

¶216

9.1. To appreciate the scope of the expression “shall be

¶217

presumed” , employed in Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, it is necessary to consider Section 4 of Evidence Act, which provides for three categories of presumption viz., “may presume”, “shall presume” and

¶218

“conclusive proof”. Section 4 of Evidence Act reads as under:

¶219

“[S 4] "May presume". - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.

¶220

25/50

¶221

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶222

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶223

"Shall presume". - Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.

¶224

“Conclusive proof”.- When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it”

¶225

9.2. Before proceeding to deal with the nature and purpose of the

¶226

different categories of presumptions, it may be relevant to briefly set out the purpose of presumptions in some detail inasmuch as controversy in the present writ petition may well have to be decided on the basis of presumption, its nature and scope under the Patta Pass Book Act, particularly with reference to sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.

¶227

9.3. It is trite that presumption is a rule of law under which courts

¶228

are authorised to draw a particular inference from a particular fact¹ . Presumptions are devices by use of which courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Presumption literally means "taking as true without examination or proof”² . A presumption means a rule of law that courts and judges shall draw a particular inference from a particular fact,

¶229

1 PR Metrani v CIT, Bangalore, (2007) 1 SCC 789

¶230

2 Kumar Exports v Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513

¶231

26/50

¶232

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶233

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶234

or from a particular evidence, unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumptions are of two kinds, (1) Presumptions of fact, (2) Presumptions of law. Presumptions of fact or natural presumptions are inferences which are naturally and logically drawn from experience and observation of the course of nature, the usages and habits of society. These presumptions are generally rebuttable. Presumptions of law are based, like presumptions of fact, on the uniformity of deduction which experience proves to be justifiable; they differ in being vested by the law with the quality of a rule, which directs that they must be drawn, they are not permissive like natural presumptions, which may or may not be drawn; and presumptions of law again differ in their force, according as they may be rebuttable or irrebuttable. Presumption of Law in reality are rules of law and part of the law itself and court may draw the inference whenever the requisite facts are before it.

¶235

9.4. Having examined the role of presumptions, now coming to the three categories of presumption, it is trite that whenever legislature chooses to employ the expression “may presume” a fact, Court has discretion to presume the fact as proved or to call for confirmatory evidence of such fact. “Shall presume”, if employed by legislature, it leaves no room for any discretion with the Court but to presume such fact 27/50

¶236

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶237

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶238

as proved until disproved with evidence. The word “conclusive proof” when employed, Court shall not allow evidence to disprove the same. I have examined the scope of the expressions “may presume”, “shall presume” and “conclusive proof” in Section 4 of Evidence Act only to show the different consequences that follow from use of such expressions by the legislature.

¶239

Scope of the presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act:

¶240

10.1. Having examined the purpose of presumption in general and

¶241

the scope of 3 categories of presumptions under Evidence Act, I shall now proceed to examine the nature and scope of the expression “shall be presumed”, employed in Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, in greater detail. The presumption in Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, is no doubt a “presumption of law”. Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, provides that entries in the Patta Pass Book Act “ shall be presumed to be true and correct until contrary is proved ”. The presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, leaves no discretion with the Court instead manifests a legislative command to presume such fact as proved i.e., entries in Patta Pass Book Act “as true and correct unless and until disproved”. In other words, in view of Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, 28/50

¶242

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶243

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶244

there is a statutory obligation to presume that entries in Patta Pass Book

¶245

Act are true and correct and burden is on the party challenging / questioning the correctness of entries in the Patta Pass Book Act, in the present case State to disprove the same. Legislature has used the expressions “shall be presumed that entires in the Patta Pass Book Act are true and correct until the contrary is proved” , conscious of the legal consequences viz., that authorities/Courts have no discretion but must necessarily presume the entries in the Patta Pass Book Act as true and correct until contrary is disproved. It may be relevant rather necessary to note that Section 4 of Patta Passbook Act has come up for consideration before this Court and has been explained as under:

¶246

i) Kulandai Therasammal v. Maria Rathinam, reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 4216 :

¶247

“15. A careful reading of the decisions relied on by either side would reveal that even though Patta is not a document of title it is an evidence of title and also reveals that presumption of correctness of entry in Revenue Records cannot be rebutted by a statement in the Written Statement. In the instant case as already stated, joint Patta was granted during the Survey Settlement period and also at the time of UDR Scheme and no proper explanation was given by the Appellant/Plaintiff that why joint Patta was granted in the name of both if really the entire

¶248

29/50

¶249

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶250

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶251

property belonged to the vendor of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the contention of the Appellant/Plaintiff is that Patta is not a document of title and hence, the Defendants are not entitled to the property cannot be accepted.”

¶252

ii) Iyyakannu v. Subramanian, reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 1150 :

¶253

“18. It is not out of place for this Court to point out that Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Patta Passbook Act provides that the entries in the Patta Passbook and the certified copies of the entries in the Patta Passbook shall be presumed to be true and correct until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor...”

¶254

(iii) Sreenivasan (died) and others v. Ramakrishnasamy @ Ramakrishnan

¶255

and others in the case of S.A.(MD).No.244 of 2021 :

¶256

“ 11 . ........................ Under section 4 when there is presumption that the entries are true and correct, then the burden

¶257

is on the person who denies such entry. In the present case the plaintiff had admitted that the S.No.194/1A is entered in the patta passbook issued to the 1st defendant on 21.12.1996 and also admitted that he is aware of the such entry in the patta passbook. Then the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the entry is incorrect. As held supra when the plaintiff and 1st defendant are brothers residing under same roof and the 1st defendant remaining exparte and the statutory presumption under section 4 is available to the 4th defendant, then adverse inference ought to be drawn against the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. Further the

¶258

30/50

¶259

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶260

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶261

same is only collusion. But the Courts below had failed of analyse the case in the angle of collusion. Further the Courts below had not taken the plea of adverse inference. Hence the courts below had erred.”

¶262

10.2. Keeping in view the law on presumption under Evidence Act

¶263

and Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, which provides that entries in Patta Pass Book “ shall be presumed to be true and correct until contrary is proved ”, this Court finds in view of the admitted fact that patta was in the name of petitioners and their predecessors in title for over 4 decades, burden is on the State which is questioning the correctness thereof to disprove the same by letting in cogent and material evidence. The impugned order ignores the statutory presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act, and denies right to compensation ingrained in Article 300A of the Constitution by proceeding on the premise that petitioners had not let in evidence to show as to how the subject property's classification stood altered / changed from “Government poromboke” to “patta land”, an enquiry wholly misplaced. The impugned order stands vitiated for ignoring the statutory presumption and shifting the burden on the petitioners contrary to Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act.

¶264

31/50

¶265

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶266

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶267

Relevance of Section 6 of Patta Pass Book Act:

¶268

11.1. Section 6 of Patta Pass Book Act provides that entries in Patta Pass Book Act issued by Tahsildar “ shall be prima facie evidence of title” . It may be relevant to refer to the following judgments to appreciate the scope and purport of the expression “ prima facie evidence of title ” employed in Section 6 of the Patta Pass Book Act.

¶269

i) Iyyakannu v. Subramanian, reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 1150 :

¶270

“18. ... Section 6 says that the entries in the Patta Passbook issued by the Tahsildar as per Section 3 shall be prima facie evidence of title of the individual in whose name the Patta Passbook has been issued to the parcels of land entered in the Patta Passbook free of any encumbrance, unless or otherwise specified therein.”

¶271

ii) Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2024) 15 SCC 48 :

¶272

“50. The Latin expression “prima facie” means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”.

¶273

(iii) According to the Black's Law Dictionary, 10^th Edition Pg.677:

¶274

“Evidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment

¶275

32/50

¶276

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶277

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶278

unless contradictory evidence is produced".

¶279

11.2. From the above, it would appear to me that by virtue of

¶280

Section 6 of the Patta Pass Book Act, patta being in the name of the petitioners and their prdecessors in title for over 4 decades, it must be treated as prima facie evidence of title of petitioners over subject properties.

¶281

Relevance of possession in determining ownership / title in terms of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, 1872:

¶282

12.1. Yet another legal aspect which assumes

¶283

relevance/significance in the facts of the present case is Section 110 of the Evidence Act, which provides that burden is on the person who affirms that person in possession is not the owner, to prove the same. Secion 110 of Evidence Act reads as under:

¶284

“[S 110] Burden of proof as to ownership - When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”

¶285

12.2. Section 110 of the Evidence Act, is based on the principle

¶286

33/50

¶287

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶288

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶289

that possession in and of itself may raise a presumption of title. It embodies the well known principle that possession follows title . Admittedly, in the present case possession for more than 41 years was with petitioners and their predecessors in title. While the above presumption is rebuttable the burden of proving that the person in possession is not the owner is on the person who so claims/affirms, in the present case the State. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgments;

¶290

i) Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 472:

¶291

“22. The pattedars proved their possession of the lands in question from 1312 Fasli (1902 AD) as pattedars. There is long and peaceful enjoyment of the lands in question but no proof of conferment of patta on the late Raja and the facts relating to acquisition of title are not known. The appellant State could not prove its title to the lands. On these facts, the presumption under Section 110 of the Evidence Act applies and the appellants have to prove that the pattedars are not the owners. The appellants placed no evidence on record to rebut the presumption. Consequently, the pattedars' title to the land in question has to be upheld.”

¶292

(ii) T Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228 :

¶293

34/50

¶294

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶295

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶296

"14. ........ Undoubtedly, a presumption of an origin in

¶297

lawful title could be drawn, as held in Syed Md. Mazaffaralmusavi v. Bibi Jabeda Khatun, that the court has so often readily made presumption in order to support possessory rights, long and quietly enjoyed, where no actual proof of title is forthcoming. It is not a mere branch of the law of evidence. It was resorted to because of the failure of actual evidence. The matter is one of presumption based upon the policy of law.

¶298

The longer the period within which and the remoter the time when first a grant might be reasonably supposed to have occurred the less force there is in an objection that the grant could not have been lawful....."

¶299

12.3. It thus appears to me that in view of the admitted fact that petitioners and their predecessors in title have been in possession of subject properties for over 4 decades, presumption under section 110 of Evidence Act would get attracted, thus burden is on the State to displace such presumption.

¶300

Burden of Proof – Its significance – Degree of proof to discharge - Consequence on failure to discharge:

¶301

13.1. From the above discussion it is clear that, there is a presumption in favour of petitioners title to subject properties in view of

¶302

35/50

¶303

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶304

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶305

Section 4 and 6 of the Patta Pass Book Act and Section 110 of Evidence Act and burden is on the party questioning the same ie., the State in the present case. It may thus be necessary to examine in some detail the relevance of burden of proof and the effect of failure to discharge the burden.

¶306

13.2. Now coming to burden of proof, it means two different things. It means that a party is required to prove an allegation before judgment can be given in its favour, it also means that on a contested issue one of the two contending parties has to introduce evidence. The burden of proof is of importance where by reason of not discharging the burden which was put upon it, a party must eventually fail . It is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party's case. If at the conclusion of the trial he has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose.³

¶307

Having examined the relevance of patta, possession and the legal presumptions which it raises in relation to title/ownership and that burden is on the party challenging the above presumption to disprove the same. I would think the next aspect which may have to be examined is

¶308

C.Abdul Shukoor Saheb v. Arji Papa Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1150: Narayan Bhagwatrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and others, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 54 : iii) Kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 121

¶309

36/50

¶310

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶311

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶312

the quality of evidence and the degree of proof required, to discharge the burden / displace the presumption provided under Section 4 and 6 of Patta Pass Book Act and Section 110 of the Evidence Act as a result of the fact that admittedly patta in respect of the subject properties have stood in the name of the petitioners and their predecessors in title over 4 decades, while possession of subject properties was admittedy with petitioners and their predecessors in title for over 4 decades.

¶313

While dealing with the degree of proof that is required to

¶314

displace the burden/displace the presumption under Section 4 and 6 of Patta Pass Book Act and Section 110 of Evidence Act, it is necessary to bear in mind that this Court is dealing with petitioners' right to property, a constitutional right which provides that while compulsory acquisition rooted in power of eminent domain may enable the Government to acquire lands, however, it is trite that even within that articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition being for a public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition are mandated. Although not explicitly contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, these twin requirements have been read in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory deprivation to afford 37/50

¶315

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶316

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶317

protection to the individuals who are being divested of property.⁴

¶318

I would think the burden on the State to disprove the presumption under Section 4 and 6 of the Patta Pass Book Act and 110 of the Evidence Act is onerous and it is incumbent on the State to produce evidence which are cogent, material, clear and direct to discharge the burden and displace the legal presumptions. It is not mere suspicion or spurious claim or evidence that is weak, nebulous and shaky that would be adequate to displace the burden keeping in view the following aspects in the instant case viz.,

¶319

a) Statutory presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act.

¶320

b) Statutory presumption under Section 110 of Evidence Act.

¶321

c) For 40 years land being treated as patta land.

¶322

d) More than 4 sale registered under the registration Act by

¶323

treating the property as patta land.

¶324

e) Conduct of authorities during land acquisition proceedings.

¶325

17.Legality of Impugned order vis a vis Statutory presumption - Burden :

¶326

17.1. From the above discussion it appears that State has not

¶327

State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528; Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533;

¶328

38/50

¶329

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶330

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶331

produced any evidence much less cogent, material and direct to discharge its burden to displace the legal presumptions arising out of documents and other material evidence produced by the petitioners in the form of patta, sale deeds and documents showing title and possession of petitioners over the subject properties. I find the State except for asserting that these are “Government Poromboke Anadheenam” has not produced any files, records or any evidence to support its claim that the subject properties are Government Poromboke. State has failed to discharge the burden.

¶332

17.2. Apart therefrom the impugned order has also erred in misplacing the burden of proof by calling upon the petitioners to let in evidence to demonstrate how the classification of land stood altered from Government Poromboke to patta lands. It appears to me the burden is on the State to prove that these are Government lands. I would also think the very fact that the Government has not come forward to disclose any material to show how the classification of land was altered / changed from Government Poromboke to patta would require this Court to draw an adverse inference inasmuch as State is the custodian of revenue records thus the basis for altering / change of classification of subject properties from “Government Poromboke” to “patta land” ought to be 39/50

¶333

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶334

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶335

established by the State. The State has failed to produce any records / files in respect there of, instead it shifts the burden to the petitioners by calling upon the petitioners to produce records showing the basis of the above alteration / change in classification. This, I would think vitiate the proceedings for misplacing the burden⁵ . That apart, this Court is compelled to draw an adverse inference against the State which is the custodian of revenue records for not producing the same. The following judgments are relevant in this regard:

¶336

i) State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri, reported in (2006)

¶337

7 SCC 172:

¶338

“18. It is now well settled that when a document being in possession of a public functionary, who is under a statutory obligation to produce the same before the court of law, fails and/or neglects to produce the same, an adverse inference may be drawn against him. The learned Special Judge in the aforementioned situation was enjoined with a duty to draw an adverse inference. He did not consider the question from the point of view of statutory requirements, but took into consideration factors, which were not germane.”

¶339

ii) Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148:

¶340

“Presumption under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence

¶341

Act

¶342

“12. Generally, it is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in his possession, which could throw light on the issue

¶343

Rangammal Vs. Kuppusamy, (2011) 12 SCC 2020

¶344

40/50

¶345

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶346

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶347

in controversy and in case such material evidence is withheld, the court may draw adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding, that the onus of proof did not lie on such party and it was not called upon to produce the said evidence.”

¶348

Impugned order vis a vis Article 14 of Constitution of India:

¶349

18.1. Finally I would think that the impugned order smacks of

¶350

arbitrariness and falls fouls of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for more than one reason. I would think that the impugned order stands vitiated in view of the fact that for more than 4 decades subject properties has been treated as patta lands and admittedly petitioners and their predecessors in title had been in possession over the subject properties. State has not challenged petitioners title during the above period, instead the State even while initiating the acquisition proceedings and until the impugned order came to be passed proceeded treating the petitioners as lawful owners of the subject properties. Inaction on the part of the State for an unduly long period smacks of arbitrariness. It is trite that exercise of power must be reasonable and it would take within its sweep time element also. No authority could exercise the power conferred upon it in an unreasonable manner. The exercise of power after inordinate delay would be unreasonable and arbitray exercise of

¶351

41/50

¶352

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶353

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶354

power. Therefore, void under Article 14 of the Constitution of India also.⁶ Arbitrariness and unreasonableness being facets of Article 14, timely action is the essence of government functioning and unreasonable delay questions the very legality of such orders. Wherever the, records offer no explanation for prolonged unreasonable delay, the equity will tilt more in favour of the petitioners than uphold the action of the authorities to be correct, being done in the normal course of its business.⁷ It hardly needs to be stated, that Courts shall frown upon arbitrary protraction or mala fide inaction of authorities resulting injury.⁸

¶355

At this juncture it may be relevant to keep in view that the “Doctrine of Adverse Possession”, would apply even to property belonging to State. While in the case of an individual the limitation for adverse possession is 12 years, while in the case of property belonging to the Government/State would be 30 years. I have referred to the doctrine of adverse posession only to indicate that when it comes to property, even Government/State ought to be vigilant lest they will lose their right

¶356

Anandi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 SCC OnLine Raj 72

¶357

Mahender Kumar v. Land Acquisition Collector, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 576

¶358

Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555

¶359

42/50

¶360

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶361

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶362

over the property. In the present case petitioners and their predecessors in title have patta in their names and had been in possession admittedly for more than 4 decades and multiple transactions of sale registered in respect of the subject properties. While I am conscious that this is not a case of adverse possession which would require letting in evidence in support of such claim, to repeat I had referred to the above doctrine only to emphasis the fact that State cannot claim immunity while asserting its right over property against inaction and lethargy.⁹

¶363

Secondly it is trite that every State action must be guided by fairness. Arbitrariness in State action would fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 is fatally allergic to arbitrariness. Action of State would suffer from arbitrariness, if it takes into account irrelevant, leaving out relevant factors. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgment:

¶364

i) R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 :

¶365

“21. .... It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory: it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations, because that would be denial of

¶366

R. Hanumaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 203

¶367

43/50

¶368

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶369

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶370

equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law.”

¶371

ii) Asha Sharma v. Chandigarh Admn. , (2011) 10 SCC 86 :

¶372

“12. Arbitrariness in State action can be demonstrated by existence of different circumstances. Whenever both the decision- making process and the decision taken are based on irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant considerations, such an action can normally be termed as “arbitrary”.

¶373

It is thus clear that whenever any action of State is taken based

¶374

on consideration which are extraneous or irrelevant while leaving out relevant would stand vitiated on the ground of arbitrariness, thereby falling foul of Article 14 of Constitution of India. Applying the above test to the facts of the present case it appears that the following relevant factors are left out:

¶375

a) Statutory presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act.

¶376

b) Statutory presumption under Section 110 of Evidence Act.

¶377

c) For 40 years land being treated as patta land.

¶378

d) More than 4 sale registered under the registration Act by

¶379

44/50

¶380

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶381

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶382

treating the property as patta land.

¶383

e) Conduct of authorities during land acquisition proceedings.

¶384

The above factors which are relevant has not been taken into

¶385

account rather ignored while it looks to an entry in the Survey Resettlement Register held by the Supreme Court to be neither dispositive or conclusive of title.

¶386

In the light of the above discussion, the impugned order is

¶387

liable to be set aside inter alia for the following reasons:

¶388

i) The impugned order overlooks the following relevant factors

¶389

viz.,

¶390

a) Statutory presumption under Section 4 of Patta Pass Book Act.

¶391

b) Statutory presumption under Section 110 of Evidence Act.

¶392

c) For 40 years land being treated as patta land.

¶393

d) More than 4 sale registered under the registration Act by treating the property as patta land.

¶394

e) Conduct of authorities during land acquisition proceedings.

¶395

ii) Burden is on the State to disprove the above presumption.

¶396

45/50

¶397

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶398

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶399

However, no evidence is let in by the State. Having failed to discharge the burden, the State must fail.

¶400

iii) The impugned order shifts the burden on the petitioners thereby, misplacing the burden and thus stands vitiated.

¶401

iv) The impugned order suffers from inaction for unduly long period and thus stands vitiated.

¶402

Before parting I must clarify that there can be no two views about the fact that this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not go into disputed questions relating to title. I must make it clear that I had only examined the scope of presumptions raised in terms of Section 4 and 6 of Patta Pass Book Act and Section 110 of Evidence Act and the failure to discharge the burden which was on the State and consequences thereof. Importantly, the impugned order while finding that patta and possession has been in the name and with the petitioners and their predecessors in title for over four decades has ignored the presumptions attached thereto and without any material/evidence to disprove the same, passed the impugned order 46/50

¶403

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶404

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶405

denying the petitioners compensation thereby offending their right under Article 300A of the Consitution of India. It is made clear that the impugned order is interfered with inasmuch as it is based on no evidence and it arrives at a conclusion which no authority properly instructed as to the relevant law would arrive at and thus wholly perverse. It is trite that this Court would interfere with orders based on no evidence or perverse.¹⁰

¶406

For all the above reasons this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 11.04.2025. Since it is stated that the compensation has been deposited it is open to the petitioners to take out appropriate application for disbursement of the compensation deposited in Court. If any such application is taken the compensation shall be paid within a period of four weeks from the date of such application. It is open to the petitioners to claim enhanced compensation if entitled in accordance with law. I must state that I have not expressed anything on the merits of the petitioners entitlement for enhancement while disposing

¶407

of the present writ petition.

¶408

State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw, AIR 1990 SC 2205; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, AIR 1975 SC 2151; Subhas Chandra Chetia v. Assam Board of Revenue, (1980) 3 SCC 234; Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd., v. Nashik Workers' Union, (2003) 6 SCC 416; South Bengal State Transport Corpn. v. Sapan Kumar Mitra, (2006) 2 SCC 584.

¶409

47/50

¶410

https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

¶411

W.P. No.21220 of 2025

¶412