Dismissed¶43

Rajagopal v. Girija

Madras HC11 Aug 2025SA(MD)/366/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Second appeal dismissed; bare injunction; permanent injunction; cause of action real not illusory; act of interference 04.07.2015 not proved; burden on plaintiff; no evidence adduced; bona fide apprehension tangible foundation; injunction cannot be granted merely for the asking; defendant disclaims title and possession; Subba Reddiar v. Vasanthammal 2000 (3) CTC 200; Order XII Rule 6 CPC admission decree misconceived; core of cause of action denied; trial court decreed solely on possession; first appellate court reversal upheld; no substantial question of law; Thanjavur; Thiruvaiyaru; Principal Sub-Court; District Munsif Court; Madurai Bench of Madras High Court; S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025; C.M.P.(MD)No.12770 of 2025.

What did the court decide?

None - Second Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs; connected miscellaneous petition (C.M.P.(MD)No.12770 of 2025) closed.

Rajagopal Vs Girija — Madras HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None - Second Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs; connected miscellaneous petition (C.M.P.(MD)No.12770 of 2025) closed.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the plaintiff discharged the burden of establishing the alleged act of interference with his possession on 04.07.2015, which formed the sole cause of action for the bare-injunction suit. +2 more

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Court's answer

The plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving that his possession was in fact disturbed by the defendant on 04.07.2015; the first appellate court rightly so recorded.

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Ratio / Principle

Even a bona fide apprehension of interference may constitute a cause of action, but such apprehension must rest on a tangible foundation; here the defendant neither claimed any right over the suit property nor denied the plaintiff's possession, so there was no reasonable basis for such apprehension.

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Key takeaways

The trial court erred in decreeing the suit solely on the ground of possession without determining whether the cause of action pleaded in the plaint had been proved.ratio¶26
Where there is no dispute or threat of interference, an injunction cannot be granted merely for the asking; when the defendant disclaims title and possession of the suit property, the relief of injunction need not be granted, as held in Subba Reddiar v. Vasanthammal, 2000 (3) CTC 200.ratio¶31
A decree on the basis of admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is misconceived where the defendant, while admitting the plaintiff's title and possession, expressly denies the alleged act of interference which constitutes the core of the cause of action; the suit resting entirely on that cause of action necessarily fails.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Bare-injunction suit fails for want of proof of cause of action. The defendant admitted the plaintiff's title and possession but specifically denied the alleged act of interference on 04.07.2015; no evidence was adduced by the plaintiff to prove the alleged interference, so the burden of establishing the cause of action was not discharged. Even a bona fide apprehension of interference must rest on a tangible foundation; where the defendant neither claims any right over the suit property nor denies the plaintiff's possession, there is no reasonable basis for such apprehension. Where there is no dispute or threat of interference, an injunction cannot be granted merely for the asking, and when the defendant disclaims title and possession, injunction need not be granted (relying on Subba Reddiar v. Vasanthammal, 2000 (3) CTC 200). A decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is misconceived where the denied interference constitutes the core of the cause of action. The trial court had decreed solely on possession without testing the pleaded cause of action; the first appellate court's independent finding that the interference was not established was upheld. No substantial question of law arose. Second Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs; connected miscellaneous petition closed. (Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Dr. Justice A.D. Maria Clete, 11.08.2025)

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

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DATED: 11.08.2025

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CORAM

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THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE A.D. MARIA CLETE

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025 and C.M.P.(MD)No.12770 of 2025

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Rajagopal, S/o. Kesavadoss, No.33/16, Vengalanayakan Street, Thiruvaiyaru Town and Munsif, Thanjavur District.

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... Appellant

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Vs.

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Girija, W/o.Babu, No. 2, Tamilmettu Street, Thiruvaiyaru Town and Munsif, Thanjauvr District. ... Respondent

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PRAYER : Second Appeal filed under Section 100 Cr.P.C., against the Judgement and decree passed in A.S.No.l9 of 2022 dated 22.04.2025 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Thanjavur reversing the Judgement and decree passed in O.S.No.l09 of 2015 dated 21.12.2018 on the file of District Munsif Court, Thiruvaiyaru.

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For Appellant : Mr.R.Rajaraman, Advocate

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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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JUDGMENT

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Heard.

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The first appellate court, in A.S. No. 19 of 2022, reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S. No. 109 of 2015, which had granted a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff.

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The suit was one for bare injunction. The defendant did not dispute the plaintiff’s title or possession over the suit property. In the plaint, the plaintiff averred that the cause of action arose on 04.07.2015, when the defendant allegedly attempted to interfere with his possession. This allegation was specifically denied by the defendant. In such circumstances, the burden squarely lay on the plaintiff to establish the alleged act of interference. No evidence was adduced to discharge this burden.

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It is trite that a cause of action must be real and not illusory.

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When the defendant neither disputes the plaintiff’s title or possession nor

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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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asserts any right over the suit property, the plaintiff must nevertheless establish the alleged act of interference. While it is correct that even a bona fide apprehension of interference may, constitute a cause of action, such apprehension must rest on a tangible foundation. In the present case, when the defendant neither claimed any right over the suit property nor denied the plaintiff’s possession, there was no reasonable basis for such apprehension.

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The evidence further shows that the defendant’s property lies to the west of the suit property, separated by a lane. This circumstance makes it evident that there is no boundary dispute between the parties. The trial court, however, decreed the suit solely on the ground of possession, without determining whether the cause of action pleaded in the plaint had been proved.

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The first appellate court, upon an independent appreciation of the evidence, rightly found that the alleged act of interference on 04.07.2015 was not established and, therefore, dismissed the suit. The settled principle of law is that where there is no dispute or threat of

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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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interference, an injunction cannot be granted merely for the asking. In Subba Reddiar v. Vasanthammal and another, reported in 2000 (3) CTC 200 , this Court held that when the defendant disclaims title and possession of the suit property, the relief of injunction need not be granted.

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At the time of arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that there is no lane between the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, as alleged by the latter. In the present case, it is unnecessary to adjudicate upon the existence or otherwise of such a lane. The first appellate court, however, relying on an admission made by the plaintiff during cross-examination, recorded a finding as to the existence of the lane. Be that as it may, the present suit pertains solely to the suit property as described in the plaint schedule and not to any lane in question.

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It is not in dispute that the defendant has categorically admitted

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the plaintiff’s title and possession over the suit property, while specifically denying the allegation of interference on 04.07.2015. In

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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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these circumstances, the burden squarely rested on the plaintiff to prove that his possession was in fact disturbed by the defendant. In the instant case, the plaintiff has failed to discharge this burden, as rightly recorded by the first appellate court.

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The submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff that a decree could be granted on the basis of admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is misconceived in the present factual matrix. While the defendant admitted the plaintiff’s title and possession, he expressly denied the alleged act of interference, which constitutes the core of the cause of action. As the first appellate court correctly observed, the plaintiff has not proved the specific allegation in the plaint that on 04.07.2015 the defendant disturbed his possession. When such a foundational fact is not established, the suit, resting entirely on that cause of action, necessarily fails. The submissions made by learned counsel are therefore untenable.

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In the present case, no substantial question of law arises for consideration. The questions formulated in the memorandum of appeal are not substantial in nature but relate to settled legal principles.

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S.A.(MD)No.366 of 2025

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