of his office premises. So far as we consider, his possession is not capable of being interfered with so long as he is incharge of it, and further his possession has all the qualities of a peaceful, lawful user which an outsider can only invade at his own peril, and particularly when forbidden to do so. It only remains for us to point out that if the act of a wrongdoer may happen to fall within the four walls of offences more than one as defined in the Indian Penal Code, then it can be no real answer to say that the offence is only the one which has been provided under a particular section and not the other. So far as we think, in such a case the wrongdoer may well be convicted of both offences, and if for some technical reason a conviction is not possible under one of the offences, then that by itself can hardly be a reason for not convicting or punishing the offender for the other offence. We may in this connection also point out that essentially an offence under Section 186, Penal Code, is aimed to reach an entirely different state of circumstances; it is designed to protect public servants in the discharge of their official duties; while section 441, Penal Code, is conceived and designed on a far more comprehensive pattern and is aimed to protect possession which may vest in anybody whatever, whether he is a public servant or not, provided of course such possession is invaded with the criminal intent provided in that section. Lastly, we may also point out that if the view propounded by the learned Judge, in the case which we are considering, were to be accented, then the employees or agents of all juristic bodies--and it admits of no doubt that the Government is such a body--will stand deprived of the benefit of the protection afforded to them under
