The Additional Superintendent Vs G.Elangovan

PRAYER: This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 378(2) of Cr.P.C. to admit this appeal and call for the records from the Lower Court and set aside the Judgment passed by the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai in C.C.No.1 of 2007 dated 06.06.2016 by allowing this Criminal Appeal.

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For Appellant : Mr.C.Muthusaravanan, Special Public Prosecutor for CBI

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For Respondents : Mr.C.S.S.Pillai for R1

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: Mr.V.M.Thorat

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for Mr.Amar Bodke for R2

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: Mr.V.S.Venkatesh for R3

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: Mr.G.Karnan for R4

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JUDGMENT

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The CBI filed the appeal challenging the acquittal judgment passed by the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai, in C.C.No.1 of 2007 dated 06.06.2016.

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2.The Respondents Nos.1 to 4 had been ranked as A1 to A4 respectively before the trial Court.

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For the sake of convenience, the rank followed by the court below is taken herein for better appreciation of this case.

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A1 was working as the Superintendent of the Commissioner of

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Customs and Central Excise Appeals, Trichy. A2 was the Commissioner of the State Office. A3 was another Superintendent of the State Office. They conspired together during the year 2006 in Trichy and other places to demand and accept illegal gratification and in pursuance of the said conspiracy, A1 demanded Rs.20,000/- as illegal gratification, as a reward from Mr.Sathyamurthy, Managing Partner of Balaji Steel, Pudukottai, for having the appellate order passed by A2 revised by reducing the penalty from Rs.4,87,292 to Rs.1,00,000. The said demand was reiterated on 20.02.2006. Therefore, P.W.10, made a complaint to P.W.20. Upon verification of the complaint, P.W.20 registered the case and arranged a trap by calling official witnesses P.W.12 and P.W.13. He demonstrated the significance of the phenolphthalein test to P.W.10 and considering the special circumstances of the case that high ranking officers in the customs department are involved, they planned to use the electronic recorder and instructed P.W.10 as to how the electronic recorder is to be handled and

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entrusted the electronic recorder and instructed P.W.10 to give a call after receipt of the bribe amount, P.W.13 was directed to go along with P.W.2. P.W.12 and other CBI officers planned to hide in the toilet and watch the happenings. The above events were incorporated in the Entrustment Mahazar, noting the numbers of the currencies. P.W.10 and P.W.13 reached the office of the accused and P.W.10 approached A1. A1 received the amount and took P.W.10 to A2's cabin and had some talks and finally he gave the signal by pressing the instrument. On receipt of the signal, P.W20 and his team rushed to the office of the accused and conducted the phenolphthalein test in the hands of A1 and the hand wash turned pink for the proof of handling tainted currency and he disclosed that he handed over the bribe amount to A2. Then test was conducted in the hands of A2 and the said hand wash also turned pink for the proof of handling tainted currency. He stated that he handed over the bribe amount to A3. Thereafter, test was conducted in the hands of A3 and the said hand wash also turned pink and he disclosed that he handed over the said amount to A4. A4 was not available in the office and hence, he was summoned to the office through the cell phone of the accused. He came to the office and test was conducted in his hand which wash also was positive and he handed over the bribe amount. Thereafter, P.W.20, prepared the recovery mahazar under

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Ex.P.22 narrating the above sequence of events and arrested the accused

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and handed over the file to P.W.21. P.W.21 conducted investigation by collecting the materials, report from the FSL, sanction from sanctioning authority and filed the final report before the learned II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai. The Special Court took the same on file in C.C.No.1 of 2007 and summoned the accused and served the copies under Section 207 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, he framed the charges against all the accused and read over the same and all the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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5.The prosecution, in order to prove case, examined P.W.1 to P.W.21 and marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P.75 and produced Material Objects as M.O.1 to M.O.20 and C1 was marked as Court Material Object. Thereafter, the accused were examined under section 313 of Cr.P.C., by confronting them with the incriminating materials available against them and the accused denied them as false and came up with some explanation. Thereafter, to prove their defense, they examined D.W.1 and marked Exs.D1 to D6. The learned trial Judge considering the entire evidence on record acquitted the accused from the charge framed. Hence, the CBI filed this appeal.

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6. Mr.C.Muthusaravanan, the learned Special Public Prosecutor

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for CBI made the following submission:

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6.1.The demand was proved through the evidence of P.W.10. The demand also was reaffirmed through the speaker phone used by P.W.10 while confabulating with A1. The reiteration of demand also was proved through exhibit C1. The same was not properly considered by the learned trial judge and hence he gave erroneous finding that the demand was not proved. The recovery of the amount from A4 was clearly proved through the mahazar witnesses and also through the officers of the accused's office.

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In the said circumstances when the demand and recovery was proved, the presumption under section 20 would come into play against the accused and the same was not properly considered by the learned trial judge.

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6.2.The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that when the available evidence clearly proved the charge against the accused under sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the court below ought to have convicted the accused under the above sections. Further, it is submitted that all the findings of the learned trial judge were perverse and he has taken some irrelevant and extraneous

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materials to disbelieve the cogent evidence of the P.W.10 and P.W.12. The

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said evidence of P.W.10 and P.W.12 corroborated with the electronic evidence exhibit C1. The same was marked with the consent of both the parties. From the perusal of Ex.C.1, it is clear that the demand was proved, acceptance was proved and hence when un impeachable evidence is available, the learned trial judge ought to have convicted the accused, but gave a perverse finding that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, he seeks to set aside the acquittal judgment.

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6.3. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that

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reasoning of the learned trial judge, that there was no reiteration of demand is against the contents of the record and also the reason assigned by the learned trial judge to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.10 is not acceptable. Similarly, the reason assigned by the learned trial judge to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.12 also is not correct. In the above circumstances he seeks for the interference in the judgment passed by thelearned trial Judge and seeks to convict the accused.

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6.4. The learned Special Public Prosecutor after reading through the

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entire typed set of papers submitted that both oral and documentary evidence and proved circumstances are all in favour of the prosecution and the evidence leads to the only inference that the accused had demanded bribe and received and tried to screen the same. He relied various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to substantiate his contention that this case required interference in the impugned unmerited acquittal judgment.

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7.Thiru.V.S.Venkatesh, the learned counsel for the third respondent /A3 made the following submissions:

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i) Delay in preferring the complaint materially affected the entire trap proceedings.

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ii) Mere recovery of the amount is not a ground to convict the respondents under the charged Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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iii) Call records also not properly adduced to prove the telephonic conversation that took place between P.W.10 and A1 on the date of the demand namely, 29.02.2016.

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(iv)A3 was not arrayed as accused in the original FIR. There was no evidence available on record to prove that he demanded any amount of

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bribe from the defacto complainant. There was no evidence available on record to prove that tainted currency was recovered from A3. Even according to the prosecution, role of A3 surfaced only at the time of the recovery of the tainted currency and hence, there was no material to convict the appellant under Section 120 (b) of IPC. Even for the proof of the specific charge against A3 under Section 511 r/w 201 of IPC that A3 and A4 attempted to commit offence of causing disappearance of the evidence, no evidence is available on record. P.W.10/Defacto complainant specifically deposed that he has not seen A2 handling over the tainted currency to A3 and A3 handing over the same to A4. Further, after the trap A3 called A4 from his mobile number and asked to bring the window cover containing, tainted currency. The same was recorded under the CDR at 03.21.pm., but the recovery mahazar proceedings was commenced at 05.15 pm. Hence, the said material discrepancies seriously affected the prosecution case of recovery ie, recovery from A4 and the disclosure made by A3. There are lot of material contradictions relating to the white colour window cover containing tainted currency and the same was not properly explained by the prosecution. There is contradiction relating to the recovery of the white colour window cover and also Ex.P22. The same was not produced before the Court as Exhibit. Therefore a suspicion arises

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from the evidence on record relating to the recovery. He also made a detailed submission on the material discrepancies between the complaint addressed to P.W.20. He also relied the evidence of P.W.1 that there are no records to prove that A3 demanded bribe from anybody and A3 has not dealt with the defacto complainant's file. He also relied the evidence of P.W.11 and stated that A3 was threatened by CBI officials and the amount was recovered under duress. Therefore, there is no evidence available on record to prove that he received the bribe amount from A2 and in turn, he handed over the same to A4 and A4 went away from the office of the accused. There is apparent lacuna in questioning under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., proceedings and no question was asked relating to the window cover. He finally concluded the argument stating that when a view taken by the trial Court is found to be possible view, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings in an appeal against acquittal.

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7.1. He would further submit that the telephonic records produced before the Court is not admissible as per the judgment of the Anwar Case . The jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in the appeal against the acquittal is very much limited. In this case, there are lot of infirmities and a slew of inconsistencies and only the possible view that can be deduced is that the charge is not proved and hence, this Court has no jurisdiction to

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interfere with the well considered judgment of the learned trial Judge. The learned counsel also relied number of the judgments of various High Courts including this Court to further prove that when the recovery is not made from the person or table drawer of the accused, the said recovery can not be held against the respondents. The evidence of P.W.10 needs corroboration on material particulars and the same is absent in this case and hence, the judgment of the learned trial Judge needs no interference. There is no evidence to prove the demand on the part of the respondent No.3 and hence, he seeks acquittal for the respondents. To substantiate his contention, he relied the number of precedents (around 88) rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court.

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8. Thiru.C.S.S.Pillai, the learned counsel for the first respondent made the following submissions :

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According to the prosecution, 3 demands were made by A1 ie., on 14.02.2006, 20.02.2006 and 21.02.2006. To prove the said demand, the prosecution has not produced adequate evidence. Even prior to the first demand on 14.02.2006, the appellate order was despatched on 06.01.2006. Therefore, the first respondent has no role in any of the transaction. The same was considered by the learned trial Judge and the learned Judge

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correctly acquitted the appellant. The learned counsel relied the number of circumstances from the evidence of witnesses and stated that the demand was not proved. Therefore, there is no truth in the case of the complainant that after despatching of order, the appellant demanded the amount. Even the evidence adduced during the trap proceedings on 21.02.2006 is not trustworthy and hence, he seeks to confirm the acquittal. He also reiterated the said submission of the learned counsel appearing for A3 that no independent evidence was adduced to prove that A1 handed over the money to A2 and A2 received the money from A1 and A2 and handed over the same to A3. When there is a clear denial of the receipt of the bribe amount and more particularly, P.W.10, in his evidence has deposed that A1 never had the habit of receiving the bribe amount. Therefore, the acceptance of the bribe amount as projected by CBI is false. The material evidence in the form of electronic record is not reliable and not admissible and the contents of the electronic evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant for the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Ex.C1 was properly considered by the learned trial Judge and the learned trial Judge on appreciation of the evidence of witnesses along with Ex.C1 gave a finding that the prosecution failed to prove the acceptance of the amount by A1 and A2. Therefore, the

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learned counsel seeks for confirmation of the acquittal judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. The learned counsel also after going through the evidence of witnesses and the entire records, specifically argued that no evidence was adduced to prove the demand and acceptance on the part of A1. He reiterated the submission that when the penalty imposed by the authority also was reduced by the CESTAT and High Court, the story of demand of bribe amount is false. He also brought to the notice of this court number of material circumstances, to show that credibility of the complainant is doubtful and he also submitted that the entrustment mahazar is false and the recovery mahazar also contain false particulars. The learned counsel also submitted that there was no preliminary enquiry relating to the complaint given by P.W.10 about the demand and illegal gratification by A1. Therefore, he also submitted that no preliminary enquiry conducted before registering the FIR. Further, he also submitted that non examination of the material witnesses affect the trap proceedings and concluded his argument saying that an illegitimate trap was conducted by the CBI and the same was properly considered by the learned trial Judge and correctly acquitted the respondent No.1 and hence, he seeks for confirmation of the acquittal by the trial Court and also relied the judgment of the learned counsel for A3 and reiterated the said submissions.

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9. Thiru.G.Karnan, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent

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made the following submissions :

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He reiterated the submission of the learned counsel for A3 and he specifically submitted that P.W.10 admitted that A4 has not made any demand and he has not handed over the bribe amount to A4. He also relied the evidence of P.W.11 who deposed only about the presence of the accused Jeyaraj and Ramesh Kumar. He also relied the evidence of P.W.12 that he has no knowledge about the transaction that has been took place between the accused Nos.2, 3 and witnesses. He also submitted that A4 worked as contingent worker at Central Exercise Office, and he has no role in the alleged occurrence. He also relied the evidence of D.W.1, who deposed that CBI officer forced the fourth accused to bring the window cover. One of the CBI officers told that the window cover was already found out and then, asked the remaining persons to leave the office premises. The above evidence was properly considered by the learned trial Judge and acquitted the accused. He also reiterated the statement that when the learned trial Judge appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the accused, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the well considered acquittal judgment.

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10. Thiru.V.M.Thorat, the learned counsel for the second respondent made the following submissions :

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The learned Counsel endorsed the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the other accused and submitted that from the perusal of Ex.C1 ie., the conversation that took place at the accused office between the complainant and shadow witnesses and the CBI officers it has not made out any case for conviction. Therefore, he seeks for acquittal. The learned counsel also relied number of judgments. He also submitted that the recovery was not proved in accordance with law and demand also was not proved and hence, he seeks for acquittal. He further submitted that in the case of appeal against acquittal, the scope of the High Court to interfere with the acquittal judgment is very much limited and even in the said limited jurisdiction, the view of the trial Court should be considered and there is double presumption of innocence against the accused. Hence, he seeks for dismissal of this appeal filed by the CBI.

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This Court considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record and the precedents relied upon by them.

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12.The question arises in this appeal is whether the appeal filed by

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the CBI is entitled to be allowed?

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13. Finding:

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P.W.10 was running a number of industries and schools. He was the

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managing partner of one of the industry namely, Balaji Steel, Pudukottai. The respondents 1 to 4 were working in the office of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals), Trichy, and their respective posts were as follows:-

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*Name of the Respondents*	*Designation of the* *Respondents*
Elangovan(R1)	Superintendent
A.D.Khadtare(R2)	Commissioner of the Appeals
S.X.Jeyaraj (R3)	Superintendent
M.Rameskumar(R4)	Contingent Employee

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13.1. The Excise Assistant Commissioner, Trichy, Division No.1 had

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passed the order in proceedings No.44 of 2005, dated 19.02.2005, directing P.W.10 to pay penalty and interest of Rs.4,77,292/-. Aggrieved over the same, P.W.10 made an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals), Trichy, on 15.09.2015. The second

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respondent had entertained the appeal and conducted enquiry and reduced the penalty to Rs.1,00,000/- from Rs.4,77,292/- by order dated 15.12.2005. On 14.02.2006, A1 called P.W.10 over phone and demanded bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- as a ' reward' for having passed the order already in favour of P.W.10. The said order was despatched to P.W.10 on 15.02.2006 and the same was received by the office of P.W.10 on 16.02.2006. On seeing the said order in his office, P.W.10 contacted A1 to thank him. At that time, A1 reiterated about the bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- and also assured to give further guidance to move the 'CESTAT', without incurring any interest against the penalty amount, P.W.10 approached the CBI and made a complaint to P.W.20. P.W.20 called the independent officials from the Railway Department and the Passport Department and received the bribe amount from P.W.10 intended to be given to A1 and demonstrated the phenolphthalein test and directed P.W.10 to hand over the bribe amount if A1 reiterated the demand of bribe amount of Rs.20,000/-. The phone recording device also was given to P.W.10 to record the conversation between the respondent/accused and himself. P.W.12 also was directed to accompany him and watch the transaction. P.W.10 approached A1 in his chamber and he received the bribe amount and introduced P.W.10 to A2 and the said amount was handed over to A2 and thereafter, the said amount

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was passed on to A3 and the same was further given to A4. In the mean time, the CBI team barged into the office after ascertaining the receipt of the bribe amount by A1 and made a search and A1 disclosed that he handed over the bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- to A2. A2 disclosed that he gave the same to A3. In turn, A3 passed on to A4. Thereafter, the CBI asked A3 to make a call to A4 asking him to come to the chamber of A1. After A4's arrival, A4 handed over the bribe amount. The CBI conducted the phenolphthalein test in the hands of the each accused before recovering the amount. After recovery, arrested the accused and prepared the Recovery Mahazar.

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13.2. P.W.11 is the officer legally entitled to keep the custody of the Appeal Papers of P.W.10. A2 directed P.W.11 to hand over the entire file relating to the P.W.10's appeal to A1. Thereafter, order was passed in favour of P.W.10 by reducing the amount from Rs.4,77,292/- to Rs.1,00,000/-. The order was passed on 15.12.2005. On 14.02.2006, A1 made a demand of Rs.20,000/- as bribe and he also reiterated the same on 20.02.2006. To prove the said communication between A1 and P.W.10, CBI produced the CDR report. According to A1's counsel, the order was already despatched on 15.02.2006 and the same was received on

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16.02.2006 and therefore, the case of the demand is false. This Court is unable to accept the same. Before despatch on 15.02.2006, on 14.02.2006, A1 made the demand through cellphone. The corresponding reference is also found in the CDR report. The reiteration of demand was made on 20.02.2006 and the same also is revealed from the call details that took place between P.W.10 and A1. P.W.12, independent official witness deposed that on 21.02.2006, at about 04.30 p.m, P.W.10 was asked to make a call to A1 and the phone was put on speaker mode. A1 asked P.W.10 to come with money. He also deposed that he was hiding in the bathroom and heard the conversation between A1 and P.W.10. The entire conversation that took place during the trap proceedings was marked as Ex.P.54. The respondents objected to the same and filed a direction petition before the Court to produce the entire CD relating to the conversation. As per the direction of this Court, the entire CD was marked with conversation as Court document under Ex.C1 during the cross examination of P.W.12 at the instance of the accused. They filed an application to mark Ex.C.1 and the Hon'ble High Court allowed the application to mark Ex.C.1. The said document was marked without any objection and both parties relied the same. In the said CD,

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P.R.S. :Denotes conversation made by P.R.Sathyamoorthy

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G.E. :Denotes conversation made by G.Elangovan A.D.K. :Denotes conversation made by A.D.Khadtare DSP :Shri.Krishnamoorthy, D.S.P., C.B.I-TLO

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S.I., CBI :Shri.Kumaresan.

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This Court perused the said conversation. It is clear from the following ' code word ' used by A1 before receiving the bribe amount from P.W.10 that

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amount was demanded.

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05.10 P.R.S. ,Uf;fPuhuh Commissioner.... G.E. Pk;.... ghh;f;fpwpq;fsh? P.R.S Pk; 05.16 G.E. mg;gbah.... ,Uq;Nfh 05.18 P.R.S vt;tsT? 05.20 G.E. Two 05.22 P.R.S. Two.. P.R.S Two, Zero, Twenty 05.23 No Conversation 05.27 P.R.S. Flj;Jlth....q;fsh G.E. mg;gbNa ghj;JLq;Nfh P.R.S. `Pk;.... ....ehdh ghh;j;JLNwd; 05.30 to 07.24 --No conversation 07.25 to 08.38 --Conversation between one of the Staff Inspector Ram Prasad and the complainant

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13.3. Thereafter, A1 took P.W.10 to A2's chamber. In the chamber of

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A2, there was a detailed discussion between A1, A2, and P.W.10. The dialogue concluded with A2 agreeing to come for dinner arranged by P.W. 10. Thereafter, P.W.10 thanked A2 and pressed the device.

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13.4. On receipt of the said signal from P.W.10, the team barged into

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the chamber of A1. P.W.10 informed about the amount given by him to A1. The team conducted the test in the hands of A1. The hand wash turned into pink in colour. Immediately, the team enquired about the receipt of the bribe amount. Initially, he refused to say anything and subsequently, he disclosed that he handed over the bribe amount to A2. Immediately, the team entered into the chamber of A2 and conducted the test in the hands of A2 and the hand wash turned into a pink in colour and enquired about the bribe amount. A2 disclosed that he handed over the same to A3 and A3's hands were tested and the hand wash also turned into a pink in colour and he disclosed on enquiry that he passed on the bribe amount to A4. A3 was asked to contact A4 through his mobile phone. A4 came back to the office, and he feigned ignorance. Therefore, his hands were subjected to the test and the said hand wash turned into a pink in colour. Thereafter, he disclosed the window cover containing the bribe amount in his right hand

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side pant pocket. The cover also was subjected to the test and the said wash also turned into pink in colour. A2's left side hand pant pocket also was subjected to the test and the said wash also turned into pink. A3's right hand pant pocket also subjected to the test and the same turned into pink in colour. The numbers of the recovered currencies also tallied with the serial numbers of currency notes noted in the Entrustment Mahazar. The sequence of events clearly demonstrated the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by A1 and A2. A3 and A4 are also involved in the process of screening the said amount. The evidence of P.W.10 and P.W.12, P.W.20 are cogent and trustworthy and this Court finds no infirmity in their evidence relating to the material particulars. Ex.C1 also affirmed the evidence of P.W.10, P.W.12 & P.W.20. P.W11 also deposed about the material file of the appeal filed by P.W.10 that was transferred to A1's custody on the direction of A2. Then only the demand was made. In the said circumstances, the prosecution clearly proved the demand and acceptance on the part of A1 andA2.

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13.5. The repeated submissions of the all the counsel for the

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respondents/accused is that A2 already allowed the appeal filed by P.W.10 and the same was communicated to P.W.10's office on 16.02.2006 and

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hence, there is no official relationship between P.W.10 and A2's office in view of the specific appeal provision before the CESTAT. This Court is unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel. The prosecution case as per the charge is as follows:-

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(i) The respondents conspired together to receive the illegal gratification as a reward for having the appellate order passed by A2 infavour of P.W.10 reducing the penalty to Rs.1,00,000/- from Rs.4,77,292/-.

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(ii) The conspiracy is to receive the bribe amount as a reward. The Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act clearly stated that reward also comes under the purview of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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13.6. For better appreciation, this Court extracts Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, hereunder:-

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7. Public Servant taking gratification other then

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legal remuneration is respect of an official act : Whoever, being, or exception to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for

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rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government compawny referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanations-(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”. _ If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this Section.

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(b) “Gratification”.- The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or to gratifications estimable in money.

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(c) “Legal remunerations”. The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept._

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(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratigiation as a motive or reward for_

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doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes withint this expression.

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(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this Section.

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13.7. As per Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the

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receipt of the bribe amount as a “reward” is also punishable. The meaning of the reward is concerned, it is applicable in the case of receipt of bribe amount for the act already performed and the same was elaborately interpreted by various Courts including this Court in the following judgements:

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13.7.(i). In the case of Venkatasubbiah Vs Emperor reported in AIR

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1948 mad 63 , the relevant portion reads as follows:

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Two ingenious arguments are raised by Mr. N. Somasundaram for the petitioner. The first is that the phrase “motive or reward” in S. 161 of the Penal Code, 1860 does not cover a case where the payment is made in respect of past favours. The term “reward” in the phrase is manifestly intended to apply to a past service.

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What is forbidden generally is receiving any gratification as motive to do or a reward for having done any such thing as is described in the definition. Any other construction would lead to an absurdity. In that view the payment would be a bribe when paid before the doing of an official act, but it would not be a bribe if paid after the official act has been done or official favour has been shown. It will be the easiest thing for a person in such a position to stipulate for the payment immediately after the doing of the official act or the showing of the official favour. Such a construction is not in keeping with either the language or the spirit of S. 161 of the Penal Code, 1860.

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13.7.(ii).In the case of Mohinder Lal Bagai v. Delhi

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Administration, reported in 1970 Cri LJ 793 , the relevant portion reads as

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follows;

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17. A payment of a sum to a public servant, whether paid before or after doing of the official act, would constitute bribe within section 161, Penal Code, 1860.

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13.7.(iii).In the case of Manikrao Abaji Thonge v. State of

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Maharashtra, reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3796 , the relevant portion reads as

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follows:

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“ 23. In my view, to constitute an offence under section 161 of the Penal Code, 1860, it is sufficient that there is an offer of a bribe to a public servant in the belief that he has an opportunity or power in the exercise of his official function to show the offerer a desired favour, although, the public servant has, in reality, no such power. Performance of the act which is the consideration for the bribe is not essential but it is essential that the bribe should be obtained as a motive or reward. Similarly, whether the complainant desires the accused to perform by way of consideration of the bribe whether it is actually performed or not at the time of the acceptance of the bribe, is not relevant. What is relevant is that the amount of bribe has been received by corrupt or illegal means by abusing his position as a public servant. Once it is shown that the amount has been received by a public servant by abusing his position as a public servant and that the amount is received by corrupt or illegal means, the offence is complete. Hence, even if the illegal gratification is received after the official act is done, yet, it will constitute an offence under section 161 of the Penal Code, 1860. As far as the wordings of section 5(1)(d) are concerned, the same are wider than the wording of section 161. The said section 5(1)(d) provides that a

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public servant would be guilty of committing criminal misconduct if he by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant obtains for himself or through any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. In my view, the contention raised that no offence can be said to have been committed since the accused had already performed his official act on the date on which he received the gratification, cannot be accepted either for the offence under section 161 of the Penal Code, 1860 or under section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act”

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13.9. The arguments of the learned counsel for the accused that after

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passing the order they became “ functus officio ” is misconceived on facts of this case. The defacto complainant having extensive business and is running various industries. The accused officers are the authorities to impose the duty. Therefore, he is under obligation to meet the demand of the accused officers. Further, specific case of the prosecution is that they demanded and accepted as a “reward”. Therefore the question of “ functus officio” is not applicable to the present case and the similar contention was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases and the

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same was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that having contact with the complainant after passing the order receiving the bribe amount amounts to offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed as follows in the following cases:-

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i) Mahadev Dhanappa Gunaki and Another Vs. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1953 SC 179

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Dr.Ambedkar then submits that in this case no offence had been committed. He points out that it was Sri Gudi and not Sri Naik who was authorised to seize the books. Sri Gudi directed Sri Naik to examine the books and make a report which the latter did on 12.03.1949, Ex.10-A. After that date Sri Naik was functus officio, having fully performed whatever duty he had to perform, and, therefore, he was not the public servant who could, in the exercise of his official function, show any favour or render any service to the appellants. Learned counsel relied on the cases of Shamsul Hug vs. Emperor, A.I.R. 1921 Cal 344 (B), In re P.Venkiah, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 851 (c) and Venkatarama Naidu V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1929 Mad, 756 (D). A perusal of the cases relied on by the learned counsel will show that the question of law was not fully discussed and the reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at are not clear or convincing. On the other hand, the High Courts

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of Allahabad, Lahore, Nagpur Bombay and Orissa have disapproved of the decisions relied on by Dr.Ambedkar. See Ajudhia Prasad vs. Emperor, (B), Emperor v. Phul Singh, A.I.R. 1947 LAH 276 (F), Bam Sewak vs. Emperor, (G), Gopeshwar Mandal vs. Emperor, AIR 1948 Nag. 82 (H), In re Varadadesikachariar, (I) Indur Dayaldas Advani v. State, (j) and State vs. Sadhuacharan Panigrahi. The point of law appears to have been more fully discussed in these cases and the reasoning set out therein appear to us, as at present advised to be more convincing than those set out in the cases relied on by Dr.Ambedkar. It is, however, not necessary for the purposes of this case, to express any final opinion on this question, for we are satisfied, on the facts of this case, that Sri Gudi and Sri Naik had it in their power, in the exercise of their official functions, to show favour or render some service to the appellants. It will be remembered that the report of Sri Naik was in the nature of a tentative report made on a cursory examination of the books of account. The books of account were still in their custody and the matter was still under their investigation. In fact, the District Magistrate had on 20.03.1949 referred the application of the appellants for the return of the books to Sri Gudi for report. Sri Gudi made his report thereon on 25.03.1949 stating that the investigation was in

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progress and the books were heavy and that he would inform the District Magistrate as soon as the books would not be required any more. The offer of bribe, as already indicated, was last made to Sri Naik on 23.03.1949. On that date there was nothing to prevent Sri Naik from making a further report stating that on closer scrutiny of the books of account he found there was no tax evasion and there was nothing to prevent Sri Gudi from reporting to the District Magistrate that the books were not required and could be returned. In view of these facts the decisions in the three cases relied on by Dr.Ambedkar can have no application even if they were well-founded in principle. The contention of Dr.Ambedkar, therefore, must be rejected.

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Similar contention also was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.C. Goel v. State reported in (2016) 13 SCC 258 and the same has been rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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13.10. Further arguments of the counsels for the appellants that the prosecution failed to prove the individual demand either on the part of respondent No.1 or on the part of the respondent No.2 is misconceived. It is relevant to extract the following portion of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

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D. Velayutham v. State, reported in (2015) 12 SCC 348

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14. Any defence of bona fide issuance by Accused 1 of the second notice, putatively issued for limitation purposes, is swiftly undercut by the proven illegality of the notice, prior imprimatur of the Assistant Commissioner neither having been sought, nor received. Both the courts below have rightly recognised the issuance of the notice as a graft-inducing ploy, designed to browbeat the complainant into paying bribes to the accused officers for their recalling/rescinding the demand notice in return.

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Billa Nagul Sharief v. State of A.P., reported in (2010) 11 SCC 575

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19.... . The feeling of a common man that when the work is enshrined to different persons bribe is demanded by one of them, when all are invariably in collusion, cannot be lost sight of. If senior officers ensure that the works of the citizens are done without payment of bribe, junior officers and employees may abandon the demand and this country would not have prominently figured as one of the most

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corrupt nations of the world, as it is widely accepted that the corruption flows from the top...

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13.11. From the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is

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clear that even though A1 made the statement during the conversation that he did not want to receive the amount but entire episode clearly disclosed that he demanded and received the bribe on behalf of A2. As per Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the act of accused amounts to offence by applying theory of constructive receipt. It is well settled principle that each conspirator need not involve in every part of the conspiracy. It is relevant to note the words of Former U.S. President

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“ Woodraw Wilson” :

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“ Everybody knows that corruption thrives in secret

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places, and avoids public places, and we believe it a fair presumption that secracy means impropriety ”.

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13.12.In the case of Harihar Prasad, Etc, vs. State of Bihar reported in 1972 3 SCC 89 it is held:

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“Secrecy, it was said, is the badge of conspiracy.

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13.13.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in 2003 3 SCC 6341 has held as follows:

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The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful

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combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment

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13.14. In the case of Aravind Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2021 (11) SCC 1, the Hon'ble Three Judges Bench considered the entire gamut of conspiracy and has reiterated the principle laid down in

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the paragraph No. 662 of “ Nalini case ”

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“662. … It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy."

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13.15. In this case the charge is that there was a conspiracy to

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receive the bribe amount and conceal the same. A1 officer directed PW4

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who was competent person to handover the file of PW10 to A2. A2 dealt the file without authority. He made a demand of the bribe amount the same was clearly deposed by PW10 and also other witnesses namely, PW12. The passing of the bribe amount from various accused and finally, A4 left the place with bribe amount clearly proved the conspiracy between the accused. Therefore, the prosecution clearly proved the offence under section 120(B) r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and section 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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13.16. Therefore, A1 and A2 have committed the offence under Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and hence, they are liable to be punished for the offence under Section 120(b) r/w 7, 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is well settled principle that each conspirator need not involve in every part of the conspiracy. In this case, the charge is that in pursuance of conspiracy to receive the bribe amount, A1 demanded and received and handed over the same to A2 as a part of the conspiracy. A2 received the said amount by making constructive demand. A3 and A4 acted in the process of the screening the offender namely, A1 and A2. A3 had knowledge about the bribe amount when he has received the said amount from A2. Similarly, A4 had knowledge about

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the bribe amount when he received the said amount from A3 and the clandestine act of A1 to A4 in the process of the causing disappearance of the bribe amount from the office itself clearly constituted offence under Section 120(b) IPC r/w 201 of IPC. Therefore, the prosecution clearly proved the charged offence beyond reasonable doubt. But, the learned trial Judge misreading the entire evidence gave the perverse finding that there was no official relationship after the delivery of the order in the office of P.W.10.

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13.17.The learned trial Judge has held in paragraphs No. 35, and 46 as follows:-

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Para 35	Para 46
*****The acceptance of the illegal	*****The prosecution has made out a case that bribe money was recovered from A4 and
gratification and	phenolphthalein tests were positive as against
tried to destroy the	A1 to A4.
evidence and	*****The prosecution is also proved that the
attempt to screen the crime were proved	currency notes recovered from the 4^thaccused and phenolphthalein tests were made against
bytheprosecution.	the A1 to A4 which weregivenpositive results.

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14.After giving the said findings, the learned trial Judge acquitted the respondents on the ground that the demand was not proved. This Court already made a detailed discussion about the proof of demand.

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15.The learned trial Judge and the learned counsels appearing for the respondents made a detailed submission relating to the window cover and telephone index diary. According to the prosecution, the tainted notes were kept in the white window cover, which was kept in the blue colour telephone index diary. But P.W.12 did not depose about the same. The learned trial Judge also in paragraph No.38 suo motu extracted 161 (3) Cr.P.C., statement of P.W.20 to find the contradiction with the evidence of P.W.12. The considered opinion of this Court that the said approach of the learned trial Judge is not legally correct.

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15.1. In this case, the learned trial Judge himself acted as defence counsel and suo motu found out the contradiction by extracting the portion of 161 Cr.P.C., statement of P.W. 20 and thereby, he committed an error of law. In the written argument of the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.3 a detailed discussion was made about the said window cover. Here the recovery is made from A4. The learned trial Judge gave a detailed finding about the recovery in one paragraph. Thereafter, he discussed about the discrepancies relating to the window cover. The bribe amount was recovered from A4. The same was proved through the evidence in accordance with law. There was no explanation from any of the accused

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relating to the recovery of tainted currency during their questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,. The respondents also did not give any explanation relating to the change of colour. The serial numbers of the currency notes recovered from A4 tallied with the numbers noted in the Entrustment Mahazar. Therefore, the discrepancies relating to the window cover is immaterial and the Hon'ble Supreme Court also reiterated the principle that unless the discrepancy materially affect the prosecution case and goes to the root of the prosecution case, the same cannot be a ground to disbelieve the available evidence.

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The submissions of the learned counsels for the respondents that the order of A2 also was set aside by the CESTAT and the documents were marked. Once P.W.10 preferred an appeal before the CESTAT, the question of demand and acceptance of bribe amount does not arise. The said submission is not correct for the reason that the specific charge against the respondents is that they conspired to receive the bribe amount as a reward for having passed appellate order by A2 by transmitting the appeal file of P.W.10 from P.W.11 to A1. The learned trial Judge gave much importance to the above aspect and hence, this Court holds that the learned trial Judge has given unnecessary importance to the irrelevant facts. Therefore, the

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learned trial Judge gave unnecessary importance to the irrelevant facts and failed to consider the relevant materials available on records to hold against the respondents that they had conspired to receive the bribe amount and received the said bribe amount and attempted to screen the materials.

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Through the evidence of P.W.10, P.W.11, P.W.12, P.W.13 and P.W.20 (TLO), the prosecution clearly proved the demand, acceptance of bribe amount, screening of bribe amount and the attempt to cause disappearance of the bribe amount without any shadow of doubt. P.W. 11 is the concerned officer to deal the file of the defacto complainant. He was instructed by the commissioner namely, accused No.2 to hand over the documents to A1, Superintendent, who is not the authority to deal with the file. He further deposed about the recovery of the tainted currency in the office on the date of the occurrence. The accused Jayaraj told that he handed over the bribe amount to A4. He called A4 and A4 appeared in the office and hand wash test was conducted in the hands of A4 and the same turned into a pink in color. P.W. 12 deposed that P.W.20, trap laying officer asked P.W.10 to contact A1 through the phone. He made a call and put an loud speaker mode A1 Elangovan asked him to come on 21.06.2006 at 6.30 pm., with money. The above conversation was heard by P.W.12, P.W. 20, and other trap members.

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Therefore, prior demand of bribe amount by A1 is clearly proved through

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the following evidence.

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17.1. P.W.11 deposed as follows:

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vd; ,Uf;iff;F gf;fj;jpy; fz;fhzpg;ghsh; jpU/b $auh$; cl;fhh;e;J ,Ue;jhh;/ fkpc&dh; fl;jnu U:kpypUe;J 2 egh;fs; eh';fs; ,Ue;j U:Kf;F Xo te;jhh;fs;/ b$auh$; ahh; vd;W fj;jpf;bfhz;L te;jhh;fs;/ fz;fhzpg;ghsh; b $auh$; mth;fis ghh;j;J ehd; jhd; b$auh$; vd;W Twpdhh;/ mth;fs; fz;fhzpg;ghsh; b$auhi$ ghh;j;J fkpc&dh; bfhLj;j gzk; v';nf vd;W nfl;lhh;fs;/ Kjypy; b$auh$; xd;Wkpy;iy vd;W Twpdhh;/ me;j egh;fs; kpul;odhh;fs;/ eh';fs; rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; vd;W Todhh;fs;/ jpU/b$auh$;. fz;fhzpg;ghsh; mth;fs; me;j mjpfhhpfis ghh;j;J. v';fs; mYtyfj;jpy; gzpg[hpa[k; unkc&; vd;gthplk; bfhLj;J mDg;gptpl;nld; vd;W b$auh$; Twpdhh;/ (,jw;F vjphpfs; jug;g[ tHf;fwp"h;fs; Ml;nrgid bjhptpj;jhh;fs;)/ rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; b$auhi$ ghh;j;J 10. 15 epkplj;jpy; me;j gzk; ,';F tuntz;Lk; vd;W Twpdhh;fs;/ jpU/b $auh$; bry;nghd; K:yk; jpU/unkir fhz;l;lhf; bra;jhh;/ ehd; bfhLj;j ftiu clnd bfhz;L th vd;W b$auh$; Twpdhh;/ miu kzpneuj;jpy; ftUld; unkc&; eh';fs; ,Ue;j miwf;F te;jhh;/ b$auh$; nkgpspy; rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; jz;zPh; cs;s lk;siu itj;J b$auhi$ ghh;j;J. iffis lk;shpy; eidf;Fk;go Twpdhh;fs;/ b$auh $; mtUila iftpuy;fis fz;zho fpshrpy; cs;s iffis eidj;J ve;j iftpy;fs; vd;W vdf;F "hgfk; ,y;iy/ gpd;g[ b$auhi$a[k; unkira[k; fkprdh; miwf;F rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; miHj;J brd;whh;fs;/ rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; vd;dplk; xU rp/o/ nghl;L fhl;odhh;fs;/ me;j rp/o/apy; tUk; Fuy;fs; ahh; ahUila Fuy;fs; vd;W

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nfl;lhh;fs;/ mjpy; xU Fuy; ,s';nfhtdpd; Fuy; MFk;/ kw;bwhU Fuy; fl;jnu fkprdpd; Fuy; MFk;/ ,d;bdhUthpd; Fuy; rj;jpaK:h;j;jp Fuy; MFk;/ rpgpI mjpfhhpfs; vd;id tprhhpj;jhh;fs;/

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17.1.1 P.W. 12 deposed as follows :

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gpwF ov!;gp fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mtuJ Ok; bkk;gh;fs;. ,s';nfhtd;. Mfpath;fSk; &kpw;F brd;wdh;/ mth;fSld; ehDk; ,ize;J bfhz;nld;/ ov!;gp jd; Iod;Oia fhz;gpj;J jhd; rpgpI apy; ,Ue;J tUtjhf Twpdhh;/ ,s';nfhtdplk; rj;jpaK:h;j;jp bfhLj;j y";rgzk; U:/20.000-? v';nf vd nfl;lhh;/ (nkw;fz;l rhl;rpaj;ij gjpt[ bra;a vjph; jug;g[ tHf;fwp"hpd; Ml;nrgiz bra;jdh;)/ mjw;F ,s';nfhtd; mth;fs;

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gzk; vJt[k; ehd; th';ftpy;iy vdf; Twpdhh;/ gpwF ov!;gp fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mth;fspd; mwpt[Wj;jypd; nghpy;. nrhoak; fhh;gndl; gt[lh; fye;j ePhpy;. ,s';nfhtDila tyJ ifia eidf;fr; brhd;dhh;/ mJ gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ kPz;Lk; mnjnghy; ntbwhU lk;shpy; cs;s brhya{c&dpy; ,lJ ifia eidf;fr; brhd;dhh;/ mJt[k; gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ ,e;j ,uz;L brhy;a{c&ida[k; ntbwhU ,uz;L ghl;oy;fspy; milj;J. rPy; bra;J ifbahg;gk; ,lg;gl;lJ/ (mJ Kiwna m/j/rh/bgh/1. 2 Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;lJ)/ ,g;nghJ kPz;Lk; rpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mth;fs; ,s';nfhtdplk; cz;ikia brhy;Y';fs; gzk; v';nf vdf; nfl;lhh;/ mjw;F mth; me;j gzj;ij fkpc&dhplk; bfhLj;Jtpl;ljhf Twpdhh;/ (nkw;fz;l rhl;rpaj;ij gjpt[ bra;a vjphp jug;g[ tHf;fwp"hpd; Ml;nrgiz bra;jdh;)/ jpU ,s';nfhtd; mth;fSf;F mbu!;l; bknkh bfhLf;fg;gl;lJ/ fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp ,s';nfhtd;.

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rj;jpaK:h;j;jp kw;Wk; Ok; bkk;gh;fs; midtUk; fkpc&dUila miwf;F brd;nwhk;/ m';nf fkpc&dhplk; fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mth;fs; jd; Ild;Oia fhz;gpj;J. rpgpI ypUe;J te;jpUg;gjhf Twpdhh; mjd;gpwF fkpc&dhplk;. fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp ov!;gp mth;fs;. ,s';nfhtd; bfhLj;j gzk; v';nf vdf; nfl;lhh;/ nkw;fz;l rhl;rpaj;ij gjpt[ bra;a vjph; jug;g[ tHf;fwp"hpd; Ml;nrgiz bra;jdh;/ mjw;F mg;gobay;yhk; gzk; bfhLf;ftpy;iy vd fkpc&dh; Twpdhh;/ mjw;F fpUc&;zK:h ; j;jp mth;fs; Twpajpd; nghpy; mtuJ fkpc&dhpd; ,uz;L iffisa[k; jdpj;jdpna lk;sh;fspy; cs ; s brhy;a{c&dy;fspy; eidf;f brhd;dhh;/ me;j brhy;a{c&d; gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ (mJ Kiwna vk; 3. 4. Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;lJ). fkpc&dhplk; fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mth;fs; cz;ikia TwptpL';fs; gzk; v';nf itj;jpUf;fpwPh;fs; vd nfl;l nghJ. Vjph; miwapy; cs;s b$auh$; mth;fsplk; bfhLj;jpUg;gjhf Twpdhh;/ (nkw;fz;l rhl;rpaj;ij gjpt[ bra;a vjphp jug;g[ tHf;fwp"hpd; Ml;nrgiz bra;jdh;)/ gpwF mtUf;F mbu!;l; bknkh bfhLf;fg;gl;lJ/ gpwF midtUk;. b$auh$; ,Uf;Fk; &kpw;F brd;W. mthplk; jpU/fpUc&;zK:h;j;jp mth;fs; tprhuiz bra;jhh;/ fkpc&dh; bfhLj;j gzk; v';nf vd nfl;ljw;F. mjw;F mth; me;j gzj;ij. jpU unkc&; Fkhh; mth;fsplk; bfhLj;J mDg;gptpl;ljhf mth; Twpdhh;/ (nkw;fz;l rhl;rpaj;ij gjpt[ bra;a vjphp jug;g[ tHf;fwp"hpd; Ml;nrgiz bra;jdh;)/ mthpd; ,uz;L iffisa[k; jdpj;jdpna ,uz;l lk;shpy; cs;s brhy;a{c&dpy; eidf;fr; brhd;dhh;fs;/ mJt[k; gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ mJ Kiwna m/rh/M/5. 6 Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;lJ/ b $auh$; mth;fspd; bry;nghdpy; ,Ue;nj unkc&;Fkhh; mth;fis miHf;fr;brhd;dhh;/ mjd;go mtUila

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;

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bry;nghdpy; b$auh$; ngrp. rpwpJ neuj;jpy; unkc&;Fkhh; mth;fs; me;j ,lj;jP.W.;F te;jhh ; / unkc&;Fkhh; ,uz;L iffisa[k;. jdpj;jdpna cs;s ,uz;l lk;shpy; cs;s brhy;a{c&dpy; eidf;fr; brhd;dhh;fs;/ mJt[k; gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ mJ Kiwna mj/rh/7. 8 Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;lJ/ mtUf;Fk; mbu!;l; bknkh bfhLf;fg;gl;lJ/ gP.W.F mthplk; ,Ue;j gzj;ij ifg;gw;wp rhpghh;j;jdh;/ mit midj;ija[k;. buf;fthp kf$hpy; gjpt[ bra;ag;gl;L. midtUk; mjpy; ifbahg;gkpl;nlhk;/ me;j buf;fthp kf $h; Vw;fdnt m/rh/M/22 Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/ ,s';nfhtd;. fkpc&dh;. b$auh$;. kw;Wk; unkc&;Fkhh; Mfpath;fSila ngz;l; ghf;bfl; jdpj;jdpna brhy;a{c&dpy; eidj;j nghJ. mit midj;Jk; gp';f; fyuhf khwpaJ/ ,e;j brhy;a{c&id jdpj;jdpna rPy; bra;ag;gl;L mjpy; ifbahg;gkplg;gl;lJ/ mJ Kiwna m/rh/M/9. 10. 11. 12 Mf FwpaPL bra;ag;gl;lJ/ mnjnghy; mth;fspd; ngz;l;fSk; jdpj;jdpna rPy; bra;ag;gl;L. mjpy; ifbahg;gk; bgwg;gl;lJ/ mJ Kiwna m/rh/bgh/17. 18. 19. 20/

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17.2.The said evidence of P.W. 12 corroborated with the evidence of

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P.W.20. The said events also form part of the recovery magazar Ex.P.22.

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The immediate reaction of the appellant and their disclosure statement is admissible under law and the same was fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in 1979 (3) SCC 90 and the relevant paragraph is

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as follows:-

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8. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the evidence relating to the conduct of the accused when challenged by the Inspector was inadmissible as it was hit by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. He relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in D.V. Narasimham v. State [AIR 1969 AP 271 : 1969 Cri LJ 1016 : 1969 MLJ (Cri) 687] . We do not agree with the submission of Shri Anthony. There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence, relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash [(1972) 1 SCC 249 : 1972

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SCC (Cri) 88 : AIR 1972 SC 975] ).

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17.3. In the case of Maha Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration)

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reported in 1976 SCC Cri 135

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39.But all the same the conduct of the accused would be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act if his immediate reactions to the illegal overture of the complainant or his action in inserting unwanted something in his pocket were revealed in the form of acts accompanied then and there or immediately thereafter by words or gestures reliably established. There is no evidence to support an innocent piece of conduct.

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17.4.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Judgment Mehiboob Ali Vs.

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State of Rajasthan reported in 2016 (14) SCC 640 . The Hon'ble Supreme

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Court has held that

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Para 13 Para 15 For application of Section 27 of the Evidence The embargo put by Section 27 of Act, admissible portion of confessional the Evidence Act was clearly lifted statement has to be found as to a fact which in the instant case. The statement of where the immediate cause of the discovery, accused persons has led to the only that would be part of legal evidence and discovery of fact proving complicity not the rest. In a statement if something new of the other accused persons and the is discovered or recovered from the accused entire chain of circumstances clearly which was not in the knowledge of the police makes out that the accused acted in before disclosure statement of the accused is conspiracy as found by the trial court recorded, is admissible in the evidence. as well as the High Court.

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From the above law and the fact of the case, it is clear that prosecution proved the recovery of the currency notes under Ex.P.22, transmitting from one accused to another forming a chain namely from A1 to A2, A2 to A3, A3 to A4. After the transfer of the amount in the said chain to A4, he absconded with the amount from the office. Thus, the prosecution clearly proved the charged offence under Section 120(B), r/w 201 r/w 511 and 7 and section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. But, the learned trial Judge has held that there was no proof of charges beyond reasonable doubt by extending the arms of the reasonable doubt beyond the limit.

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18.The Hon'ble Supreme Court on various occasions cautioned the Courts not to extend the arms of the rule of benefit of doubt to render unmerited acquittals by nurturing fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions causing miscarriage of justice. It is not only the duty of the Court to acquit an innocent, it is also the paramount duty of the Court to see that a guilty man does not escape and hence extention of arms of the rule of benefit of doubt in the present case, cannot be appreciated. The relevant precedents in this aspect are as follows:

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18.1.1. The lord Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public

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Prosecution (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] held as follows :

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“[A] Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. … Both are public duties….”

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18.1.2. In the case of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh reported in 1990 (1) SCC 445 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

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17.... Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law....

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18.1.3. In the case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P., reported in

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(2016) 4 SCC 357 at page 365, it has been observed:-

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20. ...we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Therefore, this Court is

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inclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

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18.2. It is well settled law that it is not every doubt, but only a reasonable doubt of which benefit is to be given to the accused. The function of the criminal Court is to find out the truth and it is not a correct approach to pick up the minor lapse of an investigation, irrelevant omission and minor contradiction to acquit the accused when the ring of the truth is undisturbed from the cogent and trustworthy evidence of P.W. 12 and the evidence of P.W.10 about the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount of Rs.20000/- by the respondents. Therefore, the learned trial Judge has not properly addressed the issue of “reasonable doubt”. The cherished principle of golden thread of proof of reasonable doubt which runs through web of law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases has cautioned the Courts not to extend the benefit of doubt so as to cause disastrous result and unmerited acquittal:

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18.2.1. In the case of Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of W.B., reported

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in (2017) 16 SCC 466 at page 476

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A doubt of a timid mind which is afraid of logical consequences, cannot be said to be reasonable doubt. The experienced, able and astute defence lawyers do raise doubts and uncertainties in respect of evidence adduced against the accused by marshalling the evidence, but what is to be borne in mind is—whether testimony of the witnesses before the court is natural, truthful in substance or not. The accused is entitled to get benefit of only reasonable doubt i.e. the doubt which a rational thinking man would reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has no moral courage and prefers to take shelter itself in a vain and idle scepticism.

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18.2.2.In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of H.P., reported in

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(2020) 10 SCC 740 at page 749

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Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists...

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18.2.3. In the case of Bhim Singh Rup Singh Vs. State of Maharastra

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reported in 1974 3 SCC 762, it is observed,

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“A reasonable doubt”, it has been remarked, “does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the

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minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons.

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18.2.4. In State of U.P. Vs. Anil Singh reported in (1988) Supp SCC

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686 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follow;

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Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth.

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18.2.5. In the case of Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) reported in

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[(1978) 4 SCC 161 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

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A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish

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18.3. P.W.12 was working as Executive officer in the United India Insurance Company Ltd. It is very difficult to enter the room of the accused officer, namely, the Commissioner of the appeals in the accused office, that too to entrap the Commissioner level officer and Superintendent. Therefore, CBI has taken decision to use electronic device to record the conversation between P.W.10 (defacto-complainant) and A1, P.W.12 (Official Witness) and A1, P.W.12 was hiding in the toilet of the office for more than one hour. He has no motive with the accused officer and it is also not established on the side of the accused officer, he had motive towards the respondent/accused. The TLO also has no motive. In the said circumstances, when they had taken painful efforts to entrap the accused officer by staying at toilet, much credence has to be given. Corruption spreads as wild fire and its tentacle goes into the root of administration of the Government as incurable disease of cancer. Therefore, the approach of the learned trial Judge has to be in such a manner to achieve the object of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on various decision reiterated the principles to follow different yardstick in the process of appreciation of the evidence in the case of corruption. Further, in the case of corruption, examination of witness commence after a long period of date of

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occurrence. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there will be minor contradictions on irrelevant facts. This Court finds no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the official witness who deposed before the Court in cogent manner and his evidence is trustworthy and he was subjected to incisive cross examination running over number of pages but nothing elicited itself a circumstance to accept the evidence of P.W.10 and P.W.12 about the factum of demand and acceptance. Apart from that, the learned trial Judge gave a finding about the acceptance.

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18.4.As per the Hon'ble Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of DELHI) reported in 2023 4 SCC 731 demand can be proved through the circumstantial evidence also. Apart from the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W.12, transfer of the file from the custody of P.W.11 to A1 itself is a strong circumstance to substantiate the case of demand.

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18.5. In all corruption cases, witnesses are examined after many

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years from the date of the occurrence and they are subjected to the cross examination in incisive manner and they have to withstand the cross

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examination. In view of the examination of witnesses after a long time from the date of the occurrence, there will be minor contradictions and immaterial discrepancies. The said aspect was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court .

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18.6.The evidence of P.Ws.12 & 20 are cogent and trustworthy about the recovery of the tainted currency from A4. A1 disclosed that he handedover the amount to A2. A2 inturn handed over the amount to A3, A3 in turn handed over the amount to A4. The above disclosure statement were clearly proved by the prosecution through the evidence of P.W.12 and P.W.20 and the same was affirmed from the positive result of phenolphthalein test. The same is also reduced into writing in the recovery mahazar. There was no explanation about the change of colour. Amount was finally recovered from the possession of A4. when the colour changed, the same is a corroborative evidence about the receipt of the bribe amount. The evidence of disclosure statements was clearly deposed by P.W.12 and P.W.20 . From the above sequence of the events and manner in which all the accused had taken part in the receipt of bribe and attempting to screen the tainted currency from the office of the accused, it is clear that they had requisite knowledge about the commission of the

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offence that the appellants 1 and 2 received the bribe amount and in order

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to screen the same, they had entrusted it with A3 and A3 further handed over to A4 and A4 left the place of the occurrence with the said currency notes. Therefore the prosecution clearly proved the following ingredients

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of section 201 of Indian Penal Code as per law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kodali Purnachandra Rao v. Public Prosecutor , reported in (1975) 2 SCC 570

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16. In order to bring home an offence under Section 201 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to prove:

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“(1) that an offence has been committed;

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(2) that the accused knew or had reason to believe the commission of such offence;

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(3) that with such knowledge or belief he

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(a) caused any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, or

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(b) gave any information respecting that offence which he then knew or believed to be false;

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(4) that he did so as aforesaid, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment;

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(5) If the charge be of an aggravated form, as in the present case, it must be proved further that the offence in respect of which the accused did as in (3) and (4), was punishable with death, or with imprisonment for life or imprisonment extending to ten years.”

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45. The decision in Palvinder Kaur case is a precedent on its own facts. The observations of this Court to the effect, that

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“Jaspal died, that his body was found in a trunk and was discovered from a well and that the appellant took part in the disposal of the body do not establish the cause of his death or the manner and circumstances in which it came about.”

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cannot be construed as an enunciation of a rule of law of general application. Whether the circumstantial evidence in a particular case is sufficient and safe enough to warrant a finding that an offence has been committed, is a question which belongs to the realm of facts and not of law. So is the question whether the accused knew or had reasons to believe that such an offence has been committed. It is true that this question further depends on an assessment, of the accused's mind. Nevertheless, it is a question of fact. “ The state of a man's mind”, quoth Lord Bowen, “is as much a fact as the state of his digestion”.

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18.7.In this case the mind of the accused No. 3 and 4 is clear from

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their conduct. They knew about the character of amount. At the time of receipt of the amount from A2, A3 is duty bound to verify with the nature and character of the amount. He immediately transmitted the said amount to A4. After receipt of the amount, A4 himself fled away from the office with money. Therefore all the circumstances clearly proved the prosecution

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case for the offence under section 201 of IPC r/w 511 of IPC. Therefore, the A1, A3 & A4 are liable to be convicted under section 511 r/w 201 apart from the charge under section 120(B), r/w 201 r/w 511 and 7 and section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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18.8. In this case, it is clear from the evidence of P.W.12 and P.W.10

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A1 to A3 received the bribe amount as reward for reducing the penalty

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imposed against P.W.10's company by making the demand. Therefore they are liable to be convicted under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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18.9.Demand and receipt of the bribe amount as a reward for reducing the penalty amounts to misconduct under section 13(1)(d) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the same was clearly proved against A1 to A3 and hence, A1 to A3 are liable to be convicted under section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the prosecution clearly proved the demand and acceptance.

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18.10.From the act of demand and acceptance and screening of the tainted currency, the prosecution clearly proved the offence under section

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120(B), r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and section 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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18.11.Going through the evidence of P.Ws.10, P.W.11, P.W.12, 13, & 20, the prosecution clearly proved the demand, acceptance of bribe amount, screening of the bribe amount and their attempt to cause disappearance of bribe amount without any shadow of doubt.

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18.12. When the available evidence amply proved the demand and acceptance, the segregation of the evidence by the learned trial Judge to suit the convenience by looking every contradiction with Jaundiced EYE resulted in miscarriage of justice which led to the unmerited acquittal. The learned trial Judge ought to have convicted the accused. In all aspects, the prosecution clearly proved the case of the demand and acceptance. Further there was no explanation on side of accused for the positive result of the phenolphthalein test on the hands of all the accused and pants pockets of A1, A2 & A3 and recovery of tainted currency. In the said circumstances, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the prosecution proved the case of demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification beyond reasonable

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doubt. Therefore the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence under Sections 7 & 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Act.

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18.13. The learned trial Judge erroneously acquitted the accused, when the available evidence leans towards the only possible view of conviction under the sections u/s.120-B r/w 201 r/w 511 IPC and Section 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, u/s.511 r/w 201 I.P.C. against A1 to A4, Section 201 r/w 511 IPC against A3 to A4, Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against A1 to A3 and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against A1 to A3. The learned trial Judge stated that there were lot of loopholes in the case of the prosecution. The loopholes assumed by the learned trial Judge is not at all significant and worthwhile to be considered in these type of cases, more particularly, when the examination of witnesses took place after a number of years from the date of occurrence. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to plug the said immaterial loopholes to ensure the criminal justice system is vibrant as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2018) 11 SCC 129 at page 154:

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36. That apart, it is in the larger interest of the society that actual perpetrator of the crime gets convicted and is suitably punished. Those persons who have committed the crime, if allowed to go unpunished, this also leads to weakening of the criminal justice system and the society starts losing faith therein. Therefore, the first part of the celebrated dictum “ten criminals may go unpunished but one innocent should not be convicted” has not to be taken routinely. No doubt, latter part of the aforesaid phrase i.e. “innocent person should not be convicted” remains still valid. However, that does not mean that in the process “ten persons may go unpunished” and law becomes a mute spectator to this scenario, showing its helplessness. In order to ensure that criminal justice system is vibrant and effective, perpetrators of the crime should not go unpunished and all efforts are to be made to plug the loopholes which may give rise to the aforesaid situation .

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The learned counsel for the Accused would submit that before

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registration of the case as per the CBI manual, P.W.20 did not conduct preliminary enquiry and hence the origin of the FIR itself is illegal. To consider the same this court perused following portion of the CBI manual:

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In trap cases under sections 7 and or 13 of the PC Act, 1988 the FIR should be registered as soon as a bona fide

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complaint/information is received attracting the provisions of sections 7 and/ or 13 of the PC Act 1988. After the trap materilalizes, investigation should continue under the same case number. If the offence is to be investigated by an officer of a rank who requires permission from a Magistrate, as contemplated under section 17 of the PC Act of 1988, it will be necessary for the investigating officer to obtain requisite permission, from the court soon after the case is registered. In case, the trap materializes, it will be necessary for the investigating officer, if he is below the rank specified in section 17 of the PC Act of 1988, to report the developments to the Magistrate and obtain further permission for investigation of the offence.

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19.1. From the above reading of the manual it is not necessary to conduct preliminary enquiry relating to the registration of the case. Once the defacto complainant approached the CBI and disclosed the information about the cognizable offence under section 7 of the prevention of corruption Act, 1988 about the demand of bribe amount and if the CBI considered the bonafides in the complaint, they can conduct the trap proceedings. If the argument of the counsel to conduct preliminary enquiry is accepted, then no trap can be conducted and the purpose of conducting trap will become futile. Preliminary enquiry is contemplated only to meet out certain circumstances. Therefore, there was no necessity to conduct

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preliminary enquiry. The same was also reiterated by the Hon’ble Three Bench Judges of Supreme Court in the case of CBI Vs Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi reported in 2021 (18) SCC 135 and held as follows :

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Analysis

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39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in all cases which involve allegations of corruption. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that if the information received discloses the commission of a cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary enquiry would be required. It also clarified that the scope of a preliminary enquiry is not to check the veracity of the information received, but only to scrutinise whether it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a preliminary enquiry is required only if the information (whether verified or unverified) does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Even when a preliminary enquiry is initiated, it has to stop as soon as the officer ascertains that enough material has been collected which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. A similar

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conclusion has been reached by a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition that a preliminary enquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary to law, for it is not only contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] but would also tear apart the framework created by the CBI Manual.

¶433

42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that since the institution of a preliminary enquiry in cases of corruption is not made mandatory before the registration of an FIR under CrPC, the PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this Court to issue a direction to that effect will be tantamount to stepping into the legislative domain. Hence, we hold that in case the information received by CBI, through a complaint or a “source information” under Chapter 8, discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, it can directly register a regular case instead of conducting a preliminary enquiry, where the officer is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.

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19.1.1 . Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the

¶438

accused that before registration of the case as per CBI Manual, P.W.20 should have conducted preliminary enquiry and registered the case and therefore, the same was illegal is misconceived one and the same deserves to be rejected.

¶439

19.2. The learned counsel for the third respondent Thiru.V.S.Venkatesh, would cite the precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various courts in two volumes running to pages of more than 630. He placed the said precedents to substantiate the following contentions:

¶440

*Sl.* *No.*	*Citations*	*Cause Title*
1	AIR1995 SC 1219	Ranbir Yadhav Vs State of Bihar
2	AIR 2006 SC 894	Om Prakash vs State of Haryana
3	AIR 1993 SC 2644	State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Punati Ramulu and others
4	CDJ 2012 SC 807	Rakesh Kapoor Vs State of Himachal Pradesh
5		Mehar Chand arising out of Criminal Appeal No 298-S8 of 1991 dated 11.8.2004
6		State (NCT of Delhi) vs Devender Singh CRL A 760/2012
7	2011(6)SCC 450	State of Kerala and another vs. C.P.Rao
8	CDJ 2013 SC 665	State of Punjab Vs Madan Mohan Lal Verma

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9			State Of Haryana vs Vikram Singh Appeal (Cri) 1001 of 2000
10	AIR 1992 S	C 665	Soin Prakash vs State of Punjab
11	CDJ 2011 5350	MHC	AS Kannan Vs State by: The Inspector of Police
12	2006(1) SC 401	C Cri	T. Subramanlar Vs State of Tamilnadu
13	CBI (200 SCC 779	9) 3	CM. Girish Babu Vs. Babu
14	2009 (6) 587	SCC	A. Subair vs State of Kerala
15	2003(2) (Criminal)5	RCR 41	Subhash Parbathvane Vs State of Gujarat
16	CDJ 2014 S	C 255	JayarajVa State of A.P.
17	CDJ 2012 2954	MHC	LV. Bhaskaran & another Vs CBI
18	2005 (12) 576	SCC	UOI Vs Purnandu Biswas
19	CDJ PHC 9	02	Sanjiv Kumar Vs State of Haryana
20			Arjun Bajirao Kale arising in Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 2007 dt 12.11.2008
21	CDJ 2014 1838	MHC	Rathinasami Vs The Deputy Superintendent of Police
22	AIR 1995 2178	SC	M.K. Harshan Vs State of Kerala
23	CDJ 2013 2104	MHC	Syed Saliha Vs The State rep by Inspector of Police
24	2004 (Crl.)1130	SCC	Punjab Rao Vs State of Maharashtra
25			D. Pugazhendhi Vs State Cri. A 479/2011 dated 19.12.2011
26			S.Vijayalakshmi vs State By Inspector Of Police on 15 April, 2014, Crl.A. No. 651/2008

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27	2009-Cri.J-4425- SC	State of Maharashtra Vs. Dyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede
28	CDJ 2012 MHC 4366	V. Chinnappa Vs State rep by Inspector of Police
29	2011(8)SCALE6 25	P. Parasurami Reddy Vs State of A.P
30		M. Subramani Vs State rep. by Inspector of Police, CBI ACB, Chennai in Crl.A.719/2005 dated 16.03.2011
31	CDJ 1975 SC 214	Sat Pal Vs Delhi Administration
32	CDJ 1987 SC 660	G.V. Nanjundajah Vs State
33	AIR 2010 1589 SC	Banarsi Dass Vs. State of Haryana
34		State of M.P. Vs. Rakesh Gandhi dated 12.07.2011
35	AIR 2002 SC 486	Punjabrao Vs. State of Maharashtra
36	AIR 1979 SC 1408	Suraj Mal Vs. State (Delhi Administration)
37	1975 AIR (SC) 1432	Sita Ram Vs. State of Rajesthan (no demand)
38	AIR 1976 SC 294	Sat Paul Vs. Delhi Administration
39	AIR 1995 SC 2178	M.K.Harshan Vs. State of Kerala
40		S.Venkatappa Chetty Vs. State in Crl.A.No.1212 of 2003 dated 26.07.2010
41		S.P.Paulraj V. State Crl.A. (MD) No. 1208 of 2001 dated 17.12.2008
42		Bojan Vs. State Crl.A.No.214 of 2002 dated 17.07.2008(no demand)
43		Shanmugam Vs. State rep. By its DSP Crl.A.No. 521 of 2005 dated 18.04.2011
44		Moorthy Vs. State. Reply Addl.SP Crl.A.No. 1051 of 2006 dated 23.11.2010

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45	CDJ 2012 MHC 5955	S.Gunasekaran Vs. Inspector of Police
46	2014 Crl.L.J. 4399	Satvir Singh Vs. State of Delhi, CBI
47	2015 Crl.L.J. 1740	Shantaben S. Dave, Decd. Vs. State of Gujarat
48	2015 (1) Crimes 286(SC)	R.P.S.Yadav Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
49	2015 (1) Crimes 130(SC)	C.Sukumaran Vs. State of Kerala
50	2015 Crl.L.J. 4927	N.Sunkanna Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
51	2015 Crl.L.J. 4670	P.Satyanarayan Murthy Vs. Dist. Inspector of Police and another.
52	2014 (4) SCC (Cri)136	State of Punjab Vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma
53	2014 (10) SCC 473	Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer
54	2015 (2) SCC (Cri)19	Sanjaysingh Ramrao Chavan Vs. Sattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others
55	2015 (1) SCC (Cri)344	Central Bureau Investigation Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
56		Crl.M.C.No.2455/2014 and Crl.Rev. P.No. 385/2012 dated 20.11.2014
57	2005 Crl.L.J. 5114	Pandharinath Shelke V. The State of Mahrashtra
58	2005 Crl.L.J. 4543	Suresh Singh Yadav Vs. State of UP
59	2007 Crl.L.J. 453	Diwesh Narayan Raizada Vs. The State of Bihar
60	2007 Crl.L.J 754	V.Venkata Subbarao Vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police
61	2006 Crl.L.J. 4598	Inspector of Police Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri

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62	2006 1720	Crl.L.J.	State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Inder Mohan
63	2002 Cr	l LJ 97	Mahesh Joshi Vs. State byCBI
64	2002 Cr	l.L.J.980	Dilawar Babu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra
65	1976 Cr	l.L.J. 625	Shantilal Rameshwar Vs. State of Rajasthan
66	1990 Cr	l.L.J. 611	Bahadu Singh Vs. State of U.P.
67	AIR 1 1191	979 SC	Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra
68	AIR 19	59 SC 847	The State of Ajmer Vs. Shivji Lal
69			Gajanan Shripatrao Salokhs Vs. The State of Maharashtra in Crl.A.No.622 & 623 of 1979 dated 06.02.1989
70			S.Narayanan Pillai Vs. The State of Tamilnadu in Crl.A.No. 854 of 1986 dated 09.11.1992
71			State of U.P. Vs. Ram Asrey in Crl.A.No.23 of 1988 dated 07.02.1990
72	2000 2273	Crl.L.J.	Smt. Meena Balwant Hemke Vs. State of Maharashtra
73	AIR 20	02 SC 486	Punjabrao Vs. State of Maharashtra
74	2003 4701	CRL.L.J.	Charan Dass Vs. State
75	AIR 19 267	52 Orissa	State Vs. Minaxet
76			Rajinder Parshad Vs. The State (Delhi Admn). In Crl.A.No.103 of 1979 dated 04.09.1990
77	1994 3738	Crl.L.J.	Suresh Kumar Shrivastava Vs. State of M.P.
78	1977 Cr	l.L.J. 254	Trilok Chand Jain Vs. State of Delhi
79	1988 1031	Crl.L.J.	Puran Chand Vs. State of Punjab
80	2004 1412	Crl.L.J.	State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Venkateswara Rao

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81	-		Krishan Chander Vs. State of Delhi in Crl.A.No. 14 of 2016 dated 03.03.2016
82			State Vs. Shiv Kumar dated 24.01.2015
83			S.K.Saini & Another Vs. CBI in Crl.A.No.159 of 2005 dated 19.08.2015
84			Sanga Reddy Ananda Reddy Vs. The State of A.P. In Crl.A.No.1250 of 2003 dated 09.03.2011
85			Chandigarh Vs. State of Haryana dated 10.08.2015
86	2010 233	(8)	SCC S.Arulraja Vs. State of Tamilnadu
87	AIR 1744	1996 (1)	SC State of Maharashra Vs. Som Nath Thapa
88	1995 SCC	Supp 333	(3) A.Jayaram and another Vs. State of A.P. CBI

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19.3. The learned counsel for the first respondent Thiru.C.S.Pillai,

¶462

also apart from the relying the above judgments placed the following judgments: Crl.Appeal No. 1839 of 2012 (Rakesh Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 INSC 503 (MIR Mustafa Ali Hasmi Vs. The State of A.P., Crl.Appeal.No.1904 of 2014 (RooP.W.anti Vs. State of Haryana)

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19.4. The learned Counsel for the second respondent Thiru.V.M.Thorat also reiterated the above principles of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the basis of the precedents relied upon by the learned Counsel Thiru.Venkatesh.

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19.5. The learned Counsel for the fourth respondent Thiru.G.Karnan

¶468

also relied the member of precedents to reiterate the above said principles.

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19.6. Since the learned counsel placed the volume of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and asked to apply as precedents and this Court before going into the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the appellants, re-capitulates the principle relating to the precedents more particularly on criminal law.

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S almond defines a precedent, ..’ A precedent is said to be a judicial decision which contains its principles. The stated principle which thus forms its authoritative element is called the ratio decidendi. The concrete decision is thus binding between the parties, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards as world at large”.

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19.7. Article 141 of the Constitution laid down that the “law declared” by the Supreme Court is binding upon all the courts within the territory of India. The “law declared” has to be construed as a principle of law that emanates from a judgment, or an interpretation of a law or judgment by the Supreme Court, upon which, the case is decided. Hence, it flows from the above that the “law declared” is the principle culled out on reading of the judgment as a whole in the light of the questions raised, upon which the case is decided. (See: Fida Hussain v. Moradabad

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Development Authority (2011) 12 SCC 615; Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 213; and CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363). The Supreme Court has consistently held that a decision which is not found on reasons nor proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, the Court held that “any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as precedent…. A conclusion without reference to relevant provision of law is weaker than even casual observation”. This principle is not only the evidence of laws but source of law also. It is instrument for persuasion of judges. Case decided by the court without any consideration on principle of law, cannot be treated as precedent (Vide: Satish Kumar Gupta v. State of Haryana, AIR 2017 SC 2072).

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Criminal cases are decided by appreciating evidence, connecting facts with robust common sense, analytical thought, drawing inferences and awareness of hard facts of life. A small difference in facts results into different conclusions. Precedents may not be relied except on

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principles of law in technical offences and questions of rendering justice to victims in deciding criminal ca ses.

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19.8. The Hon'ble Thiru Justice Vivan Bose in his earlier judgment

¶482

in the case of Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad reported in (1954) 2 SCC

¶483

826 stated as follows:

¶484

33. But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no special rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case and however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another...

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19.9. In the case of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey

¶486

reported in (1976) 3 SCC 334 has held as follows:

¶487

“7. … Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.”

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19.10. In the case of Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P. ,

¶492

reported in (2003) 12 SCC 306

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9. Each case, more particularly a criminal case, depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. The vague and cryptic conclusion arrived at by the trial court to treat their case differently from the manner it dealt with that of A-1, despite its very observation that the evidence was as cogent against them too as it was against A-1 lacks a judicious approach and determination and, therefore, was rightly interfered with by the High Court after an objective appreciation of the evidence independently and in the light of the relevant and guiding principles of law governing such determination.

¶494

62. As to what is ratio decidendi has been succinctly observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi reported in (1996) 6 SCC 44] , which is as under :

¶495

“9. … It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a

¶496

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Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates—(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent...

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19.11. In the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan ,

¶504

reported in (2005) 2 SCC 42 has held as follows :

¶505

42. ...It is also a well-established principle that while considering the ratio laid down in one case, the court will have to bear in mind that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be true since the generality of expressions which may be found therein are not intended to be expositions of the whole of the law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. .

¶506

19.12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Ravi Kumar v.

¶507

State , reported in 2019 14 SCC 568 has held as follows:

¶508

29. It is well settled that a judgment is a precedent for the issue of law which is raised and decided. Phrases and sentences in a judgment are to be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case and the same cannot be read in isolation.

¶509

19.13 Most of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for

¶510

the third respondent are relating to the failure of proof of demand and the absence of the either complainant or other witnesses to support the

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prosecution. Therefore, with this guiding principles, this Court considered the above judgments relied by the learned Counsel for the respondents. From the reading of the above judgments, this Court is unable to find any reason to treat the same as a precedent except culling out the following two principles:

¶515

19.13.1. Mere recovery of the amount is not a circumstance to convict the accused under sections 7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the prevention of corruption Act, 1988 without proof of demand and acceptance.

¶516

19.13.2.When the jurisdiction of the High Court can interfere with the order of the acquittal passed by the learned Trial Judge, he emphasized the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to the possible view and also if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence of record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the acquittal.

¶517

19.13.3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles that there is no bar to reverse the order of acquittal when there is glaring infirmity and perversity in the trial court judgment which led to unmeritted

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acquittal and the court has power to interfere with the judgment of the acquittal if the evidence and documents lead to the only view to convict

¶522

the accused under the charged offences without any other possible view.

¶523

Compliance of Section 65(B) of the Evidence Act, to

¶524

place the reliance on the Exhibit C1 i.e. Transcription of M.O. 13

¶525

19.13.4. The Hon'ble Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 has clearly laid down the principle about the admissibility of the electronic evidence. Ex.C.1 is fully in compliance with the above guidelines of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The same was marked on the application filed by the accused. Therefore, non compliance of 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, is misconceived.

¶526

19.13.5. Some of the judgments are relating to the lack of evidence to prove the demand. T he latest constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2023 4 SCC 731 laid down the principles to pass conviction under section 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this case, this Court already had discussed in an elaborate manner

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and holds that there is sufficient evidence to prove the demand. The learned trial Judge misread the said evidence and hence, this Court is unable to accept the finding of the learned trial Judge. It is not universal rule that the High Court has no jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence of the prosecution to test the findings of the learned trial Judge. In this case, this Court perused the entire evidence and the considered opinion of this Court that there are no two possible views relating to the demand and acceptance and recovery of the currency notes. The prosecution clearly proved the case beyond reasonable doubt about the demand and acceptance of bribe amount without infirmity. From the evidence of P.W.10, P.W.12 and other material circumstances established by the prosecution, which had not been properly explained by the accused, the only established view is that all the ingredients of charged offences against all the accused were proved

¶531

19.13.6. In this case, this court finds that the prosecution has satisfied the above requirement of law and complied the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

¶532

19.13.7. The evidence of the P.Ws.10, 11, 12, 13 & 20, and contemporaneous documents all have clearly proved that the prosecution

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established the ingredients of sections 7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and ingredients of the section 201 r/w 511 of IPC. From the assessment of the above evidence and also discussion made earlier, this court without any hesitation holds that the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence of prosecution leans only towards the view of demand and acceptance of the bribe amount and the attempt to screening tainted currency notes and therefore the argument of the counsel that two possible views are available on record is misconceived one.

¶537

19.14. The learned trial Judge on the basis of the irrelevant consideration rejected the evidence of P.Ws.10, 12 & 13 and 20 and committed error in not considering the evidence of P.Ws.10,12,13 & 20 and the contemporaneous record, namely, recovery mahazar prepared in the presence of the officials of A1's office. The recovery mahazar contains the entire material facts to constitute the offence. The evidence of P.Ws. 10,12,13 & 20 are cogent and trustworthy to prove the demand and acceptance and recovery and the only view that emanates from their evidence is that the prosecution proved the charged offence beyond any reasonable doubt i.e., Respondents have demanded and accepted Rs.20,000

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as illegal gratification and hence, the view taken by the learned trial Judge

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is not a “possible view”. Further, as the finding of the learned trial judge is perverse in all aspects, this Court finds “substantial and compelling reasons” to interfere with the impugned acquittal Judgement. This Court, in view of the above discussion finds that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is perverse and there is every substantial and compelling reason to interfere with the order of the learned trial Judge. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence, for which there is no legal impediment. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held in the case of the appeal against acquittal, this Court has jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence.

¶543

19.15. The “Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court”, in the case of M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 22 has held the same in the following paragraph:

¶544

16....But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the

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prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused.---------------

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17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, “the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons” : vide Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207 : (1952) SCR 193 at p. 201] . Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 2 SCC 709 : (1953) SCR 418] it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are “very substantial and compelling reasons to do so”. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” or for “strong reasons”. In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended,

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and should not be read to have intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial”. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression “substantial and compelling reasons” should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 715] and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1962 SC 439] and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse.

¶554

19.16. Hon'ble Three Bench of the Supreme Court”in case of Ashok

¶555

Kumar Singh Chandel Vs . State of U.P. reported in2022 SCC OnLine SC 1525 has crystallized the following principles ;

¶556

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶559

70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:

¶560

1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.

¶561

A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court's decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:

¶562

i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong;

¶563

ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law;

¶564

iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”;

¶565

iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;

¶566

v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;

¶567

vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

¶568

vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

¶569

2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.

¶570

3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/Appellate Courts must rule in favor of the accused.”

¶571

82

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶574

(emphasis in original)

¶575

19.17Geeta Devi v. State of U.P. , (2023) 12 SCC 741

¶576

. Against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court the High Court would be justified on re-appreciation of the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly erroneous.

¶577

19.18. Hon'ble the Supreme Court”, in the case of Babu v. State of

¶578

Kerala [ Babu v. State of Kerala , , reported in (2010) 9 SCC 189 has considered following earlier precedents and reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC.

¶579

Balak Ram v. State of U.P. , (1975) 3 SCC 219 Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar , (1990) 4 SCC 17 Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. , (2003) 1 SCC 761 Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. , (2004) 10 SCC 699 Budh Singh v. State of U.P. , (2006) 9 SCC 731 State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102

¶580

S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy , (2008) 5 SCC 535

¶581

Arulvelu v. State of T.N. [ Arulvelu v. State of T.N. , (2009) 10 SCC 206

¶582

Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. , (2009) 16 SCC 98 Ram Singh v. State of H.P. , (2010) 2 SCC 445

¶583

‘12. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the

¶584

83

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶587

evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court.

¶588

19.19. Hon'ble the Supreme Court”, in the case of State of

¶589

U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 gave certain illustrative circumstances in

¶590

which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of

¶591

acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include : (SCC p. 286, para 28)

¶592

“28. … (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

¶593

(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

¶594

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

¶595

(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

¶596

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

¶597

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.”

¶598

19.20 . When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to

¶599

be perverse has been dealt with and considered in para 20 of the aforesaid

¶600

84

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶603

decision, which reads as under : ( Babu case [ Babu v. State of Kerala , (2010) 9 SCC 189

¶604

‘ 20 . “ findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material ” or if they are “ against the weight of evidence ” or if they suffer from the “ vice of irrationality ”..

¶605

19.21. In K.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.’

¶606

10. As early as in 1973, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] outlined the guiding principle to be kept in mind by an appellate court while deciding an appeal from an acquittal in the following manner

¶607

“5. … an acquitted accused should not be put in peril of conviction on appeal save were substantial and compelling grounds exist for such a course. In India it is not jurisdictional limitation on the appellate court but a Judge-

¶608

85

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¶610

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶611

made guideline of circumspection. … In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration.”

¶612

(emphasis supplied)

¶613

19.22. In the totality of the circumstances, the learned trial Judge

¶614

magnified every minute irrelevant fact and made mountain out of a molehill and acquitted the respondent which resulted in miscarriage of justice. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 446 at page 463 dealing the appeal against acquittal has held as

¶615

follows:

¶616

36. .. It seems to us that the approach made by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is manifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. In fact, the learned Judge appears to have been so much prejudiced against the prosecution that he magnified every minor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence. This is the very antithesis of a correct

¶617

86

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¶619

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶620

judicial approach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed, if such a harsh touchstone is prescribed to prove a case it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish any case at all.

¶621

19.23. The learned trial Judge allowed himself to be beset with fanciful doubts and rejected the creditworthy evidence of independent trap witness for slender reasons and has misguided himself by chasing the bare possibilities of doubt and exalting them into sufficiently militating factors justifying acquittal. Therefore, there is an obligation on the part of this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the Court below, in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule and the same was emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases:

¶622

19.23.1. In the case of Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra ,

¶623

reported in (1973) 2 SCC 793 , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus:

¶624

(SCC p. 799, para 6) “6. … The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false

¶625

87

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¶627

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶628

dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.”

¶629

19.23.2. In the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 277 : (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “

¶630

23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy... Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy, on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

¶631

19.24. P.W.10 had suffered physically and mentally because of the continuous demand from accused office under the guise imposition of tax for his various industries . Therefore, he made complaint and had undergone all hardship as painfully observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 9 of the following case :

¶632

88

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶635

19.24.1. In the case of State of U.P. v. G.K. Ghosh , reported in

¶636

(1984) 1 SCC 254 at page 261

¶637

9. By and large a citizen is somewhat reluctant, rather than anxious, to complain to the Vigilance Department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded by a Government/servant. There are numerous reasons for the reluctance. In the first place, he has to make a number of visits to the office of Vigilance Department and to wait on a number of officers. He has to provide his own currency notes for arranging a trap. He has to comply with several formalities and sign several statements. He has to accompany the officers and participants of the raiding party and play the main role. All the while he has to remain away from his job, work, or avocation. He has to sacrifice his time and effort whilst doing so. Thereafter, he has to attend the court at the time of the trial from day to day. He has to withstand the searching crossexamination by the defence counsel as if he himself is guilty of some fault. In the result, a citizen who has been harassed by a Government officer, has to face all these hazards. And if the explanation offered by the Accused is accepted by the court, he has to face the humiliation of being considered as a person who tried to falsely implicate a Government servant, not to speak of facing the wrath of the Government servants of the department concerned, in his future dealings with the department.

¶638

89

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¶640

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶641

No one would therefore be too keen or too anxious to face such an ordeal. Ordinarily, it is only when a citizen feels oppressed by a feeling of being wronged and finds the situation to be beyond endurance, that he adopts the course of approaching the Vigilance Department for laying a trap. His evidence cannot therefore be easily or lightly brushed aside. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that it does not mean that the court should be oblivious of the need for caution and circumspection bearing in mind that one can conceive of cases where an honest or strict Government official may be falsely implicated by a vindictive person to whose demand, for showing favours, or for according a special treatment by giving a go-bye to the rules, the official refuses to yield.

¶642

In this largest democratic country, officers find out the way to indulge in corruption in the discharge of their duty either by acting contrary to the guidelines or deviating the guidelines. The spectrum of mode of corruption spreads in various angles and dimensions. If one angle is closed, another angle sprouts. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of corruption always took a different stand against what is applicable to the ordinary penal provisions. The learned trial Judge without adherence to the above principle, erroneously acquitted the respondents inspite of the cogent and corroborating evidence of P.W.12,10,13,20. Upon the appreciation of

¶643

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¶645

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶646

the above evidence, this Court finds no other view except to convict the respondents for the offence under sections 7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the respondents are liable to be convicted for the offence under sections

¶647

7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

¶648

Accordingly, this Court finds that the prosecution proved the case against all the accused beyond reasonable doubt and A1 to A4 are found guilty under Sections 120 B r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and Section 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

¶649

22. Conclusion:

¶650

In view of the above discussion, this court inclines to accept the appeal filed by CBI. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 are found guilty under Sections 120-B r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and 7 & 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 are found guilty under Section 511 r/w 201 of IPC; The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are found guilty under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are found guilty under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the appeal filed

¶651

91

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¶653

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶654

by the CBI in Crl.A.(MD).No.81 of 2019 is entitled to be allowed.

¶655

23.Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the impunged judgment passed by the II Additional District Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai in C.C.No. 01 of 2007 dated 06.06.2016, is hereby set aside and the respondents/accused Nos.1 to 4 are convicted for the offences under Sections as stated below:

¶656

*Sl.* No	*Charged offences under Section*	*Accused*	*Conviction*
1	120-B r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	Respondent Nos.1 to 4	All are convicted
2	511 r/w 201 of IPC	Respondent Nos.3 and 4	Both are convicted
3	7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	Respondent Nos.1 to 3	All are convicted
4	Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	Respondent Nos.1 to 3	All are convicted

¶657

92

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¶659

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶660

List this case for appearance of the respondents / Accused Nos.1 to 4 for questioning the sentence of imprisonment on 25.03.2025.

¶661

04.03.2025

¶662

NCC : Yes / No Index : Yes / No Internet :Yes / No sbn

¶663

93

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¶665

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶666

25. Sequence of events from 04.03.2025:-

¶667

After the pronouncement of the order of conviction on 04.03.2025,

¶668

all the counsel on record undertook to ensure the appearance of respondents before this Court to answer the question of sentence so as to conclude the hearing of the appeal and pass judgment with sentence of imprisonment as mandated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases:

¶669

The Hon'ble three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang reported in 1995 2 SCC 513 , has held that,

¶670

Para 12 Para 13

¶671

It will thus be seen that under the It will thus be seen from the above Code after the conviction is provisions that after the court recorded, Section 235(2) inter alia records a conviction, the accused provides that the Judge shall hear has to be heard on the question of the accused on the question of sentence and it is only after the sentence and then pass sentence on sentence is awarded that the him according to law. The trial, judgment becomes complete and therefore, come to an end only after can be appealed against under the sentence is awarded to the Section 374 of the Code. convicted person.

¶672

The Hon'ble two Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

¶673

case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs, State of Maharashtra reported in

¶674

94

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¶676

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶677

(2013) 13 SCC 1 , has held as follows:-

¶678

Para 106 Para 113 It is also clear that a conviction It is also relevant to mention that order is not a “judgment” as Section 354 makes it clear that contemplated under Section 353 and “judgment” shall contain the that a judgment is pronounced only punishment awarded to the accused. after the award of sentence. It is therefore, complete only after the sentence is determined.

¶679

The Hon'ble Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of

¶680

Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2023) 1 SCC 289,

¶681

has affirmed the said principle in para 32 of the said judgment, which is held as follows:-

¶682

“the conclusion of the trial in a criminal prosecution if it ends in conviction, a judgment is considered to be complete in all respects only when the sentence is imposed on the convict.......”

¶683

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of all the accused

¶684

undertook to make appearance of the respondents before this Court to answer the question of sentence on 25.03.2025.

¶685

95

¶686

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¶687

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶688

29.On 25.03.2025, this Court passed the following orders:

¶689

On 04.03.2025, this Court allowed this appeal filed by the CBI and all the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/accused undertook to make appearance of the respondents before this Court to answer the questioning of sentence on 25.03.2025.

¶690

2.Today(25.03.2025), when the matter was taken up for hearing, under the caption “for questioning of sentence”. The respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 are appeared before this Court in person along with their respective counsel.

¶691

3.Mr.Thorat.V.M, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent made request that the second respondent has some inconvenience today. Hence, he seeks time to make appearance before this Court. The second respondent also appeared through video conference.

¶692

4.Considering the said request made by the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, this Court adjourns the case on 07.04.2025 for questioning of sentence.

¶693

5.The remaining respondents are present before this Court along with their respective learned counsel. They also undertook to appear before this Court on 07.04.2025.

¶694

96

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¶696

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶697

6.List this case on 07.04.2025 under the caption for questioning of sentence.

¶698

30.On 07.04.2025, when the matter was taken up for hearing,

¶699

under the caption for questioning of sentence, the respondent Nos.1, 3 and

¶700

4 were present before this Court along with their respective counsel. The learned counsel for the second respondent also was present before this Court and submitted that there is some inconvenience for the second respondent in appearing before this Court.

¶701

31.It is submitted by the learned counsel on record, on behalf of the respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4, Special Leave Petition has been filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and seeks time. Therefore, this Court adjourned the case to 21.04.2025.

¶702

Today the learned counsel for the respondents/accused

¶703

produced the order copy of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which reads as

¶704

follows:

¶705

97

¶706

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¶707

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶708

Order dated 07.04.2025

¶709

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order dated 04.03.2025, passed by the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in Crl.A.(MD).No.81 of 2019, has not been uploaded till date.

¶710

The Registry of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court is hereby requested to furnish a copy of the above mentioned order to the learned counsel for the petitioner. List on 07.05.2025.

¶711

Till the next date of listing, subject to co-operation of the petitioner in the investigation, no coercive steps shall be taken against him in connection with the C.C.No.1 of 2007.

¶712

Order dated 08.04.2025

¶713

This matter is taken on board upon mentioning by Mr.S.Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel, who brought to our notice the alleged discrepancies which was crept in the order dated 07.04.2025, in the last paragraph, which is given below:

¶714

Till the next date of listing, subject to co-operation of the petitioner in the investigation, no coercive steps shall be taken against him in connection with the C.C.No.1 of 2007.

¶715

This is not the case, therefore, we delete this paragraph. The same shall be substituted in the order dated 07.04.2025 and reads as :

¶716

“The High Court may proceed to hear the parties on the issue of sentencing. However, the sentence, if pronounced, shall remain suspended for a period of three weeks from today.”

¶717

98

¶718

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¶719

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶720

33.Therefore, this Court questioned the accused about their

¶721

sentence. They answered as follows:-

¶722

G.Elangovan

¶723

vdf;F 65 taJ MfpwJ. vdf;F xU kfd; ,Uf;fpwhd;.

¶724

mtd; gpwg;gpypUe;J kdepiy rhpapy;yhj epiyapy; cs;shd;. mtd; gpwg;gpypUe;J kdepiy ghjpf;fg;gl;Ls;shd;. mtid

¶725

ftdpj;Jf;nfhs;s NtW ahUk; ,y;iy. MfNt vdf;F Fiwe;jgl;r jz;lid toq;f Nfl;Lf;nfhs;fpNwd;.

¶726

A.D.Khadtare

¶727

He stated that he is 74 years old and his wife is 72 years old. His

¶728

wife is having various age old ailments and nobody is there for taking care of his wife and he only has to take care of her. Therefore, he seeks minimum sentence.

¶729

S.X.Jayaraj

¶730

vdf;F 70 taJ MfpwJ. vdf;F rh;f;fiu Neha; cs;sJ.

¶731

NkYk; taJ Kjph;T fhuzkhf gy;NtW cly;ey FiwghL cs;sJ. MfNt vdf;F Fiwe;jgl;r jz;lid toq;f Ntz;LfpNwd;.

¶732

99

¶733

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¶734

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶735

Ramesh Kumar:

¶736

vdf;F 42 taJ MfpwJ. vd;Dila mk;khtpw;F fz;ghh;it njhpahJ. EhDk; vdJ kidtpAk; jhd; vd;Dila

¶737

tajhf mk;khit ghh;j;Jf;nfhs;s Ntz;Lk;. NtW ahUk; vq;fSf;F Jizapy;iy. MfNt Fiwe;jgl;r jz;liz toq;f Ntz;LfpNwd;.

¶738

34. Counsel submissions:

¶739

The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, namely,

¶740

Mr.C.S.Pillai, Mr.Thorat V.M., Mr.V.S.Venkatesh and Mr.G.Karnan also reiterated the above mitigating circumstances and pleaded for the lesser sentence.

¶741

34.1.The learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI would

¶742

submit that all the accused committed white collar crimes and hence, they are not entitled to any leniency and the same would amount to misplaced sympathy. Therefore, he seeks to give maximum punishment.

¶743

35. Discussion on question of sentence:

¶744

In view of the above submissions, this Court inclines to do a

¶745

balancing act between two situations ie, sympathy and the administration

¶746

100

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¶748

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶749

of Criminal Justice system in awarding punishment. To come out of the complex problem and to meet out balance between two situations considering the age and illness, this Court also is unable to concur with the argument of the learned Special Public Prosecutor to award maximum punishment on considering the gravity of the offence. To resolve the same, this Court gets guidance from the following observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI , reported in (2009) 11 SCC 737 at page 791

¶750

168. A sentence of punishment in our opinion poses a complex problem which requires a balancing act between the competing views based on the reformative, the deterrent as well as the retributive theories of punishment. Accordingly, a just and proper sentence should neither be too harsh nor too lenient. In judging the adequacy of a sentence, the nature of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, the age and character of the offender, injury to individual or the society, effect of punishment on offender, are some amongst many other factors which should be ordinarily taken into consideration by the courts.

¶751

35.1. This court does not want to show any mercy to these accused which amounts to misplaced sympathy. In the said circumstance, it will be

¶752

101

¶753

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¶754

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶755

unethical to accept the request for minimum sentence and grant minimum sentence of imprisonment and also it is not expedient in the administration criminal justice system. Therefore, this court is not inclined to grant minimum sentence which amounts to showing misplaced sympathy to the “white collar criminals”.

¶756

35.2. His Excellency former president of India Dr.Radhakrishnan, in

¶757

the following words emphasized the requirement of the strenuous action against the white collar crimes:

¶758

“ The practitioners of evil, hoarders, the profiteers, the black marketeers, and speculators are the worst enemy of our society. They have to be dealt with sternly. However well placed important and influential they maybe, if we acquiesce in wrongdoing, people will lose faith in us.

¶759

35.3.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v.

¶760

Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal , reported in (1987) 2 SCC 364 also reiterated

¶761

the said requirement of the strenuous action in the following terms:

¶762

5. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A

¶763

102

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¶765

CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶766

disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.

¶767

35.4. The said requirement also reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme

¶768

Court in the case of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI , reported in (2003) 3 SCC

¶769

641

¶770

“381. ... the need to pierce the facadial smokescreen to unravel the truth to lift the veil so that the apparent, which is not real, can be avoided. The proverbial red herrings are to be ignored, to find out the guilt of the accused.

¶771

382. The cause of the community deserves better treatment at the hands of the court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The community or the State is not a persona non grata whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book.

¶772

383. Unfortunately in the last few years, the country has seen an alarming rise in white-collar crimes which has

¶773

103

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CRL.A(MD).No.81 of 2019

¶776

affected the fibre of the country's economic structure. These cases are nothing but private gain at the cost of the public, and lead to economic disaster.”

¶777

35.5. considering the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme

¶778

Court in the case of Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2024 SCC

¶779

Online SC 984 , and also considering the age, various ailments and other mitigating circumstances, this Court is inclined to take a balanced view

¶780

and award proper sentence between the minimum sentence and maximum sentence and the same is as follows:

¶781

Sl. No	Under Section	Accused No.	Sentence Imprisonment	of	Fine Amount	Default Sentence
1	120-B r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	A1 to A4	2 yearsof Imprisonment	Rigorous	Rs.25,000/- each	3 months of Simple Imprisonment
2	511 r/w 201 of IPC	A3 and A4	1 year of Imprisonment	Rigorous	Rs.5,000/- each	2 months of Simple Imprisonment
3	7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	A1 to A3	2 yearsof Imprisonment	Rigorous	Rs.25,000/- each	3 months of Simple Imprisonment
4	Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988	A1 to A3	2 yearsof Imprisonment	Rigorous	Rs.25,000/- each	3 months of Simple Imprisonment

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104

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Accordingly, this Court imposes the following sentence of imprisonment to the accused:

¶786

(i)The respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein/accused Nos.1 to 4 in C.C.No. 01 of 2007 on the file of the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai dated 06.06.2016 are hereby directed to undergo Two years of Rigorous Imprisonment each and to pay a fine amount of Rs.25,000/(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each with default sentence of three months Simple Imprisonment each for the offence under section 120-B r/w 201 r/w 511 of IPC and 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,.

¶787

(ii) The respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein in C.C.No.01 of 2007 on the file of the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai dated 06.06.2016 are hereby directed to undergo one year of Rigorous Imprisonment each and to pay a fine amount of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five Thousand) each with default sentence of two months Simple Imprisonment each for the offence under section 511 r/w 201 of IPC.

¶788

(iii)The respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein in C.C.No.01 of 2007 on the file of the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai dated 06.06.2016 are hereby directed to undergo two years of Rigorous 105

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¶791

Imprisonment each and to pay a fine amount of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousands Only) each with default sentence of three months Simple Imprisonment each for the offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

¶792

The respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein in C.C.No.01 of 2007 on the file of the II Additional District Court for CBI Cases, Madurai, dated 06.06.2016, are hereby directed to undergo Two years of Rigorous Imprisonment each and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) each with default sentence of three months Simple Imprisonment each for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

¶793

All the substantive sentences of imprisonment are to run concurrently . The period if already undergone by the accused is ordered to be set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C.,

¶794

21.04.2025

¶795

NCC :Yes/No Index :Yes/No Internet :Yes/No sbn

¶796

Note : Issue order copy on 22.04.2025

¶797

106

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